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Abstract 
This thesis explores the state of the law as it affects the protection of minority 
shareholders in private companies in Saudi Arabia and Dubai. This research was 
precipitated by the apparent insufficiency of the law in these two jurisdictions as far as 
minority shareholder protection is concerned. It has been found that the minority 
shareholder's rights and interests are not satisfactorily protected by the company law in 
these two countries. In fact, the law grants majority shareholders an unrestricted control 
over the company that is capable of causing abuses and injustice as far as minority 
shareholders are concerned. Thus, for these two countries to meet domestic demands to 
have effective protection and to match international trends in order to attract foreign 
investment, it is argued that they should develop and improve their company law in this 
respect. 
This research has sought to address the following questions. How should Saudi Arabian 
and Dubai law be reformed in terms of minority shareholder protection? How can the 
UK company law with its long experience and knowledge proffer a way forward for the 
reform of both jurisdictions? What is workable in the context of SA and Dubai if UK 
law is adopted, and what adaptations may be required? In order to answer these 
questions the research has employed doctrinal, theoretical and empirical approaches. 
The products of this research are proposals for wide-ranging reforms to the system for 
minority shareholder protection that exist in SA and Dubai. The research has come up 
with codification of minority shareholder protection that follows in the footsteps of the 
UK statute, but not in every respect. The code has been carefully examined to comply 
with the needs, culture, tradition, conventions and Shari a that exist in both jurisdictions. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Background 
In many parts of the world, religious groups have organized to implement policies 
which influence the manner in which civil society is run. The Middle East, particularly 
the Gulf States, is one of those regions in which religion has a powerful effect in 
regulating the law. The Gulf States consist of six countries - Saudi Arabia, The United 
Arab Emirates (UAE) , Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar - which all share similar 
political legal systems based on the Islamic creed, a joint destiny and common 
objectives.1 In designing their basic laws, these countries have taken their constitutions 
and regulations from Islam. Nevertheless, there are certain aspects of modem life that 
the Islamic or Sharia Law has not covered in detail. This is not to say that Sharia Law 
does not touch all aspects of life, but rather that it sometimes provides only general 
principles. In this situation, it is the role of legislative authorities to formulate 
appropriate law to be put into operation as a viable alternative, as long as it does not 
contradict Sharia Law. Modem commercial law and company law are two of the areas 
of life where Islam and Sharia law have not had a major influence on the principles that 
have been adopted. However, there has been a need for the Gulf States to develop and 
improve their company law, not only to meet the domestic demands to do business, but 
also to match international trends in order to attract foreign investments. 
In accordance with this interest in creating a healthy company law in the region, the 
FrenchiEgyptian model was introduced by each of these jurisdictions as a basis upon 
which to enact corporate legislation2 in order to provide an exhaustive corporate 
framework, functional for all parties (local and international), and in order to enable 
them to do business successfully.3 
1 Only lately two other countries (Iraq and Yemen) have joined the Gulf States group but still have not 
obtained full membership. , 
2 R, Lewis. & C, Mallat., Centre oflslamic & Middle Eastern Law, Commercial Law in the Middle East 
[online]. Available at: <http://www.soas.ac.uk/Centres/Isalmic1aw/Materials.html> accessed 12 February 
2009. 
3 ANON., Companies under the UAE Commercial Company Law [online]. ALTAMIMI & Company, 
Available at: <http://www.tamimi.com/site_l024/pdflComplaw.pdf.> accessed 14 February 2009. 
1 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which attract the bulk of the investment in the Gulf have , 
embarked on reforms to diversify their oil-reliant economies by opening up most of 
their sectors, privatizing public enterprises and expanding their industries. This has 
required the two countries to produce certain regulations to facilitate the arrival of 
foreign investments. 4 According to the Dubai Statistics Centre of the Dubai 
government, foreign investment in 2006 in Dubai alone reached over $11.5 billion and 
this figure even increased in 2007.5 On the other hand, Saudi Arabia attracted $24 
billion of foreign investments in 2007 alone, an increase of 33 per cent compared to 
2006.6 The UAE company law applies the 51149 rule when dealing with foreign 
investors (that is, foreign investors are allowed to have no more than 49 per cent of the 
shares, so they are always in the minority, (this will be explained below in detail)).7 But 
as an alternative way to proceed, foreign investors can establish companies in one of the 
Dubai Special Zones and own more than 50% of them.8 In Saudi Arabia, in contrast, 
foreign investors may own 100 per cent of a company as long as they have complied 
with the requirements of the Foreign Investment Act 2000. 
The main concern of this research is the protection of minority shareholders in private 
companies. Such shareholders can include foreign investors who are forced to be 
minorities in the UAE, or foreigners or nationals who choose to have minority shares in 
either Saudi Arabia or the UAE. These two jurisdictions have a very large market for 
private companies and they attract many foreign and national investors who need to be 
protected. However, it is important to note here that this research will not study the 
UAE as a whole, but will only concern itself with Dubai, which is one state of a 
4 A, Sambidge., Foreign Investment in Gee Rockets [online]. (2008) Arabian Business.com. Available at: 
<http://www.arabianbusiness.coml5 26019-foreign-invesbtment-in-uae-rockets?1n=en> accessed 2 
January 2009. 
5 P, Terblanche., United Arab Emirates: UAE company law overview, Taylor Wessing (Middle East) 
LLP. (27 May 2009), Available at: <http://www.mondaq.comlarticie.asp?articieid=80106> accessed 5 
May 2010. 
6 ANON., Foreign direct investment in Saudi Arabia up 33% [online]. (2008) AME Info. Available at: 
<http://www.ameinfo.coml176732.html> accessed 15 December 2008. 
7 According to Othman (A, Othman., Essential Trade Law. 1st ed. Kuawit University, Kuawit, 1995. pg: 
192) the purpose of granting nationals more shares and control than foreigners is to improve the status of 
nationals and ensure they can be easily held accountable for any liability towards the national economy. 
8 Dubai promotes foreign investment by setting up specialized economic zones in which foreign investors 
are entitled to 100 % ownership and profits with 0% taxes. See: Dubai Technology and Media Free Zone 
Private Companies Regulations 2003. 
2 
federation of seven emirates (states).9 Dubai has been chosen for this study from among 
the other states in the UAE for many reasons including its ability to attract foreign 
investment, the fact that it is developing quickly and, to a certain extent, because of the 
availability of reliable materials. So whenever the UAE is mentioned in this research, 
reference is made, primarily, to Dubai. 
1.2 Overview of minority shareholdings 
Prior to focusing on the current doctrine in the two countries, it will be helpful to give a 
very brief overview of minority shareholdings. Shareholders, in private companies, who 
do not control the affairs of the company by voting, alone or in coalition with others, are 
to be regarded as minority shareholders. Obviously, the more shares a person or a 
company holds, the more influence that person or company may have. If the majority 
of shares are held by one particular shareholder then he/she can have substantial control. 
This influence or power can be wielded to pass decisions in general meetings or at the 
meetings of the board of directors as each of these bodies generally makes their 
decisions by majority vote. lO The practical concern here is that the majority 
shareholders, who control the company with their voting power, can cause harm to the 
company and prevent it from taking any action to remedy the harm done. 1 1 If a 
company suffers any kind of wrong, because it is a separate legal entity from its 
incorporators (majority and minority shareholders), it is only the company that should 
and can take legal action in order to redress the wrong. Unfortunately for the minority 
shareholder, if the wrong is committed by the directors and is one that is capable of 
being approved or ratified by the majority of the shareholders, then no individual 
minority shareholder can remedy the wrong as the company's will is, in most cases, 
exercised by the majority shareholder in a form of decision-making at general 
• 12 
meetmgs. 
9 Dubai is one state of a federation of seven emirates (states), the United Arab Emirates, in which each 
state is governed by a separate federal authority and slightly different laws. In this research, the focus will 
be solely on Dubai and its federal commercial company law of 1984. 
10 A, Hicks. & S, Goo., Cases and Materials on Company Law. 6th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008,pg:429. 
II S, Mayson. D, French. & C, Ryan., Company Law. 24th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007-
2008, pg: 515. 
12 A, Reisberg., Derivative actions and corporate governance: theory and operation. 1 st ed. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007, pg: 76-77. 
3 
It is also possible for the majority shareholder to act unfairly towards or oppress the 
minority shareholder. This unfairness or oppression is related to running the company in 
a way which has clearly unfair consequences for the minority shareholder. The primary 
concern of the law in providing actions against majority shareholders who act unfairly is 
not to protect the company from any wrongdoing but rather to protect the minority 
shareholder's interests. To pursue this type of protection, the court may pay regard to 
the equitable consideration of "legitimate expectation" and the loss of trust or 
confidence between shareholders as a basis to litigate. Therefore, it is clear that the law 
should always provide relief in respect of both wrongdoings against the company itself 
and any improper or illegal act that is unfair and oppressive to the minority 
shareholder. 13 
1.3 Where does the problem lie? What remedies are in place to protect 
minority shareholders? 
The commercial market in the Gulf States has attracted many international investors to 
do business in this region. A recent survey ranked Saudi Arabia and the UAE as being 
the best locations in the Arab world for conducting business and Saudi Arabia is 
positioned in the top twenty countries in the world in this respect. I4 The survey 
measured a range of factors including ease of starting a business, how simple it is to 
obtain credit, how cross-border trade operates and the level of minority investor 
protection. IS Kjaer has recently shown that there is a focus on smarter regulation in 
these countries as the whole business model is based on attracting foreign investment. 
On the other hand, foreign investors are also attracted to the region because of its high 
liquidity and oil revenues which lead to fast business development. 16 
I3 A, Hicks. & S, Goo., Cases and Materials on Company Law. 6th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008, pg: 451. 
14 According to the recent study (2008) available at: 
<http://www.thenatinal.ae/artic1eI20081110IBUSINESS/555050371111 18/rss>, Saudi Arabia ranked as 
the number one country in the Arab world and 16th overall whilst the UAE ranked second in the Arab 
world and 46th overall. 
15 A, Foxwell., UAE Climbs in world Ease of Business Ranldngs. The National. (2008), Available at: 
<http://www.thenatinal.ae/artic1e/20081110IBUSINESS/555050371/1 118/rss> accessed 15 January 2009. 
16 Jesper Kjaer, the general manger of the private enterprise partnership for MENA at the International 
Finance Corporation. See: <http://www.thenatinal.ae/artic1eI20081110IBUSINESS/555050371/1118/rss. 
4 
Therefore, one might think that these two countries, in particular, would have 
comprehensive, functional, practical and convenient company law systems which 
accommodate all parties by protecting their rights and interests. However, this is far 
from the reality. Although there have been changes in company law in Saudi Arabia and 
Dubai, as far as minority shareholder protection goes, they seem to be insufficient. I7 
The fact is that the company law currently in place does not provide full protection for 
minority shareholders. 
It is true that the law in the two countries under investigation has granted the minority 
shareholder the right to complain to the majority shareholder (not the board) over any 
wrongdoing that they believe is occurring. I8 However, it is important to note that the 
same section restricts the minority so that they can only raise complaints prior to the 
completion of the conduct or act complained of. If the conduct or act has been 
completed, then the minority shareholder has no right to complain to the majority 
shareholder in order to have the conduct reviewed. Moreover, if the majority 
shareholder ratifies the conduct after it has taken place, then there is little that the 
minority shareholder can do and the court in most cases agrees with the majority 
shareholder, preferring not to interfere in the company's internal affairs. Even if it 
appears that a director is clearly misusing hislher position, only the majority shareholder 
has the right to question the director, hold him/her accountable and/or dismiss 
himlher. 19 
Consequently, the minority shareholder's rights and interests do not appear to be 
sufficiently protected by the company law in these two countries, as their company 
statutes tend to grant unrestricted control to the majority shareholder over the 
company's interests and do not clearly allow the minority shareholder to bring any 
action on behalf of the company against the directors or the majority shareholders. 
Therefore, it is left to shareholder agreements to provide for the rights and interests of 
minority shareholders, since the statute does not offer adequate protection. 
17 A, Naciri., Corporate Governance Around the World. 1 st ed. Routledge, London, 2008, pg: 357. 
18 s28 of the Saudi Company Law 1965. Section 39 of the UAE Commercial and Companies Law 1984 
has a similar provision. 
19 s33 (1)&(2) of the Saudi Company Law 1965. 
5 
Company law in Saudi Arabia and Dubai leaves it open to shareholders to state 
whatever they wish in the shareholder agreement.20 This agreement, which is equivalent 
to the "articles of association" in the UK, must be filed with the General Company 
Authority for registration and disclosure. 21 The agreement allows the shareholders to 
protect themselves by focusing on certain areas of dispute that are likely to arise if a 
well-drafted agreement is not in place.22 It can also provide a mechanism for an exit 
procedure that can be called upon where amicable agreement cannot be reached, and 
this has the effect of enabling a minority shareholder to exit the company with minimal 
disruption. Furthermore, an express term can be included in the agreement to avoid any 
dispute regarding the removal of minority shareholders or termination of their 
directorships?3 Nonetheless, it is important to highlight the fact that, according to Saudi 
Arabian company law,24 and also that applicable in Dubai, the shareholders are allowed 
to state whatever they wish as long as it does not contradict the statute. 
1.4 The main research issue 
The failure to provide any protection for minority shareholders in company law statutes 
emanates from a limited recognition of the rights and interests which are attached to 
each share in the first place. To comprehend the legal nature of a share from a UK 
perspective, Farwell J, in Borland's Trustee v Steel, explains that " ... a share is not a 
sum of money ... but is an interest measured by a sum of money and made up of the 
various rights,,?5 On this basis, there are certain rights attached to ordinary shares once 
acquired, such as the rights to capital, voting, dividends and other rights?6 These need 
to be provided for by the statute, and minority shareholders must have some protection 
concerning these rights and interests 
20 s27 of the Saudi Company Law 1965. As long as it does not contradict Sharia law or the statute. 
21 s21 of the Saudi Company Law 1965. It is important to note that this section does not require the 
constitution or article of association to be sent alongside the shareholder agreement, as in UK and US law. 
However, the section requires shareholders to clarify certain clauses in the contract. 
22 H, Hamd Allah., Saudi Commercial law. 1 st ed. ANNAHDAH, Cairo, 2003, pg: 259. 
23 R, Cooper., How Do You Protect Your Shareholding? Rtcoopers. (2005), Available at: 
<http://www.rtcoopers.com!pdflbenefit_oCa_well_dfrafterd _shareholders _agreement.pdf.> accessed 18 
October 2008. 
24 Sections 24 - 34 of the SA Company Law 1965. 
25 [1901] 1 Ch 279, 288. This description was also cited with approval in IRC v Crossman [1937] AC 26, 
HL. 
26 E, Ferran., Company Law and Corporate Finance. 1st ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pg: 
337. 
6 
The problem starts when shares are placed in the hands of those who control more than 
half of the votes at a members' meeting. Minority members must, in principle, accept 
the decisions of the majority shareholder and must also acknowledge that the power is 
lawfully enjoyed by shareholders who hold a greater number of shares. It can be argued 
that once the minority shareholder simply disagrees with, or is faced with any abuse or 
misuse by those in control, he/she should sell hislher shares and invest elsewhere. 
Indeed, this is usually what happens in publicly listed companies as the exit option is 
always open for the disgruntled minority, meaning he/she can sell the shares on the 
market.27 On the contrary, in private companies, which are the concern of this research, 
there will almost always be no ready market for hislher shares, as the only available 
buyer may be the majority shareholder who is likely to offer a discounted price.28 In 
such circumstances, the minority shareholder may tum to the law for help. Clearly, the 
law must decide if an abuse of power has occurred and provide remedies to meet those 
cases in which the power has been abused. 
The main issue here emerges from the tension that exists between the need to empower 
the majority shareholder to run the company and the fundamental necessity to provide 
remedies for minority shareholders so they can protect their rights and interests. 
Although not easy, one would think that it is not an impossible task for Saudi Arabia 
and Dubai to make provision in their company to uphold the right to pursue litigation 
against directors/majority shareholders who are acting improperly and, at the same time, 
ensure that they do not allow every litigious minority shareholder to make nonsense 
claims.29 In fact, UK company law recognized this tension of interests within companies 
I · 30 a ong tIme ago. 
This research will argue that the idea that the majority shareholder's interests are the 
only ones that should be protected within the company should not be embraced.31 It will 
27 It is admitted, as outlined in Chapter 3, that the SA and Dubai company laws address the minority 
shareholder protection within public companies in an effective manner. 
28 L, Sealy. & S, Worthington., Cases and Materials in Company Law. 8th ed. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008, pg: 500. 
29 E, Ferran., Company Law and Corporate Finance. 1st ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pg: 
337. 
30 UK law had realized these different interests in companies since the case Foss v Harbottle [1843] 2 
Hara 461, over 160 years ago, clearly before the concept of corporate governance was born. 
31 This is the case with both the SA and UAE models as their company laws state indirectly that propriety 
should be granted to the majority's interests. This is also touched upon in s28 and s33 (1) & (2) of the 
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also argue that the VIew that the minority shareholders should not be granted any 
remedial devices because they may not use them in good faith when acting on behalf of 
the company is flawed. 32 These arguments and others will be addressed by 
demonstrating the need to reform Saudi and Dubai company law in order to produce 
efficient protection for the minority shareholder. Finally, it is claimed that the reforms 
suggested by this research will create a practical commercial environment which will 
benefit each party equally and protect the corporate and personal interests. 
1.5 Research questions and aims 
It is believed that Saudi Arabian and Dubai company law does not offer adequate 
statutory protection for minority shareholders in private companies. Although the 
shareholder agreement can provide, to a certain extent, some protection for minority 
shareholders, there must be some protection reserved in the statute for the minority 
shareholder, so, for instance, if disputes arise post-execution of the shareholder 
agreement, possible relief remains available. Minority shareholder protection, as a right, 
must not be subject to the will of the majority shareholder or the terms of the 
shareholder agreement alone. This latter point relies on the recognized fact that 
contracts are incomplete and therefore cannot provide sufficient protection for the 
minority shareholder and, accordingly, cannot be the sole source of protection. 
This research seeks to answer a number of critical questions. First, do existing minority 
shareholders in Saudi Arabia and Dubai experience any type of abuse of power or 
oppression by the controlling majority shareholders, which therefore necessitates some 
form of protection? And is the abuse a real problem? Second, is there any actual 
acknowledgment by both countries' laws and courts of the risks and problems attached 
to granting the majority shareholder supreme power over a company? Third, does the 
law or do the courts furnish any legal mechanism for the oppressed minority 
Saudi Company Law 1965 which says that the minority can only complain to the majority if wrongdoing 
has taken place and then it is up to the majority to deal with it. This has granted the majority the full 
capacity to cover up any wrongdoing towards the minority or even the company knowing that no 
litigation can be brought. 
32 In (A, Reisberg., Judicial Control of Derivative Actions, International Company and Law Review. 
2005, 16(8), pg: 337&338) the author revealed that there are some who believe that no automatic right 
should be given to the minority to bring an action on behalf of the company because of a fear that this 
right can be abused with no good faith. 
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shareholder to remedy any wrongdoing or unfairness? Fourth, are there justifiably 
convincing reasons to pursue reform for minority shareholders in both countries? 
Further, how, if at all, can UK company law, with its long commercial experience and 
knowledge, provide a [theoretical] way forward for the reform of both Saudi Arabia and 
Dubai's laws? Can UK minority protection laws be adopted for effective use in both 
countries? If so, to what extent might they have to be adapted? Finally, how should 
Saudi Arabia and Dubai law be reformed? 
A significant aim of this research is to ascertain the present position of minority 
shareholders in both Saudi Arabia and Dubai. Another aim is to identify whether there 
is any insufficiency or breakdown in the legal and judicial system of either jurisdiction 
when it comes to minority protection. More importantly, the research aims to propose 
and recommend a practical system of minority shareholder protection that avoids all 
identified disadvantages and defects and facilitates the provision of an efficient and 
healthy commercial environment that provides a basis for the equal contentment of all 
shareholders. 
1.6 The reason for addressing this subject matter 
The principal motives behind the adoption of this subject matter are as follows: firstly, 
Saudi and Dubai company laws have not, up until this time, been satisfactorily 
discussed by researchers. Secondly, both countries have attracted many foreign 
companies and international investors to participate in their businesses without, at the 
same time, providing efficient protection for those who are minority shareholders in 
private companies. Thirdly, UK company law has been dealing with the issue of 
minority shareholders for many years and it is worthwhile considering how Saudi 
Arabia and Dubai can both learn from its experience and avoid its mistakes. Finally, 
company law in Saudi Arabia and Dubai is not well-developed and there is no case law 
in the legal systems of these countries to fill the gaps. Therefore, there is strong 
justification for proposing a statutory reform.33 
33 However, it should be understood that, although these countries have no common law, Islamic general 
principles have a role to play which is similar to that of common law. See: H, Hamd Allah., Saudi 
Commercia/law. 151 ed. ANNAHDAH, Cairo, 2003, pg: 23. 
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In addition to the reasons highlighted above, there is a clear intention from the law-
makers in both Saudi Arabia and Dubai to reform their company law, especially in 
respect of minority shareholder protection. This intention was recently observed when 
the law-makers responded to the urgent need to activate a statutory device for minority 
shareholders in public companies (not applicable to private companies). This device, 
which is similar to the derivative action process in the UK and elsewhere, has been 
called 'liability action'. 34 It enables a minority shareholder to bring an action against the 
company's directors, where they have breached duties etc, on behalf of the public 
company if the company fails to do so. In Saudi Arabia and Dubai, this action must be 
commenced in the minority shareholder's name and not in that of the company. But, 
because this action is limited to public companies, it does not assist the minority 
shareholders in private companies who are the subject of this thesis. As a result, this 
research will seek to formulate a practical and actionable mechanism which can be 
employed by the minority in private companies.35 
1. 7 Methodology 
It is crucial to note that both countries, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, not being common 
law jurisdictions, have no case law that can be referred to for guidance on future cases 
and to provide reasons why judges reach particular decisions.36 In this respect, they are 
unlike the UK, where case law has a very significant role to play. Therefore, this 
research, when covering Saudi Arabia and the UAE, will rely, in the main, on the study 
of the statutory company law, new regulations, legal texts and academic literature. This 
doctrinal approach will be employed as one of two main methods. 
The second method is an empirical approach which will involve face-to-face semI-
structured interviews with businesspersons, minority shareholders, majority 
34 This action has an origin in the Saudi Company Law 1965 under s78. The law-makers have not created 
a new device as such but have added certain duties and obligations for the directors to comply with and 
designed a simpler mechanism and a more straightforward procedure for the minority to exercise the 
action. For more information see: 
<http://ksb.com.sa/j/index.php?option=com _ content&task=view&id=9 5&Itemid= 102>. 
35 Minority protection in UK company law has been in existence since Foss v Harbottle [1843] 2 Hara 
461 and been left in place for over 160 years, going through several reforms and developments under 
common law and the statute until it was most recently shaped under the Companies Act 2006. 
36 However, as is proved in Chapter 3 section 3.3, Sharia law, to a great extent, fills the gaps and works in 
a similar way to UK common law. 
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shareholders, regulators, judges, lawyers and academic researchers. The deficiency of 
case law and, accordingly, case comment, together with a lack of relevant research in 
the field, necessitates this approach. But also importantly, this work will help to assess 
what is actually occurring in the commercial world, by reflecting the reactions of people 
who are directly involved in companies and their practices. This will hopefully help to 
build a clearer picture which, in tum, will facilitate finding a way forward towards 
appropriate reform. The collected data will be subject to qualitative analysis based on a 
coding system which divides participants into categories in order to expose each 
group's opinions, views and perspectives. 
1.8 The proposed structure for this research 
Chapter 2 addresses the issue of why minority protection is needed. This will involve 
consideration of the theories and arguments that underpin this area of the law. The 
chapters following Chapter 2 then discuss the research which is divided into three main 
stages: 
The first stage involves an examination of the present position in Saudi Arabia and 
Dubai as far as minority shareholder protection is concerned. This will include 
identifying the weaknesses, defects, problems and inefficient aspects of the law in the 
two countries. In other words, this stage will ascertain what really needs to be reformed 
in the statute and will also demonstrate the failure of the statute to build an effective 
statutory footing to protect the minority shareholder. It will illustrate how minority 
shareholders, despite having considerable motive to invest, do not trust the minority 
shareholder protection that exists at present, as no rights and interests of minorities are 
formally acknowledged in statutes. 
The second stage studies in depth how UK company law deals with minority 
shareholder protection. However, this stage will not just study the law in this respect, 
but also observe, examine and analyse the developments and processes which have 
brought the law to its current position in providing effective statutory protection for 
minority shareholders. It is important to note that various remedies offered under UK 
law for minority shareholders had their origin under common law and have been 
reformed under the company law statute. So UK company law has not given, under the 
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statute, minority protection new enforcement mechanisms but minority rights and 
interests were already recognized in common law. Recently, however, since the 
Companies Act 2006 fully came into operation, there has been even more recognition of 
the need to protect the minority shareholder's rights and interests. 
The third and final stage will demonstrate how Saudi Arabia and Dubai should 
recognize and protect minority shareholder's interests and rights. In addition, this stage 
will indicate which statutory provisions existing in the UK minority shareholder laws 
can be adopted by Saudi Arabia and Dubai and to what extent they need adaptation. 
The introductory chapter of this thesis, above, has dealt with the agenda, objectives and 
methodology of the research. In beginning to outline the content of the remaining 
chapters, the second, as mentioned earlier, discusses minority shareholder protection in 
general and addresses the question of why there is a necessity to protect the minority 
shareholder. This chapter in particular shows how the majority shareholder can have the 
ultimate power and authority to abuse the company and the minority shareholder, if 
there is no efficient protection in place. It will also illustrate the various justifications 
for the need to adopt effective, efficient, practical and actionable protection for minority 
shareholders. 
Chapter Three's main concern is to examine the situation in Saudi Arabia and Dubai in 
terms of minority shareholder protection, with a greater emphasis on the former. This 
part of the research will set out what is the current doctrinal position of Saudi Arabia 
and Dubai company law in regard to minority shareholder protection. Also included in 
the chapter is a consideration of the relevance of Sharia law and, finally, there will be 
some discussion of the new Saudi Arabia and Dubai Company Law Bills in order to see 
what fresh features they include on this issue, if any. 
Chapter Four offers a detailed analysis of an empirical study that was carried out in 
Saudi Arabia to look into how minority shareholder protection truly works in the 
marketplace. This chapter will contain evaluation and reflection of this empirical study 
in order to judge the issue of minority shareholder protection in Saudi Arabia. 
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Chapter Five of the thesis is concerned with the UK context and how its laws and 
processes play a statutory role in protecting minority shareholders. This chapter will 
outline the protection offered to minority shareholders under common law, i.e. the 
statute prior to 2006, and how difficult and complex the law was then. It will also 
explain the results of investigations and reviews carried out with the aim of reforming 
the old law, as reflected in the Companies Act 2006. The reason for exploring UK law 
is to assess whether jurisdictions like Saudi Arabia and Dubai can learn and derive 
benefits from its long experience of addressing minority shareholder protection (over 
160 years so far), which has made the UK system a leading model in this respect. 
Chapter Six investigates the possibility of Saudi Arabia and Dubai borrowing and 
adopting certain devices from those workable, practical and actionable remedies which 
exist under UK law. This chapter will address each current problem in Saudi Arabia and 
Dubai, to discover what may be workable in their particular contexts if adopted, and 
what kind of adaptations may be required. 
Chapter Seven draws conclusions and makes comments relevant to any future study that 
is required. 
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Chapter 2 
Why protect minority shareholders? 
Introduction 
As trade barriers continue to collapse, it will become progressively easier for investors 
from one country to invest in companies in another. The competition for investment will 
not only be at the domestic level, but countries will also build structures that serve 
different interests in order to attract sophisticated investors from abroad. A crucial factor 
influencing the attractiveness of a particular jurisdiction will be its system for protecting 
shareholders.37 A good system will assure foreign and domestic investors that the 
company is managed by trustworthy, honest and effective managers and that all 
shareholders are treated fairly and equally. More importantly, a proper system for 
protecting the rights and interests of shareholders, particularly those of minority 
shareholders, must be in place.38 The primary purpose of such a protection system is to 
establish a mechanism for ensuring that majority shareholders do not abuse their 
corporate powers and that minority shareholders always have a means to obtain some 
kind of remedy where it is warranted. 39 
Many legal researchers have discussed the issue of minority shareholder protection as 
part of various practical approaches in the context of exit options, court interference etc. 
However, few in the UK, and almost none in Saudi Arabia and Dubai, have paid 
attention to the theoretical and philosophical justifications behind the necessity to 
protect the minority shareholder. This chapter, in response, will provide a clear picture 
of how the minority shareholder is generally treated by the majority shareholder and 
how the minority shareholder may suffer if no effective safeguards are in place. The 
chapter is divided into six sections, each split into further sub-sections. The first section 
will highlight the majority shareholder's power as opposed to the weak and limited 
37 B, Cheffins., Minority shareholders and corporate governance, Company Lawyer. 2000, 21 (2), pg: 41. 
38 L, Miles. & M, He., Protecting the rights and interest of minority shareholders in listed companies in 
China: challenges for the future, International Company and Commercial Law Review. 2005, 16(7), pg: 
275. . , th . 
39 A, Boyle. J, Birds. & Others., Boyle & Bzrds Company Law. 6 ed. Jordans, Bnstol, 2007. pg: 381. 
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position of the minority shareholder in private companies. The second will refute the 
criticism which is against the principle of minority shareholder protection systems and 
refute the belief that they are not necessary, while the third section will go on to present 
tangible justifications for providing minority shareholder protection. The fourth section 
aims to show how an understanding of the rights and interests of minority shareholders 
makes it easier to protect them and will also explain the court's role in dealing with 
minority shareholders' cases. The fifth section is divided into three sub-sections: The 
first demonstrates the impact of corporate governance on minority shareholder 
protection; the second discusses how the law can provide grounds for the minority 
shareholder to establish cases; and the third part proposes a list of factors which should 
be taken into account when seeking to formulate effective and efficient protection for 
minority shareholders. The sixth and final section is the conclusion. 
2.1 The weak position of the minority shareholder 
To understand how majority shareholders may indulge in some abuse or misuse of their 
power, it is important to visualize how a company or a minority shareholder might be 
treated by the majority shareholders who would seem to have supremacy. Majority 
shareholders, in this sense, can flex their muscles to exclusively benefit themselves 
without regard for the interests and rights of others, namely the minority shareholders. 
So the main concern of this section is to clearly deliver the idea that, if the powerful and 
authoritative control of the majority shareholder is left without restriction, the minority 
shareholder may suffer. Several possible scenarios will be explored and the different 
types of misuse and unfairness which the majority shareholder may be involved in will 
be shown. 
It is appropriate to begin this section by specifying exactly what a private company, or 
close corporation, is. Moll attempts to define it as an enterprise in which an intimate or 
even an intense relationship exists between capital and labour. He also indicates that 
private company investors are often linked by family or other personal relationships 
which ensure a certain level of familiarity among participants.4o Consequently, this 
definition may suggest that everything will progress smoothly and efficiently between 
40 D, Moll., Shareholder Oppression & 'Fair Value': Of Discounts, Dates, and Dastardly Deeds in the 
Close Corporation. Duke Law Journal. 2004, 54(2), pg: 6. 
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shareholders as long as the personal relationship is there to secure the company's 
existence. One would assume that because shareholders have strong relationships within 
the company, the directors will be forced to look after all shareholders' interests , 
otherwise they may face dismissa1.41 
However, this assumption is far from the reality when it comes to the structural 
workings of private companies. This is because, once the voting procedure is applied, 
corporate democracy will award the majority ultimate power over the affairs of the 
company.42 In effect, the democratic principle of majority rule means that substantial 
power is placed in the hands of those who control more than half of the votes on the 
board and/or at the members' meetings. On the other hand, the minority shareholders 
must, in principle, accept the decisions of the majority shareholder and must also 
acknowledge, as a fact of business life, that the power is lawfully enjoyed by those 
holding more shares.43 It is understood that a minority shareholder's individual vote is 
unlikely to carry sufficient weight to influence decisions and accordingly is unable, by 
itself, to block certain decisions and actions.44 This is due to the fact that, for an ordinary 
resolution to be passed, only a simple majority of 50% of the vote is required, whereas a 
special or extraordinary resolution requires something greater - perhaps, as in the UK, a 
majority of 75%. Therefore, all ordinary resolutions will be controlled by the majority 
shareholders who may also control special or extraordinary resolutions if they hold 75% 
or more of the shares within the company. Thus, individual minority shareholders are 
too powerless to impose their will, unless a controlling shareholder who has a high 
proportion of the shares, but less than 50% overall, and the minority shareholders can 
together formulate a coalition of shareholders.45 
As a consequence of these facts, directors (where they are not the majority shareholders) 
are expected to fear the majority more than the minority shareholders, as the only votes 
that count to create an ordinary resolution for, say, the removal of a director, are 
41 A, Boyle. J, Birds. & Others., Boyle & Birds' Company Law. 6th ed. Jordans, Bristol, 2007, pg: 384. 
42 J, Abugu., A comparative analysis of the extent of judicial discretion in minority shareholder protection 
litigation: the United Kingdom and Untied States, International Company and Commercial Law Review. 
2007, 18(5), pg: 181. 
43 A, Hicks. & S, Goo., Cases and Materials on Company Law. 6th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008, pg: 425. 
44 A, Boyle. J, Birds. & Others., Boyle & Birds' Company Law. 6th ed. Jordans, Bristol, 2007. pg: 385. 
45 A, Keay., Company directors behaving poorly: disciplinary option for shareholders, Journal of Business 
Law. 2007, Sep, pg 664. 
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effectively in the hands of the majority shareholder.46 In return, the directors appreciate 
the value of being in charge and tend to strive to keep the majority shareholder satisfied. 
An example of this is seen in Australian law,47 where a company may remove a director 
before the expiration of hislher term of appointment if an ordinary resolution is passed 
by the majority of shareholders. In the Australian case of National Roads and 
Motorists' Association Ltd v Scandrett48 an ordinary resolution was passed by the 
majority shareholder to dismiss directors of the company and the minority shareholder 
was powerless to block the resolution. The debate in this case was over whether more 
than one director could validly be removed by a single resolution, and the court 
concluded that indeed the majority shareholder had the power to do this. 
Kim, Chatjuthamard and Nofsinger have argued that if the majority shareholders alone 
have the power to appoint and remove directors, they will appoint directors that are 
aligned to their way of thinking, in order to facilitate any mistreatment or unfairness 
they want to perpetrate.49 Moreover, Ceasari has noted that conflicts of interest may 
separate the majority shareholders and directors from the minority shareholders. Since 
the directors are monitored by the majority shareholder, the majority shareholder can 
divert resources from the company to pursue private interests with the help and support 
of the directors, and at the expense of the minority shareholder. 50 Therefore, it is 
certainly possible for the majority shareholder to impose hislher will on the corporation, 
and pressure the directors into a state of submission and timid compliance by coercion, 
in order to seize every opportunity to abuse hislher position and steal value or 
. fr h 51 OppOrtunIty om t e company. 
Since the majority shareholders have the lawful power to control and are, in most cases, 
the directors in private companies, minority shareholders may find their interests and 
46 As Schlimm and others have mentioned, (D, Schlimm. L, Mezzetti & B, Sharfman., Corporate 
Governance and the Impact of Controlling Shareholder, Corporate Governance Advisor. 2010, 18(1), pg: 
3) a majority shareholder has the ultimate power to dominate the board through his direct voting power 
and also by threatening removal of the directors. 
47 Australian Corporation Act 2001, s34(3). 
48 [2002] NSWSC 1123, (2002) 43 ACSR 40. 
49 K, Kim. J, Nofsinger & P, Kitsabunnarat-Chatjuthamard., Large Shareholders, Board Independence, 
and Minority Shareholder Rights: Evidence from Europe, Journal o/Corporate Finance. 2007, 13(5), pg: 
861. 
50 A, Cesari., Expropriation of Minority Shareholders and Payout Policy. (May 12, 2009), Available at: 
<http://ssrn.com!abstract=1403202>accessed27July2009,pg: 6. 
51 D, Schlimm. L, Mezzetti & B, Sharfman., Corporate Governance and the Impact of Controlling 
Shareholder, Corporate Governance Advisor. 2010, 18(1), pg: 12. 
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rights hanned by those who can override their interests via lawful democratic decisions 
taken at either board or general meetings. On this point, Lord Davey in the English case 
of Burland v Earle52 observed that this type of abuse of power occurs when "the 
majority shareholders are endeavoring directly or indirectly to appropriate to themselves 
money, property or advantages which belong to the company or in which other 
shareholders are entitled to participate". What is most worrying is that majority 
shareholders may simply view the company as a mere extension of their own interests. 53 
The abuse of power can even go further to the point where the majority shareholder 
expropriates the minority shareholders' interests and rights. Expropriation can take a 
variety of fonns, such as stealing the profits, selling the assets, or selling additional 
shares in the company to another company they own at below market prices, or they 
may divert corporate opportunities to another company which they control or in which 
they have substantial interests. In sum, expropriation can mean that the majority 
shareholders use their power for their own gain rather than returning money to the 
company in a way which directly or indirectly benefits all shareholders. 54 
It should be understood that the more power the majority shareholder has within the 
company, the weaker the minority shareholder will be, and the more he/she will remain 
limited and immobilized. The minority shareholder can find himlherself totally 
powerless when, for instance, the majority shareholders manipulate the accounting 
reports of the company's perfonnance in an attempt to hide their 'private control 
benefits,.55 In such instances, the majority shareholder can make reported profits appear 
less than the actual profits so that they can distribute a smaller amount of those sums. 
When this happens, the minority shareholder's ability to access infonnation may be 
denied or hislher involvement in the company's management may be undennined, 
52 [1902] AC 83, at 93. See also a classic example of abuse of power in the case Rolled Steel Products Ltd 
v British Steel Corporation [1985] 2 WLR 908(CA). 
53 L, Miles. & M, He., Protecting the rights and interest of minority shareholders in listed companies in 
China: challenges for the future, International Company and Commercial Law Review. 2005, 16(7), pg: 
276. 
54 R, La Porta & Others., Investor protection and corporate governance, Journal of Financial Economics. 
2000,58(1-2), pg: 873. 
55 The meaning of such a term in this respect is that the majority use their control over the company's 
recourses to benefit themselves at the expense of the minority. See: C, Leuz. D, Nanda. & P, Wysocki., 
Earnings Management and Investor Protection: An International Comparison, Journal of Financial 
Economics. 2002, September, pg: 2. 
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especially when the financial reports inaccurately reflect the company's performance.56 
Thus, the majority shareholder's authority is far stronger than that of the minority 
shareholder who, in most cases, has little or no control. The following few points will 
elaborate on how the majority shareholder's power can cause harm to the minority 
shareholder's personal interests and expectations as well as the company's interests. The 
purpose of this is to show the different types of wrong, misconduct, abuse and 
unfairness the majority shareholder may perpetrate if no efficient minority shareholder 
protection is in place. 
a. Majority oppression or unfair prejudice of a minority shareholder (personal 
interests) 
(i) Generally 
There are a number of ways in which majority shareholders can take advantage of their 
position in order to serve their own individual interests. The oppression of the minority 
shareholder is one such way. This oppression or unfair prejudice relates to running the 
company in such a way that has consequences which are clearly unfair for the minority 
shareholder himlherself rather than for the company. 57 So, if the conduct was 
challenged, the minority shareholder here would not be pursuing a wrong that has been 
committed against the company, but rather would be protecting hislher own personal 
rights and interests. In this situation, the minority shareholder litigates against the 
majority shareholder to remedy the unfair conduct. This type of misconduct has been 
recognised and defined by certain jurisdictions and denied by others. 58 
UK company law has recognised this type of unfair action since 1948 under the old term 
"oppression",59 which was replaced in a later statute (Companies Act 1980) by ''unfair 
prejudice". With the use of this new term, a minority shareholder may bring an action 
"if the company's affairs have been conducted in a manner which is unfairly prejudicial 
56 C, Leuz. D, Nanda. & P, Wysocki., Earnings Management and Investor Protection: An International 
Comparison, Journal of Financial Economics. 2002, September, pg: 2. 
57 A, Boyle. J, Birds. & Others., Boyle & Birds' Company Law. 6th ed. Jordans, Bristol, 2007, pg: 695. 
58 As will become clear in Chapters 3 & 4, SA and Dubai have not clearly stated a ground or a device that 
covers the function of the unfair prejudice ground. 
59 The UK Companies Act 1948, s21 O. 
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to members' interests",60 or, as clearly established by the House of Lords in 0 'Neill v 
Phillips,61 a shareholder will be entitled to complain if: 
" ... some breach of the terms on which the member agreed that the affairs of the company should 
be conducted; or some use of the rules in a manner which equity would regard as contrary to 
good faith i.e. cases in which equitable considerations make it unfair for those conducting the 
affairs of the company to rely upon their strict legal powers".62 
An American court, on the other hand, defined oppression or unfair conduct as, 
"burdensome, harsh and wrongful conduct ... a visible departure from the standards of fair 
dealing and violation of fair play on which every shareholder who entrusts his money to a 
corporation is entitled to rely" .63 
To exemplify how this type of unfair act can be dealt with, the court in the English case 
of Re Sam Weller & Sons Lttf4 considered that the failure to pay proper dividends to 
shareholders, over a long period without explanation, was an unfairly prejudicial act and 
accordingly the minority shareholder was successful in a claim for relief. However, in 
cases such as this, the minority shareholder must prove hislher allegation with 
supporting evidence, otherwise the claim may fail. Indeed, this was what happened in 
the American case of Pinnacle Data Services, Inc v Gillen,65 where a lack of evidence 
defeated the minority shareholder, who had alleged that the majority shareholder had 
engaged in oppression by withholding profit distribution, terminating employment and 
paying for individual legal fees with corporate funds. On the other hand, the minority 
shareholder was successful in proving the claim in the American case Patton v 
Nicholai6 where it was alleged that the majority shareholder had refused to declare a 
dividend. The court found that the majority shareholder indeed had wrongfully 
controlled the board so as to prevent the declaration of dividends, and also found that 
the majority shareholder did this for the sole purpose of preventing the minority 
shareholder from sharing in the profits. The court ordered a mandatory injunction 
requiring the majority shareholder to pay reasonable dividends at the earliest practical 
date, as well as in future years. 
60 The UK Companies Act 2006, s994. 
61 [1999] 2 B.C.L.C.l pg: 8. 
62 O'Neill v Phillips [1999] 2 B.C.L.C.l pg: 8. 
63 Fix v Fix Material Co., 538 S. W.2d 351, 358 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976), and Shierka v. Skierka Bros., Inc., 
629 P.2d 214, 221 (Mont. 1981). 
64 [1989] 3 W.L.R 923. 
65 104 S.W.3d 188, 191-92 (Tex. App. - Texarkana 2003, no pet). 
66 279 S.W.2d 848 (Tex. 1955) 
20 
So, the majority shareholder's conduct, which can take a variety of forms, may result in 
unfairness and oppression if it violates the minority shareholder's interests and rights. 
Another example can be seen in cases where the majority shareholder dismisses the 
minority shareholder from management. In this type of instance, the minority 
shareholder will be left with two options, namely to either hold on to hislher shares 
which may pay no dividends, or to sell them for whatever the majority shareholder is 
willing to offer. 67 To be more precise, such actions, which oppress the minority 
shareholder, are often referred to as "freeze out" techniques. Common freeze out 
techniques include the refusal to declare dividends, the termination of a minority 
shareholder's employment and the wasting of corporate earnings through the payment of 
high amounts of remunerations to the majority shareholder.68 Quite often, these tactics 
are used in combination, as seen in the American case of Donhaue v Rodd Electrotype 
Co.69 In fact, once the minority shareholder is faced with an indefinite future and no 
likely return on the capital he/she contributed to the enterprise, the majority shareholder 
may well, at this point, propose to purchase the minority shareholder's shares at a low 
price. Unfortunately for the minority shareholder, hislher investment will be effectively 
trapped if he/she does not want to sell the shares to the majority shareholder since there 
is no ready market for the shares of private companies. Thus, in a private company, the 
minority shareholder may be "locked-in", and accordingly "frozen-out", from any 
b . 70 us mess returns. 
Another form of minority oppreSSIOn IS when the majority shareholder sells its 
controlling shareholdings to a third party without allowing the minority shareholder to 
participate in or to object to the decision to sell.71 In fact, there is no case law which has 
directly considered such conduct as unfair conduct and accordingly ordered the majority 
67 Selling the shares to the majority shareholder is required by pre-emption, which forces the minority to 
sell the shares (if he/she wants to sell them) to the insiders (shareholders within the company) and not to 
any outside party. 
68 D, Moll., Shareholder Oppression & 'Fair Value': Of Discounts, Dates, and Dastardly Deeds in the 
Close Corporation. Duke Law Journal. 2004, 54(2), pg: 8. The term 'freezeout' is often used as a 
synonym for 'squeezeout', which is said to mean the use by some of the owners or shareholders in. a 
company of some legal devices or techniques which eliminate from the company one or more of Its 
shareho lders. 
69 328 N.E.2d 505, 513 (Mass. 1975). 
70 D, Moll., Shareholder Oppression in Texas Close Corporations: Majority Rule Isn't What It Used to 
Be Houston Business and Tax Law Journal. 2008, Vol. IX, pg: 3. 
71 'E, Rock. & M, Wachter., Waiting for the Omelet to Set: Match Specific Assets and Minority 
Oppression in the Close Corporation, Journal ojCorporation Law. 1999,24(4), pg: 4. 
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shareholder to refrain from selling. However, courts in some jurisdictions may order the 
acquirer of the shares to give the minority shareholder the opportunity to sell hislher 
shares at the same premium price as the majority shareholder.72 This principle was 
discussed in the American case of Weinberger v UOP, Inc73 when the acquirer of the 
majority shares intended to buyout the minority shares at a lower price than he paid for 
the majority shares. Although the minority shares were not offered to be purchased at 
the same price as the majority shares, the court dismissed the claim on the grounds that 
the price offered for the minority shares was in accordance with the current market 
price. Therefore, the minority shareholder has, in such situations, the right to at least be 
bought out at a fair price; otherwise, he/she can bring an action on an unfair ground. 
(ii) The majority breaches legitimate expectations (informal agreement) 
Generally speaking, informal agreements or understandings emerge in private 
companies when co-investors discuss how the company will operate. Although most of 
what is agreed upon between co-investors goes into the articles or a shareholder 
agreement, there are always some matters of understanding which result from the 
discussions which are not ultimately stated so formally. These un-stated understandings 
may include the legitimate expectations which each shareholder may carry, and 
breaching these legitimate expectations or informal agreements may be seen to 
constitute oppression or unfairness. Therefore, the court should not allow the majority 
shareholder to breach the legitimate expectations of the minority shareholder. It is 
believed that the concept, which is designed to recognize wider application of minority 
shareholders' interests, originated in UK company law. The relevant provision in the 
UK law, s.994,74 states that "a member. .. may apply to the court ... for an order on the 
ground that the company's affairs are being ... unfairly prejudicial to the interest of its 
members or at least himself'. The word "interest" is applied more widely than "rights" 
and therefore it will include certain advantages that "rights" cannot offer, since "rights" 
(for shareholders) emanate solely from the statute or the company's agreement or 
72 R, Szudoczky., Takeover Regulations and Protection of Minority Shareholders: A comparison 
between the European and US approach. 1 st ed. Lambert Academic Publishing, Koln, 2009, pg: 16. 
73 457 A2d 701 (Del. 1983) pg: 1641. 
74 This section has a base in the CA 1985 under s459 but now an identical provision is stated in s994 of 
the Companies Act 2006. 
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articles. Effectively, members may have different interests, even if the rights of all 
members are the same.75 
Furthermore, this concept is more likely to be important in private companies76 when 
close personal relations are often present and a quasi-partnership between shareholders 
exists. This can be seen when the scope of legitimate expectations arises from a 
shareholder's understanding at the time of getting involved in the company or at some 
later stage. For example, legitimate expectation can exist if each of the parties who has 
subscribed hislher capital on the basis that he/she will participate in the management of 
the company and receive the return on hislher investment partly or totally in the form of 
a salary rather than dividends. It was noted in the English case of Re Saul D Harrison & 
Sons Plc77 that legitimate expectation "often arises out of a fundamental understanding 
between the shareholders which formed the basis of their association, but was not put 
into contractual form". 
The American courts have also recognized the concept of reasonable expectations, as 
indicated by the Court of Appeals in New York in the case re Kemp v Beatley, Inc78 
when it said that: 
"A shareholder who reasonably expected that ownership in the corporation would entitle him or 
her to a job, a share of corporate earnings, a place in corporate management, or some other 
fonn of security, would be oppressed in a very real sense when others in the corporation seek to 
defeat those expectations and there exists no effective means of salvaging the investment". 
Moll has claimed that the Kemp decision focused on the minority shareholder's 
expectations at the time he/she decided to invest in (and therefore join) the company.79 
Nevertheless, the majority shareholder has the power to ignore this fundamental 
75 J, Lowry., The pursuit of effective minority shareholder protection: S459 of the Companies Act 1985. 
Company Lawyer. 1996, 17(3), pg: 70. He also says in this article that the scope for the courts to find 
legitimate expectation, which goes beyond strict contractual rights under the company's constitution, is 
subject to limitation. 
76 As the concept of shareholder's expectations is limited in widely-held companies, where the 
expectations of members do not generally extend beyond the wish of receiving a return on their 
investment. 
77 [1995] 1 BCLC 14, CA, pg: 19 
78 473 N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y.1984). 
79 D, Moll., Shareholder Oppression and Reasonable Expectations: Of Change, Gifts, and Inheritances in 
Close Corporation Disputes, Minnesota Law Review. (2002), available at: 
<http://ssrn.comlabstract=2975030rDOI:10.2139/ssm.297503>,accessed24February2010.pg: 2. 
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understanding and act in a way that is contrary to it, neglecting the minority 
shareholder's interest emanating from hislher legitimate or reasonable expectation. In 
the US, courts have been willing to order dissolution and buyouts when convinced that 
the majority shareholder has violated the reasonable expectation of the minority 
shareholder, classifying such conduct as oppressive.8o 
However, the basis or ground for upholding legitimate expectations is something that 
has not been clearly discussed or explained. Paterson81 has attempted to do so, however, 
by distinguishing between the different types of contractual approaches which exist in 
unfair claims. Generally speaking, he emphasises that the contractual approach means 
that parties are only able to make claims where there are breaches of the explicit terms 
agreed between the shareholders in the contract. This is because a violation of any of 
these stated rights would be considered a violation of the contractual terms and would 
therefore be dealt with through an unfair prejudice claim. However, he argues that this 
contractual approach is not a particularly appropriate description for claims relating to 
reasonable expectation because legitimate or reasonable expectation may also contain 
promises or understandings between shareholders which do not have a contractual basis. 
For this reason, he suggests the quasi-contractual approach to accommodate all types of 
interests and expectations. 
On the other hand, Goddard has also noted that there is a need to provide a legal 
description of the kind of legitimate expectation which exists between parties but is not 
subject to express contractual provision.82 He suggests the 'hypothetical bargaining 
model' should govern various types of reasonable expectations. This approach is 
divided into two hypotheses to cover two types of legitimate expectations: the 
generalised hypothetical bargain and the particularised hypothetical bargain. The first 
can be distinguished on the grounds of the generality which reflects the expectations 
and interests of the corporate parties collectively, and which shareholders and the 
company expect each other to abide by. So, as long as all parties share the same 
expectations, they will be categorised under this hypothesis. The second reflects an 
80 E, Rock. & M, Wachter., Waiting for the Omelet to Set: Match Specific Assets and Minority 
Oppression in the Close Corporation, Journal o/Corporation Law. 1999,24(4), pg: 4. 
81 P, Paterson., A Criticism of the Contractual Approach to Unfair Prejudice, Company Lawyer. 2006, 
27(7), pg: 21l. 
82 R, Goddard., Enforcing the Hypothetical Bargain: Sections 459-461 of the Companies Act 1985, 
Company Lawyer. 1999,20(3), pg: 70-73. 
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individual shareholder's expectations which are fonnulated, not just because the 
relationship between all shareholders is personal, or because the company is small, but 
also because there is a fundamental understanding that this individual acted pursuant to 
these particular reasonable expectations.83 
Whether the quasi-contractual approach or the hypothetical bargaining model is used to 
provide a ground or legal description to reasonable expectations, it must be said that 
identifying reasonable expectations in each company is a difficult task because the court 
needs to take into account the parties' actual understandings, whether at the time of 
investment or as they might evolve. But even then, it will again become difficult to 
create an objective base for deciding whether any or all of those expectations should be 
honoured.84 In the American case of re Kemp v Beatley, Inc85 the court endeavoured to 
establish what the majority shareholders knew, or should have known about the minority 
shareholder's expectations on entering this particular company, so that the court could 
honour them. 
Another example which shows the extent of these expectations is the English case of R 
& H Electric Ltd v Haden Bill Electrical Lt~6 where the court found that the minority 
shareholder had a legitimate expectation to be allowed to participate in the management 
of the company as long as he remained a significant creditor of the company. 
Consequently, when he was removed from management by the majority shareholder, the 
court ordered the majority shareholder to purchase the minority shareholder's shares and 
repay as soon as possible the loans made to the company by the minority shareholder. 
It is believed that legitimate expectation was first used in the context of shareholder 
disputes in the English case Re Saul D Harrison & Sons plc87 where the minority 
shareholder claimed that the directors had acted in a manner contrary to the minority 
shareholder's legitimate expectations by not acting in the best interests of the company 
in deciding whether to pay dividends and how much to pay. The claim was dismissed in 
83 The particularised hypothetical bargain should give coverage to individual expectations as opposed to 
those of a collective to which this individual may belong. An example is the right to an investment return. 
84 B, Means., A Voice-Based Framework for Evaluating Claims of Minority Shareholder Oppression in 
the Close Corporation, Georgetown Law Journal. 2009, 97 (5), pg: 22. 
8S 473 N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y. 1984). (New York) 
86 [1995] 2 BCLC 280. 
87 [1994] B.C.C. 475. 
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this case and Hoffmann LJ explained that the reasoning behind this was that the 
minority shareholder's actual legitimate expectations amounted to no more than an 
expectation that the board would manage the company in accordance with their 
fiduciary obligations and the terms of the articles. The judgment in this case might have 
been different if the minority shareholder had been able to prove that the expectation in 
question was actually the same expectation which he had when setting up the 
company. 88 
In sum, breaching legitimate expectations is another form of misconduct which the 
majority shareholder may commit. If the minority shareholder brings a legal action to 
seek relief in line with hislher legitimate expectation then, of course, he/she will be 
representing himlherself and not the company as these types of case are based on 
personal, and not corporate, grounds. The minority shareholder can bring proceedings 
based on a right of the company only if the rights and interests of the company are 
breached. The next sub-section will illustrate these kinds of proceedings and how the 
majority shareholder can abuse the company itself in their own favour. 
b. Majority abuse of the company (corporate interest) 
There are several different ways in which the majority shareholder can abuse their 
position. As already detailed, the first is oppression against the minority shareholder's 
own interests. The second, to be explored below, concerns how the majority 
shareholder's power can be used to abuse and misuse the company's rights and interests. 
Traditional theories maintain that the majority shareholder should control the company. 
However, when the majority of shares in a company are held by those controlling that 
company at board level, they may perpetrate all kinds of wrongdoing to the detriment of 
the company and subsequently vote to prevent the company from taking legal action to 
gain compensation. This kind of vote can take place in the general meeting but it is more 
likely to occur at board meetings, where the shareholders might directly or indirectly 
control voting, and which are held far more frequently. If these scenarios prevail and the 
majority shareholder is free to do what they want in the company and escape liability, 
88 Chapter 5 will also discuss legitimate expectation in the case 0 'Neill v Phillips. 
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then potential minority shareholders may be very reluctant to invest if there are no legal 
provisions that are able to safeguard their investment. 89 
The traditional position in both the United States and the United Kingdom was that the 
courts would give unrestricted room to majority shareholders to run the company and 
would refrain from interfering in the internal management as long as the majority 
shareholders were acting within their powers.90 To this effect, it was stated in the 
English case of Carlen v Drury91 that "the court is not required on every occasion to 
take over the management of every playhouse and brew house in the Kingdom". As a 
result, courts became reluctant to get involved in internal issues within the company, 
leaving it to the majority shareholders to do what they thought was best for the 
company. The impact of this unrestricted authority, however, can allow the majority 
shareholder (or an associate of such a shareholder) to engage in wrongdoing, to vote to 
ratify hislher own misconduct and prevent the company from bringing any action 
against himlher. Therefore, those who have majority control utilise the concept of 
ratification to restrict the scope of any litigation by the minority shareholder and, as a 
consequence, the wrong causes a detriment to the interests of the company and, 
ultimately, the minority shareholder.92 In UK case law, for example, the majority 
shareholder has the capacity to stop an action brought by the minority shareholder on 
behalf of the company if the majority shareholder believes that no purpose would be 
served by the action.93 
Vinelott J explains the traditional approach operated by UK courts in Taylor v National 
Union of Mineworkers (Derbyshire Area):94 
89 T, Lazarides., Minority Shareholder Choices and Rights in the New Market Environment. (July 10, 
2009), Available at: <http://ssm.com!abstract=1432672>accessed24February201O,pg: 5. 
90 J, Abugu., A comparative analysis of the extent of judicial discretion in minority shareholder protection 
litigation: the United Kingdom and United States, International Company and Commercial Law Review. 
2007. 18(5), pg: 183. 
91 (1912) 35 E.R. 61. See also Cooper L.J. in Scottish Insurance Corp Ltd v Wilsons & Clyde Co Ltd 
[1948] S.C.360. . . 
92 H, Hirt., The Company's Decision to Litigate Against its Directors: Legal Strategies to Deal With the 
Board of Directors' Conflict ofInterest, Journal o/Business Law, Mar 2005, pg: 185 & 186. 
93 S, Mayson. D, French. & C, Ryan., Company Law. 24th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007-
2008, pg: 515. However, there are few cases where the court did not allow the majority shareholder to 
ratify the wrongdoing, as seen later on in the case Cook v Deeks [1916] 1 AC 554. 
94 [1985] BCLC 237. 
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" ... .it is open to a majority of the members, if they think it is right in the interests of the 
corporate body to do so, to resolve that no action should be taken to remedy the wrong done 
to the corporate body and such a resolution will bind the minority". 
While this is no longer the position of the UK courts,95 the approach remains applicable 
to many other jurisdictions and, importantly for the purpose of this research, this list 
includes Saudi Arabia and the UAE (Dubai).96 This position has enabled the majority 
shareholder to have the final say over any wrong committed against the company so, if 
majority shareholders are the wrongdoers, they effectively act as judges in their own 
case. This very clearly constitutes a conflict of interests, and the outcome is always 
more than likely to be a decision not to take action. 
However, courts may choose to ignore the majority shareholder's wish not to pursue an 
action and instead allow the minority shareholder to bring an action on behalf of the 
company, if there is a clear case of fraud and bad faith occurs ("fraud" as a ground to 
establish a claim is discussed in 2.5.2). This type of conduct does not mean that actual 
deceit has to occur; even abuse or misuse of power would be sufficient if it carries a 
small element of fraud. For example, in the English case of Cook v Deeks,97 the 
company (X) had built up considerable goodwill with the Canadian Railway Company 
as a result of the satisfactory performance of contracts. However, when the last contract 
between the two companies was being negotiated, the majority shareholders, who were 
involved in the negotiations, decided that the contract would be granted to another 
company which they had incorporated rather than X. In addition, they passed a 
resolution to the effect that X had no interest in the contract. The minority shareholder 
claimed that X was entitled to the benefit of the contract and that the resolution was 
unfair. The Privy Council held that the benefit of the contract belonged in equity to X, 
and the majority shareholders could not validly use their voting power to advance their 
own company and ultimately gain from this for themselves. 
95 A new company law has been produced and put into effect under the Companies Act 2006. This new 
law has facilitated the action for minority shareholders. This area will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
96 See Chapter 3&4, where it has been proved that the statute and courts in these countries still give too 
much power to majority shareholders within companies. 
97 [1916] 1 AC 554. 
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When the company has suffered a wrong, then the general rule is that it should be that 
company which attempts to recover compensation and not the minority shareholder.98 
But as we shall see, the minority shareholder can bring an action on behalf of the 
company in certain circumstances in the UK (and other jurisdictions such as Canada and 
Australia), but any compensation awarded will go to the company itself. In the English 
case of Garden v Parke/9 a company had suffered significant losses and gone into 
administrative receivership as a result of the wrong done to it by the majority 
shareholder. A minority shareholder brought a legal action to remedy the losses suffered 
by the company. However, the action was dismissed because it was brought on a 
personal basis, and not on behalf of the company. 
Moll lOO has pointed out that a breach of a fiduciary duty claim can provide a minority 
shareholder with the right to bring an action in only one situation in the US. This 
exception occurs when a company has only two shareholders and the majority 
shareholder is also the director. In such a company the fiduciary duty will be directly 
owed to the minority shareholder who can, therefore, use a breach as a ground to bring 
an action on hislher own behalf. Moll observed this in the American case Redmon v 
Griffith. 101 In this case only two shareholders invested in the company, one majority and 
one minority shareholder. The minority shareholder filed an action against the majority 
shareholder claiming that he was oppressed by a breach of fiduciary duty since the 
majority shareholder used corporate funds to pay personal expenses. The court found the 
breach of the fiduciary duty to be oppressive, and therefore the minority shareholder 
was successful. 102 
To sum up, the majority shareholder may be able to wield significant power which, if 
not restricted, can harm both the minority shareholder and the company itself. For this 
reason, the majority shareholder's power needs to be monitored and controlled through 
the law in order to protect the minority shareholder and the company. However, some 
98 B, Hannigan., Drawing boundaries between derivative claims and unfairly prejudicial petitions, Journal 
of Business Law. 2009, 6, pg: 613. 
99 [2004] 2 B.c.L.C. 554. 
100 D, Moll., Shareholder Oppression in Texas Close Corporations: Majority Rule Isn't What It Used to 
Be Houston Business and Tax Law Journal. 2008, Vol. IX, pg: 10. , 
101 202 S.W.3d 225 (Tex. App.- Tyler 2006). 
102 This is a situation where the majority shareholder may owe fiduciary duty to the minority shareholder. 
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still do not see the necessity and importance of having a comprehensive system of 
minority shareholder protection. Their arguments will be discussed in the next section. 
2.2 Criticisms against the principle of minority shareholder protection 
This section explores the views of those who do not necessarily agree with granting the 
minority shareholder more protection or restricting the majority shareholder's power. 
Once their arguments are presented, their position will be challenged in order to 
establish that it is indeed necessary for minority shareholder protection to exist. The 
section is divided into two parts. The first disagrees with those who want to justify 
unrestricted power being in the hands of the majority shareholder. The second 
challenges the position of those who tend to prioritise the rights and interests of the 
majority shareholder alone. 
2.2.1 Arguments against the importance of minority shareholder protection 
Several researchers have attempted to find justification for not establishing any strong 
form of minority shareholder protection. Payne points out that, generally speaking, 
minority shareholder protection is designed to be complex and obscure. 103 She believes 
that the purpose behind making it cumbersome is to protect the company against a 
single vexatious shareholder who (through misjudgement or malice) would waste the 
company's money if allowed to litigate on its behalf. 104 A similar view is expressed by 
Pettet who highlights the wish of certain jurisdictions to deliberately restrict minority 
shareholders' litigation, because, otherwise, the courts would be unable to cope with the 
volume of litigation. 105 In response to these two claims, however, it can be said that, 
since minority shareholders are vulnerable and subject to oppression and abuse from 
majority shareholders, law-makers and judges in any jurisdiction must provide them 
with protection even if the volume of litigation is expected to be high. Moreover, the 
103 It can be seen that the intention of the company laws in some countries, or at least SA and UAE 
(Dubai), is to make it difficult for the minority to bring an action especially on behalf of the company. See 
Chapter 3&4. . 
104 J, Payne., Section 459-461 Companies Act 1985 in flux: The Future of Shareholder ProtectIOn. 
Cambridge Law Journal. 2005, 64(3), pg: 658. 
105 B, Pettet., Company Law. 2nd ed. Pearson Education Limited, London, 2005, pg: 213. 
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court can always control litigation and monitor cases in order to prevent nonsense 
claims which waste the company's money and occupy court time. lo6 
Another argument against having protection in place for the minority shareholder has 
been articulated by Leuz and others who believe that having a strong system of 
protection may potentially provide majority shareholders with an increased incentive to 
hide their wrongdoings and their private benefits when faced with possible 
compensation claims. They add that majority shareholders would have little incentive to 
conceal their indiscretions if the minority shareholder could not seek to have these 
activities made the subject of litigation. lO? However, this is to assume that the majority 
shareholder will engage in wrongdoing at all times, whether there is protection for the 
minority shareholder or not. If that is the case, it would be much better to have strong 
protection with remedial devices available to facilitate the minority shareholder's ability 
to hold the majority shareholders accountable for their wrongdoing, rather than to have 
weak protection that offers nothing. Nonetheless, Leuz and others' assumption is 
actually based on a false premise, because statistics and studies have shown that the 
stronger the minority shareholder protection is, the less abusive and oppressive the 
majority shareholders are (See: 2.5 The ideal model to follow).108 
Another argument against offering legal protection for minority shareholders has been 
proposed by Klapper and Lovel09 who believe that completely overhauling the law and 
regulations in terms of minority shareholder protection is difficult, whereas improving 
the internal company code is not. They claim that voluntary internal codes or company 
level initiatives are better, more effective solutions to protect the interests and rights of 
the minority shareholder than those that could be offered by statute. This argument 
seems reasonable in only one respect, however: that it may be easier and simpler for the 
shareholders to adopt a voluntary code that would suit the company and at the same time 
106 This is only in relation to cases brought on the corporate ground, but there is no prioritising of the 
company's interest when it comes to unfair or personal cases; instead, the court will deal with each case 
according to what justice requires, regardless of the company's interest. 
107 C, Leuz. D, Nanda. & P, Wysocki., Earnings Management and Investor Protection: An International 
Comparison, Journal of Financial Economics. 2002, September, pg: 9. 
108 It has been found by La Porta et al in their article (R, La Porta. & Others., Law and Finance, Journal of 
Political Economy. 1998, 106(6), pg: 1116) that common-law countries confer on shareholders and 
creditors stronger protection which results in a better legal system and market. 
109 L, Klapper. & I, Love., Corporate governance, Investor protection, and Performance in Emerging 
Markets, Journal of Corporate Finance. 2004. 10, pg: 705. However, the writers emphasize the 
importance of legal reform for investor protection in the rest of the article. 
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offer some protection for the minority shareholder. However, the argument relies on the 
possibility that companies may adopt an internal code, but ignores the fact that, as it is 
voluntary, there is neither any obligation for companies to adopt it, nor to comply with 
it. It is true that some companies can obtain an internal code before the incorporation, 
but its contents are at the discretion of the shareholders. If the protection of rights and 
interests is subject to the company's internal code, then the minority shareholders will 
be at the mercy of the majority shareholders who can include or exclude rights and 
interests according to their wishes. This is because the majority shareholders will be 
able to outvote other shareholders at any general meetings held to consider the change in 
the articles of association (provided that the majority shareholder has the sufficient 
majority). However, if these rights and interests were fully protected in the statute, there 
would be no opportunity for the majority shareholders to negotiate or bargain with the 
minority shareholders over them. Rather, the majority shareholders would be obliged to 
maintain and respect the statutory rights and interests of shareholders. One concern 
which may be raised here, however, is that, even where there is statutory protection, 
there might have to be some reliance on court judgments to explain the law, and 
accordingly this reliance may lead to uncertainty. Yet even if this concern is well-
founded, it must be recognised that the court is an independent body which, unlike the 
majority shareholder, has no vested interests in the company.110 (See: 2.4.2 The court's 
role when dealing with minority shareholders' cases). 
Similar to the above argument - namely that protection can be provided VIa the 
company's internal code - it can be said that it is possible for effective minority 
shareholder protection to emanate from the shareholder agreement (contract). This 
argument is based on the contractual approach to company law which embraces the 
freedom-to-contract position, and which presumes that shareholders should be able to 
draw up whatever contracts they see fit. Therefore, it is argued, the minority 
shareholders in this case would be able to contractually protect their interests and 
rights. III In response to this suggestion, although it is accepted that the contract can 
protect some interests and rights for the minority shareholder, it certainly cannot provide 
comprehensive protection. The argument relies on the contract being the sole provider 
110 It can be also argued that it is necessary sometimes to have some parts of the company's internal code 
interpreted by the court if there is a dispute. 
111 D, Millon., Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law, Washington and Lee 
Law Review. 1993,50, pg: 1379-1381. 
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of such protection, neglecting the recognised fact that all contracts are incomplete. II2 
Keay and Zhang explain this 'incomplete contract theory' with reference to the fact that 
the parties are not able to foresee the future in definite terms and so cannot make 
complete provisions in a contract for every eventuality. Hence, contracts are by their 
nature incomplete. II3 This is because there will be problems (such as the majority 
shareholder seeking to engage in opportunistic behaviour or changes in the 
circumstances of companies) that cannot be foreseen by the minority shareholder at the 
time of signing the contract. 114 
Goddard 1 15 has discussed another possible reason for contracts being incomplete. He has 
observed that, out of strategic behaviour, informational asymmetry may arise once the 
majority shareholder has an incentive to withhold certain relevant information from the 
minority shareholder. Thus, as he has emphasised, incomplete contracts are the 
inevitable product of asymmetric information. SchwartzII6 has also noted that contracts 
may be commonly incomplete because of the collective shareholders' unwillingness to 
bear the strategic behaviour risk created by a complete contract. This happens because 
shareholders may fear judicial misinterpretation if there is a high level of specificity in 
the contract. 117 But no matter what the reason behind contractual incompleteness, as a 
result of it the shareholder agreement creates difficulty for the courts to apply principles 
associated with company law (such as equitable principles), 118 and therefore the 
minority shareholder may not be fully protected by it. It is, then, a fact that, since 
contracts are incomplete, protections afforded by contracts alone will be inadequate. 
112 I, MacNeil., Company Law Rules: An Assessment from the Perspective of Incomplete Contract 
Theory, Journal of Corporate Law Studies. 2001, 1(1), pg: 107. 
l\3 A, Keay. & H, Zhang., Incomplete Contracts, Contingent Fiduciaries and a Director's Duty to 
Creditors. Melbourne University Law Review. 2008. 32(1), pg: 154. 
114 A, Keay. & H, Zhang., Incomplete Contracts, Contingent Fiduciaries and a Director's Duty to 
Creditors. Melbourne University Law Review. 2008. 32(1), pg: 154 & 155. 
115 R, Goddard., Enforcing the Hypothetical Bargain: Sections 459-461 of the Companies Act 1985, 
Company Lawyer. 1999,20(3), pg: 68-69. 
116 A, Schwartz., Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, Journal of 
Legal Studies. 1992,21, pg: 271. 
117 This point in particular is controversial because it is believed that, the more the contract is well drafted 
and detailed to cover all specificity, the clearer the rights, interests, power and obligations will be. 
However, the costs of stating full specificity in the contract may be unaffordable for the shareholders who 
also may not initially see the resulting benefit. 
118 Other examples are reasonable or legitimate expectation, personal and corporate interests. 
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Another argument has been put forward by Means 119 who has tried to offer the 'voice-
based framework' (in which the minority shareholder's voice will be influential in 
decisions) as an alternative remedy that can always offer protection for the minority 
shareholder. He believes that, in order to improve the minority shareholder's responses 
to the majority shareholder's wrongdoings and oppression, better account of voice is 
needed in the company in order for the minority shareholder to participate in decisions. 
In response to this view, it is certainly undeniable that the minority shareholder's voice 
is vital to the health of the company.120 However, the role of the voice-based framework 
is solely an internal, operational and precautionary system which can in no way replace 
statutory protection which offers external solutions in order to remedy different types of 
wrongdoing and oppression. Effective protection cannot just rely on a perfect internal 
structure that grants the minority shareholder the right to vote on decisions, because 
there are many minority shareholders who do not intend to engage in management, but 
nevertheless invest in companies. If protection depends on the voice-based framework, 
then the minority shareholder, who is not involved in management, will be denied 
protection, and this is far from what comprehensive minority shareholder protection 
should seek to achieve. 
It is concluded that ultimate power should not be left in the hands of the majority 
shareholders to use without limitation, and that any attempt to solve this ultimate power 
problem internally will result in the same outcome. It is also clear that any protection 
cannot merely rely on one aspect, such as the minority shareholder's voice or the 
contract. Rather, for minority shareholder protection to be effective and comprehensive, 
it needs to cover all dimensions in order to safeguard all the rights and interests of the 
minority shareholder. 
2.2.2 The majority shareholder's interests should always be a priority. 
Some continue to insist that, as long as the majority shareholders invest more, and 
thereby have more power, then their rights and interests should be prioritised and 
favoured. Means has responded to those writers by drawing their attention to statistics 
119 B, Means., A Voice-Based Framework for Evaluating Claims of Minority Shareholder Oppression in 
the Close Corporation, Georgetown Law Journal. 2009,97 (5), pg: 24. 
120 This means that the minority shareholders may be allowed to participate in management and to have 
their say, but it does not mean that their views must be taken into account. 
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which show that most companies are privately held in America (as they are in the UK, 
Saudi Arabia and most other jurisdictions). This means that effective minority 
shareholder protection therefore has the potential to impact on the vast majority of 
A . b· 121 In f h· . men can USlnesses. many 0 t ese pnvate companIes the majority shareholders 
are fewer in number than the minority shareholders so those who make up greater 
numbers among shareholders deserve, without doubt, more protection to safeguard their 
interests and rights. Otherwise, any deficiency in the law to address this overwhelming 
majority of minority shareholders would cause instability and uncertainty in the 
marketplace. 
Another argument is that, because of the significance of majority shareholders in the 
company, this group should always enjoy more returns and benefits as they bear the 
costs associated with the substantial monitoring of the affairs of the company. In line 
with this argument, majority shareholders should have more interests, rights, powers and 
authority compared with minority shareholders who are able to free-ride on the majority 
shareholders' monitoring efforts. Moreover, Kim and others agree with this view by 
saying that since majority shareholders throw so much money into the company and 
dedicate a great deal of time and effort towards it, then they deserve to be treated 
differently from the minority shareholders who may often have small shares in many 
other companies. 122 In response to this line of reasoning, it is true to say that the 
majority shareholder, in most cases, works harder and spends more time and effort in 
relation to the affairs of the company, and very often is key to the running the company. 
However, this is not to say that priority or preference should be given to the majority 
shareholders in the law, as they already have more power and authority within the 
company through corporate democracy, unlike the minority shareholder who has 
nothing but the law to provide himlher with protection for hislher interests and rights. 
Obviously, if the majority shareholder acts appropriately then hislher control will not be 
challenged and therefore the minority shareholder will not be able to complain and 
would certainly not be able to bring legal proceedings. However, there should always be 
121 B, Means., A Voice-Based Framework for Evaluating Claims of Minority Shareholder Oppression in 
the Close Corporation, Georgetown Law Journal. 2009, 97 (5), pg: 10. 
122 K, Kim. J, Nofsinger & P, Kitsabunnarat-Chatjuthamard., Large Shareholders, Board Independence, 
and Minority Shareholder Rights: Evidence from Europe, Journal o/Corporate Finance. 2007, 13(5), pg: 
862. It is further noted in their article that the benefit of minority shareholders owning a diversified 
portfolio is that they can diversify their money in funds representing shares that involve a substantial 
number of companies, in order to dilute the risk. 
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a remedy for the minority shareholder to pursue if the majority shareholder acts 
otherwise. 
Another claim is that the majority shareholders' interests may not always be aligned 
with those of minority shareholders and therefore the majority shareholder's rights and 
interests should be favoured in decisions. 123 This view seems to be based on the 
d't' I h 124 h' h tra IlOna t eory w IC says that the company's money is in the hands of the 
majority shareholders and it is up to these shareholders to give it away. 125 If this view is 
accepted, then other interests and rights in the company may be neglected. It is believed 
that the company's decisions should not favour the interests of either the majority or 
minority shareholders, but rather should be based on the company's interests (which will 
not necessarily correspond with the interests of all shareholders individually).126 
Accordingly, any decision that results in benefit to the company will, directly or 
indirectly, benefit shareholders as a whole. 
A further argument which sees the majority shareholder as being entitled to a superior 
position has been put forward by Dalley who claims that, whatever trouble a minority 
shareholder gets into, there is no justification whatsoever for imposing fiduciary duties 
on the majority shareholders and holding them accountable for these duties. 127 This 
argument holds that, even if the minority shareholder faces oppression, unfairness and 
abuse, he/she should not have the right to litigate against the majority shareholder 
because the majority shareholder has more wealth in the company. If this suggestion is 
followed and the minority shareholder is not given any option to remedy wrongs and 
abuse when they occur, minority shareholders will be very reluctant to get involved in 
123 K, Kim. J, Nofsinger & P, Kitsabunnarat-Chatjuthamard., Large Shareholders, Board Independence, 
and Minority Shareholder Rights: Evidence from Europe, Journal of Corporate Finance. 2007, 13(5), pg: 
861. 
124 This theory existed under English common law where the courts were reluctant to interfere unless a 
very clear case of fraud occurred. See: 2.5.1 for more detail. 
125 Unfortunately, this theory did not respect other parties' interests in the company. The company 
consists of various parties, i.e. (stakeholders) such as minorities, employees, suppliers, creditors, potential 
investors, public members and others, who should all have their interests equally recognized. 
126 In the English case Allen v Gold Reefs of West Africa [1900] 1 Ch 656, it was established that directors 
(majority shareholders) have to act 'bonafide' in the interests of the shareholders as a whole. It is argued, 
however, that it is not always correct to say that the company's interests are constantly equivalent to the 
interests of the majority shareholders in the company. This is because sometimes proceeding a corporate 
claim can benefit the company's interests as a separate entity, but not necessarily benefit a particular 
group of shareholders, e.g. the majority. 
127 See Dalley, The Misguided Doctrine, at 176, cited In: B, Means., A Contractual Approach to 
Shareholder Oppression Law. The Fordham Law Review. 2010, 79(3), pg: 8. 
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businesses because they will be scared of getting trapped as long as there is no law to 
assist them. 128 
In sum, it is believed that the law should recognize and reserve the interests and rights of 
minority shareholders in the statute to ensure that the majority shareholder considers 
them in every decision and does not prioritize only their own rights and interests. The 
next section will now justify why having an effective minority shareholder protection is 
so important. 
2.3 Justifications for protecting the minority shareholder 
Several factors can come together to help to formulate strong justification for the 
minority shareholder to be given protection. It is important to examine each of these 
reasons in detail to appreciate why there is always a need to protect the minority 
shareholder in the company. This section is divided into two main points which deal, 
firstly, with the economic aspect and, secondly, with how the principles of justice and 
fairness provide that protection for the minority shareholder is required. 
2.3.1 The economic aspect 
Some people do not realise that there is a link between minority protection and the 
economy. It is even suggested in these lines that having effective minority protection 
might well improve the economic strength of companies because this will provide a 
degree of confidence necessary for the proper functioning of a market economy. Where 
such effective protection is in place, the cost of capital is lower and companies are 
encouraged to use resources more efficiently, thereby underpinning growth.129 This is 
attributable to the fact that the system which regulates minority protection is only part of 
the larger economic context in which companies operate. The system in this context 
deals with a set of relationships involving managers, boards, minority shareholders, 
128 This is a situation where the majority shareholder may owe a fiduciary duty to the minority 
shareholder. However, the US imposes fiduciary duties on all shareholders if the majority shareholder is 
acting as a director. 
129 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2004, at 11. Another Final Report 
in consultation with the OECD was issued in 2009, but it mainly addresses Protection of Minority 
Shareholders in Listed Issuers. 
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majority shareholders, creditors, employees and other stakeholders and can be likened to 
a net in which each element relies on the others. Protection which is able to attract such 
shareholders is critical because, unless shareholders are drawn to invest in a company, 
that company will not be able to grow easily. Instead, it will be starved of capital 
because lenders and suppliers are unlikely to be very forthcoming in providing credit to 
that company. 130 
Minority shareholder protection encourages the development of financial markets. This 
is due to the fact that, when minority investors are protected from expropriation and 
other such actions, they are more inclined to pay a greater sum for shares, which in turn 
provides more capital for companies when the shares are first issued. 131 It is believed 
that countries which protect minority shareholders have more valuable stock markets, 
larger numbers of listed shares and higher rates of capital demand in the market than 
countries where their protection is lacking. 132 Several surveys in this respect have found 
that protection contributes to economic growth. 133 Furthermore, a study undertaken by 
Levine and Zervos confirmed the finding that protection of financial investments 
promotes economic growth. 134 Finally, La Porta et al. have shown that countries with 
poor investor protection, particularly with regard to private companies, have 
significantly less liquidity and smaller markets. 135 Judge136 has reached an identical 
conclusion, but from a different standpoint, pointing out that when the liability of the 
majority shareholder is uncertain within the company, this leads to their carrying out of 
their duties carelessly, which could only harm minority shareholders and the economy 
as a whole. He also suggests, from an economic point of view, that adopting effective 
minority shareholder protection encourages both directors and shareholders to act in a 
way which promotes transparency, accountability and investor confidence, and which 
consequently benefits the economy. 
130 L, Sealy. & S, Worthington., Cases and Materials in Company Law. 8th ed. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008, pg: 371. 
131 R, La Porta & Others., Investor protection and corporate governance, Journal of Financial Economics. 
2000,58(1-2), pg: 879. 
132 R, La Porta & Others., Investor protection and corporate governance, Journal of Financial Economics. 
2000,58(1-2), pg: 879. 
I33 R, King. & R, Levine., Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be Right, 1993, cited In: R, La Porta. 
& Others., Law and Finance, Journal of Political Economy. 1998, 106(6), pg:1152. 
134 R, Levine & S, Zervos., Stock market, banks and growth, American Economic Review. 1998, 88, pg: 
540-542. 
I35 R La Porta. & Others., Legal determinants of external finance. Journal of Finance. 1997, 52, pg: , 
1146-1147. 
136 S, Judge,. Company Law. 1 st ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, pg: 140. 
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It is claimed 137 that minority shareholder protection can influence economic growth in 
three ways. First of all, it can enhance savings. Secondly, it can channel these savings 
into real investments. Thirdly, it promotes more productive uses of capital, and thereby 
improves the efficiency of money. All three of these can, in principle, lead to economic 
growth. In fact, it is believed that having an effective minority shareholder protection 
system that regulates how the minority shareholder litigates when wrongdoing or 
oppression occurs, stabilises the economy and prevents the affairs of companies being 
conducted improperly. Another point which proves that effective minority shareholder 
protection can promote economic and financial stability, certainty, trust and confidence 
in the market appears in a report by Enriques who claimed that, because the UK and the 
US apply effective protection, their accounting rules and standards are stronger than 
those in Continental-European countries which have less minority shareholder 
protection and, as a result, suffer more manipulation of accounts. 138 
Therefore, in summary, there is a strong relationship between having effective minority 
shareholder protection that restricts the majority shareholder's ability to engage in 
wrongdoing and unfairness, and the development of the economy. Furthermore, it 
should be recognised that the more effectively the minority shareholder is protected, the 
more investments are made, and the more the economy grows. However, if the 
protection or its enforcement is weak, majority shareholder will manipulate the 
company's affairs and use it exclusively in hislher favour. If this negative practice 
occurs, then there is the potential for loss of confidence and trust in the market and for 
discouraging the minority shareholder from investing, which will in tum impact 
negatively on the general economy. It is contended that, from an economic point of view 
alone, minority shareholders are perfectly justified in desiring effective protection that 
can offer them safeguards as it will also contribute to the stabilisation of the commercial 
environment. 
2.3.2 Justice and fairness necessitate protection for the minority shareholder 
I37 R, La Porta & others., Investor protection and corporate governance, Journal of Financial Economics,. 
2000, 58(1-2), pg: 880. 
138 L, Enriques., The Law on Company Directors' Self-Dealing: A Comparative Analysis, International & 
Comparative Corporate Law Journal. (Vol. 2, 2000), available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=271591> 
accessed 7 November 2009, pg: 298. 
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It seems incomprehensible that a minority shareholder who has a percentage of shares in 
a company's capital can be denied protection, recognition, distinctiveness, 
independence, dignity, participation and any respectable rights or interests, simply 
because he/she has a smaller percentage of shares than the majority shareholder in the 
company. Certainly, this does not comply with what justice and fairness seek to 
promote. In this part of the research, the claim that the principles of justice and fairness 
can together formulate a strong justification for the minority shareholder to have 
protection is discussed. 
It is very important to appreciate that when vulnerability exists, there is an obligation on 
the basis of justice and fairness to provide protection. To justify providing protection to 
minority shareholders, minority shareholders must be clearly vulnerable in the sense that 
they cannot protect their rights and interests and are subject to abuse and oppression 
from the majority shareholder. Rock and Wachter stress the fact that, because of the 
very strong connection between the directors and majority shareholders which is usually 
found in a close corporation (it is ultimately the majority shareholders who elect the 
directors), minority shareholders are particularly vulnerable. The minority shareholders 
in a private company are locked into their investments to a much greater extent than 
would be the case in either a partnership or a publicly traded company.139 Goddard also 
claims that minority shareholders are vulnerable because exiting the company is often 
not possible, and they are left with no alternative but to deal with majority shareholders. 
He adds that this may put minority shareholders at constant risk, and therefore they are 
highly likely to be vulnerable. 14o Lazarides further emphasizes the vulnerable status of 
the minority shareholder by stating that indeed the minority shareholder is even 
susceptible to expropriation from the majority shareholder once it is known that the 
minority shareholder has been forced to stay in the company.141 Thus it appears that 
there is a certain amount of agreement among legal commentators that the minority 
shareholder can be seen as vulnerable within private companies. 
139 E, Rock. & M, Wachter., Waiting for the Omelet to Set: Match Specific Assets and Minority 
Oppression in the Close Corporation, Journal o/Corporation Law. 1999,24(4), pg: 5. 
146 R, Goddard., Enforcing the Hypothetical Bargain: Sections 459-461 of the Companies Act 1985, 
Company Lawyer. 1999,20(3), pg: 70. 
141 T, Lazarides., Minority Shareholder Choices and Rights in the New Market Environment. (July 10, 
2009), Available at: <http://ssm.comlabstract=1432672>accessed24February2010,pg: 3. 
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In any jurisdiction, vulnerable parties, such as beneficiaries of trusts or clients of 
solicitors, tend to acquire somewhat more protection than non-vulnerable parties. The 
common ground that classifies these people as vulnerable is that they are weak, and 
subject to the power of another party. So the law, out of justice and fairness, provides 
vulnerable individuals with more protective rights and interests in order to safeguard 
them from potential abuse or oppression. The same case can be made for the minority 
shareholder in a company, as he/she is also often in a weak position, unable to obtain 
help and subject to potential abuse. As long as this is the case, the law, out of justice and 
fairness, should also provide protection for the minority shareholder to safeguard hislher 
interests and rights. 
It may be acceptable for the majority shareholder, who has paid more and therefore has 
more shares, to be more involved with the company's decisions and affairs, but what is 
not acceptable is if the majority shareholder chooses to ignore completely the minority 
shareholder's rights and interests in the company. It is important to mention that, even if 
the majority shareholder has say 60%, 70%, or even 90% of the shares in the company, 
it does not mean that he/she can effectively control 100% of the shares by disregarding 
the interests, benefits and rights of the minority shareholder. This is not to say, however, 
that the majority shareholder may not represent the company fully when there is a need 
to do so, but rather to say that the majority shareholder should consider other 
shareholdings when he/she represents the company or acts on its behalf. Justice and 
fairness should require the majority shareholder to take into account the interests of the 
remaining shareholders in all actions and decisions and, at the same time, the law should 
grant the minority shareholder a device to protect hislher interests in the company in the 
event that the majority shareholder violates them. 
In investigating the reasons behind the majority shareholder's potential ability to abuse 
and oppress the minority shareholder in certain jurisdictions, it may be found that this is 
due to a lack of a sense of justice and fairness which recognises the minority 
shareholder's interests and rights as being as valuable as those of the majority 
shareholder. This is not to say that minority shareholders should be totally equal to 
majority shareholders, but that they should also have certain interests and rights 
acknowledged and protected. The potential for abuse is marked in a jurisdiction where 
its legal system allows majority shareholders to exercise a high level of control which 
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does not correspond to the level of protection conferred on the minority shareholder. 142 
In these circumstances, the only option for such a minority shareholder is to tum to the 
law for help and the law, out of concern for justice and fairness, should furnish remedies 
for such cases in which power has been abused. Consequently, it should be always 
agreed that ultimate and complete power cannot be allowed to rest in the hands of the 
majority shareholder without corresponding accountability.143 This is, in part, what 
fairness and justice stand for; to guarantee that all shareholders are to be treated equally 
and that the law does not allow a single overriding power to be held by the majority 
shareholder. 144 To this end, the oEcn145 has urged all countries to adopt a framework 
that ensures equitable treatment of all shareholders, including minority shareholders. 
The result of this equality being applied is that all shareholders will have the opportunity 
to obtain effective redress for violation of their rights and interests. 
In sum, justice and fairness, in many circumstances, justify a form of protection for 
minority shareholders being in place as long as they are in a vulnerable position. In fact, 
there is some acknowledgment (unfortunately not everywhere) that the principles of 
justice and fairness constitute a strong argument for the minority shareholder to be 
afforded legal protection.146 It is then important for those jurisdictions which do not 
already afford protection to minority shareholders to adopt protection if for no other 
reason, then at least for the sake of justice and fairness. 147 
2.4 What is it exactly that needs to be protected for the minority shareholder? 
And what is the court's role in ensuring this protection? 
142 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2004, pg: 42. Another Final 
Report in consultation with the OECD was issued in 2009, but it mainly addresses protection of minority 
shareholders in listed compnaies. 
143 L, Sealy. & S, Worthington., Cases and Materials in Company Law. 8th ed. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008, pg: 501. 
144 E, Ferran., Company Law and Corporate Finance. 1 st ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pg: 
319. 
145 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2004, the Corporate Governance 
Principles, pg: 40. 
146 J, Abugu., A comparative analysis of the extent of judicial discretion in minority shareholder 
protection litigation: the United Kingdom and United States, International Company and Commercial 
Law Review. 2007.18(5), pg: 181. 
147 It can be argued that majority shareholders always deserve a fair degree of control because of what 
they have contributed to the capital of the company. However, this research is trying to prove that this 
control should be restricted and made subject to litigation. 
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The main purpose of this section is to show how the law can play a major part in 
recognising and reserving the rights and interests of the minority shareholder, and also 
have a role in defining the court's power, jurisdiction and capability to judge in such 
cases. This section is divided into two parts. The first is concerned with detailing the 
categories of potential rights and interests which could be recognised and protected for 
minority shareholders so that it can be understood which aspects need to be protected. 
The second part of this section outlines the court's actual role and the extent of its power 
when dealing with minority shareholder cases. 
2.4.1 The rights and interests of the minority shareholder which need to be 
protected 
The following section not only outlines the minority shareholder's interests and rights, 
but also shows how they should be reserved (stated in the statute) and protected. The 
starting point is when investors finance companies, typically obtaining certain rights, 
interests and powers that need to be protected. Investor protection is defined as a set of 
regulations and laws that protect investors' rights and interests and the strength of the 
legal institutions that facilitate law enforcement. I48 Since the minority shareholder is 
classified as one of those investors, the law must furnish certain rights and interests, and 
endeavour to protect them. Generally speaking, minority shareholders are more likely, 
one would think, to invest in a company if there are mechanisms which they can use to 
obtain a remedy, in the event of their rights or interests being infringed. 149 Of course, the 
law and the quality of its enforcement will be important determinants of which rights 
and interests each shareholder has and how well these rights and interests are 
protected. I50 So the question which arises here is what are these rights, interests and 
powers which are attached to each share obtained by a shareholder (including a minority 
shareholder)? 
148 M, DeFond. & M, Hung., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Worldwide 
Ceo Turnover, Journal of Accounting Research. Sep 18,2003, at: (Abstract). 
149 L, Miles. & M, He., Protecting the rights and interest of minority shareholders in listed companies in 
China: challenges for the future, International Company and Commercial Law Review. 2005, 16(7), pg: 
281. 
150 R, La Porta. & Others., Law and Finance, Journal of Political Economy_ 1998, 106(6), pg: 1114. 
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Before answering this question, it is important to provide a clear description of the 
relationship between the investors and their rights and interests within the company. 
Ferran has described a shareholder as an investor who pays a sum of money into a 
company with the hope of earning a return. 151 This sum of money is turned into a 
financial interest in the company itself but it does not amount to a direct interest in the 
company's assets. These assets belong to the company, which is a separate legal 
entity.I52 In other words, once a shareholder invests in a company, hislher investment is 
exchanged for rights, interests and powers that can be exercised in relation to the 
company's capital and affairs. 
According to the OECD's Principles on Corporate Governance/ 53 basic shareholder 
rights should include the right to (1) secure methods of ownership registration; (2) 
transfer new shares; (3) obtain relevant information on a regular basis; (4) participate 
and vote in meetings; (5) elect and remove members of the board; and (6) share profits. 
In addition to this list, the minority shareholder should also have the right (7) to sue 
directors or majority shareholders for any suspected expropriation against the company 
or himlherself, and finally, have (8) a clear mechanism to exit at a fair price. It may be 
presumed that all these rights and interests come automatically with each share 
purchased, unless contrary provision is made in the articles or constitution at the point 
when the shares are issued. 
A company which wants to issue shares with alternative rights and interests must have 
the power to do so stated within its agreement or articles. However, Rock and Wachter 
feel that the right as to access to information should depend on what the courts provide, 
as they believe that this right should not be unrestricted. This view, however, neglects 
the fact that this right will be much clearer and easier for the minority shareholder to 
understand (and as a result to exercise) if it is statutory, rather than being left to the 
court to decide how to enforce it. I54 It is also important to understand that, since the 
minority shareholder needs information on a regular basis to enable him/her to exercise 
151 E, Ferran., Company Law and Corporate Finance. 1st ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pg: 
315. 
152 Salomon v Salomon [1897] AC 22 HL. 
153 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2004, pg: 9 .. Another ~inal Report 
in consultation with the OECD was issued in 2009, but mainly concentrated on publIc compames. 
154 E, Rock. & M, Wachter., Waiting for the Omelet to Set: Match Specific Assets and Minority 
Oppression in the Close Corporation, Journal ojCorporation Law. 1999,24(4), pg: 36. 
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other rights, this right in particular should be regulated by a reserved provision in the 
law which guarantees that the minority shareholder will always be able to exercise it. 155 
In fact, all of these rights and interests should be reserved in a statutory list to avoid any 
omission, misconception, misinterpretation or ignorance and to simplify the process of 
protecting them. 
An absence of effective and reserved rights and interests may mean, for instance, that 
majority shareholders may be motivated to engage in activities that advance their own 
interests at the expense of minority shareholder interests and rights. 156 It is believed that, 
if the rights and interests are clearly stated, the minority shareholder will have a better 
understanding of what remedy to seek when anyone of them is violated. For example, 
in the English case of Clark v Cutland and Others,157 the minority shareholder was 
unsure which remedy to seek as it was not clear to him which interest or right was 
violated. In this case the majority shareholder had misappropriated funds and taken 
remuneration from the company without authority. The Court of Appeal held that this 
was an abuse by the majority shareholder and he was ordered to return the money to the 
company. Nonetheless, the minority shareholder had in fact filed two proceedings (one 
seeking to enforce corporate interests and the other personal interests) in this case. 
Although the court eventually granted the minority shareholder what he sought, the 
minority shareholder had been forced to file two claims out of confusion, leaving it to 
the court to decide which right or interest had actually been violated. Another example 
of confusion was seen in the Scottish case of Anderson v Hogg158 where the Lord 
Ordinary dismissed the personal interest claim on the basis that the minority shareholder 
had failed to prove unfairness under s459 of the Companies Act 1985, but the same 
judge noted the potential for an action if brought on behalf of the company itself. 
Nevertheless, the Inner House (on appeal) held that the judge was wrong in dismissing 
the claim as there was a potential personal interest as well as a corporate one. Dine has 
commented that there is no clear guidance as to what exactly each interest and right 
serves, and accordingly this may have the effect of confusing the minority shareholder 
155 R, La Porta & Others., Investor protection and corporate governance, Journal of Financial Economics. 
2000,58(1-2), pg: 875. 
156 R, La Porta & Others., Investor protection and corporate governance, Journal of Financial Economics. 
2000,58(1-2), pg: 875. 
157 [2003] EWCA Civ 810. 
158 (Scotland CSess Extra Div 2001) [2002] S.L.T. 353. 
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over which kind of behaviour could be the subject of litigation. 159 Similarly, 
Attenborough has claimed that a problem will occur if the minority shareholder faces 
practical difficulty in establishing a clear fact or ground for hislher interest or right. 160 
As a result of this, several rights and interests which should be protected for the 
minority shareholder, may not be, simply because they are not clearly identified. 
In addition to the rights and interests which should come with each share, the concept of 
legitimate or reasonable expectations should also be recognized and reserved as an 
interest for the minority shareholder. 161 In England, the doctrine of legitimate 
expectations was made a critical element by the House of Lords in response to a claim 
for unfair prejudice in the leading English case of 0 'Neill v Phillips.162 This is an 
important interest and it should also be acknowledged and protected by the law, in line 
with the other stated or reserved rights and interests which are granted to minority 
shareholders. The law here should pay regard to the equitable consideration of 
"legitimate expectation" and loss of trust or confidence between shareholders as 
interests for the minority shareholder (Full detail is given about this doctrine in Chapter 
5, Section 5.1.2.9.3). 
Although it may be difficult for the statute to cover all types of interests and rights in an 
exhaustive list, it is believed that the law can, nevertheless, state a non-exhaustive list of 
interests and rights. The advantage of this is that minority shareholders will be familiar 
with which kind of rights and interests they can litigate over, and recognise where other 
potential rights and interests may exist. The benefits will also extend to judges who will 
be clear about the types of particular interests or rights that can be pursued. 
Furthermore, another advantage which can be noted for the company and its 
shareholders (if a non-exhaustive list of interests and rights is stated) is that a clear 
distinction can be made between corporate and personal interests and rights. 
In sum, the fundamental aim behind highlighting these rights and interests is for the 
statute governing company law to recognise and acknowledge them on behalf of 
159 J, Dine., Company Law. 5~ ed. Palgrave Macmillan, N~w Yor~, 2005, pg: 261. . , 
160 D, Attenborough., How dIrectors should act when owmg dutIes to the compames shareholders: why 
we need to stop applying Greenhalgh, International Company and Commercial Law Review. 2009, 
20(10), pg: 345. 
161 See para 2.1.3. 
162 [1999] 1 WLR 1092. 
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minority shareholders, rather than just assuming that they come automatically with each 
share. It is argued that the statute is the only reliable source which can protect these 
rights and interests. Alternatively, the law may state a non-exhaustive list of interests 
and rights and then go on to define and categorise the grounds and principles that can 
give rise to any new potential right or interest that does not feature on the original list. 
The next part will detail the court's role in this matter. 
2.4.2 The court's role when dealing with minority shareholder cases 
It is clear that it is very difficult for minority shareholders to seek a remedy from within 
the company when any wrongdoing is committed against them, due to the majority 
shareholders' power and influence which allows them to run the company as they wish. 
Therefore, there must be an external body which has the capacity to judge and resolve 
any dispute on request. This external body cannot be other than the court, which could 
grant a relief on any ground whenever justice so requires, and particularly when an 
otherwise helpless minority shareholder is in need of assistance. 163 The court is the 
appropriate body to address disputes between shareholders because it is the only entity 
that is independent, just and disinterested in any conflict, plainly making it more capable 
than any other body to pass judgment in this respect. 
However, the court may find itself 'handcuffed' in certain jurisdictions (including SA 
and Dubai) if the majority shareholder has abused the interests of the minority 
shareholder but is still acting within the provisions of the equivalent to the articles and 
memorandum of association. 164 The court, under these circumstances, is more likely to 
be unable to deliver justice when a dispute or wrongdoing occurs in the company and, 
for this reason, there must be an alternative principle for the law to apply in order to 
justify the court's interference in bringing justice in the company's or minority 
shareholder's favour. 
There are three possible responses that can be identified as to how courts deal with 
complaints from shareholders concerning majority shareholders' abuse of company 
163 Pavlides v Jensen [1956] 2 All E.R. 518. 
164 J, Abugu., A comparative analysis of the extent of judicial discretion in minority shareholder 
protection litigation: the United Kingdom and Untied States, International Company and Commercial 
Law Review. 2007.18(5), pg: 184. 
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rights. The first is the court's traditional position of non-interference. 165 With this 
response, the court does not interfere in the company's management and this may well 
mean that unfairness, oppression, misuse and abuse are going unchecked. The second 
possible response is to freely open all cases to the courts according to the minority 
shareholder's wishes, so that the latter can simply bring an action in regard to any 
conduct they are not happy with, and they do so using company funds (where the action 
is brought on behalf of the company). This response is the exact opposite of the first, as 
it opens all doors for the minority shareholder to litigate and allows the court to interfere 
in management without any restrictions whatsoever. The possible consequence of this 
position being adopted, however, would be that the minority shareholder might either 
misjudge whether litigation is in the best interests of the company,166 or act vexatiously. 
Moreover, the minority shareholder is not always in the best position to judge whether 
or not to commit the company's resources to the costly process of litigation and, 
accordingly, could waste the company's money.167 Therefore, it is clear that neither the 
court's stance of non-interference nor the free and open scenario are appropriate options 
to deal with concerns over the company's interests, as each response produces extreme 
results. For that reason, there must be another alternative which would bring justice in 
such cases. This third response involves giving the court the discretion to investigate 
matters on a case by case basis, with the incorporation of a preliminary stage to consider 
whether it should allow the minority shareholder to proceed. 168 This strategy emanates 
from an understanding of the conflict of interests which the majority shareholder carries, 
between the desire to have complete freedom to run the company and the desire to 
prevent the minority shareholder from litigating. 169 The court here attempts to balance 
the wish of the majority shareholder to have control over litigation and the minority 
shareholder's desire to have no restriction whatsoever placed on their ability to 
165 This was the position under English common law, as illustrated in Carlen v Drury (1812) 35 E.R. 61, 
that "the court is not required on every occasion to take over the management of every playhouse and 
brew house in the kingdom". 
166 A, Reisberg., Judicial control of derivative actions, International Company and Commercial Law 
Review. 2005, 16(8), pg: 337. 
167 As stated by the Court of Appeal in the case Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd 
[1982] Ch 204. .. , .. ., 
168 This scenario has been adopted In the Compames Act 2006, s260, the statutory denvattve actIon. 
169 P, Roberts. & J, Poole., Shareholder remedies - corporate wrongs and the derivative action, Journal of 
Business Law. March 1999, pg: 101. 
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litigate. l7O While this means that the court will be more involved with companies' 
internal management over litigation, it is only done to ensure that justice occurs. 
a. The court's involvement in commercial and litigious decisions: 
For the court to judge whether the directors of a company have acted wrongly, there is a 
requirement for it to be more involved in the company's internal management. 
Inevitably, this involvement has been criticised on the basis that it is not practical for the 
court to position itself to assess whether or not litigation is in the company's interest. I7I 
In response to this criticism, however, it is important to understand that the court, when 
exercising its discretion, will examine the majority shareholder's conduct on both 
objective and subjective levels to ensure the most thorough comprehension of the 
matter. In The court's greater involvement with commercial decisions is for a superior 
purpose, which is to bring justice to companies when necessary and, at the same time, it 
ensures that nonsensical minority shareholder claims are not able to be pursued. 
One role the court may play, if involved with commercial and litigious decisions, is in 
having the power to redirect minority shareholders' claims from being pursued on the 
grounds of corporate rights to being taken up on the grounds of personal rights, or vice 
versa. As mentioned already, there are two main grounds that minority shareholders can 
use in order to establish an action. The first is the corporate ground which is associated 
with corporate rights, as in the case of abuse or fraud committed against the company 
itself. The second is the personal ground which is attached to the shareholder's own 
rights and interests. The main purpose of the role of redirecting minority shareholders' 
claims is for the court to select the correct legal format for each case, as several effects 
will ensue accordingly. This is an issue where there is uncertainty, as demonstrated 
above. Therefore, it should not be left: to minority shareholders (or even lawyers) to 
choose which ground to use according to their wishes,I73 because proceedings based on 
170 T, Boyle., The new derivative action, Company Lawyer. 1997, 18(8), pg: 255-257. 
171 H, Hirt., The Company's Decision to Litigate Against its Directors: Legal Strategies to Deal with the 
Board of Directors' Conflict oflnterest, Journal o/Business Law, Mar 2005, pg: 191-193. 
172 M, Almadani., Derivative actions: does the Companies Act 2006 offer a way forward?, Company 
Lawyer. 2009, 30(5), pg: 138. 
173 At the start of any claim, it is initially open to the minority to bring it on any ground he/she chooses, 
but the court then has a role which enables it to redirect the claim on the basis of what it believes to be the 
most appropriate ground. 
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the corporate ground, for example, bring certain advantages that are not available to 
proceedings based on personal grounds. For instance, using corporate grounds as the 
basis for an action will allow the minority shareholder to use the company's name in the 
claim and perhaps to seek indemnity for costs if the case succeeds. 174 If the court has the 
ability to redirect cases to be pursued on their correct grounds, there will be benefits for 
minority shareholders, and also for the company, as the court will always ensure that 
action is taken on the most appropriate grounds. 175 One benefit in particular is that the 
court would not penalise a minority shareholder if he/she proceeded on the wrong basis. 
Thus, for the court to fulfil its role efficiently, it should have discretion to monitor, 
guide, direct, resolve, enforce the law and safeguard the minority shareholder and the 
company. However, some legal commentators question the court's ability to deliver. 176 
b. Scepticism of the court's capacity to judge in minority cases: 
One of the criticisms levelled at the court's ability to judge directors' decisions 
surrounds the fact that courts may make their judgments on the basis of the tangible 
results of these decisions and, accordingly, they are more likely to hold the directors 
accountable. This happens because the court has access to evidence of what has 
occurred as a result of the directors' decisions but not of what led to those decisions. 
Arguably, this may lead the court to hold that directors (or majority shareholders) could 
have acted in a different manner or could have done more for the company's benefit. 
This presumption might render majority shareholders anxious that the court is not a 
suitable body to judge on business matters - especially those made in the past - as it may 
not possess a comprehensive awareness of the prevailing conditions at the time in which 
a particular decision was reached. In response to this argument, however, Keay has 
pointed out that courts do appear to have been vigilant concerning this possibility, and 
have warned about using hindsight or "second guessing" to judge the past actions of 
directors. l77 He reached this view after studying several English cases dealing with 
174 B, Hannigan., Drawing boundaries between derivative claims and unfairly prejudicial petitions, 
Journal a/Business Law. 2009, 6, pg: 610-611. 
175 S, Mayson. D, French. & C, Ryan., Company Law. 24rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007-
2008, pg: 678. 
176 Some may query whether the court should have to guide parties in proceedings. This guidance might 
seem unusual in the common law system. However, it may be appropriate in a civil law system where the 
court is always empowered to be more involved in such cases. 
177 A, Keay., Wrongful trading and the liability of company directors; a theoretical perspective, Legal 
Studies. Sep 2005. 25(3), pg: 440. 
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claims for wrongful trading and breach of the duty of care by directors. It was said by 
the judge in the English case of Re Sherborne Associates Ltd,178 for example, that it is 
dangerous to assume that "what has in fact happened was always bound to happen and 
was apparent". A similar view was also taken by Lewison J in the English case of 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Goldberg. 179 Thus, courts have demonstrated 
recognition that directors must make difficult decisions, often in challenging 
circumstances, and matters might not have been as clear for them at those moments as 
they are when they can see the outcome of their decisions. 
Similarly, there have been questions asked of the court's capability to solve these types 
of cases. It is suggested by certain commentators that courts lack the experience and 
ability to pass judgement when it comes to commercial and business decisions. I8o This 
is to say that the directors themselves are the best placed to judge from a commercial 
point of view on matters related to the company's affairs, and that there is no need for 
the minority shareholder to request the involvement of the court in every dispute as it is 
not capable of judging in the same way. Oesterle is one of those who believe that, 
because judges lack business experience, the court is not the appropriate forum for 
considering whether or not directors have acted properly.I81 However, this argument is 
challenged by Keay, who asserts that the claim does not accord with the only empirical 
evidence from UK law, namely the reported decisions!82 Keay draws attention to the 
decision in the case of Re Continental Assurance Co of London plc. 183 Although in this 
case the judge described the financial system which the directors had overseen as 
antiquated, he did not criticise the directors for not having had a better one in place, 1 84 
and therefore appeared to be acting leniently. A similar picture arises from the English 
178 [1995] BCC 40. 
179 [2004] 1 BCLC 597, pg: 613. 
180 For example, Cheffins in (B, Cheffins., Company Law: Theory, Structure and Operation. 1 51 ed. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, pg: 543). Also, Wishart in (D, Wishart, 'Models and Theories of 
Directors' Duties to Creditors', New Zealand University Law Review. 1991, pg: 340-341). 
181 D, Oesterle., 'Corporate Directors' Personal Liability for "Insolvent Trading" in Australia, "Reckless 
Trading" in New Zealand and "Wrongful Trading" in England: A Recipe for Timid Directors, Hamstrung 
Controlling Shareholders and Skittish Lenders', cited In: I, Ramsay & Others., Company Director's 
Liability for Insolvent Trading. 151 ed. Centre for Corporate Law and Securities Regulation, the University 
of Melbourne, Australia, 2000. 
182 A, Keay., Wrongful trading and the liability of company directors; a theoretical perspective, Legal 
Studies. Sep 2005. 25(3}, pg: 439. 
183 [2001] BPIR 733. 
184 A, Keay., Wrongful trading and the liability of company directors; a theoretical perspective, Legal 
Studies. Sep 2005. 25(3}, pg: 440. 
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case of Re Purpoint Ltd,185 where the judge (even though he admitted having some 
doubts as to whether a reasonable director would have permitted the company to have 
commenced trading at all due to the existence of clear critical factors against trading) 
did not conclude that the company had been doomed from the outset. 
A point which proves the courts' competence to judge in minority cases is that some 
jurisdictions have specialised courts that are dedicated to judging in commercial cases. 
This commercial speciality has made judges within such courts perfectly able to 
comprehend and appreciate the facts of every minority case, and therefore deliver fair 
judgments. However, even if courts in these jurisdictions do appear to be weak in their 
ability to judge fairly in minority cases, they will usually be presented with evidence 
from professional experts and this will help guide them. Therefore, the court can indeed 
be seen as capable of showing understanding of the directors' position as well as 
minority perspectives, and it can be now said with confidence that courts are able to 
make fair judgments. 
c. Clear criteria to guide the court: 
It is strongly believed that if the minority shareholder is gIven efficient protection, 
courts will make concerted efforts to solve disputes fairly for all parties. The question of 
whether or not the courts are qualified to comprehend business or commercial decisions 
does not remain unanswered as courts have proved themselves able to do so. 
Meanwhile, it is suggested that, for the sake of increasing confidence and trust in the 
court's ability yet further, certain clear criteria to guide the court should be drawn up in 
the statute. The statute may compel the court to take these criteria into account in order 
to decide whether or not to interfere and whether to allow the action by the minority 
shareholder to proceed.186 Thus, the statute should not only list minority shareholders' 
rights and interests and provide their protection, but should also offer guidance and 
direction to judges on how to apply the law. This will enhance trust in the court's ability 
to judge in such cases. 
185 [1991] BCLC 491; [1991] BCC 121. 
186 These criteria have been set for the court to follow in the English Companies Act 2006, s263 (2). They 
are not only important to guide the court, but also for lawyers and shareholders. 
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Consequently, minority shareholder protection is positively related to the court's role as 
it is the only true refuge that the minority shareholder can take in order to seek justice. 187 
For this reason, the statute should first recognise the rights and interests of the minority 
shareholder, and then provide a mechanism for the court to ensure the protection of 
these rights and interests. It should be noted that having clear criteria to follow in the 
statute does not only benefit the court, but also benefits lawyers, shareholders, directors 
and others. However, it is accepted that offering guidance and direction for the court in 
the statute is not an easy task, but the benefit that is received from having one in place 
outweighs anything else. 
2.5 What would be the ideal way to produce efficient protection for minority 
shareholders? 
This section of the chapter outlines what would have to be the minimum protection 
available for the minority shareholder in order to offer sufficient safeguards. The section 
is divided into three parts. The first discusses the principles of corporate governance. 
The second section calls for making the best use of the grounds which the minority 
shareholder has available to establish their cases. The third recommends a practical and 
efficient model of minority shareholder protection. 
2.5.1 Corporate governance. 
a. Its definition and scope: 
Minority shareholder protection can emanate from many sources, including statutory 
provisions, the judicial system, external mechanisms of control, voluntary adoption of 
an internal company code, ethics, shareholders' agreement or corporate governance 
principles and regulation. 188 However, corporate governance as a whole can prove more 
important and useful than the remainder of these sources as it does not just provide 
protection for the minority shareholder, but also offers a comprehensive system of 
benefits for everyone dealing with the company. There is a vast literature on corporate 
187 B, Means., A Voice-Based Framework for Evaluating Claims of Minority Shareholder Oppression in 
the Close Corporation, Georgetown Law Journal. 2009, 97 (5), pg: 3. 
188 T, Lazarides., Minority Shareholder Choices and Rights in the New Market Environment. (July 10, 
2009), Available at: <http://ssrn.com!abstract=1432672>accessed24February201O,pg: 1. 
S3 
governance but there is no single accepted definition of it. The tenn was first coined 
around 20 years ago so it is relatively new and, surprisingly, since then its meaning has 
not been analysed in-depth. It has been generally defined as "the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled".189 However, this definition seems too broad to 
account for its actual meaning. Most recently, du Plessis has offered a more carefully 
considered explanation which seeks to reflect all aspects and functions of the corporate 
governance role: 
"It is the process of regulating and overseeing corporate conduct and of balancing the 
interests of all internal stakeholders and other parties .... who can be affected by the 
corporation's conduct in order to ensure responsible behaviour by the corporation and to 
achieve the maximum level of efficiency and profitability for the corporation".190 
This is a much more appropriate and accurate definition, and can better serve the 
purpose of this research. It shows that corporate governance is a complete system 
concerned with the rights and interests of all shareholders and other stakeholders, and 
utilizes different areas of the law for the same purpose. This can be seen, for example, 
when corporate governance refers to Contract Law191 to regulate negotiated 
agreements, and to Company Law to list (and where necessary adopt) certain rights and 
interests for both the majority and minority shareholders. These fields of law, and the 
quality of their enforcement by the regulators and courts, are essential elements of 
corporate governance. 192 
Nonetheless, this recent definition has not specified any role for corporate governance in 
furnishing litigation remedies and would be much more comprehensive if it were to 
expand corporate governance's scope to reach beyond the internal environment of the 
company. More to the point, if corporate governance does not pay attention to providing 
an adequate remedy when the rights and interests of minority shareholders are harmed, 
189 The UK Cadbury Report (1992) and the South African King Report (1994). These reports tried to 
define corporate governance and were mentioned in the article (J, Du Plessis., Corporate law and 
corporate governance lessons from the past: ebbs and flows: but far from "the end of history ..... ": Part 1, 
Company Lawyer. 2009, 30(2), pg: 43). 
190 J, Du Plessis., Corporate law and corporate governance lessons from the past: ebbs and flows: but far 
from "the end of history ..... ": Part 1, Company Lawyer. 2009, 30(2), pg: 44. 
191 This does not contradict the principle that says parties have freedom of contract to write what they 
wish. Instead, it suggests that the government should state certain rights and interests with certain 
procedures in the statute for any agreement of this type, in order to reserve them and make them 
contractual for the minority shareholder. 
192 R La Porta & Others., Investor protection and corporate governance, Journal of Financial Economics. 
, 
2000,58(1-2), pg: 879. 
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there is no assurance of protection at all. 193 Before discussing the purpose and aims of 
corporate governance below, it is important to make clear that it is wrong to assume, as 
some seem to,194 that strong minority shareholder protection is key to creating an 
environment that fosters effective corporate governance. This viewpoint confounds the 
reality that minority shareholder protection is just one aspect of corporate governance 
and not the other way around. The minority shareholder is but one stakeholder; 
corporate governance serves all stakeholders. 195 Any definition should therefore involve 
the idea that effective corporate governance can create an environment which fosters 
minority shareholder protection. 
b. Its general aims: 
The aIm of corporate governance in this context is to construct effective minority 
shareholder protection by balancing conflicting interests and tensions, and offering 
remedies in relation to disputes. For corporate governance to serve minority shareholder 
protection in this way, it is believed that it should ensure the following: 
1. That the minority shareholders must be treated fairly and have their rights and 
interests protected. 196 
2. That the procedures and mechanisms to litigate are clearly and plainly designed 
in the law for the minority shareholder to exercise. 
3. The availability of a remedy for each and every type of wrongdoing and 
unfairness. 
4. That the minority shareholder can sell hislher shares for a fair price when he/she 
wishes to exit the company. 
c. Its role to provide remedies 
193 L, Miles. & M, He., Protecting the rights and interests of minority shareholders in listed companies in 
China: challenges for the future, International Company and Commercial Law Review. 2005, 16(7), pg: 
277. 
194 DeFond and Hung in their paper (M, DeFond. & M, Hung., Investor Protection and Corporate 
Governance: Evidence from Worldwide Ceo Turnover, Journal of Accounting Research. Sep 18,2003, 
pg: 10) analysed a number of studies and came to such a conclusion. .. 
195 Stakeholders can include majority shareholders, minority shareholders, employees, dIrectors, credItors, 
suppliers, public members and others. . 
196 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2004, pg:. 40. Ano~er Fmal 
Report in consultation with the OECD was issued in 2009, but mainly focused on publIc compames. 
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What should always stand out from the list of aims is the responsibility of corporate 
governance to ensure the availability of legal devices which help obtain a remedy in 
cases of wrongdoing or oppression. This, indeed, is a major role as it grants minority 
shareholders certain litigation remedies, rather than leaving them to rely solely on 
internal mechanisms within the company. In order to reach this level and produce this 
result, the corporate governance framework should distribute responsibilities and 
accountabilities among shareholders. 197 However, holding the wrongdoer or oppressor 
accountable for any misuse or unfairness may not be possible unless the minority 
shareholder has clear and defined procedures and remedies on which to act. Lazarides 
has commented that, for corporate governance to serve minority shareholder protection 
effectively, it needs to explicitly state the rights and interests of minority shareholders 
and then furnish an efficient regulatory, legal, judicial and penalty system that 
guarantees the availability of clear remedies for the minority shareholder to exercise as 
necessary. 198 
It is important to note that the role of corporate governance in ensuring the availability 
of litigation remedies in the law does not only serve the minority shareholder but also 
the court, as it must be clear for the court which remedies can be applied in each case. If 
the statute does not make explicit provision to this effect, the court may not find itself 
freely empowered to judge and bring justice. This was clearly illustrated in the 
American case of Wheeler v Pullman Iron & Steel Co, 199 where the court held that the 
power to order winding up of the company must be statutory before the courts can 
deliver such a remedy.200 Any failure to statutorily specify both the choice of remedies 
available and the court's power, results in uncertainty and unpredictability in the law as 
far as both shareholders and judges are concerned.201 
197 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2004, pg: 29. Another Final 
Report in consultation with the OECD was issued in 2009, but mainly focused on public companies. 
198 T, Lazarides., Minority Shareholder Choices and Rights in the New Market Environment. (July 10, 
2009), Available at: <http://ssrn.com!abstract=1432672>accessed24February201O,pg: 6. 
199 III. 197; 32 N.E.420. 
200 In the United States, the court cannot bring justice without an actual statutory footing to do so. The 
statute should always empower the court to order winding-up when needed as the court may not grant a 
remedy that is not statutory. 
201 J, Abugu., A comparative analysis of the extent of judicial discretion in minority shareholder 
protection litigation: the United Kingdom and United States, International Company and Commercial 
Law Review. 2007.18(5), pg: 188. 
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The corporate governance mechanisms will therefore be pointless if they do not include 
a statutory mechanism which offers clear litigation remedies.202 Concentrating 
exclusively on listing the rights and interests of the minority shareholder without arming 
them with remedies to deploy when necessary, does not produce protective, practical 
and efficient corporate governance. Thus, it is important to realise that once the majority 
shareholder knows that corporate governance grants the minority shareholder certain 
power to pursue any wrong or oppression through litigation, he/she will be more likely 
to comply with the law?03 
In sum, minority shareholder protection is a major part of corporate governance. For 
corporate governance to serve minority shareholder protection effectively, it should 
facilitate and clarify at least the following: legal remedies, empowerment of courts and 
minority shareholder participation in management. Undoubtedly, both corporate 
governance and minority shareholder protection are positively related in a way that 
means, if effective corporate governance is in place, it is highly likely to be reflected in 
the effectiveness of minority shareholder protection. Nevertheless, the role of corporate 
governance can be made absolutely redundant if there are no grounds in the law to 
remedy each and every type of wrongdoing and unfairness. Thus, it is very important for 
an effective corporate governance system to have broad grounds which can 
accommodate all categories of majority shareholder misconduct. The next sub-section 
will discuss the grounds available currently and demonstrate the need for there to be 
more grounds to litigate upon. 
2.5.2 Grounds on which to establish an action for corporate interests 
For the minority shareholder to bring an action, he/she should have to attribute the 
misconduct to a ground which is specified and acknowledged by the statute. One 
common ground is fraud. What is interesting is that in certain jurisdictions (e.g. Saudi 
Arabia) "fraud" is the only clear ground on which the minority shareholder can rely in 
order to establish a claim. The problem starts for the minority shareholder when a wrong 
is committed against the company which does not amount to fraud. In these 
202 T, Lazarides., Minority Shareholder Choices and Rights in the New Market Environment. (July 10, 
2009), Available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1432672>accessed24February2010,pg: 3. . 
203 D, Schlimm. L, Mezzetti & B, Sharfman., Corporate Governance and the Impact of ControllIng 
Shareholder, Corporate Governance Advisor. 2010,18(1), pg: 6. 
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circumstances, the minority shareholder still needs to establish "fraud" as a ground, 
even if the wrong actually gives rise to other grounds, such as pure negligence, abuse, 
misuse etc, for which there are no stated remedies.204 
It is possible to take traditional UK common law205 as an example of a system which 
used to only allow fraud as a ground for a case brought by a minority shareholder. This 
was after UK courts created a common law device called the 'derivative action'. In this 
circumstance, the minority shareholder was permitted to bring an action on behalf of the 
company, but only where clear fraud had occurred.206 This sole ground of "fraud" 
placed extremely strict limitations on the conduct which could be attributable to it 
because all wrongdoing and miscount had to amount to "fraud". Relatively speaking, 
very few claims were reported under common law, as seen from their infrequent 
appearance in case law.207 It was difficult to bring an action as the minority shareholder 
had no power to access information which might have been able to prove the fraud and 
could have been used as evidence in court. Also, the minority shareholder had to 
establish that the wrongdoers were in control of the company to establish fraud. An 
example of how important it was to establish fraud can be seen in the English case of 
Pavlides v Jensen,208 where the minority shareholder failed to establish the alleged 
negligent disposition of assets as fraud, and so the case failed. However, in Daniels v 
Daniels,2°9 the court allowed a derivative action where no clear fraud was alleged, only 
negligence. The judge in this case seems to have been influenced by the fact that a 
majority shareholder made a considerable profit at the expense of the company, which 
was self-serving negligence and could therefore be considered as fraud. In fact, this 
weak, complicated and incomplete ground allowed many instances of wrongdoing and 
204 These grounds serve the corporate interest to obtain a remedy, but for the oppression of minority 
'personal interest' there is another remedy, already mentioned in 2.1.a and 2.1.b. 
20S This is no longer the case in English company law as this device has been moved to the statute under 
the Companies Act 2006, instead of common law. This new law will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
206 A, Reisberg., Judicial control of derivative actions, International Company and Commercial Law 
Review. 2005, 16(8), pg: 337. 
207 M, Almadani., Derivative actions: does the Companies Act 2006 offer a way forward?, Company 
Lawyer. 2009,30(5), pg: 135. 
208 [1956] 2 All ER 518. Fraud affecting the minority was also seen in Daniels v Daniels [1978] Ch. 406; 
[1978] 2 All E.R. 89 Ch D. 
209 [1978] Ch 406. 
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misconduct to go unpunished because of its narrow scope and problematical 
1· . 210 app lcatlOn. 
It was only towards the end of the twentieth century that reviews211 were conducted 
which concluded that limiting all types of misconduct to one ground only, namely 
"fraud", was detrimental. At this point, recommendations and proposals were put 
forward with the aim of widening the scope of liability in order to accommodate many 
more types of wrongful conduct besides fraud and also to abolish any need to establish 
the fact that the wrongdoers were in control of the company. Indeed, this is what was 
adopted in the UK Companies Act 2006. The position under the new law is that a 
derivative action can be launched when there is any breach of duty, breach of trust, 
default, misuse, abuse or negligence, besides fraud. It is no longer important to establish 
fraud in any of these grounds but, instead, each ground has the ability to stand on its 
own to constitute a claim. 
In sum, the knowledge gained from the UK's long experience should be taken into 
consideration by those jurisdictions which still apply "fraud" as the sole ground on 
which to base an action. They should be acquainted with the need for listing several 
grounds, besides fraud, for the minority shareholder to deploy, as these grounds will 
benefit the company itself. However, if they do not do so, many instances of misconduct 
and wrongs may escape liability and the company will be first to suffer. 
2.5.3 The ideal model of protection 
It is important to realise that the vast majority of jurisdictions apply one of only two 
models when dealing with minority shareholder protection. The first model is that of 
French-civil-law countries, a legal family which includes many jurisdictions besides 
France, such as Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, the UAE and SA. The second model is 
that of common-law countries (the Anglo-Saxon countries) such as the UK, Canada, the 
United States and India, whose laws are modelled on UK law. It has been found by La 
Porta et al that common-law countries confer on shareholders stronger protection, 
210 M, Almadani., Derivative actions: does the Companies Act 2006 offer a way forward?, Company 
Lawyer. 2009, 30(5), pg: 132. 
211 Law Commission Report 1997 & Company Law Review, Developing the Framework, 2000. 
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relatively speaking, than the French-civil-law countries which provide the weakest 
protection of all legal systems.212 This is specifically because common-law jurisdictions 
have a law that protects oppressed minority shareholders. However, the pre-emptive 
. h 213 ( h· h·· d d 
ng t w lC IS mten e to protect shareholders from dilution of their shareholding 
and to prevent the issue of shares at below-market prices) is not particularly protective 
in common-law jurisdictions and the French-based countries have better pre-emptive 
rights than those systems based on common-law. But generally speaking, the Anglo-
Saxon countries offer more effective protection for minority shareholders. Lazarides 
believes that this effectiveness of protection in the Anglo-Saxon countries may be due 
to the explicit legal protection for the minority shareholder, whereas the markets in the 
other models do not have the same legal capacity to monitor and control companies.214 
Broadly speaking, it is true to say that the Anglo-Saxon systems, relative to other 
jurisdictions, indeed have a package of laws that offer the best protection for minority 
shareholders.215 The main cornerstone, which has made the common-law countries so 
strong in this respect, is the availability of certain mechanisms for minority shareholders 
to exercise. For example in the UK, these mechanisms are as follows. Firstly, a 
minority shareholder can bring a "personal action" if hislher personal rights have been 
infringed. 2 16 The second device, namely the derivative action, is intended for the 
minority shareholder to exercise when the company's interest is harmed.217 Thirdly, the 
unfair prejudice/oppression action is a further device, specifically designed to deal with 
any act by the company that harms the shareholder's interests in hislher capacity as a 
member.218 Fourthly, it is also possible for minority shareholders to seek a winding-up 
order when it is just and equitable to do SO.2I9 Finally, the minority may request that the 
212 R, La Porta. & Others., Law and Finance, Journal of Po litica I Economy. 1998,106(6), pg: 1116. 
213 Pre-emptive rights generally either allow the shareholders within a particular company to be given 
priority to purchase any new shares, or those of a shareholder who wishes to sell his/her shares, before 
they are made available to the public or require board approval for a transfer. 
214 T, Lazarides., Minority Shareholder Choices and Rights in the New Market Environment. (July 10, 
2009), Available at: <http://ssm.com/abstract=1432672>accessed24February2010,pg: 4. 
215 R La Porta. & Others., Law and Finance, Journal of Political Economy. 1998, 106(6), pg: 1129. 
216 This action in particular is still available under English common law and will be discussed in detail in 
chapter 5. See, e.g. Smith v Croft No 2 [1988] Ch 114, and Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd v Newman 
Industries Ltd (No.2), [1982] Ch 204. 
217 This action used to function under English common law but was made a statutory action under the 
Companies Act 2006. 
218 This action used to be under s459 ofthe CA 1985 but now comes under s994 of the CA 2006. 
219 For example, see sI22(1)(g) Insolvency Act 1986. This is the last option available to the minority 
shareholder but he/she must first prove that it is just and equitable to do so. 
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company should be investigated because its affairs are being handled improperly (this 
remedy in particular has been mostly used in public companies).22o 
After looking at the types of protection which some jurisdictions offer, it is believed 
that, in order to produce an ideal model of minority shareholder protection, a jurisdiction 
should take into account a few key principles. It is expected that if these principles are 
considered, the minority shareholder will then have the minimum protection that 
safeguards hislher investment. I would suggest these principles or guidelines as follows: 
1. Furnishing clear legal devices and mechanisms for a minority shareholder to 
litigate when he/she has reasonable grounds to believe that hislher rights or the 
company's rights have been violated.221 
2. Widening the grounds on which the minority shareholder may be able to bring 
an action on behalf of the company, in order to include a broad range of types of 
misconduct. 
3. Activating the court's role, discretion and power when dealing with shareholder 
disputes in order to have the ability to interfere and bring justice when necessary. 
4. Withdrawing the power to make decisions over litigation from the majority 
shareholder and granting it to the court when a shareholder seeks to enforce 
rights owed to the company or when the company's interests are being abused, 
but with the court being able to ensure that the minority shareholder is not 
bringing nonsense claims. 
5. Designing a clear mechanism for exiting the company at a reasonable price 
without unnecessary delay. 
6. Reviewing and assessing, on a regular basis, how minority shareholder 
protection laws work in practice in order to offer immediate reforms when 
needed. 
It is important to state that, in order for these guidelines to produce efficiency, 
legislators and regulators should sincerely consider them when addressing minority 
220 The action has a base in CA 1985, S431 (1) & (2). Some amendments were made to the Companies 
Act 2006 in order to give the power of investigation to the Secretary of State under sII77. . 
221 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2004, ~t 40. Ano~her Fmal Report 
in consultation with the OECD was issued in 2009, but mainly focused on publIc compames. 
61 
shareholder protection in the statutory provisions. Meanwhile, it will remain difficult for 
the regulators and legislators to strike the right balance when they are faced with the fact 
that majority shareholders need space and freedom to run the company, while the 
minority shareholder needs protection that will sometimes restrict the majority 
shareholder's actions.222 In other words, there will always be a dilemma for regulators in 
determining how they should frame legislation to ensure the various interests in the 
company are equally considered. This requires legislators to engage in a balancing 
exercise. Similarly, judges will also face difficulty when attempting to achieve balance 
in cases where the minority shareholder has a right to litigate, but the case may not 
benefit the company's interests should it succeed.223 
2.6 Conclusion 
In order to understand the positions of both the majority and minority shareholders in 
the company, it was necessary to begin this chapter by revealing how the power and 
authority within a company is handled by the majority shareholder and to what extent 
this power can be unrestrained. Thus, the first section demonstrated the majority 
shareholder's power, and also highlighted the weak and limited position of the minority 
shareholder in the company. 
The second section contested the views of those who dispute the importance of minority 
shareholder protection, while the third section put forward certain justifications for the 
existence of minority shareholder protection to prove that activating minority 
shareholder protection can contribute to both business prosperity and accountability. 
The fourth section illustrated precisely which interests and rights need to be protected 
and detailed the court's role in dealing with minority shareholder cases. The fifth 
section considered an ideal model of protection in order to see what might help to 
produce an efficient system of minority shareholder protection in reality. 
Dealing broadly with the issue of minority shareholders, this chapter has shown how a 
company or a minority shareholder can be maltreated by majority shareholders who 
222 L, Sealy. & S, Worthington., Cases and Materials in Company Law. Sth ed. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 200S, pg: 371. . . 
223 H, Hirt., The Company's Decision to Litigate Against its Directors: Legal StrategIes to Deal WIth the 
Board of Directors' Conflict ofInterest, Journal of Business Law, Mar 2005, pg: 194. 
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would normally enjoy full domination within the company. If they are not restricted, 
this can harm many parties including the company itself and, therefore, also its minority 
shareholders. The result can be financially harmful to the minority shareholder since the 
majority shareholder, taking advantage of hislher power, may be effectively 
"maximizing the controlling shareholder's utility," but not necessarily "maximizing the 
value of the corporation".224 For this reason, this chapter has concluded that the majority 
shareholder's power needs to be monitored and controlled by granting the minority 
shareholder certain statutory protection. This statutory protection should acknowledge 
the minority shareholder's rights and interests, and should be sufficient to arm himlher 
with remedies that allow the protection of these rights and interests if violated. 
The chapter concludes with certain recommendations and proposals that, if considered, 
may help to produce an ideal model of minority shareholder protection. These general 
guidelines should be taken into consideration by any jurisdiction which intends to 
reform the minority shareholder protection within its company law, as they should 
guarantee the minimum basic protection for the minority shareholder. The next chapter 
addresses the position of minority shareholder protection in Saudi Arabia and Dubai. 
224 D, Schlimm. L, Mezzetti & B, S harfin an. , Corporate Governance and the Impact of Controlling 
Shareholder, Corporate Governance Advisor. 2010, 18(1), pg: 6. 
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Chapter 3 
An examination of minority shareholder protection in Saudi Arabia 
and Dubai 
Introduction 
It would seem that in order to protect minority shareholders, laws need to be developed 
to discourage directorial misconduct. This will enhance the minority shareholders' 
confidence, promote transparent accountability and contribute to national economic 
growth. Unfortunately, there is no ready-made model of minority shareholder protection 
that can be transplanted to all jurisdictions. It is therefore vital to undertake a detailed 
study of each country's company law, examining its characteristics to gain a better 
understanding of what reforms are needed and to what extent they should be 
implemented. This is because important influential factors including the constitution, 
laws, customs, conventions, creeds, language, roots, culture and economic potential will 
vary from one country to another. Thus, for a study conducted in a particular country to 
be beneficial and effective, it should investigate all aspects of doing business, such as 
transactions, the quality of infrastructure, security from theft and looting, the 
transparency of regulation, liquidity, accountability and enforcement of law, so that it 
can deliver a clear picture of the company system.225 These are the factors which matter 
most in deciding whether to invest, as the potential investor ultimately wants to ensure 
that an effective protection exists to safeguard the investment. It is reported226 that the 
availability of effective protection is an important consideration for up to 73% of 
investors. Thus, law-makers have a key interest in reforming the law on a continuous 
basis in order to reinforce investor protection. In the context of developing countries, 
and of SA and Dubai in particular, this interest is shown by the governments' intention 
to make the economy more attractive for foreign investors to do business. However, this 
is less likely to happen in the absence of effective regulations and reliable corporate 
practices which can guarantee the safety of an investment. Confidence and trust in the 
225 The World Bank and International Finance Corporation, Doing Business 2010 Saudi Arabia, 1st ed. 
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, 2009, pg: 1. 
226 The World Bank and International Finance Corporation, Doing Business 2010 Saudi Arabia, 1 sl ed. 
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, 2009, pg: 28. 
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market and the system must be visible and tangible for national and local investors first 
and can then be extended to international investors. 
The particular aim of this chapter is therefore to investigate relevant company law and 
commercial legislation in SA and Dubai as examples of Arab and Islamic countries. 
This will involve an examination of the present doctrine in SA and Dubai as far as 
minority shareholder protection is concerned. It is designed to identify any weak and 
inefficient aspects of laws dealing with minority shareholders, not merely to prove that 
the laws regarding minority shareholder protection are weak, but also to diagnose where 
exactly the problem lies in order to offer correct and workable reforms. Phrased 
differently, this chapter will identify the shortcomings of the legal position as far as 
minority shareholders are concerned in Saudi Arabia ("SA") and Dubai and establish 
what is in greatest need of reform. 
This chapter will be more concerned with SA than Dubai because of its greater potential 
for attracting foreign investment, the higher circulation of money and greater number of 
transactions in its market,227 as well as its surprisingly greater need for legal reform 
compared with Dubai (discussion of the Dubai law and Bill is delivered towards the end 
of this chapter). The chapter is divided into the following six sections: the first gives 
background data concerning SA, the second sets out what SA company law states 
regarding minority shareholder protection and the third explains the role that Sharia law 
(Islamic jurisprudence) plays in protecting minority shareholders. The fourth section 
discusses the new SA Company Law Bill in an attempt to identify what elements of it 
would be beneficial to minority shareholders, if any. The fifth section considers the 
position of minority shareholder protection under Dubai Company Law and its Bill. 
Finally, there is a conclusion. 
3.1 General outline of Saudi Arabia 
SA is a Muslim country, all of whose citizens are Muslims. Thus, it is part of the 
Muslim world, which is often stereotyped, according to Miles and Goulding, as 
backward and with high illiteracy rates, corrupt rulers and much terrorist activity. If all 
227 See section 1.1 of the first chapter. 
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of this were true, these factors would reduce the attractiveness of Muslim countries as 
k t · h· h t db· 228 N h mar e s m w IC 0 0 usmess. onet eless, the same authors emphasise the recent 
growth of worldwide academic interest in studying the commercial and company law of 
the region because of the substantial trade between Islamic countries and the West. It is 
estimated that only 13 % of the trade of Muslim countries takes place among 
themselves, while 87% is conducted with the rest of world.229 This figure indicates that 
there are very many potential business partners and shareholders whose existence 
cannot be ignored or neglected, especially at a time of great diversity in global markets. 
Among the developing Muslim countries, SA stands out for its political stability, the 
quality of its infrastructure, its light tax regime, the low cost of its manpower and 
energy, as well as the financial incentives and liquidity which it offers to its private 
business sector. As a result of its wealth in petroleum and gas,230 SA is one of the most 
dynamic and creditworthy markets in the world.231 In any discussion of SA, it is 
inevitable that oil will feature prominently. With approximately 244.7 billion barrels of 
oil reserves - which is estimated to be more than a quarter of the world's total and two 
thirds of the Middle Eastern supply - and up to 1 trillion barrels of ultimately 
recoverable oil, the Kingdom has no global rival in oil-based industries?32 The wealth 
of its oil legacy is mirrored in every aspect of life in the country, underpinning the 
provision of a healthy environment which fosters liquidity and volume in the Kingdom 
and thereby strengthens investors' confidence in the Saudi business market.233 
There is no doubt that this liquidity factor attracts investors to SA, as El Sheikh notes, 
because their main concern is to generate profits, which are likely to be more easily 
obtained in a rich country such as SA, whose huge financial resources enable it to 
228 L, Miles. & S, Goulding., Corporate governance in Western (Anglo-American) and Islamic 
communities: prospects for convergence?, Journal of Business Law. 2010, 2, pg: 137. 
229 K. Ahmad, "The Challenge of Global Capitalism: An Islamic Perspective" cited In: L, Miles. & S, 
Goulding., Corporate governance in Western (Anglo-American) and Islamic communities: prospects for 
convergence?, Journal of Business Law. 2010,2, pg: 128. . . 
230 It is estimated that Saudi Arabia is the world's largest exporter and the thIrd largest producer of OIl. 
231 J, Bancal., Legal, tax and fiscal engineering for industrial co-operation in Saudi Arabia. International 
Business Law Journal. 1993, 6, pg: 687. 
232 International Energy Agency (lEA), by country, Saudi Arabia, 2008. Available at: 
<http://iea.org!country/n_country.asp?COUNTRY _ CODE=SA&Submit=Submit#bottom> accessed 16 
February 2010. . . 
233 F, Almajid., A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the Corporate Goven:ance of Saudi .Pubhcly 
Held Companies: A Comparative and Analytical Study from a Legal Perspective. Ph.D TheSIS. 2008. 
University of Manchester: UK. pg: 47. 
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construct an infrastructure consistent with the highest international standards. Hence, 
foreign investors will not be required to make significant contributions to overall 
infrastructural costs, 1.e. public expenditure on roads, power stations, 
telecommunications systems etc, because they pay little or no tax.234 
One would assume, given all these advantages of investing in SA, that there would be 
no impediment to national or even foreign investment, as everything would seem to be 
working effectively and efficiently. Unfortunately, however, this is not the whole 
picture, because there is one major obstacle that is the Saudi commercial and company 
law, particularly as it applies to the protection of minority shareholders in private 
companies. Current Saudi company law was enacted in 1965 and came into force prior 
to the recent explosion of commercial activity in the country. It seems that its provisions 
are modelled indirectly on civil law and that company and commercial law in SA have 
the effect of partially impeding foreign and national investment, to the extent that an 
English or American lawyer would find it difficult to advise clients operating there, 
without the assistance of local lawyers?35 This factor alone may reduce the 
attractiveness of business-makers who intend to invest in SA, who are now more aware 
of legal systems and the uncertainties surrounding their provisions?36 The next section 
will explore Saudi company law and show how the statute deals with minority 
shareholders (whether foreign or national), illustrating the extent of any existing 
protection. 
3.2 Saudi Arabian Company Law and minority shareholder protection 
Saudi Commercial Code originated from the French system. However, there are some 
who claim that the Gulf States adopted a modified version of this system which was 
I h . 237 Th' passed on by the Ottoman Empire, which used to contro t e regIon. IS may 
234 F, EI Sheikh., The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment in Sudan and Saudi .Arabia. lSI .ed. 
Cambridge, University Press, 2003, pg: 24. SA does levy varying amounts of tax on foreign compames, 
but they may seek exemptions under certain conditions. . ., sl 
235 F, El Sheikh., The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment In Sudan and Saudi Arabla. 1 ed. 
Cambridge, University Press, 2003, pg: 76.. . 
236 L, Miles. & S, Goulding., Corporate governance m Western (Anglo-Amen can) and Islamic 
communities: prospects for convergence?, Jo.umal of Business L.aw. 201.0, 2, pg.: 137.. .". . 
237 J, Burgoyne., "Specific Problems and Umque Aspects of Domg ~usmesses In Saudi ;rabl~.' clte~ I~. 
F, El Sheikh., The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment In Sudan and Sau lAra la. 1 e. 
Cambridge, University Press, 2003, pg: 76. 
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explain why Saudi company law does not contain the exact provisions of the French 
company law of the time and why SA law provides for many types of corporate 
institution that do not exist in French civil-law jurisdictions.238 It is also important to 
note that Egyptian legal scholars further refined and adapted the French commercial 
system after the Ottoman modifications, creating the so-called French/Egyptian model, 
which was taken by SA as the basis on which to enact company law.239 This does not 
mean that existing SA company law corresponds exactly to the French/Egyptian model, 
since the Saudi law-makers selected what they believed would most closely fit within 
the Saudi commercial environment. Another significant factor which has played and 
will continue to play a dynamic role in formulating Saudi company law is Sharia law 
(Islamic jurisprudence), which establishes the general principles of every aspect of the 
law?40 Thus, Saudi company law has developed under a number of successive and 
overlapping influences (French, Ottoman, Egyptian, Saudi and Sharia) which have 
modified its provisions and its operation. 
At the same time, it must be noted that it has always been the intention of the SA law-
makers and relevant councils (Panel of Experts, Shura (consultatory) Council and 
Council of Ministers)241 to improve the commercial environment in order to diversify 
the country's economic activity away from a dependence on oi1.242 This is seen in the 
flexibility and practicality of the Foreign Capital Investment Law 2000/43 which 
marked a considerable improvement in conditions for foreign capital investment in the 
Kingdom. The main aim of this law was to encourage, attract and facilitate foreign 
investment to make the country an open market for potential shareholders. 
As well as clear improvements to the law regarding foreign investment, Saudi company 
law has also sought to provide effective protection to shareholders of public companies, 
238 To understand the differences between the two dominant systems, see section 1.1 of Chapter 1 & 2.5.3 
of Chapter 2. 
239 R, Lewis., & C, Mallat., Commercial Law in the Middle East. Centre of Islamic & Middle Eastern 
Law, Available at: <http://www.soas.ac.uklCentres!IsalmiclawlMaterials.html> accessed 12 February 
2009. 
240 The influence of Sharia on SA company law will be discussed in the next section. 
241 The process of making a law starts with the Panel of Exp.erts withi~ the Shura (consultatory) Council 
who will debate and discuss the proposed draft of the law In to see If any changes or amendments are 
needed. Otherwise the draft will be sent to the Council of Ministers for final review and then approval. 
242 F, El Sheikh., The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment in Sudan and Saudi Arabia. lSI ed. 
Cambridge, University Press, 2003, pg: 22. .., 
243 This law was approved by the cabinet on 10 April 2000 to replace a complIcated Investment law which 
restricted foreign capital investment to certain narrowly limited economic sectors. 
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granting them the statutory right to bring legal action agal'nst d' t 244 A d' lrec ors. ccor mg to 
sections 76, 77 & 78 of the SA Company Law 1965: 
(76): The directors are jointly liable for compensation to the company or its 
shareholders or others if their management of the company's affairs cause 
abuse, misuse or wrongdoing. 
(77): The company may file a "liability action,,245 against the directors if 
they have caused damages to all shareholders. In this case, the action should 
be on behalf of the company. 
(78): Each shareholder has the right to bring a "liability action" against the 
company's directors if their wrongdoing caused particular damage to the 
shareholder. The shareholder may do so only if the company's right to 
litigate is still valid. The shareholder must notify the company of his 
intention to bring a case. 
Therefore, shareholders in a public company can sue the directors on the basis that they 
have violated either the statutory law or the company's internal code (s76 is even 
broader than that, as the directors may be liable to a third party). In this case, all 
directors may be held accountable for such violation, but a shareholder will not be 
responsible as long as hislher refusal to approve the action was recorded at a board 
meeting. The shareholder in a public company can also bring a liability action in 
relation to a wrongdoing that harmed him/her personally, but he/she needs to prove that 
the company has also a right to litigate. It is also interesting that the Saudi Company 
Law, when dealing with public companies, does not require a shareholder to obtain the 
court's permission to instigate legal proceedings against directors as long as the relief 
obtained goes to the company.246 Moreover, shareholders in a public company can sue 
the directors collectively on the basis of mismanagement if their action has harmed 
either the company or any of its shareholders.247 Gross negligence can also be seen as a 
. ell' . d' 248 sohd ground lor a ega actIOn agamst lrectors. 
244 Ss 76, 77 and 78 of the Company Law 1965 which deal with the shareholders' right to litigate against 
the directors based on a variety of reasons. 
245 "Liability action" is the translation from Arabic to English of the action available in public companies. 
246 s76 of The Saudi Company Law 1965. 
247 s76 of The Saudi Company Law 1965. However, as mentioned by AI-Jeber (M, AI-Jeber., "The Saudi 
Commercial Law" cited In: F, Almajid., A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the Corporate 
Governance of Saudi Publicly Held Companies: A Comparative and Analytical Study from a Legal 
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Therefore, it is evident from some provisions in the foreign investment law and also 
from some provisions regarding public companies that there are at least minimum 
safeguards which offer some sort of confidence and trust in the Saudi commercial 
environment, both helping to attract foreign business-makers to invest and encouraging 
domestic investors to remain and not to take their capital to other jurisdictions. 
However, it is important to note that about 80% of foreign investors who choose to do 
business in SA do so by establishing mixed enterprises and joint (private) companies 
with Saudi nationals, while very few establish an enterprise on their own.249 This may 
be because foreigners do not wish to be present in the country to run such companies 
themselves, and because engaging a national would facilitate the running of the 
company and any dealings with officials. Also, a national can provide a better 
understanding of the market or help the firm to compete. Or another reason might be 
that the foreign investor is seeking to avoid paying the, albeit modest, taxes levied on 
1000/0 foreign-owned companies.25o Whatever the explanation, considerable number of 
foreign investors in SA forms private companies with nationals. This is not to say that a 
Saudi partner is required at any stage, as there is no legal limitation on the percentage of 
foreign ownership according to the Foreign Capital Investment Law 2000?51 However, 
it is assumed that, in most cases, foreign investors will be minority shareholders and 
nationals will hold the majority of shares in these private companies, so the latter will 
have more power in running the business. 
All minority shareholders, whether foreign investors or nationals, will be directly 
affected by laws which govern the protection of minority shareholders and regulate 
Perspective. Ph.D Thesis. 2008. University of Manchester: UK. pg: 240), Saudi courts have not yet 
developed any consistent criteria on which an action can be deemed mismanagement; it is still left to the 
judge's discretion to decide. . . . 
248 M, AI-Jeber,. The Saudi Commercial Law. 3rd ed. King Fahd NatIonal LIbrary, RIyadh, 1996, pg: 341. 
249 F, El Sheikh., The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment in Sudan and Saudi Arabia. lSI ed. 
Cambridge, University Press, 2003, pg: 52. 
250 There has always been a small amount of tax regularly paid by foreign investors, subject to the rate 
officially announced from time to time. s14 of the Foreign Capital Investme~t Law.2000 states th~t ."all 
foreign investments licensed under this Law shall be treated in accordance WIth applIcable tax provIsIons 
and amendments thereto in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia". The government announced recently that 
foreign companies in Saudi Arabia can pay less investment tax if they employ more nationals .. E, Baxter., 
Saudi plans tax cuts for foreign companies, Arabian Business.com. (~)ctober 19,.2009), AvaIlable at: < 
http://www.arabianbusiness.com/570928-saudi-plans-tax-cuts-for-forelgn-compames> accessed 18 
February 2010. . 
251 See also: Ali & Partners., Doing Business in Saudi Arabia, (2004), AvaIlable at: 
<http://www.mideastlaw.com/middle _eastern_laws _ saudi_arabia.html.> accessed 18 February 2010. 
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relationships between shareholders. It is disappointing that, despite the efforts of the 
Saudi Arabian regulators to improve the commercial environment when it comes to , 
private companies, the legal status of minority shareholders and the protection provided 
for them is different from the situation in public companies. It is admittedly very rare 
for Saudi commercial or company law literatures to discuss the protection of minority 
shareholders' rights and interests in private companies, making it difficult to evaluate 
the impact of the relevant statute. Basically, Saudi Company Law leaves it open to the 
shareholders to state in the shareholder agreement what they wish to establish in terms 
of rights, interests, profit distribution, management, liability, authority, power, 
protection and so on, as long as it does not contradict any of the statutory provisions.252 
In terms of appointing or dismissing directors in private companIes, one of two 
scenarios will apply. Under the first, where the director (whether a minority or majority 
shareholder) has been appointed by a specific clause in the shareholder agreement, then 
dismissing himlher from management requires a unanimous resolution by all 
shareholders and not just those attending the meeting?53 Alternatively, an order can be 
sought from the court by a majority of shareholders to dismiss such a director.254 The 
court will not grant such an order, however, unless it is satisfied that the director is no 
longer fit to act for the company.255 The statute here does not clarify what is really 
meant by 'no longer fit to act for the company'. Alshareef and Alqurashi believe that in 
this case the court will seek to find an existing reasonable ground to order dismissal; 
otherwise it will reject the case and allow the director to remain in pOSt.256 The second 
scenario is where the director was appointed by a resolution rather than by a specific 
clause in the shareholder agreement. In this case, hislher dismissal requires only a 
.. I· 257 maJonty reso utlOn. 
On the other hand, if the shareholders have not specified (in the shareholder agreement) 
or agreed (by a resolution) on who shall be appointed as a director, then the statute here 
252 s24 to s34 of The Saudi Company Law 1965. 
253 s27 of The Saudi Company Law 1965. 
254 s33 of The Saudi Company Law 1965. 
255 s33 of The Saudi Company Law 1965. 
256 N, Aishareef., & Z, Alqurashi., C?mmercial La~. I st.ed. HAFIZ, Jed~ah, 2007, pg: 183. The au~~rs 
also elaborate further on this by saymg that the dIscretIOnary power of Ju~ges can assess the capabIlIty 
and actions of the director in question in order to see whether or not he/she IS valuable to the company. 
257 s33 of The Saudi Company Law 1965. 
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considers all shareholders to have a role in management and I ·d t· a so consl ers any ac Ion 
by an individual shareholder to bind the remaining shareholders.258 In other words, all 
shareholders will be deemed directors if there are no specially appointed directors. 
However, the same statutory provision gives any shareholder the right to complain to 
the majority shareholders over any conduct that concerns them, and it is then for the 
majority shareholders to decide whether to ratify the action or not.259 Even though the 
statute allows such complaints, it restricts them to being made prior to the completion of 
the conduct that is impugned; otherwise the right to complain is denied. It is claimed by 
one academic scholar that the purpose of this provision is to keep power and control 
over the company's affairs in the hands of the majority shareholders. He also believes 
that the law intends here to grant the majority shareholders the ultimate say on disputed 
matters rather than allowing the minority the chance to destabilize the company on 
every issue.26o 
Furthermore, there are certain grounds designed in the statute for any shareholder to 
bring a legal action against the directors of the company, who in most private 
companies are the majority shareholders or are appointed by a majority shareholder. 
These grounds are for use when the company is acting or about to act ultra vires or 
illegally.261 This provision is more beneficial to minority than majority shareholders as 
it grants the minority shareholders the right to litigate on the grounds of ultra vires or 
illegality. This is because, while the majority shareholders can use their power within 
the company to pass a resolution to stop an action which they do not agree with, 
minority shareholders must use the grounds of ultra vires or illegality to prove such a 
claim to the court. The issue of lack of good faith is an important element in upholding 
such a claim, especially where a third party (external to the company) is involved?62 
Hamd Allah assumes that, if the company acted ultra vires or illegally, then the third 
party will be protected only if he acted in good faith in his dealings with the company. 
This is to protect what appears to the third party to be proper transactions with the 
company. In this case, the transaction remains valid as far as the third party is 
258 s28 of The Saudi Company Law 1965. 
259 s28 of The Saudi Company Law 1965. It is important to note that the statute here does not define the 
types of conduct which the majority has authority over and. to .what extent. It i~ also not clear for the 
minority shareholder as to when he/she can involve the court In dIsputes or complamts. 
260 H Hamd Allah. Saudi Commercial law. 1 st ed. ANNAHDAH, Cairo, 2003, pg: 260 &261. 
261 H: Hamd Allah.: Saudi Commercial law. 1 st ed. ANNAHDAH, Cairo, 2003, pg: 270. 
262 s29/3 of The Saudi Company Law 1965. 
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concerned, but the company can have the right to pursue the director for compensation 
d d·· h· 263 an may IsmlSS Imiher. It is noteworthy to stress that the Saudi statute does not 
clarify who can act on behalf of the company in such cases, and, similarly, does not 
specify the options which may be available for the minority shareholder if the company 
does not intend to pursue any compensation. 
Another statutory right that is designed for those shareholders who have no role in 
management is the right to give advice to those who are involved in management 
(directors or majority shareholders) in such a way that is considered to be in the best 
interests of the company.264 This right entitles the shareholders who are non-directors to 
have their say on matters related to the company even if they are not directors. The 
same statutory provision gives the right to all shareholders to access, on request, any 
type of information, statistics, data and reports that are relevant to the company's 
affairs.265 It is assumed that the appointed director should facilitate the granting of such 
a request, so that other shareholders can be always informed of the company's progress. 
It is also assumed that this right is not subject to negotiation and cannot be denied, as it 
is reserved in the statute for any shareholder to utilize?66 The shareholder may litigate 
to have this right enforced if the director in control fails to comply. However, the statute 
does not provide a mechanism to show which procedures to follow in making such a 
claim. Furthermore, the statute also does not specify what ground the shareholder 
should use or even which remedies are available when prosecuting such a claim. 
Another possible right for the minority shareholder in private compames has been 
suggested by Almadani,267 who believes that the "liability action", which is originally 
provided in the statute to serve the minority shareholder in public companies, should be 
also used in private companies. He has taken this concept from s 168(1 )268 which states 
that directors (majority shareholders) are liable for compensation for any harm which 
they have caused to the company or its shareholders, and no ratification can prevent 
such an action. It is true that such an action is available under this section, but it does not 
relate to private companies. In fact, this action is related to a separate category of 
263 H, Hamd Allah., Saudi Commercial law. 1st ed. ANNAHDAH, Cairo, 2003, pg: 271. 
264 s24 of the Saudi Company Law 1965. 
265 s24 ofthe Saudi Company Law 1965. 
266 H, Hamd Allah., Saudi Commerciallaw.2 st ed. ANNAHDAH, Cairo, 2003, pg: 272. 
267 H, Almadani., Saudi Commercial Law. 5 ed. ALMADANI, Jeddah, 2001. pg: 313. 
268 Saudi Companies Law 1965. 
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companies that are not classified as either private or public companies.269 This third 
category of company has mixed features; some in common with the public companies 
(especially in its financial aspect) and some are in common with private companies 
(especially with regard to the quasi-partnership or personal relationship between 
shareholders). In practice, the "liability action" is often limited in use to the public and 
mixed companies and is unknown in relation to purely private companies. 
Having examined what is relevant in the Saudi statute for the protection of minority 
shareholders, it can be claimed that the statute creates overlaps and interrelations which 
have undoubtedly caused inconsistency and uncertainty. There are many circumstances 
which can occur in private companies which the statute does not address clearly or at 
all, such as misuse, abuse, negligence, breach, fraud, expropriation, infringement and 
oppression committed by directors or majority shareholders, and even the court's exact 
role in dealing with minority shareholders is unclear. It is even believed that the current 
statute, rather than offering legal assistance, guidance and protection to minority 
shareholders, has served to increase the degree of difficulty, confusion and uncertainty, 
not only among foreign shareholders, but also among Saudis. Most financial, legal, 
economic and political studies, which have examined the Saudi minority shareholder 
protection laws from different perspectives, have found a marked disregard for the 
rights of minority shareholders.27o Indeed, most of the statutory provisions have weak 
characteristics and so cannot protect minority shareholders appropriately. 
The statutory provisions which specifically deal with minority shareholders in private 
companIes are very few, incomplete, ambiguous and unbalanced. They afford little 
protection, as they grant overall power in almost all circumstances to the majority 
shareholders - who have the ultimate say on almost all issues - without giving a clear 
right to the minority shareholder to litigate and involve the court in disputes. In other 
words, Saudi company law does not have a detailed and sufficient code that is related to 
269 The Saudi Company Law 1965 classified companies to three. categories: listed comp~nies, non~li~ted 
companies and mixed companies, which share certain factors WIth. the .first two categones. The LImIted 
Partnership in Shares is one of few companies which come under this thIrd category. " 
270 F, Almajid., A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the Corporate Goverrz.ance of Saudl .Pubhcly 
Held Companies: A Comparative and Analytical Study from a Legal Perspectlve. Ph.D TheSIS. 2008. 
University of Manchester: UK. pg: 299. The researcher also says that other systems, i~ particular ~h~se 
using civil codes, offer less protection and thus afford corporate managers. and dlrecto~ (maJonty 
shareholders) a freer hand to manage their companies without great fear of any mvolvement, mterference 
or challenge. In Saudi Arabia, this is almost always the case. 
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the protection of minority shareholders l' • t . n pnva e companIes. The statute seems to grant 
the majority shareholders excessive power that is completely unrestricted and may 
result in harm, not just to the minority shareholders, but also to the company. 
Added to the fact that the legislation is vague and difficult to understand is that there is , 
no distinct legislative body which can investigate and identify the need for reforms.271 
This is to say that there is no Saudi Law Commission or other body that is dedicated to 
reviewing continuously how company law works in practice in order to make reforms. 
To all intents and purposes, Saudi minority shareholder protection is wholly lacking 
from top to bottom, starting with the failure to recognize the rights and interests of 
minority shareholders and ending with the lack of remedies for them to use when 
necessary. 272 
Some argue that this deficiency in Saudi company law may emanate from the 
contradictory interaction between the modem legal institutions and traditional Islamic 
applications.273 However, this is not true, because certain recent legislation produced by 
the Saudi law-makers has met international standards in its sophistication and quality, 
while Islamic principles have not prevented or hindered its creation.274 In fact, Islamic 
principles have never prevented modem institutions from creating new laws that may 
benefit society; on the contrary, Islamic principles have worked side by side with the 
law-makers since the establishment of the Kingdom. The next section will show how 
these Islamic principles work to fill gaps in modem legislation, just as aspects of the 
common law do in jurisdictions like the UK. 
3.3 The role of Sharia law in protecting minority shareholders275 
271 A, Layish., "Saudi Arabian Legal Reforms as a Mechanism to Moderate Wahhabi Doctrine", In: F, 
Almajid., A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the Corporate Governance of Saudi Publicly Held 
Companies: A Comparative and Analytical Study from a Legal Perspective. Ph.D Thesis. 2008. 
University of Manchester: UK. pg: 154. 
272 N, Sfeir., The Saudi Approach to Law Reform, The American Journal of Comparative Law. 1988,36, 
Pg: 734. 
273 F, Almajid., A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the Corporate Goven:ance of Saudi .Publicly 
Held Companies: A Comparative and Analytical Study from a Legal Perspective. Ph.D TheSIS. 2008. 
University of Manchester: UK. pg: 140. . . . . 
274 The Foreign Capital Investment Law 2000 is a claSSIC example of the ablhty to produce a hIgh 
standard legislation. .. ... 
275 This section has been published as a whole m: M, Almadaru., The Role of Shana Law m Protectmg 
Minority Shareholder in Private Companies, International Company and Commercial Law Review. 2010, 
21(12), pg: 395-402. 
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3.3.1 Background 
One of the distinctive characteristics of Islamic states (like SA) is that they apply what 
is known as Sharia law. This provides a set of rules and principles which have a history 
going back l,400 years,276 and which pertain to all aspects of life. It is vital for any 
researcher who intends to study law in a Muslim country to understand the influence of 
Sharia. Even when investigating the commercial concepts of the contemporary world, 
the juridical stance of Sharia remains necessary for most Muslim countries. The Arabic 
word Sharia generally means "the Way" and denotes the system which governs the 
lives of Muslims and their relationships with society. Sharia has a very complex system 
of jurisprudence that outlines the methods by which Muslims conduct their lives 
according to Islamic teachings.277 It wields a significant influence over every aspect of 
life, including the political, social, commercial, public and private. 
Indeed, Sharia has recently become the subject of global academic interest and is 
considered by those who seek to investigate and study the commercial framework of 
those jurisdictions which base their laws on Sharia due to the increasing trade between 
Islamic countries and the West.278 Al-Rimawi notes that, unlike Western legal systems, 
which have long separated religious principles from secular laws, Sharia principles 
continue to constitute essential sources of legislation in the majority of Muslim 
jurisdictions.279 Shari a, in this context, can be defined as a body of religious laws and 
principles which provide direction in relation to rules of conduct for Muslims, and they 
must be adhered to.280 
276 Sharia was founded in the age in which Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, came with his 
revelation and prophethood, after he was sent to all mankind with a message calling for the oneness of 
worshiping one God. . . 
277 A, Ali., The role of Islamic jurisprudence in finance and development In the MuslIm world, Company 
Lawyer. 2010, 31(4), pg: 121. 
278 According to Miles and Goulding in their paper (L, Miles. & S, Goulding., Corporate governance in 
Western (Anglo-American) and Islamic communities: prospects for convergence?, Journal of Business 
Law. 2010, 2, pg: 128 & 129.), only 13 per cent of the trade of Mus~i~ c~untries takes .pla~e amo~g 
themselves, while 87 per cent is conducted with the rest of the world .. ThIS Just~fie.s t~e .growIng. Interest In 
studying this topic, especially given the existence .of some Shana-bas~d Jun~dIctlOns WhICh are of 
particular interest to foreign investors, such as MalaYSIa, the UAE and SaudI ArabIa. 
~79 L, AI-Rimawi., Relevance of Sharia in Arab securities regulation with particular emphasis on Jordan 
as an Arab regulatory model. Company Lawyer. 2006, 27(8), pg: 227. 
280 H, Hajjaji., Shareholders' agreements and Islamic financing, International Business Law Journal. 
2009, 5, pg: 556. 
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3.3.2 Sources of Shari a 
Sharia is derived from primary and secondary sources. The former are the Quran (the 
Holy book for Muslims) and the Sunna (the deeds and citations of the Prophet 
Muhammad, peace be upon him), while the secondary Sources are Ijtihad (the human 
interpretation of the Quran and Sunna, undertaken by qualified Islamic scholars and 
jurists) and Ijma (the consensus or unanimous agreement of all the Islamic jurists of an 
age).281 
The widely recognised schools of thought (for Ijtihad and Ijma) are the Hanaji, 
Hanbali, Maliki and Shaji schools, each of which has a distinctive methodology of 
observing fundamental principles (i.e. primary sources) when addressing each issue or 
case. Thus, each school may apply similar relevant principles to each issue or case, but 
may reach slightly different conclusions. It is important to indicate that both the Quran 
and Sunna are considered perfect and immutable, while human comprehension of them 
may be imperfect and faulty.282 It is believed that Islamic law has been revealed to 
regulate people's lives, no matter where or when they live, as Islamic doctrines are 
applicable at all times and in all places.283 
According to Sharia, the criteria for distinguishing right from wrong are found in the 
primary sources.284 The substance of the Quran as a primary source of legislation 
emerges from its role not only as a collection of spiritual rites, but most importantly as a 
set of legal duties, as it is believed by Muslims that the Quran is the word of God and 
that He is best able to regulate their activities, dealings, relations and so on. Thus, the 
Quran contains many legal injunctions of several types. One important type that is 
281 AI-Rimawi in (L, Al-Rimawi., Relevance of Sharia in Arab securities regulation with partiCUlar 
emphasis on Jordan as an Arab regulatory model. Company Lawyer. 2006, 27(8), pg: 229) divides these 
sources into two groups: revealed and non-revealed. The former are the Quran and Sunna while the latter 
are Jjtihad and Jjma because they rely on the interpretation of qualified Islamic scholars are therefore not 
fixed. 
282 H, Abdul Jabbar., 'Islamic finance: fundamental principles and key fmancial institutions', Company 
Lawyer. 2009, 30(1), pg: 23. The author also mentions that the possibility of imperfect comprehension 
causes a divergence of opinion among Islamic jurists on some matters as each may reach a different 
conclusion. 
283 F, Almajid., A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the Corporate Governance of Saudi Publicly 
Held Companies: A Comparative and Analytical Study from a Legal Perspective. Ph.D Thesis. 2008. 
University of Manchester: UK. pg: 145. " ., . . . 
284 God says in the Holy Quran Chapter 7, verse 157 that 'He WIll enJom ~n them that ~~Ich IS nght and 
forbid them that which is wrong. He will make lawful for them all good thmgs and prohIbIt for them only 
the foul; and He will relieve them of their burden and the fetters that they used to wear". 
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relevant to the subject of this research are the legal rules which b' t' 'ty govern usmess ac IVI , 
the economy, commerce, trade, and, more specifically, mortgages, deeds of sale, trusts, 
285 
contracts etc. The Sunna then elaborates on the principles established in the Quran. 
As a source of authority, it is second in position to the Quran and its mission is not only 
to deliver the verses of the Quran, but also to explain them to the people and to teach 
them how to live by them.286 
As for the secondary sources of Sharia (1jtehad and ljma), there is a major drawback in 
that not all Islamic law is expressed in the form of legislation. Indeed, the most 
substantial part of the law is to be found in the scholarly literature written by Islamic 
legal scholars over the centuries. In most cases, these books and references are not 
available in different languages, as very many of them have not yet been translated from 
Arabic.287 
3.3.3 The application of Sharia 
The existence of principles and rules produced by Sharia does not mean that there is no 
space for governments to regulate human activity whenever there is a public interest in 
doing so. This applies to Muslim governments (especially SA), which may produce new 
laws or even adopt new principles, regardless of their origins, as long as these laws or 
principles do not violate the Islamic legislation established by Muslim scholars in light 
of the Holy Quran and the Sunna. It is even commanded in the Quran that people must 
comply with the regulations and legislation laid down by their rulers, as long as they do 
not contradict what God and His messenger have already legislated. The Quran says: 
"0 you who believe, obey God, and obey the messenger and those of you who are 
in authority; and if you have a dispute concerning any matter, refer it to God and 
h ,,288 t e messenger .... 
285 F, Almajid., A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the Corporate Governance of Saudi Publicly 
Held Companies: A Comparative and Analytical Study from a Legal Perspective. Ph.D Thesis. 2008. 
University of Manchester: UK. pg: 146. . . 
286 F, Almajid., A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the Corporate Goven:ance of Saudl .Publzcly 
Held Companies: A Comparative and Analytical Study from a Legal Perspectlve. Ph.D TheSIS. 2008. 
University of Manchester: UK. pg: 146. . ' . SI 
287 F, EI Sheikh., The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment In Sudan and Saudl Arabia. 1 ed. 
Cambridge, University Press, 2003, pg: 76. 
288 Holy Quran, Chapter 4, verse 59. 
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The interpretation of this verse shows that people are obliged to follow rulers' laws, 
regulations, legislation and guidelines as long as these do not require disobedience to 
God and his messenger.289 Another aspect of this verse is that Sharia law allows any 
ruler to exercise originality, creativity, inventiveness and imagination in the interests of 
the people and of society. 
It is important to understand that the mam functions of Sharia when it comes to 
transactions and commercial dealings are to fill gaps and to serve as the foundation for 
any new law, leaving the detail to be developed by other means?90 For instance, the 
Saudi legislature follows this principle by taking Sharia as the basis for any new 
legislation. Indeed, instances of the adoption of such a guide to the provision of general 
laws and principles are not limited to Muslim countries; England, for example, has 
common law principles that provide non-codified legal obligations.291 It is important to 
note that Sharia tends to draw wide-ranging and general principles when it comes 
specifically to commercial codes. Therefore, there has always been an opportunity for 
Muslim governments to create contemporary statutes dealing with specific issues, where 
there is no inconsistency with Sharia. 
A close examination of the role of Sharia law in building the foundation of commercial 
dealings and in shaping their operation reveals that Sharia urges Muslims to be ethical 
in conducting transactions and forbids cheating, deception, the manipulation of weights 
and measures and dealing in stolen goods. It makes clear that Muslims must trade on the 
basis of free mutual consent, so that a sale under compulsion is not acceptable. Taking 
advantage of buyers and charging disproportionate prices are forbidden. Sharia law 
requires Muslims to always be truthful in describing the quality of their merchandise. 
Furthermore, any Muslim who intentionally conceals defects in goods that he offers for 
289 Ibn Kathir, I., Tafseer Ibn Katheer: Interpretation of Quran. 1 st ed. Dar Taibah, Almadina, 2002, Vol 
(2),pg:326. . . 
290 L, Al-Rimawi., Relevance of Sharia in Arab securities regulation with partIcular emphaSIS on Jordan 
as an Arab regulatory model. Company Lawyer. 2006,27(8), pg: 228. . 
291 J Makdisi. "The Islamic Origins of the Common Law," 'North Carolina Law Review 77' 1999, CIted 
In: F, Almajid., A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the Corporate Gove,:,ance of Saudi .Publicly 
Held Companies: A Comparative and Analytical Study from a Legal PerspectIve. Ph.D TheSIS. 2008. 
University of Manchester: UK. pg: 149. 
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sale "risks losing the blessing of God on hislher business dealings.,,292 Thus, Sharia law 
sets the foundation of company law by stipulating the manners ethics morals , , , 
principles, values, standards and ideal attitudes which Muslims must follow in 
conducting their business. 
3.3.4. Sharia protects the weaker party 
In respect of the subject matter of this research, Sharia makes no direct and specific 
mention of the regulation of modem companies or the protection of minority 
shareholders in any of its writings, notwithstanding the existence of a body of Islamic 
literature on transactions and commerce. However, Sharia does contain many general 
principles addressing the protection of the weaker party in contracts and commercial 
dealings?93 To provide an example of the principles of Sharia in protecting the weaker 
party, safeguarding others' interests and encouraging all to act with honesty, one verse 
of many in the Quran says: 
"And do not swallow up your property among yourselves by false means, 
neither seek to gain access thereby to the judges, so that you may swallow up a 
part of the property of men wrongfully while you knoW".294 
The interpretation of this verse is that God commands Muslims not to take others' 
money by deception, denial of rights or in any other unjust or illegal way.295 The 
Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, also says (in one of many such references) 
regarding the dealings between people and the protection of the rights of one Muslim 
over another: 
" .... a Muslim .... does not oppress his brother nor abandon nor humiliate ... every 
Muslim is protected, his blood, his wealth, and honour',.296 
292 L, Miles. & S, Goulding., Corporate governance in Western (Anglo-American) and Islamic 
communities: prospects for convergence?, Journal o/Business Law. 201?, 2, pg.: 133. . 
293 L, Al-Rimawi., Relevance of Sharia in Arab securities regulation WIth partIcular emphaSIS on Jordan 
as an Arab regulatory model. Company Lawyer. 2006, 27(8), pg: 228. 
294 Holy Quran, Chapter 2, verse 188. 51" 
295 Ibn Kathir, I., Tafseer Ibn Katheer: Interpretation o/Quran. 1 ed. Dar Talbah, Almadma, 2002, Vol 
(1), pg: 521. 
296 Narrated by Imam Muslim. 
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It is important to note that Sharia urges Muslims to act upon these principles not only 
when dealing with other Muslims, but also in order to protect the wealth and property of 
non-Muslims, where there is a recognised contract between parties.297 Sharia allows a 
Muslim party to enter into a shareholders' agreement with a non-Muslim party, but 
certain conditions must be met. For example, any such agreement must be confirmed as 
Sharia-compliant before it is signed?98 Therefore, entering into an agreement with non-
Muslims is, in principle, allowed by Sharia as long as the agreement does not contradict 
Sharia in its terms or objectives, such as by trading in alcohol, pork or prostitution; 
otherwise the whole agreement will be considered void and impermissible in the eyes of 
a Sharia court?99 
Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, is also quoted as saying that God states: "I am 
a third partner of those who form partnership; unless one of them betrays the other, I 
leave them alone". 300 The general interpretation of this citation is that a business 
partnership will be blessed by God if it is built on honesty, truthfulness and sincerity. 
However, if any of the partners engages in cheating, deception, oppression, betrayal or 
unfaithfulness against another, then God will withdraw his blessing, compassion and 
protection from the business. This means that problems of all kinds are more likely to 
afflict such a business, since God does not support cheats, oppressors or deceivers.301 
This citation alone has a very strong impact on Muslim business owners in that it makes 
them think twice before doing anything in bad faith, advancing their own interests 
against those of others, practising oppression, or any form of abuse. In other words, 
these verses can be seen to protect the weaker party, who may be vulnerable to abuse, 
misconduct or oppression on the part of a stronger party in authority if the power of the 
latter is not restricted. This applies to relations between minority and majority 
shareholders. 
297 F, El Sheikh., The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment in Sudan and Saudi Arabia. 1st ed. 
Cambridge, University Press, 2003, pg: 121. 
298 H, Hajjaji., Shareholders' agreements and Islamic financing, International Business Law Journal. 
2009,5, pg: 557. . . . 
299 A contradiction Sharia may be within the agreement's tenns where the partIes agree agamst the Shana 
requirement of sharing risk and profit. However, in this case, the Sharia courts will not consider the whole 
agreement void, but only such a tenn. 
300 Narrated by Abu Dawood. 
301 A Salem. Book of Sales. Islamweb.net. (2006), Available at: . 
http://audio.i~lamweb.net/audio/index.php?page=FullContent&audioid= 135007#135009 accessed 2 Apnl 
2010, at: Chapter (1); Company and Agency. 
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Another principle developed from secondary Sharia Sources (where Islamic scholars 
have taken verses of the Quran and citations from the Sunna like those above and 
applied them in different contexts) to protect the weaker party is that of Ghabn or 
Gharar, one of whose meanings is to prevent the gain of money, property or opportunity 
by cheating.302 Sharia forbids such gain, regardless of its magnitude, if it is achieved 
through fraud. 303 Thus, if a shareholder tries to take advantage of others or advance 
hislher own interests over those of others, this will be considered under Sharia as 
cheating or fraud. Another application of Ghabn or Gharar has been in relation to 
contracts, where it prohibits uncertainty, ambiguity or deception.304 The use of having 
deliberately open terms in contracts which convey more than one meaning is prohibited 
under Sharia. In other words, any type of ambiguity that may give rise to doubt in the 
contract will be considered to render it void.305 Therefore, "contracts should clearly 
specify the nature of goods to be sold, and clearly define the rights and obligations of 
buyer and seller so as to avoid any disputes;,,306 otherwise, the potential for abuse may 
exist, especially by a stronger party over a weaker one.307 It is worth mentioning that 
according to Abd Jabbar, Ghabn or Gharar under Sharia is wider than the principle of 
uncertainty under secular law because, although uncertainty in a contract may render it 
void under secular law, "some ambiguity is permitted as long as it can be resolved by 
interpretation or by examining the intention and conduct of the parties to the 
contract".308 The demands of Sharia are that there is to be complete certainty in respect 
of all of the fundamental terms of a contract. 309 
302 The prohibition of Ghabn or Gharar is evidenced by a number of Quranic verses and Sunna citations 
that mention the word no less than 50 times. 
303 Islamic Research and Training Institute, IRTI., Islamic Capital Markets: Products, Regulations & 
Developments, 1 st ed. Islamic Development Bank, Jeddah, 2008, pg: 286. 
304 Saleh has noted in (" Unlawful Gain and Legitimate Profit in Islamic Law" 1992, cited in: H, Abdul 
Jabbar., 'Islamic finance: fundamental principles and key financial institutions', Company Lawyer. 2009, 
30(1), pg: 25.) that what is prohibited is not uncertainty as to the business risk or ~e business out~o.me ~f 
a transaction, because business risk is what sometime justifies the profit. What IS actually prohIbIted IS 
uncertainty related to the main elements which constitute the transaction. ...., 
305 H, Abdul Jabbar., 'Islamic finance: fundamental principles and key finanCIal InstItutIons, Company 
Lawyer. 2009, 30(1), pg: 24. . 
306 L, Miles. & S, Goulding., Corporate governance in Western (Anglo-Amencan) and Islamic 
communities: prospects for convergence?, Journal of Business Law. 2010, 2, pg: 133 .. 
307 L, Miles. & S, Goulding., Corporate governance in Western (Anglo-Amencan) and Islamic 
communities: prospects for convergence?, Journal ofB~sin.ess Law. 2010,2, pg: 13?. . , 
308 H, Abdul Jabbar., 'Islamic finance: fundamental pnncIples and key finanCIal InstItutIOns, Company 
Lawyer. 2009, 30(1), pg: 25. . . . . . . , 
309 H, Abdul Jabbar., 'Islamic finance: fundamental pnncIples and key finanCIal InstItutIOns, Company 
Lawyer. 2009, 30(1), pg: 25. 
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When relating the principle of Ghabn or Gharar to the subject matter of this research, its 
first application will be the prevention of any monetary gain, or benefit in terms of 
property or opportunity, by means of cheating or fraud. The second application requires 
any shareholder agreement to be Sharia-compliant,31o safeguarding the weaker party 
from Ghabn or Gharar in any transaction and ensuring that he/she has adequate 
knowledge of the contractual details;311 otherwise, he/she has the right to bring a legal 
action on this ground. This does not mean that Sharia restricts creativity or innovation in 
the business between parties; on the contrary, contractual clauses, under Sharia, are 
always open to the inclusion of newly developed commercial ideas, as long as they 
comply with the limits set by Sharia. Indeed, it is believed that the principles of free will 
and freedom of contract were well-established among Muslim scholars and jurists in the 
eighth century AD, long before they were recognised under Western law.312 
3.3.5 Sharia and the protection of minority shareholders 
Sharia generally defines a partnership as "a company in which each partner contributes 
a sum of money in exchange for which such partner benefits from a right to manage the 
assets of the company, provided that the profits are distributed pursuant to the 
agreement binding the partners and the losses are borne by each partner proportionally 
to its interests in the company's share capital".313 Sharia does not require any specific 
structure of ownership. However, the overwhelming majority of companies within the 
Arab world exist in the form of joint ventures with the government, public and/or 
private companies.314 It is the law which affects the manner in which companies are 
structured. Taking the existing law in the UAE as an example, foreign investors are only 
allowed to own up to 49% of the shares within a company.315 In SA, about 75% of 
310 H, Hajjaji., Shareholders' agreements and Islamic financing, International Business Law Journal. 
2009,5, pg: 556. 
3ll L, Al-Rimawi., Relevance of Sharia in Arab securities regulation with particular emphasis on Jordan 
as an Arab regulatory model. Company Lawyer. 2006, 27(8), pg: 228. The author clarifies further the 
concept of Ghabn or Gharar by saying that it can refer to a number of things, including uncertainty, 
excessive risk chance, speculation and lack of control over the subject-matter. 
312 M, AI-Zarka., AI-Figh A I-Islam i fi thawbihi AI-Jadid. cited In: H, Hajjaji., Shareholders' agreements 
and Islamic financing,Intemational Business Law Journal. 2009, 5, pg: 561. 
313 H, Hajjaji., Shareholders' agreements and Islamic financing, International Business Law Journal. 
2009, 5, pg: 558. ., . sl 
314 F, El Sheikh., The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment m Sudan and SaudI Arabza. 1 ed. 
Cambridge, University Press, 2003, pg: 449. 
315 A Ferasat. & Others., Middle East, The International Lawyer. 2008, 24(2), pg: 1078 & 1079. The law 
, 
does not allow, for example, foreigners to trade in petroleum. 
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companies are owned by founding families and relatives and the rest are owned by 
others and the Government.316 Thus, there is no particular type of ownership that Sharia 
imposes, but rather it is up to the regulators to monitor it. 
Let us now consider specifically what Sharia says in relation to the protection of 
minority shareholders. In fact, as already noted, Sharia does not address this matter 
directly. However, it must be said that Sharia, from the general definition given above, 
seems to treat every person investing in a company as a holder of an interest in the 
capital and the holder of a proportional ownership right over the assets of the 
company.31? Thus, Sharia here recognises, in principle, both the rights and interests of 
the minority shareholder as long as he/she invests in the company, and these rights and 
interests must, accordingly, be protected. This is an efficient foundation for the whole 
system of minority shareholder protection to build upon. Acknowledging diverse 
interests and rights in the company, rather than favouring those of the majority over all 
others, is a practical and useful start to providing protection for these rights and interests. 
The role of Sharia in protecting minority interests can be seen when it teaches business 
owners to exercise a "moral duty of trust, equity and benevolence towards their 
stakeholders (employees, suppliers, buyers, consumers and the environment),,,318 which 
applies a fortiori to minority shareholders, who are more involved in the business and 
have contributed as much, if not more, to the company than other stakeholders.319 
Majority shareholders are obliged under Sharia to take care of the welfare of everyone 
associated with the company, especially minority shareholders. They must also act 
pastorally towards their associates, providing care and direction to such persons in order 
to ensure that the values of Islam are applied within the company. 320 
316 J, Solomon., Corporate Governance and Accountability. 2nd ed. Wiley, Chichester, 2007, pg: 218. 
317 H, Hajjaji., Shareholders' agreements and Islamic financing, International Business Law Journal. 
2009,5, pg: 563. 
318 L, Miles. & S, Goulding., Corporate governance in Western (Anglo-American) and Islamic 
communities: prospects for convergence?, Journal of Business Law. 2010, 2, pg: 134. Employers are 
obliged under Sharia to take care of the welfare of their employees and treat them with kindness. Islam 
advances the same principle to be applied to any relationship between partners, fellows, shareholders, 
colleagues and so on. .. 
319 This is a highly debatable issue and involves pitting the shareholder pnmacy theory agaInst the 
stakeholder theory. This research is only concerned with consideration of the position of minority 
shareholders. 
320 L, Miles. & S, Goulding., Corporate governance in Western (Anglo-American) and Islamic 
communities: prospects for convergence?, Journal of Business Law. 2010, 2, pg: 134. 
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Nevertheless, in practice, not everyone in the Islamic commercial environment behaves 
ethically. Grais and Pellegrini argue that the full commitment of concerned business 
owners to Islamic religious principles cannot be taken for granted.321 Although Muslims 
believe that minority shareholders can be guaranteed efficient protection if Sharia 
principles are precisely followed, reality shows that not all Muslim business owners 
comply with these principles, because people sometimes neglect ethics in pursuit of 
th . lfi h . 322 Th . elf own se IS mterests. erefore, the key Issue which underlies this problem is 
the gap between the Sharia framework as it exists in principle, and its implementation in 
reality. On this point, Hirschman contends that: 
"under any economic, social, political (or religious) system, individuals, business 
firms, and organizations in general are subject to lapses from efficient, rational, 
law-abiding, virtuous, or otherwise functional behaviour".323 
The commercial enforcement of Islamic law is no exception. In fact, several breaches of 
fiduciary responsibilities and different types of wrongdoing occur in Shari a-based 
jurisdictions. The history of Islamic commerce shows that there have been several cases 
of practical tension, such as collusion of the board of directors with management, 
external and internal audit failure, neglect of minority shareholders' interests or rights, 
imprudent lending and excessive risk taking by management. 324 Thus, the Sharia 
principles alone cannot protect minority shareholders in private companies and there is a 
need for additional provisions to cover any missing features. Furthermore, Sharia 
principles, when it comes to minority shareholder protection, do not contain detailed 
enforcement machinery that could determine "when" and "how" to enforce specific 
£ . h d' 325 per ormance or compensatIon w en a Ispute occurs. 
321 W, Grais. & M, Pellegrini., Corporate Governance in Institutions Offering Islamic Financial Services: 
Issues and Options, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper. No. 4052, (November 1, 2006), pg: 6. 
322 Of course, sometimes there might be disagreement between parties to a contract or business 
arrangement as to what constitutes good ethics. 
323 A.O., Hirschman., (1970) Exit Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and 
States (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA), cited In: W, Grais. & M, Pellegrini., 
Corporate Governance in Institutions Offering Islamic Financial Services: Issues and Options, World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper. No. 4052, (Nov~mber.l, ~006), pg: ? ... . 
324 W, Grais. & M, Pellegrini., Corporate Governance m InstitutIOns Offenng IslamIC Fmanclal ServIces: 
Issues and Options, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper. No. 4052, (November 1, 2006), pg: 6. 
325 F, El Sheikh., The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment in Sudan and Saudi Arabia. 151 ed. 
Cambridge, University Press, 2003, pg: 354. 
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Sharia leaves it open to the shareholders to state in the shareholder agreement what they 
wish in terms of rights, interests, profit distribution, management, liability, authority, 
power, protection and so on, as long as its principles are not contradicted. However, as 
mentioned in Chapter 2, the contractual relationships cannot be the sole provider of such 
protection as this would neglect the recognised fact that all contracts are incomplete,326 
in that the parties are not able to foresee the future in definite terms and so cannot make 
I t .. . 327 comp e e proVISIOns III a contract for every eventuality. This is because there will be 
problems (such as the majority shareholder seeking to engage in opportunistic 
behaviour) that cannot be foreseen by the minority shareholder at the time of signing the 
contract. 328 Therefore, shareholder agreements under Sharia may assist in protecting the 
minority shareholder to a certain extent, but they are never able to provide complete 
protection. It is strongly believed that the company statute is the appropriate provider of 
complete protection, and any other source has only a secondary role. 
3.3.6 The role of company statute in regulating protection alongside Sharia 
EI Sheikh has confidently stated that there are no written statutory provisions in the 
company law of many Islamic jurisdictions that are designed specifically to protect 
minority shareholders against illegal expropriation. The learned commentator went on to 
say that such protection is accommodated within Islamic law, which is the main provider 
of commercial principles in such jurisdictions.329 This statement is correct in only one 
respect: that Sharia indeed contains principles that may protect minority shareholders 
from potential abuse or misuse. Nonetheless, it merely provides general and indirect 
principles, leaving the detailed mechanisms, legal grounds and remedies for the law-
makers to formulate according to the requirements of contemporary commercial and 
company law. For example, under the general principles of Sharia law, shareholder 
agreements may confer the right to exit the company, but the detailed application of the 
principle which monitors this right is not specified under Sharia. In this sense, it is left to 
326 I, MacNeil., Company Law Rules: An Assessment from the Perspective of Incomplete Contract 
Theory Journal o/Corporate Law Studies. 2001, 1(1), pg: 107. 
327 A, Keay. & H, Zhang., Incomplete Contracts, Contingent Fiduciaries and a Director's Duty to 
Creditors. Melbourne University Law Review. 2008, 32(1), pg: 154. 
328 A, Keay. & H, Zhang., Incomplete Contracts, Contingent Fiduciaries and a Director's Duty to 
Creditors. Melbourne University Law Review. 2008, 32(1), pg: 154 & 155. 
329 F, EI Sheikh., The Legal Regime 0/ Foreign Private Investment in Sudan and Saudi Arabia. 1 S\ ed. 
Cambridge, University Press, 2003, pg: 122. 
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the law-makers to provide and then to regulate plainly the mechanisms and legal 
procedures to clarify its application. The right of shareholders to exit the company may 
bring the enforcement of other related rights, such as those of pre-emption, transferring 
shares to a third party and the valuation of shares. But it would seem that there are not 
sufficient provisions in the legislation of Islamic jurisdictions to deal adequately with the 
protection of minority interests. Thus it is very important to understand that, even if 
Sharia and the current company statutes of some Islamic jurisdictions are taken together, 
they still do not deliver the high standards of protection to minority shareholders that 
would be consistent with the international demand to protect minority shareholders, 
because the statutes are not sufficiently detailed. 
Unfortunately, in some Sharia-based jurisdictions (like SA) no clear rights and interests 
are recognized for minority shareholders in the statute and, therefore, they are not 
adequately protected. This is because there are no clear procedures to follow concerning 
how one can bring an action if any abuse, misuse or oppression occurs. And, while 
Sharia might provide some basis for minority shareholders to complain, it does not 
provide any procedures which enable such shareholders to take action. So, when it 
comes to the enforcement of the company law in some of these jurisdictions, it is found 
that their out-of-date company laws obstruct minority shareholder protection and create 
gaps which result in uncertainty, and even injustice. The enforcement of existing 
provisions that deal with minority oppression are, for the most part, neither workable 
nor efficient in these jurisdictions because they are not consistent with modern company 
law.33o Concerned minority shareholders have no specific avenue that they can follow to 
obtain adjudication in relation to their complaints. 
Most importantly, there is no statutory guidance as to the grounds on which the victim 
may bring an action. Furthermore, no remedies are identified for the minority 
shareholder when a wrongdoing occurs in the company. These detailed procedures and 
mechanisms, together with their application and enforcement, are factors which 
determine whether or not the laws of a country provide strong protection for minority 
330 F El Sheikh. The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment in Sudan and Saudi Arabia. 1st ed. 
Cambridge, Uni:ersity Press, 2003, pg: 74. The a~thor here .stressed that '~th~ enforcement 0: law in most 
of the Shari a-based jurisdictions suffers from thIS uncertamty and ambIgUity because theIr laws were 
enacted a long time ago during the colonial period, and for this reason they are not well adapted to the 
complexities of the modem business institutions." 
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shareholders. In the case of some Islamic jurisdictions, the statute does not contain 
Proper provisions to guarantee the ml'n' . d . .. Imum reqUIre protectIOn for mmonty 
shareholders. A classic illustration of this point is the acceptability under Sharia law of 
the issuing of preferred voting rights for a shareholder,331 while there is no statutory 
provision of exhaustive mechanisms or devices to afford protection if this right is abused 
or misused. 
This deficiency in protecting minority shareholders in private companIes IS not 
attributable to Sharia, as its role is to provide general principles, not specific detail when 
it comes to company law;332 it is rather the statute of such a jurisdiction that is to blame 
for not giving much greater detail and not providing remedial mechanisms. If the statute 
did so, then there would be instruction and guidance for business owners (foreign and 
national) and for judges, who would be more aware of the remedies which could be 
applied, and which would be the most appropriate in each particular case. 
Overall, Sharia and statutory structures can complement each other in strengthening 
minority shareholder protection. Together they can contribute to greater transparency 
and provide effective protection for minority shareholders. In Sharia-based jurisdictions, 
the law and its provisions cannot merely rely on one and neglect the other; instead, 
Sharia and the statute should work shoulder-to-shoulder to furnish general principles 
and detailed mechanisms. However, it is essential to comprehend that Sharia is not very 
likely to develop its principles and provide detailed procedures when it comes to 
company law, whereas the statute of any Islamic jurisdiction can converge along the 
lines of the Anglo-Saxon model of minority shareholder protection. Miles and 
Goulding333 note that the adoption of such a model has become an important means of 
ensuring high standards of corporate governance, effective protection and enhanced 
investor confidence, even by those countries, such as Islamic jurisdictions, which do not 
share the culture, tradition or system in which it operates. They further assert that the 
Anglo-Saxon model is the only practical one and should be copied by all countries in 
331 Sharia Standards for Islamic Institutions 2008, cited In: H, Hajjaji., Shareholders' agreements and 
Islamic financing, International Business Law Journal. 2009, 5, ~g: 564. . 
332 Sharia provides full detail and complete guidelines when It comes, for example, to famIly law or 
inheritance. . 
333 L, Miles. & S, Goulding., Corporate governance in Western (Anglo-Amencan) and Islamic 
communities: prospects for convergence?, Journal of Business Law. 2010,2, pg: 127 & 128. 
88 
order to increase competitiveness and attract foreign investment. 334 In fact, it has been 
found by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny that Anglo-Saxon countries 
confer on minority shareholders stronger protection, relatively speaking, than the 
French civil code countries, which provide the weakest protection of all legal 
systems.335 
It is important to emphasise that most Sharia-based jurisdictions, if not all, are heavily 
influenced either by the Anglo-Saxon common law (based on the US and UK models) 
or the French civil code, as long as the relevant law is compliant and consistent with 
Sharia principles.336 This would include company law in SA and, therefore, it is difficult 
to understand why the same scheme or model has not been adopted by SA when dealing 
with minority shareholder protection. In other words, if SA has already adopted the 
Western model of company law, after some adaptation, why has minority shareholder 
protection not also been embraced? In fact, there does not appear to be any clear answer 
to this question. However, one can argue that the possible justification for not providing 
defined and specific protection in the company law in SA may be attributable to the 
government's intention to liberalise or widen the judges' power by allowing them to 
rule in such cases with broad discretion. It may be assumed, from the perspective of 
legislatures, that if all remedies were specified under the statute, then judges would be 
restricted or limited to them and could not go beyond them when required to deliver 
justice. The current position in SA may give more room for judges' discretion because 
remedies and their functions are not taken from the statute, but from general Islamic 
jurisprudence, justice, fairness, equality and commercial conventions, which enables 
judges to apply more remedies and bring justice to cases on broader terms. Another 
possible reason as to why certain Shari a-based jurisdictions (including SA) have not 
adopted the Western minority shareholder protection system in their company law may 
be ascribed to the insignificance of minority shareholders' input in the market or due to 
them being relatively few in number. However, this argument, in particular, is very 
weak because reality shows that most companies are privately held, as they are in 
334 L, Miles. & S, Goulding., Corporate governance in Western (Anglo-American) and Islamic 
communities: prospects for convergence?, Journal of Business Law. 2010, 2, pg: 128. 
335 R, La Porta. & Others., Law and Finance, Journal of Po litica I Economy. 1.998. 105(6), p~: 1116. . 
336 M, Souria!., Corporate Governance in the Middle East and North Africa: An OvervIew. Egyptzan 
Ministry of Foreign Trade. (February 28,2004), pg: 10. 
89 
· l'k h 337. 
countnes 1 e t e UK. ThIs means that effective minority shareholder protection, 
therefore, has the potential to impact or affect the vast majority of companies and their 
shareholders. 338 
It is believed that the easiest and most effective way of introducing a practical system of 
protection in Sharia-based jurisdictions (including SA), is by following in the footsteps 
of the Anglo-Saxon minority shareholder protection model (with, perhaps, some 
adaptation) as long as it does not contradict Sharia. It is also believed that the minority 
shareholder protection in SA cannot be subject only to general principles or commercial 
conventions any longer as it has now become a necessity to codify all remedies and 
reliefs for minority shareholders in the company law statute.339 Any resistance to the 
idea of codification may basically contribute to the unpredictability and uncertainty of 
the court's decisions and, generally, to the commercial and legal environment. 
3.4 The Bill for a new Saudi Arabian Company Law 
It is only recently that a tangible intention to reform the existing out-of-date commercial 
and company statutory law has been demonstrated by the Saudi Arabian government. As 
far as this research is concerned, it is the current minority shareholder protection, in 
particular, which is in real need of reform because of the considerable ambiguity within 
its provisions. In addition, other aspects of company law suffer from this uncertainty and 
complexity as they are inadequate for modem commercial transactions.34o It is believed 
that reform cannot be directed towards only one aspect of company law, but rather 
towards the whole, as the statutory provisions of company law relate to and depend on 
each other. It has taken the Saudi legislative authority too long to realise that company 
law reform has become necessary in order to comply with international standards and to 
create a competitive commercial environment. However, the reform and refinement have 
337 It is probably the same case in every jurisdiction (including S~), as private companies are ~lw~ys 
greater in number than public companies and, consequently, thIS may also suggest that mmonty 
shareholders are more numerous than majority shareholders. 
338 B, Means., A Voice-Based Framework for Evaluating Claims of Minority Shareholder Oppression in 
the Close Corporation, Georgetown Law Journal. 2009, 97 (5), pg: 10. 
339 F, Almajid., A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the Corporate Goven:ance of Saudi .Publicly 
Held Companies: A Comparative and Analytical Study from a Legal PerspectIve. Ph.D TheSIS. 2008. 
University of Manchester: UK. pg: 166. . ' . 51 
340 F, EI Sheikh., The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment In Sudan and SaudI Arabza. 1 ed. 
Cambridge, University Press, 2003, pg: 74. 
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been delegated to the relevant authority (the Law ReC.onn C " . th Sh 11 ommlsslOn In e ura 
Council)341 which will seek to revise the law and to draft a bill for a new company law. 
It is hoped that the Law Refonn Commission will take into consideration the necessity 
of building strong minority shareholder protection to overcome the deficiencies and 
weaknesses of the current law. 
Nevertheless, it has been some years now since the Law Refonn Commission was first 
tasked with refonning the company law, but no final approval has so far been reached. A 
draft Bill has been published recently, most probably for legal practitioners, analysts and 
scholars, and those who deal with company law on a daily basis to have their say on 
what they think is appropriate and what is not. It is true that the Bill has not yet been 
finalised, but this draft is probably very similar to what the final draft will contain. 
Therefore, a valuable opportunity exists to examine this Bill and see how the law-
makers address the complexities of minority shareholder protection. 
The Bi1l342 contains more provisions than the existing law and generally seems to give 
more detail and guidance than the Company Law 1965. However, many of the existing 
provisions are transferred to the Bill unchanged, but in a different sequence, and, 
unfortunately, this means that once again minority shareholder protection in private 
companies has no specific section setting out all of its provisions in one place. For 
example, the Bill contains certain sections applying to private companies, which restate, 
that any decision regarding the amendment of the shareholder agreement must be agreed 
unanimously. 343 But this provision is currently available under s25 of the Saudi 
Company Law 1965, so no new addition is represented here. Another example is where 
the Bill reaffirms that a director (or majority shareholder) cannot do business with the 
company for hislher own benefit (conflict of interest) unless it is declared and agreed 
unanimously by all shareholders. Furthermore, it states that the director/majority 
341 Shura Council is the main legislative authority in Saudi Arabia. Its role is to introduce regulations, 
laws, projects and so on. Prior to the introduction of any law, the Shura's members (who ar~ experts) 
need to discuss it in detail. They then pass it to the Council of Ministers for approval and executIon. 
342 The draft Bill is available from Twsyat.net, 2004. A vailable at: 
<http://twsyat.netlforumlshowthread.php?t=197> accessed 22 March 2010. In .addition, J, Almalki., 
Almadina Newspaper. (14. February. 2011), Available at: <http://www.al-madma.comlnode/288033> 
accessed 15. February 2011, has confirmed that the Bill has 226 sections and 12 chapters. 
343 It is believed that several drafts of the Bill have been published and each version is slightly different 
from the others. Therefore, it is not helpful to mention the numbers of clauses as the reader will not be 
aware of which draft in particular this research refers to. It is thought that it is better to discuss what the 
clauses state without referring to the clause numbers as what matters most is the contents of the Bill. 
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shareholder is liable to pay compensation to the company, other shareholders or a third 
party for hislher breach of the shareholder agreement, and any agreement otherwise is 
not valid. The same provisions are set out in sections 31 and 32 of the Saudi Company 
Law 1965. Therefore, there is no tangible change in the draft Bill which positively 
protects the minority shareholder in private companies. 
It appears, regretfully, that while the Bill is concerned with various new issues not 
covered in the 1965 Act, minority shareholder protection in private companies is not one 
of them. The most important change in the Bill is perhaps towards public companies. 
For instance, the new Bill activates a practical, effective system of corporate governance 
and, for the first time, requires public companies to have supervisory boards (observers) 
separate from the shareholders and management, who examine how the company works 
and to ascertain if any problems have occurred. 
It is believed that, although such a huge project is undoubtedly a step forward in 
reforming the company law, only time will tell if the objectives of the reform have been 
met.344 Nonetheless, as far as minority shareholder protection is concerned, the Bill fails 
to address many of the deficiencies and weaknesses that have been identified in this 
research. Disappointingly, the proposed legislation simply does not provide clear power 
for the minority shareholder to litigate in private companies and thus a number of 
questions remain unanswered: Firstly, what are the grounds on which the minority 
shareholder may litigate? Secondly, who pays the costs of litigation? Thirdly, what 
remedies can be sought? Additionally, how is one to distinguish between the 
shareholder's right to litigate on hislher own behalf, and the right to litigate so as to 
protect the corporate interest? Finally, which of the minority shareholder's rights and 
interests should be protected? As long as these matters are not dealt with efficiently, it 
remains hard to advise minority shareholders as to what their rights are, how they can 
. lb· . t· 345 exercise them, and whether they are hke y to 0 tam any JUS Ice. 
344 F, Almajid., A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the Corporate Gove,:,ance of Saudi .Publicly 
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University of Manchester: UK. pg: 166. . ' . . . 
345 L, Miles, & M, He., Protecting the rights and interest of minonty sh~eholders I~ hsted compames In 
China: challenges for the future, International Company and Commercial Law Review. 2005, 16(7), pg: 
280. 
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It is seriously hoped that the Bill does not become fi l' ed' . . 
na IS m ItS current state, as It 
seems not to have been drafted with sufficient care and 'd t' d" conSl era IOn towar s mmonty 
shareholders in private companies. If the Bill is adopted as it is, no fundamental changes 
will be introduced for minority shareholder protection, and minority shareholders may 
find it difficult to challenge decisions which harm their rights and interests. 346 
3.5 The position of minority protection in Dubai 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the key aim here was to investigate 
relevant company law and commercial legislation, mainly in SA and briefly in Dubai. In 
particular, we wish to examine the status of minority shareholder protection in both 
jurisdictions. The provision in SA has already been analysed in detail throughout the 
previous sections of this chapter and now we tum to investigate how minority 
shareholder protection works in Dubai, and to identify any weak and/or inefficient 
aspects of the law, so that it might be possible to offer some workable reforms. 
Dubai is one state of a federation of seven emirates (states), the United Arab Emirates, 
in which each state is governed by a separate federal authority and slightly different 
laws.347 Dubai has been chosen in this research from among the other states in the UAE 
because of its significant attraction to foreign investors, its current rapid development 
and, to a certain extent, because of the availability of some reliable materials that reflect 
the reality there and are useful for the purpose of this study. According to the official 
Dubai Statistics Centre, foreign investment in 2006 in Dubai alone reached over $11.5 
billion and this figure increased further in 2007.348 Broadly speaking, the majority of 
countries in the Middle East are seen by Tricker349 as having emergent, small and 
illiquid capital markets which consequently result in poor corporate control. However, 
346 L, Miles, & M, He., Protecting the rights and interest of minority shareholders in listed companies in 
China: challenges for the future, International Company and Commercial Law Review. 2005, 16(7), pg: 
280. The authors in this article also studied the reform of the company law provisions in China, which 
was similar to the draft Bill in Saudi Arabia in its failures. 
347 M, Blair. & J, Orchard., Legal issues arising in the new Dubai International Finance Centre, Journal of 
International Banking Law and Regulation. 2005, 20(5), pg: 207. It is important ~o be. aware that the UAE 
is divided into a number of small states ruled by independent laws. However, In thIS research the focus 
will be solely on Dubai and the commercial company law of 1984 that. operates within it: . 
348 P Terblanche. United Arab Emirates: UAE company law overvIew, Taylor Wesszng (MIddle East) 
LLP.' (27 May 2009), Available at: <http://www.mondaq.comlarticle.asp?articleid=80 1 06> accessed 5 
May 2010. sl • • • 
349 B, Tricker., Corporate Governance. 1 ed. Oxford: Oxford Umverslty Press, 2009, pg. 207. 
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he considers Dubai (along with a few other countn'es' th .) . 
III e regIOn as an exceptIOn to 
such general observations. This is because Dubai l'ntends t b . t t' 1 o ecome an III erna IOna 
commercial centre and is making every effort to do so. 
3.5.1 A general overview of company law and regulation in Dubai 
Company law in Dubai is governed by a federal statute, the UAE Commercial and 
Company Law 1984.350 One particularly interesting feature is that the law applies the 
51/49 rule
351 
when dealing with foreign investors (that is, foreign investors are allowed 
to have no more than 49% of the shares in a company and are therefore always in the 
minority). The only alternative is for foreign investors to establish businesses in one of 
the Dubai Special Zones where they can obtain any level of ownership without 
" 352 H 
restnctlon. owever, the 51/49 rule has provoked the development of an illegal 
practice whereby U AE nationals set up companies then enter into so-called "side 
agreements,,353 with foreign shareholders, which allow the foreigners to own shares in 
excess of what the law permits them to acquire. This means that nationals are acting as 
illegal proxies for foreign companies so as to manipulate the law and benefit along with 
foreign investors.354 Those foreign investors who do choose to comply with the law 
usually form a limited liability company (Ltd) with a UAE national. 355 
We will now begin to investigate the protection for minority shareholders in private 
companies in Dubai, no matter whether these minority shareholders are foreign investors 
or UAE nationals. Thus, it is not important to identify who the minority shareholder 
(either foreign or national) is, but what matters is the protection which the law offers to a 
minority shareholder in the commercial environment. However, it can be argued that, 
350 This company law applies to all Emirates in the UAE, but each Emirate has the capacity to produce 
further regulations and amend some practices according to what it sees fit for its own circumstances. 
351 UAE Commercial and Company Law 1984, section 22. 
352 Dubai promotes foreign investment by setting up specialised economic zones in which foreign 
investors are entitled to 100% ownership and profits with 0% taxes. Each zone has its own regulations 
and specialisation, such as the Dubai Technology and Media Free Zone Private Companies Regulations 
2003. See: http://www.tecom.ae/law/index.htm. 
353 This "side agreement" is a hidden agreement which foreign investors make with nationals to allow 
them to own 100% of the company. When registering the company they produce a shareholders' 
agreement which complies with the law in terms ofthe 51149 rule but, in reality, the nationals do not have 
any shares in the company. This practice is totally illegal. 
354 P Terblanche. United Arab Emirates: UAE company law overview, Taylor Wessing (Middle East) 
LLP: (27 May 2009), Available at: <http://www.mondaq.comlartic1e.asp?artic1eid=80106> accessed 5 
May 2010. 
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SInce Dubai company law forces foreign investors to always become minority 
shareholders, it must provide, at the same time, an efficient system for them to protect 
their rights and interests from being abused or oppressed. 
An empirical study was not conducted in Dubai, but it is assumed that the situation there 
is very similar to that of SA, especially because of the following similarities between the 
two jurisdictions. Firstly, Dubai company law is also somehow based on Sharia 
(although not to quite the same extent).356 Secondly, it is also a system which is derived 
from the French (civil law) model. Thirdly, the two regions have a number of similar 
statutory provisions in their company law legislation, including their provision for 
minority shareholder protection. Finally, like SA, Dubai has no case law system that can 
guide the judges and lawyers.357 These general similarities between the two countries in 
terms of the law and its practice allow us to make reasonable assumptions about how 
minority shareholder protection works in the Dubai market. It cannot be said that the 
empirical study reflects the situation in Dubai as accurately as in SA, but it can still give 
a good indication as to the position of minority protection in Dubai. 
Generally, it is true to say that the UAE Commercial and Company Law 1984 is more 
detailed, functional, modem, and workable than the Saudi Company Law 1965. To 
exemplify this, s240 of the UAE company law requires shareholders, if their number 
exceeds seven, to have some sort of internal monitoring and the establishment of an 
independent supervisory board consisting of at least three shareholders to observe how 
the company is managed and if any governance issues exist.358 Thus, it is admitted, that, 
in general, Dubai company law is a few steps ahead of its Saudi Arabian equivalent. 
3.5.2. Advantages and disadvantages of minority shareholder protection 
provisions in Dubai 
356 Y, Mubaydeen., Legal aspect of project finance transactions under the laws of the United Arab 
Emirates, Journal of International Banking Law and Regulatio~. 2003, 18(5), pg: 219. . 
357 Y, Mubaydeen., Legal aspect of project finance trans~ctlOns under the l~ws of the Untted Arab 
Emirates, Journal of International Banking Law and Regulatzon. 2003, 18(5), ~g. 220. . 
358 The same section requires the re-appointment of the members of the supervISOry board after the expIry 
of the said period. 
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When it comes to minority shareholder protection in particular, Dubai may be, to some 
extent, in a slightly better position than SA.359 Laubach and Khan describe in general 
terms the position of minority shareholder protection in Dubai: 
"In the case of abuse of minority shareholder interests, the Regulations give the 
courts great discretion to determine the most appropriate course of action to protect 
such interests, including amending a company's by-laws and/or changing its capital 
structure. ,,360 
However, this statement is very broad as it does not say how the courts would do so, or 
what regulates this discretion. Is it perhaps totally subject to the judges' opinion as it 
seems to be in SA? Mubaydeen, rather, sees the extent of judges' discretion in the UAE 
as positive, stressing their ability to provide compensation equal to any loss suffered.361 
Furthermore, section 231 362 has a device that may be considered advantageous to 
minority shareholders, since it regulates the statutory right of pre-emption. If a minority 
shareholder in a private company intends to sell hislher shares to a third party, other 
shareholders must be notified of such an intention and the majority shareholder is 
required to act within thirty days of receiving such notice if he/she wishes to acquire the 
shares. If the majority shareholder does not use hislher right to buy them, the minority 
shareholder has the right to sell the relevant shares to a non-shareholder.363 This 
statutory provision is particularly beneficial to the minority shareholder as it offers 
himlher both a fair exit strategy and, arguably, the chance to obtain an undiscounted 
359 According to Watts, the Dubai Companies Law is similar in some of its protection of shareholders' 
rights and interests to that which exists under the United Kingdom legislation. See G, Watts., The 
shareholder's legal toolkit. Minority shareholder rights under UAE law. Al Tamimi & Company. (19 April 
2010), Available at: 
<http://www.thefreelibrary.comlThe+Shareholdet>1027s+Legal+Toolkit+Minority+Shareholder+Rights+u 
nder+UAE. .. -a0224273778> accessed 10 May 2010. 
360 C, Laubach., & A, Khan., UAE: Saadiyat zone - further regulations, Journal of International 
Financial Markets. 1999, 1(7), pg: 79. 
361 Y, Mubaydeen., Legal aspect of project finance transactions under the laws of the United Arab 
Emirates Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation. 2003, 18(5), pg: 222. The author has 
come to ;his perspective from ss. 389 and 390 of the UAE Civil Code 1987. 
362 UAE Commercial and Company Law 1984. 
363 In the case of a difference over the price, the company's auditor shall evaluate the price as of the date 
of the redemption. However, as long as the legislation allows ~ third party to be involved.' then it ,is 
assumed that the company's auditor will take into account the pnce offer produce,d ?y the, third party In 
the evaluation report. If the third party's offer is considered reasonable, then It IS belIeved that the 
majority shareholder would be asked to offer the same price. 
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price for shares.
364 
What distinguishes this method is that the law here provides an 
option for the minority shareholder to leave the company if he/she is not happy with the 
.• 365 H . 
way It IS run. owever, even thIS strategy cannot always offer an ideal outcome 
because sometimes no third party is willing to buy minority shares, especially if the 
majority shareholders are suspected of being guilty of misuse, abuse and oppression, and 
there is no effective law that allows the minority shareholder to seek relief and remedy 
for such treatment. 
By exploring and examining minority shareholder protection in Dubai in detail, we have 
found that, similar to the position in SA, the DAE Commercial and Company Law 1984 
has no specific section or separate package of provisions that provides for minority 
shareholder protection in private companies. However, the law does contain a few 
provisions here and there regarding minority shareholder protection. For instance, 
section 37 states that decisions in a joint liability company shall be made by unanimous 
agreement of the shareholders unless the shareholder agreement provides that the 
opinion of the majority of shareholders shall suffice. However, a decision relating to the 
amendments of the shareholder agreement shall never be valid unless adopted by the 
unanimous agreement of the shareholders. This provision is a safeguard for the minority 
shareholder in this type of company as it makes the rule of unanimous agreement of all 
shareholders a requirement, so that the majority shareholder cannot make sole decisions. 
On the other hand, and also similar to the position in SA, s39 of the DAE Commercial 
and Company Law states that if there are several directors and no specific function is 
assigned to each of them in the shareholder agreement, then each of the directors may 
perform any management functions, provided that the others are entitled to object to the 
performance of any action before it is completed. In this circumstance, the majority 
shareholder's opinion shall prevail. It should be remembered that even if the minority 
shareholder complains before the conduct is completed, he/she needs to make the 
complaint to the majority shareholder who has the ultimate power to decide whether to 
react to the complaint or not. It is believed that if there is no clear fraud, and the majority 
364 If a dispute between the shareholders occurred over the price for sh~es, usually the parties refer the 
matter to the court and the court, in most cases, value the shares accordmg to the market value of shares. 
365 Watts in his article (G, Watts., The shareholder's legal toolkit. Minority shareholder rights under UAE 
law. Al Tamimi & Company. (19 April 2010), Available at: 
<http://www.thefreelibrary.comlThe+ShareholdetJIo27s+Legal+TooIkit+Minority+Shareholder+Rights+u 
nder+UAE ... -a0224273778> accessed 10 May 2010) has said that it is not always open for the minority 
shareholder to sell the shares to a third party as the majority shareholder may restrict this. 
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shareholder declines to do anything about the complaint, even the court may not 
investigate the matter complained of because the matter has been already decided by the 
majority shareholder.366 
Therefore, it may be claimed that, in some respects, Dubai company law offers better 
protection for minority shareholders than that of SA but, in reality, this is not necessarily 
the case. In fact, majority shareholders in Dubai are firmly in control, while the statute 
does not provide necessarily sufficient and specific protection to minority shareholders 
to remedy any misuse, negligence, fraud, unfairness or oppression. Thus, it can be 
concluded that both jurisdictions (SA and Dubai) are lacking statutory mechanisms, 
procedures, grounds, remedies and recognition of specific interests and rights for the 
minority shareholder. 
3.5.3 Proposed solutions and recommendations 
This weak position of minority shareholder protection in Dubai has been acknowledged 
by a number of legal practitioners and researchers, who have proposed certain solutions 
to overcome the inadequacies. Watts367 has suggested that the best way to provide 
protection for minority shareholders is by having them engaged in the board. He also 
proposes that all major decision-making and critical issues should come to the board for 
discussion and approval. He believes that minority shareholders can be protected by 
involvement in the company's management for the following reasons: Firstly, they will 
have total access to confidential information. Secondly, they will have knowledge of all 
dealings, transactions and commitments so they could use a defensive action whenever 
protection of their interests is necessary. Thirdly, if involved in the board, minority 
shareholders would be able to control the appointment of key signatories. In response to 
this proposed solution, however, it should be borne in mind that the law should protect a 
minority shareholder even if he/she is not involved in management. In fact, it is 
unreasonable to make the protection of a minority shareholder dependent on hislher 
366 It is believed that this section is not fair because it does not grant the minority shareholder a clear 
mechanism to complain after the completion of an action. Rather, the section blocks the way for the 
minority shareholder to complain to the court once the majority shareholder ratifies the conduct or it is 
completed. 
367 G, Watts., The shareholder's legal toolkit. Minority shareholder rights under UAE law. Al Tamimi & 
Company. (19 April 2010), Available at: 
<http://www.thefreelibrary.comlThe+Shareholder%27s+Legal+Toolkit+Minority+Shareholder+Rights+u 
nder+UAE. .. -a0224273778> accessed 10 May 2010. 
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involvement in management. It is assumed that substantial numbers of minority 
shareholders invest in companies of which they cannot be involved in the management 
but, despite this, they will expect the law to protect their interests and rights. Even if the 
proposal to have involvement in the company's management is taken on board, 
practically it may not offer adequate protection to a minority shareholder if the majority 
shareholder's percentage is enough to pass resolutions or ratify decisions. 
Another strategy to overcome weakness in protecting minority shareholders in private 
companies has been put forward by Laurence, Robinson and Gunson368 who believe that 
the shareholders' agreement can grant protection to the minority shareholder if it 
contains protective provisions which expand the rights already guaranteed by the law.369 
For instance, the shareholders' agreement could contain a list of "reserved matters" 
which require a higher percentage of votes to be approved, and the majority 
shareholder's percentage alone would not enable himlher to grant approval, unless the 
particular shareholder had an unusually high percentage of shares. In response to this 
suggestion, it has been proven by the empirical study undertaken in SA that, although 
the shareholders' agreement can provide, to a certain extent, some protection for the 
minority shareholder, it cannot replace the statute in providing a list of all rights and 
interests and also in providing a comprehensive practical mechanism to protect these 
rights and interests.37o It is wrong to assume that once the shareholders' agreement 
contains a list of "reserved matters" which have to be approved by a particularly high 
percentage of votes, the minority shareholder is well protected. In fact, there are other 
activities which the majority shareholder may engage in, such as misuse, abuse, 
negligence, fraud, breach, default and unfairness or oppression, which can give rise to 
the need for protection. It is argued that the only way of obtaining comprehensive 
protection is by introducing a statute that contains efficient safeguards, and that other 
sources of protection (shareholders' agreement, involvement in management and 
internal company code) remain secondary. 
3.5.4 New Company Law in Dubai 
368 P Terblanche. United Arab Emirates: UAE company law overview, Taylor Wessing (Middle East) 
LLP.' (27 May 2009), Available at: <http://www.mondaq.comlarticle.asp?articleid=80l06> accessed 5 
May 2010. 
369 Something that is done frequently in the UK. 
370 See Chapter 4, Section 4.3.2.3. 
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It has been officially confirmed that Dubai is about to produce new companIes 
legislation which may revise the ownership limitation on businesses established by 
foreign companies in the jurisdiction. It is expected that the amendments to the law will 
allow foreign shareholders to acquire 100 per cent ownership of a company's 
shareholding even outside of the allocated free zones. Terblanche speculates that lifting 
this obstacle to foreign ownership will improve the commercial environment further in 
Dubai and will attract even more foreign investment. 371 Nonetheless, local experts and 
legal analysts predict that the new law would never allow lOO per cent ownership by any 
foreign company. Saidi,372 an economist, believes that the new law will merely allow 
foreign companies to have more than the current 49 per cent, but still not full ownership, 
and that this will maximise investments in Dubai as it will provide more opportunities 
for small and medium businesses to be established.373 However, it is important to realise 
that whether the new law allows foreign investors to have more than 49 per cent of 
ownership or not is not the actual issue in the current study, because what really matters 
is the protection for minority shareholders which applies regardless of whether they are 
foreigners or nationals. 
It is believed that even the newly proposed law will only address superficial or external 
issues and neglect fundamental matters when it comes to minority shareholder 
protection. Similar to the draft Bill for a new company law in SA, the legislative 
authority in Dubai has not given substantial consideration to many of the deficiencies 
and weaknesses which are seen to exist in the present commercial environment. It is also 
unfortunate that the proposed law is to be drafted without addressing the following 
questions: What are the interests and rights of the minority shareholder that should be 
protected? What grounds may the minority shareholder use to litigate on behalf of the 
company or on hislher own behalf? Who bears the cost of litigation (indemnity)? What 
371 P Terblanche. United Arab Emirates: UAE company law overview, Taylor Wessing (Middle East) 
LLP.' (27 May 2009), Available at: <http://www.mondaq.com!article.asp?articleid=80106> accessed 5 
May 2010. . 
372 N, Saidi., Chief Economist of the Dubai International Financial Centre, CIted In: F. Mehmood, U.A.E. 
unlikely to allow 100% foreign company ownership, TopNews Arab Emi~ates. (24 March 201.0), 
available at: <http://topnews.ae/contentl21851-uae-unlikely-allow-l OO-forelgn-company-ownershlp> 
accessed 5 May 2010. . . . 
373 This new law is expected to obtain approval and to come mto effect by the end of 2011. The mam aim 
of this new law is to create flexibility in foreign ownership to allow more worldwide investors' money to 
flow into the country. 
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remedies can be sought? How can one distinguish between shareholders' interests and 
the corporate interests? 
Watts374 has emphasised three matters under the current Dubai company law which 
would need reform in any forthcoming law. He believes that if these requirements are 
dealt with in the new company law, minority shareholder protection in Dubai could be 
considerably improved. They are: firstly, to enforce a specific remedy for conduct 
amounting to excessive prejudice and oppression; secondly, to allow minority 
shareholders with a clear right to access corporate information; and thirdly, to provide a 
device that enables the minority shareholder to limit illegal or ultra vires actions. In 
other words, Dubai company law urgently needs legal instruments to remedy all types of 
misconduct and unfairness, together with a clear mechanism that facilitates doing so. 
These instruments and their mechanisms cannot be offered through any other means 
than the statute. It is hoped that the new proposed company law in Dubai will address 
the issue of minority shareholder protection appropriately, and thus comply with what 
the market demands, before it is put into effect. 
3.6 Conclusion: 
The aim of this chapter has been to investigate the relevant company law, mainly in SA, 
as far as minority shareholders are concerned. Unfortunately, it is thought that one of 
the major obstacles which tends to limit the flow of capital into SA is the protection of 
minority shareholders. This may be because current Saudi company law is not up to 
today's international standards. Although some provisions provide the minimum 
safeguards and protection to minority shareholders when it comes to public companies, 
there are no provisions which grant the same level of protection when it comes to 
private companies. 
Therefore, it was necessary for this chapter to examine and investigate the present status 
of minority shareholder protection in SA in practice to understand where the problems 
emanate from. Starting with what is relevant in the Saudi statute, it has been found that 
374 G, Watts., The shareholder's legal toolkit. Minority shareholder rights under UAE law. Al Tamimi & 
Company. (19 April 2010), Available at: 
<http://www.thefreelibrary.comfThe+Shareholder>1027s+Legal+Toolkit+Minority+Shareholder+Rights+u 
nder+UAE. .. -a0224273778> accessed 10 May 2010. 
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there are many circumstances which may arise in private com' h b f panIes, suc as a use 0 
power, negligence and oppression committed by directors or majority shareholders, 
which are not addressed clearly or at all. It has been demonstrated that even the court's 
exact role in dealing with minority shareholders is uncertain. 
The chapter has shown that the role of Sharia in Saudi company law is merely to provide 
general principles regarding company law, while it leaves the detailed mechanisms, 
devices and remedies for the legislature to provide for in the statute, to ensure that the 
requirements of contemporary company law are met. Therefore, any deficiency in 
protecting minority shareholders cannot be attributable to Sharia, as providing specific 
detail when it comes to company law is not one of its roles. Rather, the statute is to 
blame for not offering much more detail and for failing to provide remedial mechanisms. 
This chapter has also discussed the draft Bill to reform the existing out-of-date 
commercial and company law in SA. Eventually, the Saudi legislative authority has 
realised that company law reform has become necessary in order to comply with 
international standards and create a competitive commercial environment. Nonetheless, 
this Bill places very little focus on minority shareholder protection when compared with 
other aspects of company law. The Bill fails to address many of the deficiencies of 
minority protection in private companies. It is hoped that this Bill is not approved in its 
current form as it seems not to have been drafted with sufficient care and reflection. If 
the Bill is enacted as law in this form, minority shareholders may still find it difficult to 
challenge decisions which harm their rights and interests. 
It was also decided to investigate minority shareholder protection in Dubai within this 
chapter. It has been assumed that its position in practice in Dubai is very similar to that 
of SA. Generally speaking, it is true to say that Dubai law in this respect is more 
detailed, modem and practical than its Saudi equivalent. Nevertheless, when examining 
minority shareholder protection in Dubai closely, it has been found that the provision is 
almost the same as in SA, as there are no specific sections in the law that provide for 
minority shareholder protection. In fact, both jurisdictions are lacking sufficient 
statutory devices, mechanisms, grounds, remedies and recognition of specific interests 
and rights for the minority shareholder in private companies. 
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It has been officially confinned that Dubai is about to produce new contemporary 
company legislation. However, it is believed that even the new proposed Bill only 
intends to address superficial or external issues and will neglect fundamental matters 
when it comes to minority shareholder protection in private companies. Similar to with 
the proposed new company law in SA, the Dubai legislature has not given substantial 
consideration to many of the deficiencies and weaknesses which are seen to exist in its 
present commercial environment. 
Therefore, there is clear weakness and deficiency in SA and Dubai laws and their ability 
to provide protection for the minority shareholder. However, to offer reform to such a 
region, there is a necessity to have a better understanding of the area and what the 
position is in practice. For this reason, the next chapter will seek to study different 
reliable source that can reflect the reality and enable us to comprehend this area of law 
more. Hence, an empirical study was conducted in SA to investigate the doctrine of 
minority shareholder protection in practice. 
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Chapter 4 
An empirical study of minority shareholder protection in Saudi Arabia 
Introduction 
Any legal research intended to contribute to the field and offer valuable results should 
first place the matter at hand in a broad context and identify its problems. To do this, it 
should examine legislation, cases, academic literature, legal reports, reviews of the work 
of relevant councils etc, in such a way that it can paint a very clear picture of the area 
investigated. In the case of SA, there is a shortage of such legal materials and references. 
If all that exists was made available, it would enable this research to be based on a full 
understanding of the area, but unfortunately a good portion of it is not available to the 
pUblic.375 It has therefore been necessary to fill in the gaps by seeking another reliable 
source upon which to build the facts, results and contributions of this research. This 
source is an empirical study that was conducted in SA.376 
This chapter will involve an examination and analysis of the present doctrine as far as 
minority shareholder protection is concerned in SA. It is designed to identify any weak 
and inefficient aspects of the law to diagnose exactly where the problem lies in order to 
offer correct and workable reforms. The chapter is divided in a number of sections. The 
first section addresses the question of why it is essential to conduct an empirical study 
and the second details the approval process for the study. The third offers a detailed 
analysis of the empirical study that was carried out in SA (during October-December 
2009) into how minority shareholder protection truly works in the marketplace, while 
the fourth contains a full assessment of, and reflections on, its results in order to 
diagnose exactly where the weaknesses lie in the existing law. The fifth section contains 
the conclusion. 
375 SA is not only lacking legal materials and references in this study field to a certain extent, but some 
data and infonnation are also not accessible by the public for general purposes. 
376 It is true that this empirical study has been only conducted in SA and not Dubai, but it may give a 
general indication of the legal position in Dubai since all the Gulf States have similar laws. 
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4.1 Why conduct an empirical study? 
In the present case it was considered essential to conduct an empirical study in SA to 
investigate the doctrine of minority shareholder protection in practice. In fact, there was 
no real alternative method which could exhaustively reflect the reality of the situation in 
the same way and this is critical, as reforms should address the problems which actually 
exist in real life. The necessity to carry out such an empirical study has provided the 
opportunity to add more value to this research. It is important to make clear that the aim 
of the study was to collect information and data regarding the relevant protections and 
standards in SA, regardless of whether they emanated from the statutory provisions or 
Sharia principles, and to ascertain if the lack of minority protection, which has been 
highlighted in this thesis thus far, is a problem. In order to achieve these aims, the study 
was designed around a set of questions which were to be put to participants in 
interviews (the full set of questions is set out in the Appendix). The questions were 
divided into three groups, the purpose of the first of which was to identify the problems 
of minority shareholders in practice, the second to reflect the current remedies available 
to minority shareholders and the third to gather any proposals from participants by 
eliciting their views on what would work better and to what extent. The face-to-face 
interview was chosen as the method for conducting the study, rather than distributing 
written questionnaires for candidates to complete on their own. It was thought that the 
face-to-face interview was more advantageous because it would allow the researcher 
more freedom to engage in open discussion with interviewees. It would also allow the 
researcher to provide further explanation or interpretation of any difficult or potentially 
ambiguous questions, as well as being able to clarify answers given. The questions were 
delivered to the professional respondents in a semi-structured interview format designed 
to last 30 minutes if answered straightforwardly. 
The intention from the beginning was to select candidates on the basis of their careers 
and positions, and their understanding of company law issues. Moreover, candidates 
had to be conversant with the law of minority shareholder protection and its impact. 
This target was met, as all candidates were carefully chosen from amongst those 
holding posts which enabled them to be in very close touch with the issue of minority 
shareholder protection and they were therefore able to reflect the true situation and 
share their experience. Examples of posts held by interviewees are those of regulator, 
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judge, lawyer, businessperson (sole trader), minority shareholder, majority shareholder, 
I k d d . 377. aw-ma er an aca emIC researcher. The aIm was to interview a total of about twenty 
five persons from all categories.378 Some of the arrangements with the candidates relied 
on personal contacts, while judges, officers and officials, for example, were selected and 
contacted on a random basis. Each official institution provides a list of the specialized 
people working for it and their functions, and this helped in selecting interview 
candidates. 
4.2 Obtaining approval for the empirical study 
Since this research was conducted under academic supervision at Leeds University 
School of Law, ethical approval was required for the empirical study. The AREA 
Faculty Research Ethics Committee at the University was asked to grant such approval 
and, having been informed about the subject matter of the research and the purpose of 
the empirical study, it specified certain standards and instructions with which the study 
must comply. One of the most important of these was that all data and information 
collected had to be kept confidential. Therefore, all opinions, comments, remarks and 
information given by the participants, together with their names, have been kept private. 
The only people with access to this data are the thesis supervisors and the researcher 
and no names or personal information are mentioned in the thesis itself. A copy of the 
findings will be made available to all participants in order to inform them of the results. 
The second important condition set by the committee was that an information sheet 
should be given to every participant stating the title of the research and its purpose, 
explaining its subject matter and describing how the empirical study would add value to 
the research. Furthermore, this sheet explained to participants their right to withdraw at 
any stage without giving a reason. Attached to it was a consent form to be completed by 
each candidate to confirm that they had read the information sheet and understood their 
317 This empirical study has not surveyed the position of Saudi public companies because the shareholder 
in a public company has more remedies and reliefs made available to him than the minority shareholder in 
a private company. Furthermore, the minority shareholder in a public company always has the exit option. 
37 This number was thought sufficient to reflect reality on the ground. It was also thought to be much 
better to have valuable comments and statements from a few specialists than to seek contributions from 
non-specialists. 
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rights. Once the committee's requirements had been fulfilled, approval was granted for 
the empirical study to be conducted in SA.379 
4.3 Analysis of the empirical study 
The interview protocol had five pages (with some blanks), divided into three groups of 
questions, as mentioned above. There were a total of fifteen questions, all in English but 
with Arabic translations.38o The data collected from the interviews was subjected to 
qualitative analysis based on a coding approach, where participants were divided into 
categories in order to expose each group's opinions and perspectives in a comparable 
way. Having done this, the results were analysed. It is important to note that this 
analysis could not include all the information gathered from the responses of the 
twenty-five interviewees, but instead involved a filtering of the data in order to use the 
most relevant. It is admitted that this data may carry some shortcomings, especially 
because the sample interviewed was small. However, it was thought that this number 
would provide a valuable glimpse of the reality on the ground. Thus, the small sample 
was in fact deliberately targeted in order to concentrate on the quality of the information 
and data collected, rather than the quantity of participants. The number of participants in 
each professional category and their individual identifying codes are given in the Table 
(3.xx) below. 
379 The Chair of the AREA Faculty Research Ethics Committee at Leeds University granted the approval 
to carry out the empirical study on 21 st August ~009. . 
380 Just so there is no doubt, the language of SA IS ArabIC. 
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Table 3.xx: Interviewees and their coding references 
Categories Number of participants Coding reference 
Businesspersons (Sole traders)3lSl 5 A,B,C,D,E 
Majority shareholders 3 F, G, H 
Lawyers 4 I, J, K, L 
Academic staff 2 M,N 
Judges31SZ 3 0, P, Q 
Minority shareholders 5 R, S, T, U, V 
Others3• 3 W,X, Y 
Total: 25 
A review of published material shows that this empirical study is the first to publicly 
discuss the issue of minority shareholder protection in SA. It is unsurprising that, 
because this issue has never before been subject to investigation or even public 
discussion, people have not given it a lot of deep thought. Therefore, the empirical study 
alerted the interviewees to this fact and gave them the opportunity to offer the benefit of 
their experience. Despite the fact that these participants were aware of what went on in 
practice, they had not specifically considered the concept of minority shareholder 
protection previously. Thus, the questions in this empirical study started by addressing 
the actual problem, the remedies currently available and participants' recommendations 
and proposals. The questions were designed to help participants to visualize the problem 
in several dimensions and to enable them to assess the effectiveness of the present legal 
position and existing remedies. It was intended to ascertain whether the participants felt 
that the current law was deficient in some particular areas and whether they could make 
valuable recommendations and proposals for reform. 
381 The tenn 'businessperson' here refers to a person who is the only shareholder in the company. 
382 The judges who participated in this empirical study were all from the Commercial Division of the 
Board of Grievance, which is one of its three main divisions. 
383 These other participants were also chosen on the basis of their professions. One was a legal consultant 
at the Ministry of Commerce, another was a Human Resources (HR) officer at the Chamber of Commerce 
and the third was an officer in the Investment Opportunity Department of the Chamber of Commerce. 
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4.3.1. The Problem 
4.3.1.1. Existence of oppression and wrongdoing: 
The first question in the interview protocol was: Do minority shareholders face abuse, 
fraud, infringement, negligence, breach or oppression from majority shareholders in 
Saudi Arabian companies? If so, how? Responses indicate that only a little over 60% of 
all participants felt that there was clear abuse and oppression of minority shareholders 
by majority shareholders taking place in companies. However, participant S and some 
others did not acknowledge any actual or potential abuse or oppression by majority 
shareholders. In fact, participant S emphasized the fact that Saudi private companies are 
mostly built on strong relationships between parties: 
"Any potential wrongdoing or oppreSSIOn IS subject to the shareholders' 
morality and ethics, so a potential shareholder would make careful inquires 
about whom he would have shares with in a company." 
Those participants who did recognise a problem, on the other hand, were also able to 
report experience of certain incidents in which a majority shareholder had used hislher 
power for hislher own interests alone or oppressed those of minority shareholders, such 
as by: 
• Controlling the making of all decisions, especially those regarding whether to 
distribute profits and dividends; or whether to reinvest profits as capital. 384 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Using ratification of board decisions only in their own interests.385 
Controlling the approval of the balance sheets and financial reports. 386 
Appointing acquaintances or relatives to sensitive positions within the company 
d h ., I . I 387 to a vance t elI own mterests exc USlVe y. 
., • s:: • 388 Preventing the minority shareholder from accessmg Important mlormahon. 
384 Stated by businessperson A and lawyer K. In addition, m.inority.S believ.ed ~hat only the majo~ty 
shareholders have the power to circulate the profits into the capItal, whIle the mmonty cannot do anythmg 
to stop this. . . . . 
385 Minority shareholder participant U, who also said that maJont~ shareholders would employ ratification 
only according to what benefits them the most and not accordmg to what benefits the company as a 
whole. 
386 Minority shareholder participant T. 
381 Judge P. Majority shareholder H also mentioned this point. 
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• 
• 
• 
Passing resolutions to withdraw authority or power from minority 
shareholders 389 Fl' '. " 
. or examp e, preventmg the mmonty from sIgnmg cheques, so 
that only the majority shareholder could do so; again, serving their own 
interests.39o 
Stealing money in an indirect way, such as by making the company pay for the 
majority shareholder's personal expenses, rent or private schooling for their 
children. 391 
Increasing hislher own remuneration for participation in management. 392 
Participants generally agreed that minority shareholders had the right to go to court and 
bring legal actions against majority shareholders in the event of misconduct against the 
company or oppression of shareholders. However, a dissenting view was expressed by a 
few participants, namely majority shareholders H, F and G and businessperson B, who 
did not think that minority shareholders should be eligible to represent the company in 
such cases since they hold less than 50% of the shares and therefore represent merely 
their own interest in the company and not the company as a whole. 393 Participant B 
went even further, arguing that "the minority shareholders should not have a direct right 
to litigate until they had exhausted all ways of complaining within the company". 394 
4.3.1.2. Minority complaints: 
The second question was as follows: What are your views on s.28 o/the Saudi Company 
Law,395 which allows a minority shareholder to complain to the majority shareholder 
388 Said by lawyer L, who also illustrated that this infonnation in most cases is very important and can 
EfOve the actual affairs of the company and how it is being run behind the scenes. 
89 Minority shareholder participants V and R agreed on this issue. 
390 This particular example was given by judge Q who dealt with similar cases. 
391 Participant X, who is a legal consultant at the Ministry of Commerce, and also said by businessperson 
D. 
392 Academic participant N, and also the majority shareholder F. 
393 Only 2 participants (8%) adopted this view. They seemed not to unders~nd the concept of 
representing the company in order to litigate on its behalf so that any compensatlon would go to the 
company itself. This point will be discussed in detail in section 3.6. 
394 Some may consider it reasonable that all ways of complaining within the company are exhausted first, 
before the minority has a direct right to litigate. However, this requirement may be too harsh if it means 
the minority shareholder has to follow certain procedures and waste time, only in order to obtain the right 
~~~ . 
395 When the shareholders have not specified (in the shareholder agreement) or agreed (by a resolutIOn) 
who shaH be appointed as a director, then the statute here considers all shareholders to have a role in 
management. 
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over any conduct, but which also entitles the majority shareholder to decide whether to 
ratify the conduct or not. Does it cause any problems in real business life? In response 
to this question, almost 640/0 of participants said they were in favour of the section, 
because they felt that its higher purpose was to stabilize the company and ensure that a 
final decision could always be reached within it. Furthermore, some participants (M, E, 
L, Rand S) who agreed with this section assumed that minority shareholders would, in 
most cases, not be present most of the time, meaning that decision-making would be 
negatively affected if the majority shareholder did not have the ultimate power to 
conduct the company's business. An academic participant (M) stressed that, although 
the law grants power over decision-making to the majority, it also protects the minority 
shareholder by requiring unanimity of votes from all shareholders in certain 
circumstances. One example of these few circumstances is in the making of decisions to 
amend the company's contracts (the shareholder agreement or articles) will not be valid 
unless passed unanimously.396 
Nonetheless, a small group of participants (minority shareholders T and V), believed 
that this section caused great hostility between the majority and minority shareholders 
by allowing the former to cover up their own misconduct. Participant V stated that "the 
consequences of this section are that any conflict would remain unsolved and might 
enlarge". Unexpectedly, all participants categorised as majority shareholders (H, F and 
G) were among those who disagreed with s.28, considering it useless because, although 
it gives the minority the right to complain, any such complaints will be received by the 
majority shareholders, who will ultimately favour their own interests. The judges (0, P 
and Q), on the other hand, unanimously agreed that even if complaints were not dealt 
with satisfactorily by the majority shareholder within the company, minority 
shareholders retained the right to litigate, and then it would be for the court to decide 
whether a valid case existed or not. 397 It is significant here that, although the judges 
were aware that minority shareholders always have the right to litigate against majority 
shareholders, this right is not clearly stated in the statute and so is not widely 
recognised. This point will be discussed in detail in sub-section 4.4. 
396 s.25 of The Saudi Company Law 1965 states that "all decisions require a majority of votes unless the 
company's shareholder agreement provides otherwise. However, decisions to amend the company's 
contracts are valid only ifpassed unanimously". . . . 
397 Two of the 3 judges agreed with the section, but all believed tha~ It served merely to gran~ the m~Jonty 
control over daily decision-making. However, all three judges conSIdered the court an effectIve optIOn for 
minority shareholders who believe that misconduct or oppression has occurred. 
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4.3.1.3 Theory adopted by the Act: 
The third question asked of participants was: What hypothesis or theory has the Saudi 
Company Law adopted as a basis for granting the majority shareholder this ultimate 
power over the company? This was the only question in the whole of the empirical 
study on which there was 100% agreement among interviewees in admitting that indeed 
the existing law favoured the majority shareholder over the minority in terms of power, 
interests and rights. Participants replied that the law gives the majority shareholder more 
power because it considers that whoever spends more will care more for the company. 
They elaborated by saying that the law seeks to protect capital, so those who invest 
more obtain greater rights and interests, which must accordingly be enhanced and 
exercised through greater authority and control. One of the most convincing 
explanations was put forward by lawyer (L), who believed that: 
"the law adopts this principle because it sees majority shareholders as fIrst and most 
strongly affected by the profIts and losses of the company, hence they are more 
eligible to have control and be protected". 
Another reflective justification was given by academic M who indicated that the law 
sees majority shareholders as uniquely able to sustain strong performance and keep 
companies running smoothly. The vast majority of participants attributed this theory to 
the so-called "philosophy of interest".398 Although all participants could understand 
why the law would adopt such a bias, only two participants (businessperson C and 
minority shareholder R) explicitly stated that by doing so the law would neglect other 
existing interests in the company such as those of minority shareholders. Participant C 
in particular suggested that it was understandable for the law to favour the majority 
shareholders' interests and rights, but not for it to neglect to specify any protected rights 
and interests for minority shareholders and others in the company. 
4.3.1.4. Absence of protection causes problems: 
398 This is an Arabic expression commonly used to suggest in this conte~t that the maj.ority shareholder 
has more interests in the company and is thereby entitled to greater authonty and protectIon. 
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The fourth question was: Do you think that the lack of minority protection causes any 
problems? Why? In response, 920/0 of participants clearly considered problems to be the 
inevitable results of deficiency in the law. The minority shareholders (R, S, T, U and V) 
had the strongest opinions regarding this question, as they were mostly directly affected 
by it. Participants U and V believed that the lack of protection or of clarity in the law 
caused disputes, conflicts and dissatisfaction among shareholders, particularly the 
minority. Moreover, Rand T believed that it put them in a very vulnerable position to 
the extent that they did not know what to do or even to whom the problem should be 
referred when misconduct or oppression occurred. Similarly, academic participants M 
and N claimed that the lack of protection for minority shareholders empowers majority 
shareholders to do what they wish, knowing that there is no legal mechanism to stop 
them or to enable questions to be asked about their actions. However, N disagreed with 
the minority shareholders (R, S, T, U and V) as to who would suffer the most, stating 
that research shows that a lack of protection causes uncertainty and instability within 
companies and accordingly it is the company which suffers foremost, not the minority 
shareholders.399 N elaborated by saying that this is because any problem between 
shareholders will be reflected in the running of the company. 
There was also some agreement among the other participants (lawyers, majority 
shareholders, businesspersons and others) who felt that the lack of minority protection 
would deplete the company's resources and divert concentration away from its affairs, 
with negative consequences for all concerned. Participant vt°O agreed with majority 
shareholder F that the harm caused by this lack of minority protection in the law 
extended to negatively affect majority shareholders as well. Indeed, W went so far as to 
suggest that majority shareholders were the only parties who might suffer from the lack 
of minority protection, because the absence of legal clarity allowed the minority to 
cause disruption and destabilize the company. That is, the deficiency in the law will 
encourage minority shareholders to fight for poorly-defined rights and interests, causing 
chaos and detracting from the company's reputation, whereupon the majority 
shareholder would be the first to suffer. According to this view, minority shareholders 
benefit in either scenario (i.e. whether protection is available or not), because if there is 
399 It is almost impossible to find any research or specific book covering ~e area.o.f minority shareholder 
protection in private companies in Saudi Company Law, but the academiC p~lclpants meant that they 
had come to this conclusion from their readings and studies, not from any publIshed reference. 
400 HR Officer at the Chamber of Commerce. 
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no law to protect their interests then they are likely to be moved to cause disruption to 
claim their rights, while, if there is a law in place, then they are protected. This view is 
countered by the argument that, in the absence of statutory protection for the minority 
shareholder, no other option would really uphold hislher rights and interests, while any 
disruption to the company would affect the interests of the minority shareholder too. 
Finally, there were just two respondents who argued that the lack of minority 
shareholder protection in the company law did not cause a problem. Judge 0 said: 
"Generally the Saudi Company Law is transparent and comprehensive and if 
hypothetically there is a lack of protection in the statute, there are other different 
resources which can still provide the minority shareholder with protection, such 
as the company's internal code or the shareholder agreement". 
However, the judge here has neglected to note the fact that the company's internal code 
and the shareholder agreement can still be heavily influenced by, and weighted in 
favour of, the majority shareholder, who can include or exclude clauses according to 
what benefits himlher the most. He has also neglected the fact that the statute is the 
main provider of protection and that no other sources can replace its fundamental role or 
even be equal to it. It seems that the comments of judge 0 fell into line with his job 
interests as it may be in his interests to describe the current company law as transparent 
and comprehensive so he can always have unlimited discretion in dealing with such 
cases. However, the two other judges (P and Q) held views totally opposite to those of 
judge O. Judge P claimed that the lack of minority shareholder protection disrupted the 
smooth running of the company and likewise, judge Q assumed that since the law 
lacked guidance, protecting minority shareholders would be left to personal interests 
and efforts and this would cause problems. 
4.3.1.5. Impact on the economy and investment: 
Question five was an extension of the previous question: Does this lack of minority 
protection have any impact upon the general economy and upon local and foreign 
investments? Participants were divided into two groups when it came to evaluating the 
first part of the question, concerning the impact on the general economy. The first 
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group, comprising slightly less than 25% of all participants, believed that the lack of 
minority shareholder protection would have no effect on the general economy because 
they (minority shareholders) are not numerous and their inputs are not large anyway. 
For example, one member of this group was minority S, who did not think that the lack 
of protection would affect the economy because the law was designed to satisfy 
majority shareholders, whose impact on the economy is greater. Participant R supported 
this idea by saying that minority shareholders would have no impact on the general 
economy because of the small number of people who hold minority shares. Thus, 
according to this group, if minority shareholders lack protection, this will not affect the 
general economy, which is subject to more substantial factors having much greater 
influence than the protection of minority shareholders.401 
The second group, on the other hand, looked at the matter from a wider perspective. 
They maintained that minority shareholders play an important role in the general 
economy, which is ultimately like a network in which each party relies on the others. 
This group believed that, as long as company shareholdings can be divided into 
minority and majority holdings, all shareholders must enjoy appropriate protection, 
regardless of who they are. They argued that minority shareholder protection is essential 
for the economy to grow because if shareholders are not attracted to invest in them, 
companies will not be able to grow so easily and, as a consequence, the general 
economy will be negatively affected. Businessperson E acknowledged that: 
"the lack of minority shareholder protection might negatively impact upon the 
economy, by hindering the early discovery of abuse, which might in turn lead to the 
collapse of many companies in Saudi Arabia". 
If there were practical protection for minority shareholders, it would assist in remedying 
companies' problems in a quick and effective way, as minority shareholders would then 
have the legal capacity to protect their companies from any wrongdoing or oppression, 
thereby safeguarding the general economy. Judge Q backed this idea, asserting that 
defects in minority shareholder protection would directly affect the circulation of money 
in the general economy_ Additionally, academic N argued that the number of insolvent 
401 Participants R, S, W & F gave examples of factors that are more influential on ~he general economy 
than minority shareholder protection, such as specialisation of courts and ease of settmg up a company. 
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companies would increase because the law which regulates their relations is not clear 
and shareholders would accordingly have no solutions for their disputes, which would 
in tum affect the commercial environment. 
When it came to the second element of the fifth question, which concerned the impact 
of the lack of minority protection on local and foreign investment, almost all 
participants believed that there was a positive relationship between minority protection 
and investment in that more effective protection would lead more minority shareholders 
to invest in companies. Majority shareholder H admitted that people would not invest 
their savings because of their inability to protect their investments in a company, since 
the law provides no assurance for these small inputs. He further argued that what is 
more worrying is that people may lose trust in each other and, as a result, people with 
few investments will tend to set up small independent businesses or projects or even 
leave the money in banks in an attempt to avoid having to go into business with others, 
because no existing clear law can cover them once they become minority shareholders. 
Participant y402 felt that the lack of protection for minority shareholders caused 
reluctance to enter the market and invest. Similarly, academic N and lawyer I argued 
that few would be willing to become minority shareholders because of the high risk of 
losing their investments; accordingly, they would refrain from investing in the majority 
/ minority model and would look for a different type of investment. For example, the 
potential investor may invest in a public company which always offers the exit option or 
may set up a company with another investor, in which each shareholder has equal shares 
(50/50 shares). Academic M noted that the same applied to foreign investors 
considering joining a company as minority shareholders.403 Indeed, he said that the 
protection of minority shareholders' rights and interests may be of more concern to 
foreign investors, who in most cases live abroad, than to local residents or nationals, 
because the foreign investors must rely on Saudi law to protect their rights and interests, 
while the nationals have other options, such as accessing up-to-date information on the 
company's progress or seeking friendly reconciliation.404 
402 Officer in the Investment Opportunity Department of the Chamber of Commerce. 
403 M argued that foreign investors would be less likely to be attracted to SA in light of the weak rights 
and interests of minority shareholders. . . 
404 Reconciliation as certain points later will show, has proven to work effectIvely In SA. There are 
influential busine'sspersons who always offer to intervene to solve disputes in order to keep the 
commercial environment working smoothly. 
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It is remarkable that almost all participants appreciated the impact of the lack of 
protection upon local and foreign investors, but did not all agree that it would also affect 
the economy. This suggests that some failed to understand that there is based on , 
evidence, a very strong relationship between the level of local and foreign investment 
and the general economy.405 Thus, if something prevents people from investing, the 
general economy will be immediately affected because it is ultimately constituted by the 
totality of such investments. This makes it difficult to understand how some participants 
could recognise the negative effect of having no minority protection on potential local 
and foreign investments, but could not see the same effect on the general economy. A 
possible explanation for this apparent inconsistency is that they considered that minority 
shareholders, being relatively small in number, would not make a major contribution to 
the economy and would therefore be less important to the market than the majority 
shareholders. This point will be discussed in detail in sub-section 4.4. 
4.3.1.6. Undiscounted payout: 
The sixth question was: Do you think that it is possible for a minority shareholder to 
seek an undiscounted payout, if the minority shareholder is not happy with the way the 
company is being run? It is important to note that according to Saudi company law406 
the majority shareholder has a pre-emption right to buy the minority shareholder's 
shares, so the price offered for the shares comes from the majority shareholder who 
would, in most cases, favour hislher own interests.407 Minority shareholder U confirmed 
that majority shareholders use their power to force minority shareholders to sell and 
then offer an unfair price. In fact, the overwhelming majority of participants believed 
that minority shareholders would be unable to obtain a fair price reflecting the true 
value of the shares unless an independent expert or specialist were available to value 
them. Indeed, a small group of participants (U, V and H) argued that, even where a third 
405 Islamic Research and Training Institute, IRTI., Islamic Capital Markets: Products, Regulations & 
Developments, 1 st ed. Islamic Development Bank, Jeddah, 2008, pg: 324 & 324. 
406 The pre-emption right has its original basis under Sharia but the first application of it involved 
neighbours since prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, cited that "a landlord has a pre-emption over 
his/her neighbour'S property" (in the case ofa sale). (As narrated by Abo Dawood and others). The same 
concept was later extended to cover different types of relationships, the relationship between shareholders 
in a company being one of them. 
407 According to Saudi company law and Sharia, the minority shareholder can sell hislher shares to an 
outsider only if the majority shareholder shows no interest in buying them. Furthermore, according to 
majority shareholder F, even if an outsider showed such an interest, he/she would offer less than the full 
value, knowing that a dispute was going on within the company. 
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party was involved, the minority shareholder would never obtain a fair price. 
Participants U and V, as minority shareholders stated from th . . th t . 
, elr own expenence a III 
all cases the price based on a valuation would not be satisfactory. H, a majority 
shareholder, explained that majority shareholders would always have influence over the 
expert assessor, who would therefore rule in their favour. Judge 0, on the other hand, 
stated that: 
"any minority shareholders disagreeing with such a valuation could always refer the 
whole matter to the court, which would do its best to grant the minority shareholder an 
undiscounted price". 
It is absolutely critical here to indicate that the option of going to court after the valuer 
has ruled was not known to a large number of participants, as they believed that once an 
independent specialist had become involved, no further action could be taken. This 
matter will be discussed in detail in sub-section 4.4. 
4.3.1.7. The provision of criteria to be followed: 
The seventh and final of the first group of questions was: What guidelines or criteria do 
you follow when dealing with minority cases, since there is an absence of common law 
and accordingly no case law? In answering this question, participants listed certain 
reference points which they considered to be resources setting out principles, rules and 
guidance to assist and direct them in minority shareholder cases. For example, there was 
total agreement amongst all participants that the first reference is commercial and 
company statutes. Nine participants408 then agreed that the second reference is the 
General Islamic jurisprudence (Sharia). Eight participants409 said that the legal advice 
from specialised official entities comes next as a reference point. Five participants410 
believed that the reports and opinions of professional third parties or arbitrators, such as 
1 c. . . 411 1 1 expert valuers, are also an important resource. However, on y lOur partICIpants c ear y 
saw the shareholder agreements (between parties) as a reliable point of reference which 
can guide them in such cases. As well as the low number of those who believed in the 
408 (Judges P, 0 and Q, Majority F, Academic N, Minority S and V, Lawyer I). 
409 (Businesspersons B, E, A and D, Majority H, Academic N, Minorities R and V). 
410 (Judge 0, Majority H, Academic N, Lawyer K, Businessperson A). 
411 (Businessperson B, Academic M, Lawyers K and L). 
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reliability of the shareholder agreement, only four participants412 claimed that the 
experiences of neighbouring countries which have similar status for minority 
shareholders and more resources to refer to when dealing with such cases can also be 
viewed as a trustworthy reference. Merely three participants413 thought that corporate 
and commercial conventions can also be a very useful as a source of guidance. Finally, 
only two participants414 believed that academic books and articles which cover this area 
in detail can provide constructive and detailed guidance and criteria to be followed. 415 
All three judges (0, P and Q) added case law to these resources. Judge Q said that case 
law in this context means a body of cases dealing with similar issues where new 
decisions have been reached or a new principle developed. He indicated that case law, 
which is also known in the Saudi commercial environment as "judicial precedents", is 
not something that judges have to follow or even to consider, but that it is available to 
them simply to provide guidance and direction. It is very surprising that none of the 
other participants mentioned that they considered case law a source of guidance or 
criteria in such cases. It is yet more surprising that even the four lawyers (I, J, K and L), 
who would deal with legal cases every day, did not mention case law as a reference 
point for guidance and direction. It is true that judges indicated that they refer 
sometimes to case law to seek guidance, but it seems that judges would prefer not to 
have binding case law as it may result in a reduction in their power and limit their 
discretion, so it may be in their interests not to have the case law systemised. 
Judge P pointed out that case law in this respect is a very important reference, but it is 
not organised in a way that facilitates reference to it and is subject to personal 
interpretation by each judge. It is believed that the main reason for other participants not 
mentioning case law as a source of guidance is that it is not easily accessible by the 
412 (Other "HR" Y, Majority F, Minorities Sand U). They also emphasized that this can include any case 
law or principles that can offer guidance. 
413 (Majority F, Judge Q, Lawyer J). 
414 (Majority F, Other V). 
415 Participant Y, who was a Human Resources (HR) officer at the Chamber .of Co~merce, stated that 
knowledge and guidance regarding this issue can be also sought from the mte~atl~nal stand~rds of 
company law which most countries follow. The majority shareholder G agreed WIth thiS su~gest .. o? and 
said that guidance and knowledge can be also taken from the USA and UK who have dealt WIth thIS Issue, 
even though they lack a common basis with Saudi Arabia. 
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public.
416 
It is worth noting, as minority shareholder S said, that conventional and 
traditional cases in Sharia are always available and can be used a fi . t 417 s re erence pom s. 
However, such cases cannot function like modem ones, because the issues, facts, 
principles and other factors being disputed in courts today are largely quite different 
from traditional cases as society has changed. 
4.3.2 Current remedies available 
While the first part of this empirical study sought to identify the problems related to 
minority shareholder protection from different perspectives, the second part was 
designed not only to examine the remedies available to minority shareholders under 
Saudi company law, but also to identify the bodies or entities which can be involved in 
such cases. 
4.3.2.1 Available remedies: 
The first question was: What practical remedies are available for the minority to seek if 
there is wrongdoing or abuse done to the company? Importantly, no category of 
participants agreed on a sequence to follow when referring a dispute to an independent 
body. However, the majority shareholders and businesspersons tended to favour initial 
attempts to solve disputes not through the court, but instead via arbitration or friendly 
reconciliation. Businessperson E, for instance, suggested that "when a dispute occurs 
between shareholders, the court is not the best option to refer the matter to, but rather 
reconciliation and intercession is the way forward". Similarly, majority shareholder F 
preferred that disputing shareholders first attempt to solve the matter by negotiation and 
then involve the court if this fails (The next question has sought to find out how the 
court can be involved and to what extent it has discretion). 
It is possible that majority shareholders and businesspersons specifically tend not to 
favour the court as the first step because they know that its involvement would be costly 
416 This issue of having no public accessibility to case law while judges take it as a reference point will be 
discussed in detail in the next section. 
417 What S meant here was certain well known cases from Islamic jurisprudence and convention. These 
are accessible to the public but in most cases provide only general principles and not detailed guidelines 
like the modem cases. 
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for the company in terms of time and money. Majority shareholders and 
businesspersons, in most cases, will also care more for the company's reputation and 
therefore prefer disputes to be kept confidential. Another very important reason for 
majority shareholders in particular to prefer arbitration or reconciliation is that they can 
always use their power, control and authority in negotiations with minority shareholders 
to obtain better deals, for example by making a buy-out offer at less than the market 
price. On the other hand, minority shareholders R, S, U and V favoured going to court 
immediately, rather than wasting time and effort in trying to solve the dispute amicably. 
This view seems unreasonable to some, but it is most probably preferable for minority 
shareholders because they know that any attempt to solve the problem within the 
company might well end up in deadlock. Participant S stressed that once legal advice is 
sought and it is evident that the case has potential for success, it would be better to refer 
it directly to the court for a ruling. It is important to stress here that a real guarantee of 
success is not possible because there are no clear guidelines for courts to follow in such 
cases and accordingly it is difficult for lawyers to advise in advance on the success of 
any case. 
Perhaps minority participants held firmly to the court option because they realised that 
the majority shareholder is always able to press for hislher own interests outside of 
court. Participant T, who alone among the minority shareholders did not favour the 
court option, proposed another option to solve disputes: seeking the involvement of well 
recognised businesspersons who could pressure the majority shareholder to offer a fair 
deal. In other words, the minority shareholder would invite such influential 
businesspersons to intercede. This option could be effective because the majority 
shareholder, who might well be junior in terms of age or business standing, would 
respect what the well-established businesspersons said and accept their judgement, in 
case he might later need their assistance and experience in the market. In fact, this 
option has proved successful in the Saudi commercial environment, but is gradually 
disappearing because the commercial market is expanding and new faces are entering 
every day. Thus, although this option may offer some help in certain cases, it cannot be 
relied upon in every dispute; therefore the court option is still preferred by the majority 
of minority shareholders as a first step. 
4.3.2.2 The court's role: 
121 
The next question was: What role does the court play in cases where minority 
shareholders allege oppression or wrongdoing? Does the court strictly apply the Act or 
does it go beyond the law when it is necessary to hring justice?418 In response to the 
first part of this question, 64% of participants saw the court's role in dealing with 
minority shareholders as weak. However, when it came to applying the law, 56% of 
participants believed that the courts applied the law strictly, not going beyond its formal 
requirements in any case. All minority shareholders were among those who saw the 
court's role as weak and also among those who believed that the courts would apply the 
law strictly even if justice required otherwise. For example, participants T & U 
specifically considered the courts' role to be weak either because of deficiencies or 
because there is no clear law for the court to follow, as a result of which each judge will 
exercise his discretion differently, based on his background, experience and the way he 
looks at each case. U elaborated by saying that the first thing which the court will do is 
to refer to the statute and, if this is not detailed, then the rulings will be subject to each 
judge's discretion. Both T and U felt that the courts were limited to the law, while V 
offered the following explanation for this strict application of the law: 
"the court will strictly stick to the Company Law Act even if justice is not 
served, because the court is a body that is only concerned with implementing the 
law rather than legislating new provisions". 
For his part, majority shareholder H indicated that in minority shareholder cases, judges 
lack experience, knowledge, guidance and direction, which leads to confusion in the 
judicial system. Academic N argued that the absence of clarity in the law, and the lack 
of knowledge and experience on the part of judges, will make it very difficult for 
lawyers and others to understand the criteria and standards by which cases are decided 
and thus to predict their outcome. This makes it very difficult for them to give advice to 
companies and shareholders. Businessperson C came to the same conclusion as N, but 
from a different perspective as he considered that: 
418 It is important here to note initially that s.28 of t~e Saudi Co.mp~ny Law 1965 grants ma~ori~ 
shareholders the right to investigate any conduct complamed of by mmonty sharehol~e~ and to adjust 1~ 
or approve it. So if the court applies the law strictly, it may tend to favour the maJonty shareholders 
decisions. 
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"the court's perfonnance is inefficient because it takes a very long time to solve 
any dispute, which will have a negative effect on the running of any business. It is 
unfortunate that judges always blindly implement the law as it is, because there is 
little space for creativity". 
Interestingly, majority shareholder F stated that the courts recognIse this lack of 
knowledge and experience in dealing with minority shareholder cases and, as a 
consequence, push hard for friendly settlement or reconciliation so that such cases do 
not have to be judged in court. 
On the other hand, all participating judges strongly believed the court to have an active 
role in dealing with minority cases. Judge Q stated that the court applies the Act, which 
is in favour of the majority shareholder, but if there is a clear wrongdoing or oppression, 
then it has the power to exercise its discretion. Judge P agreed that the court will 
sometimes go beyond the codified law if justice requires it, stating that it also has the 
power to reject or amend any clause in a contract or shareholder agreement if it is 
adjudged unfair to a minority shareholder. Remarkably, judge 0 confidently asserted 
that the court always has the power to invalidate, if necessary, the majority 
shareholder's decision and grant compensation to the minority shareholder, or force the 
majority shareholder to endure the consequences of the decision alone. One of the few 
other participants who backed the court's role in such cases was academic M, who 
considered it very significant when dealing with minority cases because judges have to 
understand not only the wording of the statute, but also its intention, in order to dispense 
justice. 
It is important to stress here the significant difference in responses between judges and 
other categories of respondent, who doubted the court's ability to deliver justice in 
minority shareholder cases, because of a clear deficiency in the law which causes others 
to distrust the court's ability and weakens confidence in the judicial system. 
Businessman D clearly stated his perception of the present position: 
"The law is not well detailed or even clear regarding minority shareholder 
protection. Provisions are not obvious or comprehensive, and for this reason there 
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IS a huge space for judges to rely on their personal understanding and 
interpretation to deal with such cases." 
4.3.2.3 Shareholder agreement's role: 
Question three was: To what degree does the shareholder agreement protect the 
minority shareholder? If the shareholder agreement was the only source to provide 
protection for the minority, do you think that this would be adequate? What about 
including rights and interests in a statutory form rather than stating them in the 
shareholders agreement? This set of questions aimed to discover whether a shareholder 
agreement is sufficient as the only source of protection for minority shareholders. The 
overwhelming majority of participants agreed on the importance of the shareholder 
agreement to protect the minority, but they disagreed on the extent of this protection. 
For instance, judge Q said that a shareholder agreement can protect minority 
shareholders to a great extent, but needs to be well detailed and to cover as many 
eventualities as possible. Minority shareholder V also indicated that the agreement is an 
essential ground for determining the obligations and rights of each party. 
A few participants did not believe that the shareholder agreement can provide sufficient 
protection to minority shareholders. For example, both minority shareholder U and 
businessperson A felt that it provides inadequate protection because it is ultimately an 
extension of the statute, which itself is not clear. Majority shareholder H said: 
"in percentage terms, I think that the shareholders' agreement can offer only 65% 
protection at the very maximum, because most contracts are written by majority 
shareholders, who tend to serve their own interests fITst". 
Lawyer L supported this view by saying that the majority, in most cases, dictate their 
conditions in the agreement and as a result minority shareholders are forced to sign the 
shareholder agreement as it is. Nonetheless, there was unanimity among participants that 
the shareholder agreement cannot function instead of the statute or replace it. Lawyer K 
argued that it was absolutely fundamental for the statute to reserve powers, rights, 
interests, obligations etc clearly for each party. Likewise, minority shareholder V said 
that protection of everything related to the minority shareholder should always be clearly 
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reserved in the statute in order to prevent misinterpretation. V also noted that, if the 
minority shareholders' rights and interests are left to the sh h ld t th are 0 er agreemen , e 
majority shareholder will use them as a pressure device to negotiate what to include and 
exclude in the agreement. Businessperson A emphasised this point by saying that the 
statute is the best device to protect minority shareholders' rights and interests, otherwise 
these rights and interests will be subject to inclusion lll, or exclusion from the 
shareholder agreement. Interestingly, judge Q, quoted above as saying that the 
shareholder agreement should be as comprehensive as possible, later conceded that 
statute can cover more possibilities, rights and interests than any shareholder agreement 
and thereby benefit minority shareholders more. Therefore, as majority shareholder F 
argued, the shareholder agreement cannot replace the statute, but instead they can work 
together to protect the interests and rights of minority shareholders.419 
4.3.3 Participants' recommendations 
4.3.3.1 Rights and interests: 
The first and second parts of this empirical study have been used to identify the problem 
with minority shareholder protection and to consider the currently available remedies 
and protections. The third part invited participants to make recommendations for the 
reform of the Saudi minority shareholder protection statute in order to address its 
deficiencies. The first question in this last series was: What rights and interests, in your 
opinion, should be reserved in the statute for minority shareholders and protected by the 
law? When participants answered this question, some of them initially recommended 
that the statute should: 
• Specify certain matters that cannot be passed unless through unanImous 
resolutions, so that the majority shareholder cannot have the ultimate say on all 
matters.420 (it is important to note here that one of the few advantages of the 
Saudi Company Law 1965 in protecting minority shareholders is the requirement 
419 Judge 0 stated that if any clause in the shareholder agreement contradicts the sta~te, ~ in the e~a~ple 
of not allowing the minority to litigate against the majority shareholder, th~ court ~Ill still grant thiS nght 
to the minority shareholder to represent himlherself and the company. It IS very Important to note that, 
according to 0, the court always makes the company's interests a priority. 
420 (Businessperson A, Academic N, Judge 0, Majority shareholder F). 
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• 
• 
• 
of the law to have unanimous resolutions regarding certain specific matters. But 
participants recommended that further matters should be specified as having the 
same requirement). 
Require the majority shareholder to be liable personally for the damages, rather 
than the company, when he/she has taken the wrong decision.421 
State certain criteria and standards for directors to comply with when running a 
company.422 
Clarify and simplify the grounds, mechanisms, procedures, devices and remedies 
that can be utilised by minority shareholders to exercise their litigation rights and 
other rightS.423 
However, when it came to listing rights and interests, interviewees said that the statute 
should reserve or codify at least the following rights: 
• The right for the minority shareholder to have hislher signature required for the 
issuing of a cheque ifhe/she asks for such a right.424 
• The right for a minority shareholder to bring a legal action at any time either on 
behalf of the company or himlherself. This right should be protected with a clear 
statutory mechanism which enables the minority shareholder to exercise it.425 
• A right for the minority shareholder to represent the company in litigation 
without the need to obtain permission from the majority.426 
• A right to compensation for the minority shareholder if it is proved that the 
majority shareholder has caused harm to himlher.427 
• The right to have a transparent exit system where the shareholder would be given 
Co • • Co h' /h h 428 a laIr pnce lor IS er s ares. 
• The right to attend all meetings and participate in all decision-making.
429 
421 (Minority shareholder S, Judge P, Majority shareholder F). 
422 (Businessperson D, Majority shareholder H). 
423 (Minority shareholder U). 
424 (Judge Q). 
425 (Participants Y and W "officers at the Chamber of Commerce", Minority shareholders V and T, 
Lawyers I and L, Businessperson A, Participant X "legal consultant at the Minister of Commerce"). 
426 (Judge P, Majority shareholder H, Minority shareholder U). 
427 (Minority shareholder S, Judge P, Majority shareholder F). ., . 
428 (Participants Y and W "officers at the Chamber of Commerce", Academic N, Mmonty Shareholder V, 
Businessperson C). 
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• 
• 
• 
The right to have equal votes if the company has only two shareholders, even if 
they hold different percentages of shares.43o 
Clear right of access to information, documents and financial reports.431 
The right for the minority to know of any conflict of interest on the part of the 
majority shareholder.432 
It was noticeable from the answers to this question that participants particularly valued 
two main rights: to participate in decision-making and to have a simple litigation 
procedure. However, majority shareholder F noted here that these two rights would have 
to be carefully monitored in order to protect the stability and running of the company, 
for, if they were left unrestricted, the company would be likely to suffer. Majority 
shareholder G was the only participant who did not recommend the granting of any more 
rights and interests for the minority shareholder other than are already enshrined in the 
current Saudi law because he thought that to do so would harm companies. This 
participant ignored the benefit which the company may obtain if litigation is facilitated 
so that the minority shareholder can pursue any type of wrongdoing or misuse which 
occurs in the company. Nor did he accept that each minority shareholder has rights and 
interests in the company that need to be recognised and protected just like those of the 
majority shareholder. It seems that this majority participant might have come to this 
view because he had interests and rights in a company which he did not want to be 
withdrawn or minimised, as would be the case if the minority shareholder had more 
rights and interests. 
Two other participants recommended rights and interests for the minority shareholder 
that were somewhat different. Lawyer I proposed that the power to investigate any 
complaint by a minority shareholder should be completely withdrawn from the majority 
shareholder and delegated to an independent body, while businessperson E suggested 
that minority shareholders should have the right to have any action that is subject to a 
disputed resolution suspended until it has been fully investigated by the court. It can be 
429 (Majority shareholder F, Judge P, Participant Y "officer at the C:h~mber o~, Commerce", Minority 
shareholders U and R, Lawyers I, K and L, Businessperson D, PartIcIpant X legal consultant at the 
Minister of Commerce"). 
430(Minority shareholder S}. 
431 (Businesspersons E and D, Majority shareholder H, Lawyer K). 
432 (Businessperson B). 
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argued, however, that neither of these recommendations would benefit the stability, 
efficiency and smooth running of the company if put into effect. The first fails to 
recognise that leaving the power to investigate a complaint initially in the hands of the 
majority shareholder will always provide an opportunity to resolve the matter internally. 
Likewise, the second, which is similar to obtaining an injunction in English law, fails to 
appreciate that if minority shareholders had an unrestricted right to suspend any disputed 
resolution, then the company would suffer by losing many opportunities to complete 
transactions and make profits. Alternatively, the minority shareholder might have the 
right to ask the court, by way of urgent application, to suspend the disputed resolution 
before it is put into practice and, in this case, the suspension would come from the court 
if it considered it inappropriate. 
4.3.3.2 Extra remedies and a healthy environment: 
The second question in this third part of the empirical study was: Do you think that 
further remedies, solutions, reliefs and protections should be available under the 
statute? If so, what would you suggest? The third question extended this point by asking: 
What could create a healthy protective environment that accommodates the minority 
shareholder's needs? The suggestions made by participants in response to these two 
questions were put into different categories (statute, court, company and others). 
Participants believed that, if the following suggestions were adopted, Saudi minority 
shareholder protection would be improved accordingly. 
Statute: 
• Codifying all remedies and reliefs in the statute.
433 
• Adopting related provisions and remedies from other jurisdictions with 
. . h' fi ld 434 expenence III t IS e . 
• Empowering judges statutorily to compensate the minority shareholder from the 
. . h h ld ' 435 maJonty s are 0 er s own money. 
Court: 
433 (Participant X "legal consultant at the Ministry of Commerce", Businessperson C, Lawyer~, Mi~o~ty 
shareholders T and S, Academic N, Participant Y "officer at the Chamber of Commerce, MaJonty 
shareholder F). 
434 (Businessperson A, Minority shareholders R and U, Judge P). 
435 (Judge Q). 
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• Creating a commercial court specialising 1ll company law with experienced 
. d 436 JU ges. 
• Prioritising company interests in all cases.437 
• Punishing those who commit wrongdoing and oppression by nammg and 
shaming them.438 
• Activating case law as a source of guidance and criteria.439 
• Ensuring the enforcement of the court's decisions.44o 
Company: 
• Producing an ideal model of an internal code for all companIes to follow, 
guaranteeing minimum protection for minority shareholders.441 
• Producing a model shareholder agreement to guarantee the minimum protection 
of minority shareholders' rights and interests.442 
• Applying corporate governance in a way that it can monitor companies and the 
way their decisions are made.443 
• Ensuring that each party knows that the company is an entity which benefits 
them equally and has a role to play in social responsibility.444 
• Favouring the general interests (company interests) over individual interests 
(shareholders' own).445 
Others: 
• Promoting arbitration and designating a specialised and empowered third party 
who can rule professionally on disputed matters. 446 
• Encouraging research to continuously investigate the rights and interests 
associated with companies and minority shareholders. 447 
• Spreading the culture of justice and fair treatment among shareholders.
448 
436 (Participants Wand Y "officers at the Chamber of Commerce", Businesspersons C, A and E, Lawyer 
J, Minority shareholder T, Judge Q). 
437 (Lawyer I). 
438 (Businessperson E, Judge Q). 
439 (Lawyer J). 
440 (Businessperson C, Majority shareholder F). . 
441 (Businesspersons A and D, Lawyer L, Minority shareholder R, AcademIc N, Judge 0). 
442 (Businessperson A, Minority shareholder V, Judge Q). 
443 (Lawyer I, Judge 0). 
444 (Businessperson D, Lawyer J). 
445 (Lawyer I, Minority shareholder S). . . " 
446 (Lawyers Land J, Academic N, Majority shareholder H, PartIcIpant Y officer at the Chamber of 
Commerce", Judge 0). 
447 (Minority shareholder S, Majority shareholder G). 
448 (Lawyer L, Minority shareholder V, Majority shareholder F) 
129 
• Educating and training shareholders constantly about their rights, interests, 
powers, obligations and liabilities towards the company and each other.449 
The clear majority of participants believed that, if the above suggestions were adopted 
and acted upon, Saudi company law might then be able to offer practical and effective 
protection to minority shareholders. It is noteworthy that more than half of the 
participants stated that the current company law has many inadequacies, defects, 
inaccuracies and loopholes, so that the best way forward would be to reform the entire 
company law (generally and not only in relation to minority protection) in order to 
redefine all the rights and interests of minority shareholders and others in the company. 
Judge P was one of these. He said, 
"All the problems emanate from the statute, which is outdated and does not meet 
contemporary standards. There is now an urgent need to produce a new 
comprehensive statute that can avoid all these overlaps, lack of protection, 
domination by certain parties and ultimate control which exist under this old law". 
In addition to judge P' s suggestion, participant X, a legal consultant at the Ministry of 
Commerce, recommended that the company law should be reformed in its entirety to 
recognise the various interests and rights of all vulnerable parties, especially minority 
shareholders. Another significant suggestion was made by judge Q: that there should be 
a higher judicial committee assigned to review from time to time how the law works in 
practice, in order that it can be improved and developed accordingly. 
In response to this question, it is unsurprising that the two most strongly opposed 
responses came from a minority (V) and a majority shareholder (G). The former 
suggested that a good way to safeguard minority shareholders' rights and interests would 
be for the courts to treat them in the same way as orphans or minors, acting as a legal 
guardian to protect them from oppression and wrongdoing by majority shareholders, 
while the latter argued that there was no need at all for new remedies or solutions to be 
granted to minority shareholders under the statute, as these would damage the corporate 
world by giving minority shareholders enough power to destabilise their companies. 
449 (Participant W "officer at the Chamber of Commerce", Participant X "legal con~ul~nt at the Ministry 
of Commerce", Lawyer J, Minority shareholders V, Rand U, Busmessperson E, MaJonty shareholder F). 
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Both of these extreme positions can be considered wrong, in that V's idea exaggerates 
the vulnerability of minority shareholders, while G's rejection of reform ignores the 
proven need of minority shareholders for greater protection. It should be understood that 
each of these participants was arguing solely to protect their own interests while totally 
ignoring the others' . 
4.3.3.3 Adoption and adaptation of remedies: 
The final question in this section of the study sought opinions as to the question: Which 
UK remedies could work effectively in the Saudi commercial environment if adopted? 
The UK remedies were explained to participants. It is important to be aware that none of 
the UK remedies are explicitly provided for in the Saudi company statute. However, 
some participants said that similar ones are available under the Saudi judicial system, 
but by other names. Thus, it was essential here to elicit from participants which remedies 
(or similar functions) they thought were implemented in practice and which ones were 
not. The Table (3.xxx) below shows their responses regarding the availability of the UK 
remedies (or similar functions) in the current Saudi commercial environment.45o 
450 The function and role of each remedy was clearly explained to pa~icip~ts, so that ~ey could, de~i?e 
whether a similar remedy, even if under a different name, was avaIlable In the SaudI law or JudICIal 
system. 
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Table 3.xxx: Are UK remedies available in SA? 
Minority Majority Business- Lawyers Academics Judges Others 
UK 
(5) (3) persons (5) (4) (2) (3) (3) 
remedies Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Personal 1 4 
action - 3 2 3 - 4 1 1 2 1 1 2 
Derivative 3 2 
action 1 2 - 5 4 - 1 1 3 - 2 1 
Unfair 
prejudice 2 3 2 1 5 - 4 - 2 - 3 - 3 -
petition 
Winding-up 2 3 3 5 1 3 1 1 3 1 2 
order - -
-
It is clear from the table that responses varied in all categories of participants, none of 
whom agreed on the availability of all the UK remedies. Nonetheless, the three judges 
were in full agreement on the availability of three of them (derivative action, unfair 
prejudice petition and winding-up order), while they did not agree on the availability of 
personal actions. It is a remarkable finding that none of these categories of participants, 
who were selected as being likely to be in very close touch with the law and its 
implementation, were able to agree on which of these remedies are available. This 
suggests strongly that there is something missing from the statute, whose function would 
be to provide guidance as to what remedies are available and which is the most 
appropriate in any particular case. 
Approximately two-thirds (68%) of all participants did not believe that the winding-up 
order existed as a remedy in relation to minority shareholder protection in SA. 
Furthermore, over two thirds of these respondents thought that there would be no benefit 
in adopting the winding-up order in the Saudi system, as it would grant minority 
shareholders a very powerful weapon that they might abuse. For example, minority 
shareholder V stated that: 
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"allowing the minority to apply to wind up a company would not be beneficial to 
the corporate environment because it would disrupt the smooth running of many 
businesses" . 
However, these participants, who fonned a significant percentage, were mistaken in 
believing that the winding-up order was not available in the Saudi system. All of the 
judges (0, P and Q) were able to con finn that a minority shareholder in any company 
has the right to pursue a winding-up order, although a winding-up application needs to 
be based on reasonable grounds to proceed.451 
This question also exposed considerable confusion as to the correct names of these 
remedies, with participants attributing many different names to one particular remedy. 
To exemplify this, when the function of the UK remedy of derivative action was 
explained to all participants, 56% of them said that the same function existed in Saudi 
law, but they differed on its name. Judge ° said that it existed under the name of 
"contest claim", while Judge Q stated that a remedy with this function existed, but that it 
had no particular title. Minority shareholder T and lawyer J, for their part, recognised it 
under the name of "misuse of the company", while academic participant M said that this 
type of remedy was well known as "claims against the company" and lawyer L called it 
"misfeasance or liability claim". Thus, notwithstanding broad agreement on the role of 
this remedy (such as for claiming against the majority or management and that any 
compensation would go to the company), there was no agreement as to its name. From a 
practical point of view, this inconsistency of nomenclature must have a negative effect 
and cause confusion for everyone dealing with minority shareholder protection. 
It is evident that all of this confusion (even among judges) as to whether a particular 
remedy exists and, if so, what it is called is due to a lack of clarity in the statute. While it 
is reassuring to know that the Saudi system, according to the judges, has similar, and in 
fact more remedies to those which exist under UK company law,452 it is also very , 
451 This winding-up order has a statutory basis in some sections related to private and public companies. 
However, it is totally up to judges to grant it or not depending on their discretion and on whether there is 
a reasonable ground. . 
452 There was justification for not creating specific remedies under the. statute, WhICh was p~t forward by 
the judges, that if all remedies were specified under the statute, then Judges wo~l? be restrIcted to them 
and could not go beyond them when required to deliver justice. The current pOSItIOn, on the other hand, 
gives more room for discretion because remedies and their functions are not taken from the statute, but 
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unfortunate that these remedies are not systematically organised on a statutory footing in 
a way that simplifies their application and ensures that all participants in the justice field 
and all those in corporate life are able to refer easily to the same thing. 
4.4 Assessment and reflection 
After analysing the data and infonnation collected by this empirical study, I am now 
more able to observe and pass judgment on the causes which have led to Saudi minority 
protection provisions being deficient and weak, and also in a better position to see the 
consequences of the absence of an effective protection system being in place. The 
negative effect of this upon many aspects of business life 453 is now much clearer than 
before and can be evaluated and assessed on the basis of facts and evidence which allow 
accurate reflection to take place. 
First of all, it is realised that the failure of the statute to provide clear guidance and 
criteria to be followed when dealing with minority cases confuses people, including 
those who work with the law on a daily basis. It is not an exaggeration to say that no 
one knows exactly which rights, interests, powers and remedies are available to the 
minority shareholder under the law. Only judges seemed to understand any detail of 
minority shareholder protection whereas other people, including lawyers, were ignorant 
or confused. Surprisingly, the empirical study shows that even judges were uncertain 
about the availability of some remedies, and referred to the remedies by different names. 
Therefore, they can be also considered, to a certain extent, unsure or confused about 
what is actually available. 
It is important to emphasize here that, when judges were interviewed, their responses to 
almost all questions gave the impression that the minority shareholder can always go to 
court if not satisfied with any matter and it will then be up to the court to investigate it. 
The problem, however, is that there are no detailed provisions in the statute to guide 
judges in such cases, as one minority shareholder might be pennitted a hearing, while 
another may not. It leaves open the possibility of partiality, inconsistency and injustice. 
from general Islamic jurisprudence, justice, fairness and commercial conventions, enabling judges to 
apply more remedies and bring justice to more cases. 
453 Commercial environment, shareholders, local and foreign investments and the general economy. 
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However, even if this right (right to litigate) is always granted by judges, it is not 
secured in the statute and thus is not well known among those who deal with company 
law from day to day. It is also important to note that, even if a judge allows a minority 
shareholder to bring any matter to the court's attention, it is still not clear on what 
criteria or grounds the minority shareholder may do so. It is very unfortunate that 
certain participants did not know that this right exists and even those who knew about it 
were not aware of how to exercise it. This is because the right is not clearly stated in the 
statute in a way which clarifies the grounds, mechanisms, procedures and remedies 
which the minority shareholder may use. Even more regrettable is the way in which 
Almajid has described the enforcement of the law in terms of Saudi minority protection. 
He has pointed out that, although the minority shareholder may be allowed under the 
Saudi legal system to litigate against the majority shareholders, enforcement of the law 
is weak enough to prevent minority shareholders from suing majority shareholders for 
breach, misuse, wrongdoing or oppression.454 This may be due to the ineffective legal 
protection in place, which also makes it very hard to predict outcomes. 
The deficiency of the law in protecting minority shareholders was evident since the 
participants listed several other reference points, beside the statute, which enable them to 
judge whether there is potential for successful litigation regarding a particular matter. 
This indicates that the statute alone is not able to provide clear answers, which is why 
people tend to refer to other sources to provide them with what the statute lacks. This is 
not necessarily a bad thing, but it does produce uncertainty. Another negative effect of 
this absence of clear guidance in the law is that the outcome of similar cases can differ, 
subject to each judge's discretion, as there are no comprehensive guidelines, criteria and 
legislative authority for judges to follow in such cases. 
Secondly, the empirical study proves that neither the shareholder agreement nor the 
company's internal code is adequate in protecting the minority shareholder. Admittedly, 
both the shareholder agreement and the company's internal code may assist in protecting 
the minority shareholder to a certain extent, but they are never reliable enough to 
provide complete protection even by working together. It is strongly believed that it is 
454 F, Almajid., A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the Corporate Goven:ance of Saudi .Publicly 
Held Companies: A Comparative and Analytical Study from a Legal Perspective. Ph.D TheSIS. 2008. 
University of Manchester: UK. pg: 241 & 242. 
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the statute which should be the provider of primary protection, and any other source has 
only a secondary role. Therefore, any reform must be made to the statute itselfby adding 
appropriate provisions and providing correct enforcement devices. The statute can also 
provide alternative options for the minority shareholder to use rather than merely relying 
on a litigation process, which may ultimately waste the parties' and company's time and 
money. In this sense, the statute could, for example, offer certain professional arbitration 
bodies to solve disputes within a short time and with little cost. Furthermore, the statute 
could provide a practical exit option which would ensure that a fair price is paid for 
shares when the minority shareholder wishes to leave the company. Thus, the statute 
does not have to concentrate only on delivering provision of litigation if it is even more 
beneficial to all to offer other alternatives for the minority shareholder to use. 
Thirdly, from a practical point of view it is observed that the notion of representing the 
company and litigating on its behalf to protect its rights and interests is not understood 
by a large number of people. This should not be a surprise because, if the law is to adopt 
a policy of preferring the majority over the minority shareholder in all statutory 
provisions (as it does so now), then in practice the former will have much more space to 
engage in excessive misuse and oppression, while the latter will have less opportunity to 
litigate, as the law will always support what the majority shareholder does. 
Having talked about the practicality of the Saudi minority protection, it should be also 
noted that Sharia traditional case law can provide general guidance and direction, but not 
to a very great extent, because modem business involves new facts, issues, principles 
and circumstances requiring detailed specification which can be obtained only from 
recent cases. Therefore, there should be a systematic case law in place in order to offer 
effective protection to the minority shareholder. 
Fourthly, it seems from this empirical study that judges may not be in favour of 
codifying all remedies and reliefs for minority shareholders in the statute. This is 
something which came out in their answers throughout. For instance, one or two 
participants from each category of participants455 recommended codification of all 
remedies and reliefs in the statute when answering question 4.3.3.2., except judges who 
455 Participant X "legal consultant at the Ministry of Commerce", Businessperson C, Lawyer K, Minority 
shareholders T and S, Academic N, Participant Y "HR" and Majority shareholder F. 
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did not mention anything in this respect. This may be due to the loss of discretion which 
the judges will suffer if the statute deals with the area. The possible resistance of judges 
to the idea of codification has also been noted by Almajid456 who states that judges' 
refusal to accept the idea of codification will basically contribute to the unpredictability 
of court decisions. In fact, he stresses that codification as a way of consolidating the 
grounds, devices, principles and remedies under statutory minority shareholder 
protection would assist judges in being more consistent in their adjudications. 
Finally, it may be worth mentioning that, although a few people still think that minority 
shareholders do not need effective protection in SA, there is a general awareness of the 
deficiency in the law and the problem caused by giving the majority so much power and 
authority, while no effective protection is available to the minority. This suggests that 
there will be a strong and positive reception to statutory provisions, especially from 
those who work directly with cases related to minority shareholder protection. It is true 
that a few people still hold the view that minority shareholders are not large in number 
and make little contribution towards the economy, making them less important to the 
market than majority shareholders. However, this view is questionable, as it would seem 
likely that minority shareholders actually outnumber majority shareholders and that their 
contribution is no less important to the market, and therefore needs efficient protection. 
4.5 Conclusion 
What has made this chapter unique is the discussion of the results of an empirical study 
that provides an indication of the true picture in SA. The face-to-face interview was 
chosen as the method for conducting this study and the participants were judges, 
lawyers, businesspersons (sole traders), minority and majority shareholders and 
academics. Having collected and analysed the data, there are a number of things that can 
be concluded. Firstly, we have found that the failure of the statute to provide clear 
guidance with respect to minority cases confuses people, even those who work with the 
law on a daily basis. Secondly, it has been suggested, on the evidence obtained and the 
state of law, that neither the shareholder agreement nor the company's internal code can 
456 F, Almajid., A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the Corporate Goven:ance of Saudi .Publicly 
Held Companies: A Comparative and Analytical Study from a Legal PerspectIve. Ph.D TheSIS. 2008. 
University of Manchester: UK. pg: 166. 
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overtake or replace the need for statutory provision In protecting the minority 
shareholder. Thirdly, it has been observed that the notion of representing the private 
company and litigating on its behalf to protect its rights and interests is not understood 
by a large number of people. Fourthly, it has been assumed that judges may not be in 
favour of codifying all remedies in the statute, because they tend to have unfettered 
discretion and do not wish to be restricted by the statute. Finally, it is predicted that there 
would be a positive reception from stakeholders for any attempt to reform the current 
provisions, as they realise that there is a problem that needs urgent attention. 
In conclusion, improvement of the law in this area in both SA and Dubai demands more 
study and research that may identify the overall structure and effectiveness of legal 
mechanisms.457 Phrased differently, Muslim jurisdictions may not advance if there is no 
efficient legal framework in place that is able to monitor the decision-making and 
enhance transparent and workable laws and accountability within private companies.458 
Probably one way of doing this, as Miles and Goulding459 have suggested, is by 
following in the footsteps of the Anglo-American (Anglo-Saxon) minority shareholder 
protection model. It is believed that the adoption of this model could ensure high 
standards of governance and increase investors' confidence, even in jurisdictions that do 
not share the culture, traditions, customs or systems of those countries which apply the 
Anglo-Saxon conventions. 
Conducting a companson between the development processes of company and 
commercial law in the Western jurisdictions and the Muslim countries (such as SA and 
Dubai) will definitely underline the similarities and differences to assist in exchanging 
experiences and sharing concepts across jurisdictions and creating efficient reform if 
needed.46o In fact, Saudi law-makers have already been willing to adopt certain 
457 Islamic Research and Training Institute, IRTI., Islamic Capital Markets: Products, Regulations & 
Developments, 1 st ed. Islamic Development Bank, Jeddah, 2008, pg: 324. . 
458 Islamic Research and Training Institute, IRTI., Islamic Capital Markets: Products, RegulatIOns & 
Developments, 1 st ed. Islamic Development Bank, Jeddah, 2008, pg: 324.. . 
459 L, Miles. & S, Goulding., Corporate governance in Western (Anglo-Amencan) and IslamiC 
communities: prospects for convergence?, Journal of Business Law. 2010,2, pg: 127 & 128. . 
460 Islamic Research and Training Institute, IRTI., Islamic Capital Markets: Products, RegulatIOns & 
Developments, 1 st ed. Islamic Development Bank, Jeddah, 2008, pg: 324. 
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commercial, company and economic principles which were originally designed in the 
USA and the UK, as long as they do not contradict Sharia.461 
Therefore, the next chapter will embark on the second stage of this research by studying 
English company law in terms of minority shareholder protection in order to observe 
and examine the developments and processes which have created the present position in 
providing statutory protection for minority shareholders. The aim of this second stage is 
to explore whether, and to what extent, SA and Dubai could adopt English provisions to 
good effect. 
461 F Alma· id A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the Corporate Goven:ance of Saudi .Publicly 
, J., . d A I t· I St dy from a Legal Perspective. Ph.D TheSIS. 2008. Held Companies: A Comparative an na y lca u 
University of Manchester: UK. pg: 52. 
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Chapter 5 
An examination of minority shareholder protection in UK Company 
Law 
Introduction 
This chapter addresses the second stage of the present research, and is concerned with 
the UK Companies Act 2006 and its provisions regarding minority shareholder 
protection. It aims to observe and examine the developments and processes which have 
led to the present provision of efficient statutory protection for minority shareholders in 
the UK. Thus, its purpose is not merely to describe the current legal provisions in this 
respect, but the primary aim is to study and analyse the development, refonn and 
improvement, which has brought the statute to its current level of sophistication. This is 
done whilst bearing in mind whether, and to what extent, UK law might be employed in 
Saudi Arabia and Dubai. 
The most recent development in UK company law was reached after a number of 
studies and reviews proposed certain refonns to the traditional system of protection, 
which was considered inefficient. The current UK company law has passed through 
many stages, each involving changes, and at every stage the protection of minority 
shareholders has gradually improved, to the point where it might be argued that the 
Companies Act 2006 offers the most efficient and practical protection to minority 
shareholders. This valuable UK legacy could usefully be shared by other jurisdictions. 
The value of taking UK company law as a model for both Saudi Arabia and Dubai is 
that it can offer them direction and guidance as to how to deal with minority shareholder 
protection in an effective way. In fact, some of the deficiencies and uncertainties which 
used to exist under the old English law were somewhat similar to those applying now 
under the SA and Dubai company laws. Therefore, it would be very useful for these two 
jurisdictions to understand how the development of English law has addressed these 
problems and whether they have done so successfully. This chapter takes a descriptive 
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and exploratory approach (accompanied by analysis) to the study of the functioning of 
the former English provision for minority shareholder protection and the ways in which 
it has been reformed. It is, however, important to note here that the author does not 
recommend that the present English company law be adopted unreservedly as a model 
for reform, for two reasons. Firstly, there are certain concerns regarding some aspects of 
the English protection of minority shareholders that would need slight modification. 
Secondly, SA and Dubai cannot adopt the English provisions without an initial 
assessment of which provisions can be utilized exactly as they are and which of them 
would need adaptation in order to be compliant with local traditions, needs, culture and 
conventions, and especially the requirement of Sharia. 
This chapter comprises four main sections, the first of which outlines the protection 
offered to minority shareholders under common law and statutes prior to 2006. This will 
illustrate the difficulties and complexities which minority shareholders faced and which 
discouraged them from pursuing actions against anyone committing a wrong against the 
company. The second section examines what the Law Commission and the Company 
Law Review Group recommended and proposed in order to address the failure of 
minority shareholder protection under common law and previous statutes. The third 
section shows the results of these recommendations as reflected in the Companies Act 
2006. This section compares and contrasts derivative actions under common law with 
the newly introduced statutory derivative action; it also describes the other remedies 
available under the statute (unfair prejudice). Thus, the great majority of the materials 
and references in this section date from the period after 2006. The chapter concludes 
with a summary. 
5.1 Minority shareholder protection under common law and pre-2006 
company law 
5.1.1 Common Law 
As mentioned several times in this research, English law is seen as a leading model 
within common-law countries (the Anglo-Saxon countries), such as Canada, the United 
States, Malaysia and India. Minority shareholder protection has been in existence under 
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English law since the development of exceptions to the rule in Foss v Harbottle462 and 
was left in place for over 160 years under common law. However, under common law 
the minority shareholder faced problems which prevented himlher from claiming in 
relation to a wrong done to the company, since the majority shareholder was entitled to 
ratify.463 In those cases, the help that minority shareholders could receive was very 
limited as the courts were extremely reluctant to interfere on their behalf 
The traditional position was based on a very old principle which did not allow minority 
shareholders to sue for wrongs done to their company or to complain of irregularities 
regarding its internal affairs.464 This principle came from Foss v. Harbottle, but was 
clearly stated by Lord Davey in Burland v Earle,465 who divided the principle into two 
main limbs. The first stated that the courts would not interfere in the internal 
management of companies, as courts regarded the majority shareholders as being in a 
far better position than judges to decide what should be done.466 The second limb stated 
that, when a wrong was done to a company, the proper claimant was the company itself 
and not any individual shareholder, namely the minority shareholder. Therefore, it was 
clear from these rules that there were harsh restrictions placed upon minority 
shareholders, while majority shareholders could have complete control over decision-
making and litigation. Many problems arose as a consequence of this power being in the 
hands of majority shareholders. Having recognised these problems, the courts 
developed certain exceptions to the rules in Foss v. Harbottle to allow a minority 
shareholder to bring an action when a wrong was done to the company. These 
exceptions were: 
(1) When the complaint was that the company was acting or about to act ultra 
vires467 or illegally.468 No ordinary majority could sanction such an act.469 
462 [1843] 2 Hara 461. 
463 However, in some cases the minority shareholder could challenge the majority's action if the action 
was fraud, as seen in Cook v Deeks [1916] 1 A.C. 
464 MacDougall v Gardiner (1875) 1 Ch D 13, at 25. 
465 [1902] AC 83, PC, and also Edwards v Halliwell [1950] 2 All ER 1064. 
466 B, Pettet., Company Law. 2nd ed. Pearson Education Limited, London, 2005. pg: 213. 
467 The doctrine of ultra vires applies to transactions which are outside the corporate powers of a company 
which are stated in the memorandum of association, as seen in Rolled Steel Products v British Street 
Corporation [1984] 2 WLR 908. tb 
468 Illegality, as clarified in (A, Boyle. J, Birds. & Others., Boyle & ~irds'. Comfany Law. 6 ed. Jordans: 
Bristol, 2007. pg: 675), should in this context be understood as meanmg eIther contrary to company law 
or 'so plainly illegal that the directors have acted in abuse of their powers'. 
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(2) When the act complained of did not have the sanctl'on f . d . 1 
o a reqUIre speCla or 
extraordinary resolution. 470 
(3) Where it was alleged that the personal rights of the minority shareholder had 
been infringed. 
(4) Fraud on the minority, when those who controlled the company were 
perpetrating fraud on the minority shareholder. No resolution could justify the 
minority being the victim of fraud. This was a particularly important exception 
to the rule in Foss v. Harbottle. 
It is important to note that these exceptions were developed by the courts to ensure that 
justice could be brought to cases when needed. Accordingly, litigation was exercised by 
minority shareholders under common law only through the exceptions to Foss v. 
Harbottle. These exceptions were categorised into two types: personal actions and 
derivative actions. However, many academics and practitioners have held the view that 
fraud on the minority was the only true exception to the rule in Foss v Harbottle, which 
indeed served and benefited the company and the minority shareholder. 
5.1.1.1 Personal actions 
The personal action was always available for the minority shareholder to pursue in order 
to protect himlherself personally. The action was simply called a personal action when a 
minority shareholder was claiming that some of hislher personal rights were infringed. 
However, there was no attempt to define what was really meant by personal rights under 
common law. Instead, it was left to the courts to decide what counted as a personal right 
and what did not, with the result that such rights were not clearly identifiable. Case law 
appears to show that an action was treated as a personal action only when the 
shareholder could be seen to have some cause for action vested in himlher personally. 
From what was held in Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd 
(No. 2),471 it is understood that the court allowed the minority shareholder to bring a 
personal action only in respect of matters which were not regarded as associated with 
469 Nevertheless, in Smith v Croft No 2 [1988] Ch 114 it was stated that the minority shareholder had no 
ri§ht to sue if a majority of the shareholders who were independent did not want the action to continue. 
47 See Edwards v Halliwell [1950] 2 ALL ER 1064 at: 1067. 
471 [1982] Ch 204. 
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the company's rights. Therefore, it is evident that the first three exceptions to the rules 
in Foss v Harbottle (namely ultra vires, failing to meet requirements of special or 
extraordinary resolution and infringement of member rights) were most closely related 
I 'gh 472 h'l to persona n ts, WISt the fraud on the minority was associated with the 
company's rights and was therefore not related to personal action. 
In practice, the minority shareholder could bring a personal action to prevent the 
company from altering the articles in a manner that might be considered oppressive to 
minority shareholders personally. In Sidebottom v Kershaw, Leese and Co. Ltd,473 the 
court decided to prevent the company from altering an article which, if allowed, would 
have granted the majority shareholder more power. In these types of cases, the company 
was the defendant and damages or an injunction could be granted against it in favour of 
a minority shareholder. To illustrate, the minority shareholder was able to bring a 
personal action in respect of: 
a) A decision which failed to meet the required majority of votes to pass a special or 
extraordinary resolution and was therefore passed without the minority's vote being 
counted, as demonstrated in Yong v South African and Australian Exploration and 
Development Syndicate474 and Edwards v Halliwell. 475 In such cases, the minority 
shareholder would have been denied hislher voting rights and accordingly would 
have been harmed personally by the decision. 
b) A decision by majority shareholders to allot shares, as occurred in Fraser v 
Whalley,476 Punt v Symons and Co. Lttf77 and Residues Treatment and Trading Co 
Ltd v Southern Resourced Ltd. 478 In such cases, the majority's decision would 
lessen the position of minority shareholder as they were not offered fresh shares; 
their portion of the overall shareholding of the company was reduced. 
472 S, Mayson. D, French. & C, Ryan., Company Law. 23rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006-
2007. pg: 678. 
473 [1920] 1 Ch 154. 
474 [1896] 2 Ch 268. 
475 [1950] 2 All ER 1064. 
476 [1864] 2 Hem & M 10. 
477 [1903] 2 Ch 506. 
478 [1988] 51 SASR 177. 
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As Percival v Wrighl
79 
showed, because the directors owe a duty to the company and 
not to the shareholders individually (the same applying under s170 of the Companies 
Act 2006), it was impossible for the minority shareholder to bring a personal action for 
breach of duty by the directors. Thus, the type of conduct which might have given rise 
to a personal action was very narrowly defined and required personal harm to have been 
suffered. In sum, the availability of personal action under common law did not properly 
serve the minority shareholder, as it was limited to protecting hislher personal rights. 
This meant that it was either not applicable in many cases or sometimes difficult to 
prove. Another disadvantage of personal actions was that case law rarely involved them 
and there was accordingly little judicial guidance and direction, which made such 
personal actions neither identifiable nor favourable. 
5.1.1.2 Derivative actions under common law 
The second category of litigation under common law was the derivative action, a device 
which was created by the courts to allow minority shareholders to bring a claim against 
those in control of a company where there was a fraud on the minority. In these 
circumstances, the minority shareholder was not enforcing a right which belonged to 
him/her, but rather one vested in and therefore derived from the company.480 The 
minority shareholder had to litigate on behalf of the company and any compensation 
recovered would go to the company, so the derivative claim could be brought by the 
minority shareholder only to enforce the company's rightS.481 In sum, the minority 
shareholder in a derivative action would be acting in the capacity of a representative of 
the company, as was held by Chadwick J in Cooke v Cooke. 482 
a. How to prove fraud on the minority under common law 
It was understood that the minority shareholder should have to prove that the wrong 
involved fraud on the minority to ensure a successful derivative action, so the minority 
shareholder had to establish the existence of fraud in the wrong, which meant 
479 [1902] 2 Ch 421. 
480 Percival v Wright [1902] 2 Ch 421, stated that the directors' duties were owed to the company and not 
to members. 
481 It is claimed in (N, Shulman. & M, Simmons., The Liabi~ity .of the .Dotcom ~ifestyle, The Law;:er. 
2000, 14(29), pg: 15) that in the US it is easier to bring denvatlve aCtions, as dIrectors owe fidUCIary 
duties to their shareholders, whereas in the UK the duty is owed to the company. 
482 [1997] 2 BCLC 28. 
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something as serious as appropriating the assets of the company.483 Lord Davey, in 
Burland v Earl,484 ruled that fraud on the minority would only occur when "the majority 
are endeavouring directly or indirectly to appropriate to themselves money, property or 
advantages which belong to the company or in which other shareholders are entitled to 
participate". As well as establishing fraud, the minority shareholder was also required to 
prove that the majority shareholder, who was also the wrongdoer, was in control of the 
485 
company. 
However, it could also be understood that for a wrong to constitute fraud on the 
minority, actual deceit did not need to occur, as abuse or misuse of power alone might 
have been sufficient if it carried a clear element of fraud. For example, in Clark v 
Cutland and Others,486 the majority took remuneration from the company without 
authority so the minority shareholder initiated a derivative action, but it failed in the 
first instance. Subsequently, the minority shareholder appealed and the Court of Appeal 
found the conduct to be a breach of duty owed to the company and accordingly allowed 
the minority's appeal, holding that the company was entitled to trace the payments and 
claim them back. Although consideration of what constitutes fraud was not the key 
ground in this case, a form of abuse and misuse of power was apparent and sufficient to 
prove the fraud. 
Therefore, for the minority shareholder to succeed under common law, he/she had to 
establish fraud as a cause of the wrong, and this could take the form either of bad faith 
or of abuse of power.487 The minority shareholder was required to establish fraud even 
if the case included other types of misconduct, such as default, negligence, breach of 
duty or breach of trust. An example of how important it was to establish fraud can be 
seen in the case Pavlides v Jensen,488 where the minority failed to establish that the 
483 C, Timmis, Company Law: In good company? Law Society Gazette, 2006, 103(13), pg: 16. 
484 [1902] AC 83. . . .. . 
485 Which means: making decisions on behalf of the company or in the pOSItIon of dlrectmg and runnmg 
the company. 
486 [2003] EWCA Civ 810. . 
487 Nonetheless in Estmanco Kilner House Ltd v GLC [1982] 1 WLR 2, Magarry J allowed the exceptIon 
of "fraud on th~ minority" to be applied. Although there was neither bad faith nor abuse by ~he majority 
shareholder, he tried to change the purpose for which the company was formed, and accordmgly caused 
iniury to the minority shareholder's interests. 
48A [1956] 2 All ER 518. Fraud on the minority was seen in Cook v Deeks [1916] 1 A.C. 554 PC (Can). 
Abuse of power was seen in Rolled Steel Products Ltd v British Steel Corp [1985] 2 W.L.R. 908 CA. 
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alleged negligent disposition of assets constituted fraud.489 However, in Daniels v 
Daniels,49o the court allowed a derivative action where no obvious fraud was alleged, 
only negligence (taking the form of gross undervalue of company property) but the 
judge seems to have been particularly influenced by the fact that the majority made a 
considerable profit from their negligent actions, and at the expense of the company, and 
this effectively constituted fraud. 
It was within the power of the majority shareholder to ensure that a wrong was ratified. 
Of course, utilising ratification in this way restricted the scope of derivative actions and 
accordingly did not serve the company's interest, as it could prevent the company from 
receiving justice when needed.491 However, there were few circumstances in which the 
court might allow the minority shareholder to bring a derivative action even if the 
wrong was ratified.492 Specifically, these were if clear fraud existed493 or if the company 
was close to, or actually in, insolvency,494 as seen in Multinational Gas and 
Petrochemical Co. v. Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Services Ltd.495 
So, generally speaking, cases under common law showed that many acts of misconduct 
and wrongs were prevented from being brought to justice because of the majority 
shareholders' power to ratify any misconduct. 496 However, as mentioned earlier, if a 
clear case of fraud existed, then there were certain requirements, as Dine points out, 
which the minority shareholder had to meet to bring a derivative action under common 
law:497 
489 It has been said in (B, Hannigan., Company Law. 1st ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. pg: 
460.) that mere negligence, even when it causes significant losses to the company, is ratifiable and cannot 
amount to a fraud on the minority exception. 
490 [1978] Ch 406. 
491 H, Hirt., The Company's Decision to Litigate Against its Directors: Legal Strategies to Deal with the 
Board of Directors' Conflict oflnterest, Journal of Business Law, 2005, March, pg: 185-186. 
492 A, Reisberg., Judicial Control of Derivative Actions, International Company and Commercial Law 
Review. 2005, 16(8), pg: 337& 338. 
493 As held in Menier v Hooper's Telegraph Works (1874) 9 Ch App 350 and Estmanco Ltd v Greater 
London Council [1982] 1 All ER 437, [1982] 1 WLR 2. See also Cook v Deeks [1916] 1 AC 554. 
494 J, Payne., A re-examination of ratification, Cambridge Law Journal. 1999,58(3), pg: 618. 
495 [1983] Ch. 258, 280. .. . 
496 J, Sykes., The continuing paradox: a critique of minority shareholder and denvahve claIms under the 
Companies Act 2006, Civil Justice Quarterly. 2010, 29(2), pg: 221. 
497 J, Dine., Company Law. 5th ed. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2005, pg: 253. 
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1. The minority was required to establish fraud in the case f 'f o any wrong, even 1 
the wrongdoing did not appear to involve any fraud (e.g. negligence or breach of 
duty). 
2. The minority was required to prove that the company suffered an actual loss as a 
result of this alleged fraud. 498 
3. The minority was required to prove that the majority had benefitted personally 
from the fraud, as the case of Daniels v Daniels showed.499 
4. The minority was required to prove that the majority was III control of the 
company, i.e. "wrongdoers' control", as stated in Burland v Earle and Edwards 
v Halliwell. 500 
5. The minority was required to have 'clean hands' and have acted in good faith, as 
shown in Towers v African Tug C0501 and Nurcombe v Nurcombe. 502 
b. Difficulties with derivative actions under common law 
When eXamInIng derivative action under common law, it can be clearly seen that 
extreme limitations were placed on the circumstances and conduct which could be 
subject to it since, in fact, fraud was the sole ground on which such an action could be 
established. Therefore, very few claims were reported under common law, as seen from 
their infrequent appearance in case law. 503 There were several reasons for this: first, the 
minority shareholder had no power to access information regarding the management of 
the company, in order to prove the wrongdoing and accordingly to build a strong case. 
Secondly, if the litigation under the derivative claim succeeded, the principal 
beneficiary of the action would be the company, in whose favour judgment would be 
given. This raises the question of why the minority shareholder would bother to bring 
such an action if he/she could obtain no direct personal benefit from it, while there was 
498 A, Reisberg., Judicial Control of Derivative Actions, International Company and Commercial Law 
Review. 2005, 16(8), pg: 335 to 339. 
499 This condition came from Daniels v Daniels [1978] Ch 406, which stated that directors could not be 
sued under the derivative action unless it was shown that they had profited themselves. 
500 Edwards v Halliwell [1950] 2 All E.R. 1064 CA, and Pavlides v Jensen [1956] 1 Ch. 565 Ch D. In 
these cases it was the right of the majority to bar the minority action whenever they lawfully ratified 
alleged misconduct. 
501 [1904] 1 Ch 558. . 
502 [1985] 1 W.L.R. 370. In both cases, the minorities had no clean hands and accordmgly the court 
refused the action. The action must be brought bona fide for the benefit of the company. 
503 M, Almadani., Derivative actions: does the Companies Act 2006 offer a way forward? Company 
Lawyer. 2009, 30(5), pg: 135. 
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a risk of having to pay the costs of loss if the litigation did not succeed.504 The third 
reason was that it was clear from Smith v Crofl505 that a majority amongst the minority 
shareholders might be able to prevent the remaining minority shareholders from 
continuing with the action. For instance, if there were three minority shareholders in a 
company and two of them did not want to continue with the action, the action might not 
go ahead because the court would accede to the wishes of the two dissenting minority 
shareholders. Finally, the court would usually not allow a derivative claim to proceed if 
another adequate remedy could be sought, as shown in Cooke v Cooke506 and Mumbray 
v Lapper. 507 
It was argued that litigation under common law was deliberately characterised by 
confusion and complexity in order to restrict actions; otherwise the courts would have 
been unable to cope with the volume of litigation.508 This is illustrated by Barrett v. 
Duckett,509 when the court refused to allow a derivative action to proceed because the 
claim was not being pursued bona fide on behalf of the company. Although the minority 
shareholder had the potential to succeed in this case, the court did not allow the action 
to continue, simply because the minority lacked good faith. Thus, the court wanted to 
spread the message that a minority shareholder should not have an automatic right to 
bring a derivative action on the company's behalfifhe was not acting in good faith. 51o 
c. Indemnity in derivative claims 
It is believed that the infrequency of derivative action cases under common law may 
have been attributed to the issue of funding. It is difficult to see why a minority 
shareholder would risk hislher own time and funds in proceeding with a derivative 
action, when the result in terms of pecuniary recovery was always uncertain.511 Indeed, 
it has been pointed out that the successful minority shareholder would not have been 
504 Pettet has answered this question (B, Pettet., Company Law. 2nd ed. Pearson Education Limited, 
London, 2005. pg: 220) by saying that the shareholders as a whole will indirectly get a pro-rata benefit 
from any compensation to the company. 
505 (No.2) [1988] Ch 114. 
506 [1997] 2 BCLC 28. 
507 [2005] EWHC 1152 (Ch). 
508 B, Pettet., Company Law. 2nd ed. Pearson Education Limited, London, 2005. pg: 213. 
509 [1995] 1 B.C.L.C 243. . C· I 
510 A, Reisberg., Judicial Control of Derivative Actions, InternatIOnal Company and ommerc/a Law 
Review. 2005, 16(8), pg: 337. 
511 Q, Bu., The Indemnity Order in a Derivative Action, Company Lawyer. 2006, 27( 1), pg: 3. 
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better off than fellow shareholders who made no effort to s rt th d' 512 UppO e procee mgs. 
Chef fins also commented that when a minority shareholder knew that the company and 
other shareholders would free-ride on his/her efforts, he/she would have had no 
incentive to litigate, even in situations where litigation would have increased the total 
value of shares. 513 Therefore, it was very important to allow ways to fund the derivative 
action so that minority shareholders could remedy any wrongs which occurred in the 
company. 514 
This financial dilemma in bringing a derivative action was initially recognised and 
positively dealt with in Wallersteiner v MOir,515 where Lord Denning MR in the Court 
of Appeal stated that: 
"The minority shareholder, being an agent acting on behalf of the company, is entitled 
to be indemnified by the company against all costs and expenses reasonably incurred by 
him in course of agency ... But what if the action fails? Assuming that the minority 
shareholder had reasonable grounds for bringing the action he should not himself be 
liable, because he was acting for it and not for himself. In addition, he should himself 
be indemnified by the company in respect of his own costs even if the action fails." 
Accordingly, the minority shareholder in this case was given the right to be indemnified 
by the company without the probable success of the claim being considered, because 
the rights being vindicated were those of the company and recovery would flow to it.516 
On the other hand, Walton J in Smith v Croft517 insisted that the minority shareholder 
would be able to gain indemnity from the company only in the "clearest, obviously just 
case". This meant that the court would need to examine all of the facts to decide 
whether to grant an indemnity order at an early stage or to delay the order. Prentice 
512 Q, Bu., The Indemnity Order in a Derivative Action, Company Lawyer. 2006, 27(1), pg: ~. 
513 B, Cheffins., Refonning the Derivative Action: The Canadian experience and Bnttsh Prospects, 
Company Financial and Insolvency Law Review. 1997, 1(2), pg: 257 - 260. Also, see T, Boyle., The new 
derivative action, Company Lawyer. 1997, 18(8), pg: 253 
514 A, Reisberg., Derivative Actions and Funding Problem: The Way Forward, Journal of Business Law, 
2006, (Aug), pg: 447. 
515 [1974] 1 WLR 991. . ., 
516 It was established in Wallersteiner v Moir [1974] 1 WLR 991 that the mdlvldual shareholder was not 
enforcing a right which belongs to him but which was rather vested in and therefore derived from the 
company, and accordingly he was entitled to an indemnity order. 
517 (No.2) [1988] Ch. 114. 
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agreed with Smith because the procedure laid down in it would probably improve the 
operation of the Wallersteiner procedure.518 However, it is important to note that 
although Smith v Croft sought to ensure that all derivative actions be brought in good 
faith and for the best interests of the company, the case did not establish to what degree 
the evidence given to the court by the minority shareholder at an early stage should be 
sufficient to grant himlher indemnity.519 Eventually, the indemnity cost order was 
refused in Smith v Croft and it was held that such orders should not be made until it was 
established that the case was well founded. 520 
A major criticism of Smith v Croft is that it is very difficult for judges to decide at an 
early stage whether or not the case has been brought on reasonable grounds, unless it is 
extremely obvious. More importantly, Smith did not define or clarify the meaning of 
'reasonableness' or 'clearly just' in this context and therefore left this area of law 
without criteria by which to judge any action. However, no matter what the exact 
meaning of 'reasonable ground' is, it cannot be clearly seen early on in many cases. In 
reality, examining all the legal issues and facts pertaining to the case at an early stage, 
in order to identify a potentially reasonable ground on which to justify the indemnity 
order, is impractical and unachievable. Furthermore, what if the case appears to be 
brought on a reasonable ground and the indemnity order is granted, but subsequently 
the case is not successful for some reason? 
To overcome this financial dilemma, it has been suggested521 that a conditional fees 
agreement should apply in such cases. Thus, lawyers would agree to take a case on the 
understanding that if it is lost they will not charge their clients for the work they have 
done,522 while if the case is won they are entitled to charge a success fee calculated from 
their normal cost structure.523 This approach is flawed as cases would be dependent on 
the potential for success as a criterion for lawyers who would then be concerned only 
with how much reward they could obtain from each case. In other words, lawyers would 
518 D, Prentice., Wallersteiner v Moir: a decade later, Conveyancer and Property Lawyer. 1987, May-
June, pg: 169. 
519 Q, Bu., The Indemnity Order in a Derivative Action, Company Lawyer. 2006,?7(1), p~: 5. 
520 This more restrictive approach to Wallersteiner orders was not followed In Fayblrd Group Ltd v 
Greenwood [1986] BCLC 319 at 327. . 
521 A, Reisberg., Derivative Actions and Funding Problem: The Way Forward, Journal of Buszness Law, 
2006, Aug, pg: 447 & 448. '.
522 W, Emons., Conditional versus Contingent Fees, Oxford EconomIc Papers. 2007, 59, pg. 91&92. 
523 D, Marshall., Conditional Fee Agreements, New Law Journal. 2001, 151 (6995), pg: 1187. 
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approach such cases from a commercial point of view and would never take cases 
unless they were able to foresee a clear profit, unlike the minority shareholder, whose 
primary interest will always be to remedy the wrong done to the company.524 This 
would be far from achieving the original purpose for which the derivative action was 
designed. Furthermore, derivative action under common law was known for its 
uncertainty and unpredictability, making it even more difficult for lawyers to risk their 
time and effort for unpredictable outcomes. 
It can be reasonably argued that the indemnity procedure should openly follow the rule 
in Wallersteiner v Moir to indemnify the minority shareholder regardless of the 
outcome, because he/she is acting in the company's interest and any reward will go to 
the company itself. It is pointless for the court to try to establish whether the minority 
shareholder has the right to be indemnified or not, since to do so will lengthen the case 
and its cost might then exceed the benefit that the company could possibly receive. 
Thus, the basic principle should be that the minority shareholder has a right to be 
indemnified by the company in a derivative action,525 unless it is clear that the action 
brought is unnecessary. 
d. Comments on the functioning of the derivative action under common law 
Making it difficult to institute a derivative action under common law has sometimes 
been seen as having had a number of advantages. One advantage is that it eliminated 
wasteful litigation by those bringing vexatious actions and trying to harass or bargain 
with the company.526 Nonetheless, there were also several disadvantages. First, 
reqUITIng the minority shareholder to establish "fraud" and "wrongdoer (majority) 
control" to bring a derivative action did not help the minority shareholder to promote 
the company's interest. In fact, these harsh requirements placed extreme limitations on 
I 527 such cases, as seen from the lack of case aw. 
524 This is clearly seen, in practice, in the United States. . . 
525 Or at least at the end of the proceedings an order for costs may be made on a common fund baSIS If the 
result of the case is beneficial to shareholders generally, as seen in Re A Company [1987] BCLC 82. 
526 B, Hannigan., Company Law. 1 st ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. pg: 459. . 
527 See Cook v Deeks [1916] 1 A C 554 (PC). A classic example of abuse of power was seen 10 Roll~d 
Steel Products Ltd v British Steel Corporation [1985] 2 WLR 908(CA). Gross undervalue was held 10 
Daniels v Daniels [1978] Ch 406. 
152 
Secondly, it was mistakenly believed by a large number of judges that fraud as a ground 
was wide enough to accommodate all types of wrongdoing and misconduct, so that 
there was no need to consider other grounds, as shown in Estmanco (Kilner House) Ltd 
v Greater London Council. 528 But this was not true, because there were several types of 
misconduct other than fraud which could not lead to the bringing of proceedings.529 In 
fact, what was experienced in practice was the opposite, as limits on the initiation of 
derivative action under common law allowed majority shareholders to escape liability 
on many occasions and justice was not brought to all cases. 
Thirdly, corporate wrong cases (derivative cases) could be brought under s459 of the 
Companies Act 1985 as well as under common law. This meant that the court 
sometimes allowed a shareholder who presented an unfair prejudice petition to pursue a 
corporate wrong which was obviously a derivative action. 53o In fact, s459 facilitated and 
served derivative cases more effectively than common law itself. 53 I This better 
treatment of corporate wrong cases under s459 was due to there being fewer 
requirements to meet when establishing an action under the section. For example, s459 
did not require of the minority shareholder 'clean hands' in order for an action to be 
brought,532 while common law would not allow the same action to proceed if the 
minority shareholder was not proven to have clean hands.533 
5.1.2 Statutory personal rights for minority shareholders before 2006534 
5.1.2.1 Background 
It is thought absolutely essential to study the history and background of this particular 
area of English law to see how the process has been developed and improved 
throughout, especially in the case of this research, where reform of the position in SA 
528 [1982] 1 W.L.R.2. Also see R, Reed., Derivative claims: the application for permission to continue, 
Company Lawyer. 2000, 21(5), pg: 156 & 157. 
529 B, Hannigan., Company Law. 1 sl ed. Oxford: Oxford University ~re~s, 200~. pg: 460. 
530 Basically, for any wrong that was done to the company, the d~nva.ttve actIOn was what to pursue. B~t 
there were only a few cases in which the courts allowed the mmonty shareholder to pursue an unfaIr 
prejudice petition instead to remedy such a wrong. 
531 B, Hannigan., Company Law. lSI ed. Oxford: Oxford University Pr~ss, 2003. pg: 460. 
532 The minority shareholder was not required to have clean hands m Nurcombe v Nurcombe [1985] 1 
W.L.R 370, because s459 was brought to remedy the wrong in this case. 
533 J, Payne., Clean hands in derivative actions, Cambridge ~awJournal. 2002, 61(1) p~: 81. 
534 The latest law is contained in ss994-996 of the Compames Act 2006. The Compames Act 2006 came 
into force completely in 2009. 
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and Dubai is sought through the example of minority shareholder protection under 
English law. 
According to the statutory law, prior to 1948, the court could offer only a winding-up 
order on the just and equitable ground when a dispute occurred between shareholders. In 
many ways this was an unsatisfactory remedy, as the shareholder might not have 
wanted to wind up the company, but rather to seek a remedy that could keep the 
company going. Unsurprisingly, this led to the termination of many businesses, because 
the winding-up order was the only solution to all types of dispute. Therefore, Parliament 
reformed the law and introduced the ground of "oppression" under the Companies Act 
1948, whereby alternative remedies came into effect. In this Act, s210(1) stated that 
"any member of a company who complains that the affairs of the company are being 
conducted in a manner oppressive to some part of the members (including himself), 
may make an application to the court by petition for any order under this section". 
However, practice demonstrated that even this alternative remedy did not offer relief in 
all types of cases. For example, no remedy was available when there was disagreement 
regarding the distribution of dividends, and there was no remedy which could be used 
when the shareholder had legitimate expectations to participate in management but 
those expectations were never met. The term "oppression" in the 1948 Act was not 
clearly defined. Relatively few cases were brought and even fewer were successful. 
Therefore, this unsatisfactory and insufficient application of the law led Parliament 
again to seek further reform to address the difficulties.535 Eventually, Parliament 
amended the Companies Act 1948 and adopted the term ''unfair prejudice" in the 
Companies Act 1980, instead of oppression. This provision was reproduced in 1985 and 
became section 459. This introduced much greater flexibility. 
536 f ''tine. . . d' ,,537 Th As stated above, this new provision included the concept 0 laIr preJu Ice . e 
section stated that: 
535 A, Hicks., & S, Goo., Cases and Materials on Company Law. 5th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004,pg:400. fi 9 ) 
536 According to the Jenkins Committee (1962), the draw,backs of ~he. old law (be ore ~45 ) were: \a an 
order could only be made if the facts could be the basts of a wmdmg-up order on Just and eqUItable 
grounds. . ' hId d' 1989 
537 The provisions were contained in ss459-461 of the Compames Act 1985 and shg t y amen em. 
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"A member of a company may apply to the court by petition for an order on the 
ground that the company's affairs are being or have been conducted in a manner 
which is unfairly prejudicial to the interest of its members generally or some part of 
the members (including at least himself)". 
When this new concept replaced the old one, judges were flexible and innovative in 
their use of the new section. By the late 1980s there had been several reported cases. 
This greater number of cases was due to the fact that the wording of s459 was broad 
and unrestricted and that its categories were open. Indeed, this led minority 
shareholders to use s459 as an effective device for bringing majority shareholders to 
court, even if it was not necessary. Gradually, it was realised that the availability of the 
new remedy was capable of being oppressive towards the majority shareholder because 
the minority shareholder could use it when it was unnecessary. At that time, certain 
judges tried to develop ways of restricting the number of cases being brought. 538 This 
was seen in Re Saul Harrison,539 where an action was brought by the minority 
shareholder to have the company wound up on the grounds that the majority 
shareholders were running it in their own interest, and not acting bona fide in the best 
interests of the company. The minority shareholder also claimed that he was not 
receiving dividends and was also unlikely to in the future. Although the action was 
dismissed in the first instance, the minority shareholder appealed. The Court of Appeal 
dismissed the appeal, holding that the minority shareholder could not prove that the 
majority shareholders were acting in a wholly unreasonable manner and in bad faith in 
continuing to operate the company purely to provide themselves with salaries. This case 
in particular attempted to restrict the circumstances in which a remedy could be granted 
under s459, because, in previous cases, the minority shareholder had been able to obtain 
a remedy easily once it was proved that no dividends had been distributed. Paterson540 
has commented that the judgment in this case was influential in the development of the 
unfair prejudice remedy, as it was generally regarded as a leading case in restricting the 
use of s459, to the extent that it was frequently referred to in subsequent decisions. 
Thus, it was sensed in later cases that judges tended to restrict the capacity to apply 
538 B, Pettet., Company Law. 2nd ed. Pearson Education Limited, London, 2005. pg: 233. 
539 [1994] BCC 475. . 
540 This case limited the criteria by which the court is to detennine whether the conduct complamed of 
amounts to unfair prejudice. See: P, Paterson., A Criticism of the Contractual Approach to Unfair 
Prejudice", Company Lawyer. 2006, 27(7), pg: 209. 
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s459 in order to limit its excessive use 541 The case 0 '7t.Tez·11 Ph'll' 542 h' d thi • lVl V Z zps emp aSlse s 
restriction even more (full discussion of this case appears later in this chapter). 
5.1.2.2 The meaning of s459 (conduct of the company's affairs) 
Section 459 of the Companies Act 1985 uses particular wording which needs to be 
clarified at this point, as it mentions the fact that a shareholder might apply " ... to the 
court by petition for an order on the ground that the company's affairs are being or have 
been conducted in a [certain] manner". This means that the conduct complained of must 
relate to the conduct of the affairs of the company.543 In Re Legal Costs Negotiators 
Ltd544 the company had four shareholders with equal holdings. Three of the four 
dismissed the fourth as an employee and he resigned as director. Having failed to 
persuade the fourth member to sell his shares to them, the majority shareholders 
brought a claim under s459 to force him to do so. The Court of Appeal rejected their 
claim, holding that this action did not relate to the conduct of the affairs of the company 
and that the majority were in a position to resolve any prejudice being inflicted on the 
company as they had control. 545 
In the same way, in Arrow Nominees Inc v Blackledge546 the majority shareholder lent 
considerable sums to the company at a high interest rate and this was regarded by the 
minority shareholder as unfair. The minority shareholder commenced proceedings, but 
they were struck out on the ground that lending to the company at that rate of interest 
could not in itself amount to unfair or prejudicial conduct of the company's affairs 
under s459. However, the court's decision in this case is difficult to understand since 
the fact that the majority shareholder lent a significant amount of money to the 
company at a higher interest rate than was prevalent at that time can be seen to be an 
abuse of power which aimed to further his own interest. Although this conduct might 
541 It is important to know who had the right to claim under this section. Relief under s459 was available 
to a person to whom the shares had been transferred or transmitted by operation of law. However, in 
Atlasview Ltd. V. Brightview Ltd [2004] EWHC 1056 (Ch) the claim was brought by individuals who 
held only the beneficial interest in shares in the company. The judge, however, adopted a flexible 
approach and held that the beneficial shareholders had an indirect right to claim. 
542 [1999] 1 WLR 1092. 
543 B, Hannigan., Company Law. 1 st ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. pg: 413. 
544 [1999] 2 BCLC 171. . 
545 The Company Law Review, Completing the Structure (2000), para 5.102 notes that It ~h~uld be made 
clear that the section does apply to exercising the minority's powers to block company deCISIOns. 
546 [1994] 1 BCLC 609. 
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not have related to the company's affairs, it did affect the minority's interest as a 
member of the company and it should have been considered unfair conduct and 
prejudicial to the minority's interest. 
Section 459 has another dimension which needs to be considered, which is that the 
company's affairs must be current or have been conducted at a certain time. That is, the 
conduct should either be in progress or have occurred in the recent past because, 
otherwise, it will be difficult to challenge. Nevertheless, in Lloyd v Casey547 a past act 
was accepted as the subject of a claim because the court felt that it would be 
unsatisfactory if present shareholders were unable to complain against conduct which 
they considered unfair. However, if the decision made in this case was consistently 
followed, it might cause a lot of instability or uncertainty in companies because past 
conduct could then always be subject to challenges.548 It is believed that past conduct 
should not be subject to a claim, unless it has harmful consequences which remain in 
effect at the time when proceedings are brought. 
Future acts or proposed acts which, if carried out or completed, would be prejudicial to 
the interests of the minority shareholder might also be the subject of a claim. However, 
in Re Astec (BSR) plc549 the minority shareholder was very quick to bring an action at a 
time when the majority had only made statements relating to steps which they might 
have taken in the future, but none of those steps had been taken up until the time of the 
claim and accordingly the claim was rejected. Things were different, however, in both 
Re Kenyon Swansea Ltd550 and Whyte, Petitioner551 where resolutions were passed to 
amend articles which, if carried, would have had unfairly prejudicial consequences for 
minority shareholders. In both cases the courts restrained the majority shareholders 
from carrying the amendments. 552 
547 [2002] 1 BCLC 454. . . . 
548 It is fair to allow the minority shareholder to claim against a past wrong, but It should be hmited to a 
particular time to protect the company's stability and settlement. In Re a. Company (No 001761 of 1986) 
[1987] BCLC 141, Harman J stated that it was no defence to a s459 claIm to say that the conduct about 
which a complaint is made had ceased six months before the petition was presented. 
549 [1998] 2 BCLC 556 at 577-578. 
550 [1987] BCLC 514. 
551 [1984] SLT 330. . .. . 
552 However the minority shareholder had to prove that there was potential for unfaIr prejudIce to occur 
in the futur~. In Hawkes v Cuddy and others [2007J All ER (D) 27 (Aug) the court could not order in 
favour of the minority shareholder when he failed to prove for certain that the unfair prejudice would 
occur. 
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5.1.2.3. The concept of unfair prejudice in s459 
The concept of unfair prejudice in s459 is wider than the concept of oppression in s21 0 
of the old Companies Act 1948. In Re Saul D. Harrison and Sons pic,553 Neill LJ said 
in clarifying "unfair prejudice" that the words are general and flexible in order to meet 
the circumstances of many cases. However, the same judge in the case stressed that the 
conduct being complained of must be both prejudicial and unfair in order to comply 
with the requirements of the provision. Thus, the conduct may be unfair without being 
prejudicial or prejudicial without being unfair554 and it is not sufficient if the conduct 
satisfies only one of these requirements. Therefore, the minority shareholder must 
establish that the conduct which forms the basis of the claim is both prejudicial, in the 
sense of causing harm to the relevant interests, and unfair. 555 For instance, in Rock Ltd v 
RCO pic556 the minority shareholder claimed that shares were sold by the majority 
shareholder at an undervalue. The judge, in the first instance, found that the sale was 
not made at an undervalue and that, in consequence, the minority shareholder had 
suffered no unfair prejudice and therefore the petition was dismissed. The minority 
shareholder appealed, but the Court of Appeal rejected the appeal, holding that, 
although the directors had breached their fiduciary duties, the minority shareholder had 
not suffered prejudice and, even though the conduct was improper and unfair, it was not 
seen as unfairly prejudicial within s459. Although it is important to establish both 
unfairness and prejudice to show unfair prejudice, it is not necessary to show that the 
I · d f' . ·11 1 557 act comp ame 0 IS Improper or 1 ega. 
Parliament chose the unfairness test as the criterion in s459 which the court must use to 
decide whether it has jurisdiction to grant relief after examining whether the action is 
553 [1995] 1 BCLC 14. 
554 Also in Re Marco v Thompson [1994] 2 BCLC 354, the court had to answer the question of whether 
the conduct was prejudicial to the members' interests, and if so, if it was also unfair. The court o~dered 
the majority to purchase the minority shares when it was found that the conduct was both unfarr and 
prejudicial. ..
555 J, Lowry., The pursuit of effective minority shareholder protectIOn: s459 of the Compames Act 1985, 
Company Lawyer. 1996, 17(3), pg: 68. 
556 [2004] EWCA Civ 118. th. . 
557 A H· ks & S Goo Cases and Materials on Company Law. 5 ed. Oxford: Oxford Umverslty Press, 
, IC., , ., 
2004, pg: 409. 
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unfairly prejudicial or not.558 This was set out in Anderson v Hogg,559 when it was held 
that the minority shareholder could succeed if he/she could show that the action 
complained-of in the company satisfied the test of unfairness in s459, notwithstanding 
that the action might be lawful. Moreover, the court in this case refused to apply a 
subjective test and applied the objective test of unfairness. 560 
Furthermore, Lord Hoffmann said in 0 'Neill v Phillips,561 "fairness is a notion which 
can be applied to all kinds of activities; its content will depend upon the context in 
which it is being used". Thus, the context and background of every such case is very 
important. In Bermuda Cablevision Ltd v CoHea Trust Co. Ltd,562 all of the factors 
which were relevant to the claim were taken into account to examine whether or not the 
action was unfairly prejudicial. Some of the issues which the court will take into 
account are, for instance, the minority shareholder's conduct and hislher prior 
knowledge of the matters complained of. However, there is no requirement of good 
faith on the part of the minority shareholder who brings such a claim. 
5.1.2.4 The minority shareholder's interest in the company 
Section 459 aims to protect the interests of members and not merely their rights. While 
s459 does not prohibit actions in relation to public companies and large private ones, it 
is in relation to quasi-partnerships where most actions occur. This is because it is only 
in these circumstances that the shareholders will have the particular rights which s459 
protects, such as legitimate expectations, and trust and confidence in each other. In an 
attempt to clarify the traditional definition of quasi-partnerships, an examination of the 
Partnership Act 1890 shows it to provide that, in such companies, all shareholders have 
the right to participate in management and the duty to maintain good faith between one 
another. Therefore, s459 tends to serve and protect the interests of the minority 
558 M, Hemraj., Maximising shareholder's wealth: legitimate expectation and minority oppression. 
Company Lawyer, 2006, 27(4), pg: 125 & 126. 
559 (Scotland CSess Extra Div 2001) [2002] SC 190. 
560 Also see, Re R.A. Noble & Sons (Clothing) Ltd [1983] BCLC 273. 
561 [1999] 1 WLR 1092. 
562 [1998] AC 198. 
159 
shareholders of a company in a broad sense and to this extent it can be described as a 
very powerful weapon.563 
However, the prejudice mentioned in s459 must be hannful in a commercial sense, not 
1 . t· 1 564 mere y III an emo lOna sense. Nor is a minority shareholder entitled to complain of 
prejudice to any other interest not relating to hislher shareholding.565 In sum, s459 
serves the minority shareholder's interests in two ways: where there is wrongful 
conduct by the directors or majority shareholders and where the majority shareholder's 
conduct is lawful but breaches the minority shareholder's legitimate expectations. 
5.1.2.5 The remedies available under s461 
If the court is satisfied that a claim under s459 is well founded, it is empowered by s461 
to make such an order as it thinks fit in respect of the matters complained of. More 
particularly, under s461 (2), the court may order any of the following. First, it may 
regulate the conduct of the company's affairs in the future, including by altering the 
company's memorandum or articles or by preventing the company from making any 
alteration to the constitution without the court's leave.566 Secondly, it may force the 
company to refrain from carrying out or continuing an act complained of by the 
minority shareholder. For instance, in McGuinness v Bremner plc567 the court ordered 
that an extraordinary general meeting should be held on a specified date. Thirdly, the 
court may authorize civil proceedings to be brought on behalf of the company by such 
person or persons and on such terms as it deems appropriate. This provision III 
particular, Hannigan argues, was intended to allow the minority shareholder to 
commence a derivative action under s459. However, as she also notes, it is unlikely that 
a minority shareholder, who would be in a position to obtain a direct personal remedy 
through s459, would ask the court for pennission to commence a derivative action.568 
563 A, Hicks., & S, Goo., Cases and Materials on Company Law. 5th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004, pg: 409. 
564 See Re Unisoft Group Ltd (No.3) [1994] 1 BCLC 609. 
565 S, Mayson. D, French. & C, Ryan., Company Law. 22nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005-
2006. pg: 644. 
566 For example, in R & H Electric Ltd v Haden Bill Electrical Ltd [1995] 2 BCLC 280, the court ~r?ered 
the company to repay loans made to it by the minority shareholder because he .had a legitimate 
expectation that he would participate in the management as long as the company owed hIm money. 
567 [1988] SCLR 226. 
568 B, Hannigan., Company Law. 1 st ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. pg: 429. 
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There are few reported cases where the minority shareholder has used s459 instead of a 
derivative action in order to seek a remedy for the company itself; examples are Re Saul 
D. Harrison & Sons plc569 and Anderson v Hogg.57o Fourthly, the court may provide for 
purchase of the shares of any member(s) of the company by other members or by the 
company itself. There are other orders that may be made under s461, but they will not 
be covered here. 
The most common order made under s459 is the last mentioned,571 where the majority 
shareholders would be ordered to buy the minority shareholder's shares. McGee572 
points out that, although it is evident that as many as 90% of claims made under s459 
have sought the buyout remedy, it should not be assumed that this was always a matter 
of free choice. This is because the court judges whether a purchase of shares is the best 
option or not. Therefore, the minority shareholder must specify the relief sought, which 
must be appropriate to the conduct complained of, but then it is up to the court to decide 
what is most appropriate at the time of the hearing.573 It is very unusual for the court to 
order the minority shareholder to purchase the majority shares, but this did occur in Re 
Brenjield Squash Racquets Club Ltd.574 
5.1.2.6 The winding-up order 
Basically, the winding-up order is not available as a remedy under s461, but the court 
occasionally believes that the remedies under s461 are not applicable or will not be able 
to achieve justice in a particular case, so it may make a winding-up under s122 (1)(g) of 
the Insolvency Act 1986. For example, in Re Full Cup International Trading Lt~75 the 
court refused to grant relief under s461, and made a winding-up order. The Insolvency 
Act 1986 s 125 (2) requires the court to decide whether it is just and equitable for the 
company to be wound up. If the court believes this to be the case, then it should make a 
569 [1995] 1 B.C.L.C 14. 
570 (Scotland CSess Extra Div 2001) [2002] S.L.T. 353. 
571 s461 (2)(d) of the Companies Act 1985. . . 
572 A M G E't Mechanisms in Private Companies, The Company Flnanczal and Insolvency Law 
, c ee., Xl 
Review. 1999.3 (l), pg: 54 & 56. d . . 
573 S M D F h & C Ryan Company Law. 22D ed. Oxford: Oxford Umverslty Press, 2005-
, ayson. , renc. , ., 
2006. pg: 654. 
574 [1996] 2 BCLC 184. 
575 [1995] B.C.C. 682, Ch.D. 
161 
winding-up order unless there is evidence that the minority shareholder has acted 
inappropriately in seeking such an order. Thus, the granting of a winding-up order is 
entirely at the discretion of the court, which may allow it despite the applicability of one 
or more remedies under s461. This was seen in Re R.A. Noble & Sons (Clothing) Ltd,576 
where the winding-up order was favoured over s459 in the court's judgment (the claim 
sought remedies under both s459 and sI22(1)(g)). The judge held that the conduct of 
majority shareholders had been the "substantial cause" of the lack of mutual confidence 
between the parties and accordingly dismissed the claim for s459 relief and made an 
order for the winding up of the company on the just and equitable ground. 
It has been argued that if no winding-up request is made in the minority shareholder's 
claim, the court has no power under s461 to make a winding-up order, because it is not 
available. 577 This argument came from Practice Direction (Chancery 1190),578 which 
demonstrated that the court was unwilling to enforce the winding-up order because it 
was not available as a remedy under s461, and also because the minority did not ask for 
it. This argument, however, is correct in only one respect: that the winding-up remedy is 
indeed not specified under s461. However, s461 empowers the court to "make such 
order as it thinks fit for giving relief in respect of the matters complained of'. The 
words "as it thinks fit" surely make clear that the court is empowered to grant any 
remedy, even if it is not expressly stated in the section.579 However, the court will never 
grant a winding-up order unless there is just and equitable ground on which to do so. 
For example, in Re Full Cup Ltd580 the court told the minority shareholder to bring a 
winding-up order instead of a claim under s459. Currently, following the restrictions 
and limitations which were advanced by the decision in 0 'Neill v Phillips,581 the courts 
are reluctant to grant a winding-up order if they can find any alternative suitable remedy 
under s459.582 
5.1.2.7 The valuation of shares 
576 [1983] BCLC 273. 
577 B, Pettet., Company Law. 2nd ed. Pearson Education Limited, London, 2005. pg: 248. 
578 [1990] 1 WLR 490. 
579 As already shown in Re R.A. Noble & Son (Clothing) [1983] BCLC 273. 
580 [1995] BCC 682. 
581 [1999] 1 WLR 1092. ... ..' . 
582 This point will be discussed further when the Impact of 0 Nelli v PhIllIps IS exammed. See next sub-
section. 
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Whenever share purchase, the most common remedy, is ordered, problems regarding 
the valuation of the minority shareholder's shares arise. Nourse J acknowledged in Re 
Bird Precision Bellows Ltd583 that where there is a quasi-partnership and there has been 
unfairly prejudicial conduct, the shares should be valued on a pro rata basis and not 
discounted. He stated that the minority shareholder here was being forced to sell and it 
was not fair to put that shareholder in the same position as someone selling freely. The 
Court of Appeal, in this case, held that it was fair for the valuation to be undiscounted , 
and ever since it has been generally regarded as the prima facie norm in unfair prejudice 
cases. More importantly, the Court of Appeal in Re a Company584 stated that even if a 
price was fixed in the articles, which would depreciate the value of the minority 
shareholder's interest, then the terms of the articles would not be used to ascertain the 
price and the court would value the shares on a pro rata (undiscounted) basis. However, 
an exception to this principle can be found when a quasi-partnership between 
shareholders does not exist, and the minority shareholder cannot benefit from the 
principle of selling in full and obtaining the undiscounted value. This was well 
established in Elliott v Planet Organic Ltd,585 where it was held that the company, 
which was owned by nine shareholders, could not be regarded as a quasi-partnership 
and accordingly the shares had to be subject to a discounted valuation. Similarly, in 
Irvine v Irvine,586 the court did not consider the company a quasi-partnership and 
therefore the shareholdings were not valued on a pro rata basis. 
As well as the necessity to establish the existence of a quasi-partnership between 
shareholders to apply the principle of selling at the full and undiscounted value, the 
minority shareholder must be being forced to leave the company and should not be 
leaving because he/she has chosen to do so. This was seen in Phoenix Office Supplies 
Ltd v Larvin,587 where, because the Court of Appeal recognized that the minority 
shareholder was leaving his position of his own will, he was not entitled to have his 
shares bought out at their full undiscounted value. This decision was heavily criticised 
583 [1984] 3 ALL ER 444. 
584 [1987] BCLC 94. 
585 [2000] 1 BCLC 366. 
586 [2006] EWHC 583 (Ch); [2007] 1 BCLC 445. 
587 [2002] EWCA Civ 1740. 
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by Taylor,588 who argued that it was based on a relatively narrow VIew of what 
constituted the shareholder's interest. This criticism is reasonable because it is 
understood that once a quasi-partnership exists between shareholders and conduct 
which amounts to unfair prejudice takes place, the principle of buyout with full and 
undiscounted value should be applied irrespective of whether the minority shareholder 
is forced to leave or does so willingly. On the other hand, some have agreed with the 
decision in this case, arguing that, even if the articles of association specify the right to 
full and undiscounted value, the right should not be absolute, because guaranteeing the 
minority shareholder the full value of hislher shareholding might be totally ruinous for 
the company.589 Thus, it may be considered better for the company, and indeed for the 
minority shareholder, if the principle of it being up to the court's discretion to determine 
whether the minority shareholder is entitled to the full and undiscounted value, and if 
so, whether the company can afford it. 
According to Projinance Trust SA v Gladstone,590 the date of the valuation is usually 
the date of the claim, but it is a matter of the court's discretion to decide on any 
alternative valuation date. In fact, it was stated in Re OC (Transport) Services Ltcf91 
that the court may order a valuation of shares on the date on which the unreasonable 
conduct started. Nevertheless, there is no clear standard or guidance to follow when 
setting the valuation date or when dealing with other aspects of valuing the shares, such 
as the extent of the company's obligation to pay the undiscounted value and the 
assessment of quasi-partnership. Many of these matters are subject to the court's 
discretion in each case. Furthermore, it is not clear what valuing the shares at a full and 
undiscounted rate really means; it is only assumed that the full and undiscounted value 
should cover all the preferences and privileges attached to each share.592 
5.1.2.8 The impact of O'Neill v Phillips593 on s459 
588 B, Taylor., The Rights of Outgoing Investors and Directors in Private ~ompani~s, Cor~pany Lawyer. 
2003,24(7), pg: 221. In this case, the minority shareholder expressed a deSIre to eXIt. If thIS had not been 
the case, then the minority shareholder would have been entitled to undiscounte~ value. 
589 Anon, Not Every Quasi-Partnership Relation Entitles the Shareholder to ClaIm under s459, CA 1985, 
Finance and Credit Law. 2003, 1 Jan, pg: 4&5. 
590 [2002] 1 BCLC 141 CA. 
591 [1984] BCLC 251. . 
592 This could include the shares, remuneration, dividends and any other good that could be valued In 
monetary terms and could be associated with the shareholders' shares. 
593 [1999] 1 WLR 1092. 
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a. Introduction 
It is true to say that the inclusion of sections 459-461 in the Companies Act 1985 
granted minority shareholders broad opportunities to litigate and obtain relief. 
Nevertheless, the section failed to identify and define clearly the circumstances in 
which proceedings could be brought. For example, the range of conduct covered by the 
notion of unfair prejudice in s459 was not satisfactorily clear. As a result, minority 
shareholders found many opportunities to use the section improperly by bringing 
unnecessary and unjustified actions, until the case of 0 'Neill v Phillips came to define 
and clarify the ambit of the section. It is believed that the statements in 0 'Neill v 
Phillips as to the use of s459 reduced the number of minority shareholder actions and 
provided guidance for the courts to follow. 
b. Background to 0 'Neill v Phillips 
In 0 'Neill v Phillips, the whole company was originally owned by the majority 
shareholder, Phillips, who first employed the minority shareholder, O'Neill, as a 
manual worker in 1983. Phillips was impressed by O'Neill's ability and promoted him 
gradually. Phillips also conferred on O'Neill 25% of the shares and appointed him as a 
director in 1985. Later in the same year, Phillips informally promised O'Neill 50% of 
the company's profits and an increase in his shareholding and voting rights to 500/0 
when certain targets were reached. However, this promise did not come to fruition. In 
1991, after a downturn in the company's financial position, Phillips told O'Neill that he 
was no longer to be managing director and he would no longer receive 50% of the 
profits. Subsequently, when Phillips also failed to comply with his promise in terms of 
increasing O'Neill's shareholding, the latter claimed that he had behaved unfairly and 
prejudicially. O'Neill sought an order594 under s459 that his shares should be purchased 
at a fair value fixed by the court or, alternatively, an order that the company be wound 
up. 
594 The minority shareholder (O'Neill), in seeking both remedies, was relyi~g on to ~e ~aul D Harrison & 
Sons pic [l995] 1 BCLC 14, at 19-20, which sought both the just and eqUltable wmdmg-up remedy and 
the unfair prejudice remedy. 
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The court, in the first instance, dismissed the claim, holding that the maJonty 
shareholder had not committed himself permanently and unconditionally to equal 
profit-sharing or to granting more shares and that the minority shareholder had 
accordingly not suffered in his capacity as a shareholder. However, the Court of Appeal 
allowed the appeal and ordered the majority shareholder to purchase the minority 
shares, holding that the minority shareholder had a legitimate expectation that he would 
receive more shares and 50% of the profits when the targets were reached, and that the 
fact that this did not happen meant that O'Neill had suffered unfair prejudice as a 
shareholder. Subsequently, the majority shareholder appealed against the decision of the 
Court of Appeal to the House of Lords, which allowed the appeal, thereby agreeing 
with the court at first instance. In reaching this decision, the House of Lords had to 
consider a number of issues which subsequently led to a redefining and reinterpreting of 
the principles underpinning s459, such as the type of conduct which amounts to unfair 
prejudice and clarification of the concept of legitimate expectation. 
c. Unfair prejudice and legitimate expectation in 0 'Neill v Phillips 
In examining the conduct in the case to see whether it was unfairly prejudicial, Lord 
Hoffinann used the term 'good faith' to cover the terms 'just', 'equitable' and 
'unfairness' which had been used in previous cases involving the provision.595 He 
introduced 'good faith' by stating that "unfairness may consist in a breach of the rules 
or in using the rules in a manner which equity would regard as contrary to good 
faith".596 He explained that there were two circumstances which should be considered 
contrary to good faith. The first would be when there was a breach of the terms by 
which the minority and majority shareholders agreed that the affairs of the company 
should be conducted. The second was when there was a breach by the majority of 
equitable considerations (legitimate expectations) which exist between shareholders. 
Thus, according to Lord Hoffinann, if one of these two circumstances existed, the 
majority would be regarded as acting contrary to good faith, which would thereby 
justify a case under s459. This was the approach applied in 0 'Neill v Phillips and it was 
595 In examining these principles and doctrines (unjust and inequitable or unfair) Lord Hoffmann ~ad to 
consider old cases like Bisset v Daniel (1853) 10 Hare 493, to distinguish between the legal and eqUitable 
a~proaches to the use of power. 
5 0 'Neill v Phillips [1999] 1 WLR 1092, pg: 1099 & 11 00. 
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held that nothing contrary to good faith had occurred and that there had accordingly 
been no unfair prejudice. 
B I 597 h ·1 . .. d 
oye eaVl y cntlclse Lord Hoffinann's application of the tenn 'good faith', 
arguing that minority shareholders should not need to prove bad faith when dealing with 
the company's interest. 598 Boyle added that it was clear that a breach of fiduciary duties, 
even if it did not involve bad faith, may justify relief under section 459 in certain 
circumstances. Thus, the intention of the conduct was not a factor that should need to be 
established; what mattered most was the consequence of that conduct and whether it 
was unfairly prejudicial towards the member's interests. 
The concept of legitimate expectation599 was also affected by 0 'Neill v Phillips. In this 
case Lord Hoffinann redefined the tenn 'legitimate expectation,6oo by limiting it to 
circumstances where there was understanding among shareholders, at the time of setting 
up the company, that they would participate in its management. In such a case it would 
usually have been considered unjust, inequitable or unfair for a majority to use its 
voting power to exclude a member from participation in the management without 
giving himlher the opportunity to remove hislher capital upon reasonable terms. Thus, 
if a breakdown in relations caused the majority shareholder to remove a minority 
shareholder from participation in management, where the minority shareholder had a 
legitimate expectation of such participation as an essential reason for investing in the 
company, this would have been regarded as unfair. 
In 0 'Neill v Phillips Lord Hoffinann found no basis to hold that the majority 
shareholder was behaving unfairly in withdrawing from the negotiations with the 
minority and not allowing him to have more shares, because the latter had no legitimate 
597 A, Boyle., "Unfair Prejudice" in the House of Lords. Company Lawyer. 2000. 21 (8), pg: 253. 
598 A, Boyle. J, Birds. & Others., Boyle & Birds' Company Law. 6th ed. Jordans, Bristol, 2007. pg: 697. It 
is thought that using the teon 'good faith' to cover justice, equity and fairness is unfortunate. See 
Westboume [1973J AC 390, at 379, where the House of Lords specifically rejected the test of 'bad faith' 
as the basis for just and equitable winding up.. """ . . 
599 Originally, the recognition of legitimate expectatIOn came from the w?rd Interests In s4~9, which 
was wider than "rights", as "rights" emanate merely from the company s agreements or articles. B~t 
shareholders may have different interests even if their rights as members. ~re the same. ~rd Ho~ann In 
Re Saul D Harrison & Sons Pic [1995J 1 BCLC 14 said that legitimate expectation anses from 
fundamental understanding, but is not put into contractual fonn. . . . ,. . 
600 Lord Hoffmann noted that he himself had used the phrase 'legitimate expectations In thiS case and 
even in Re Saul D Harrison & Sons pic [1995J 1 BCLC 14, but he conceded that this use was probably a 
mistake. 
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expectation of that at the time he initially invested in the company. Similarly, Lord 
Hoffmann found that there was no legitimate expectation as to the sharing of profits 
because, as he explained, no promise to share the profits equally was made at the time 
of investing in the company and it was therefore not inequitable or unfair for the 
majority to refuse to carry on doing so. Thus, Lord Hoffmann stressed the view that, as 
no conclusive agreement was reached in the case, there could accordingly be no 
reasonable legitimate expectation sufficient to be taken into consideration. Indeed, Lord 
Hoffmann reformed and redefined the grounds which constitute legitimate expectation. 
It is no longer possible to rely on a general notion ofunfaimess or to found a petition on 
reasonable expectations unless there has been some breach of a recognized agreement 
or of an equitable principle. 
Lord Hoffmann's statement in relation to the concept of legitimate expectation (if there 
was no conclusive agreement between shareholders, then there could be no reasonable 
legitimate expectation) has faced criticism. Clark has pointed out that this limitation of 
the concept of legitimate expectation restricts its interpretation and causes different 
outcomes from those on which previous cases were based.601 Similarly, Hirt has 
criticised the restriction of legitimate expectation in this case by saying that applying 
this restriction would deny recognition to all sorts of informal agreements or 
understandings.602 On the other hand, Hemraj is in favour of applying the legitimate 
expectation in this way because he believes that it may prevent minority shareholders 
from pressing too far for their rights in seeking to say that every expectation they have 
. I .. . 603 
IS a egltlmate expectatIOn. 
In sum, the case of 0 'Neill v Phillips has indeed contributed to the field by designing 
new guidance and direction to replace the ease and simplicity of pursing an unfairly 
prejudicial case, especially in cases like this where the minority shareholder had been 
removed from management as a director. 604 Although the court should have allowed 
601 B, Clark., Unfairly Prejudicial Conduct: A Pathway through the Maze. Company Lawyer. 2001. (22).6, 
pg: 173. . . T R dUd 
602 H, Hirt., In What Circumstance Should Breaches of Directors' Duties Give Rise 0 a erne y n er 
SS.459-461 of the company Act 1985? Company Lawyer. 2003. 24 (4), pg:.101 & 102... . 
603 M, Hemraj., Maximising shareholder's wealth: legitimate expectation and mmonty oppression. 
Company Lawyer, 2006, 27(4), pg: 126. , 
604 B, Clark., Unfairly Prejudicial Conduct: A Pathway through the Maze. Company LaW) er. 2001. (22).6, 
pg: 175. 
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him to exit at a fair value on the basis of a relationship breakdown and loss of mutual 
trust and confidence 605 the court dell·berately· t d d d 1· . . 
, m en e to elver a message to mmonty 
shareholders that unfair prejudice provisions are not a cure-all remedy for shareholders 
who are not satisfied with the way in which the company is run.606 Consequently, the 
only option left to the minority shareholder in 0 'Neill was to accept the purchase of his 
shares, but not at an undiscounted fair value. 
d. Changes delivered by 0 'Neill v Phillips 
Certain researchers see this case as having contributed to a clearer interpretation and 
illustration,607 while others believe that it has failed to deliver any new criteria or 
guidance and that accordingly it neither extends nor restricts the range of circumstances 
which may amount to unfair prejudice.608 However, this latter opinion in particular is 
extreme, as the case has indeed redefined and restated certain concepts and principles, 
such as legitimate expectation and breakdown of confidence and trust. It may be true to 
say that before 0 'Neill v Phillips, a few facts were enough to constitute an unfairly 
prejudicial case,609 but after this case some criteria, such as a mere breakdown in 
relationships, cannot alone constitute grounds for action. Admittedly, 0 'Neill v Phillips 
has restricted this area of law.610 The following points, among others, can be seen as 
resulting from the decision in this important case. 
First, Lord Hoffmann stated in the case that "legitimate expectation should not be 
allowed to lead a life of its own".611 Notably, this is a rejection of the concept of 
legitimate expectation as a stand-alone basis for an application under section 459612 and 
certainly does not confer recognition on an informal arrangement or understanding. If 
605 Because the majority shareholder did not fulfill his promise. 
606 D, Keenan. & J, Bisacre., Smith and Kennan's Company Law. 13th ed. Longman, Essex, 2005. pg: 299. 
607 A, Boyle., "Unfair Prejudice" in the House of Lords. Company Lawyer. 2000. 21 (8), pg:. 254. 
608 A, Boyle. J, Birds. & Others., Boyle & Birds' Company Law. 6th ed. Jordans, Bristol, ~~07. pg: 698. 
609 Certain cases in the past showed that these bases could be used as grounds for obtammg rehef under 
s459 such as Re Full Cup Ltd [1995] BCC 682, where the court told the minority shareholder to bring a 
winding-up order instead of s459. However, in 0 'Neill it was held that legitimate expectation should not 
be allowed to lead a life of its own. th 
610 It was argued in (D, Keenan. & J, Bisacre., Smith and Keenan's C?,!,pany Law. 13 ed. Longman, 
Essex, 2005. pg: 571) that the decision in 0 'Neill restricts the ~blll~ of shareholders of. ~ma~ler 
companies to take action under s459 and therefore will discourage mmonty shareholders from httgatmg 
and might lead to unfairness. 
611 O'Neill v Phillips [1999] 1 WLR 1092, pg: 1102. 
612 D, Keenan. & J, Bisacre., Smith and Kennan's Company Law. 13 th ed. Longman, Essex, 2005. pg: 571. 
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this view is applied strictly, the minority shareholder may no longer point to some sort 
of informal arrangement. 
Secondly, since 0 'Neill v Phillips, it is now very clear that the dismissal of a minority 
shareholder from management is capable of constituting an unfairly prejudicial case, if 
the minority shareholder's legitimate expectation of being able to participate in 
management was an essential reason for investing in the company.613 Nonetheless, 
o 'Neill v Phillips expressly establishes that a mere breakdown in relations between 
shareholders, even if it makes it impossible for them to work together, is not in itself 
unfairly prejudicial conduct. Moreover, such an incident would not in itself be a reason 
for the type of loss of confidence and trust which allowed relief to be sought under 
s459. 
Finally, there was always substantial overlap between the remedies of section s459 and 
the winding-up remedy under s122 (l)(g) of the Insolvency Act 1986. Even 0 'Neill v 
Phillips did not draw a line between the two remedies to eliminate this overlap. 
Although s459 turned out not to be applicable in 0 'Neill v Phillips, there was no 
consideration of whether s122 was applicable. However, Clark614 argues that the mere 
fact that there had been a breakdown of trust and confidence between shareholders in a 
quasi-partnership company would have given rise to a winding-up order under s122 on 
the basis that it would not be fair for a disaffected member to be locked into a company 
where trust and confidence did not exist anymore. It is proposed that the winding-up 
order should be added as a remedy under s461,615 so the court can have the power to 
apply it where it thinks fits. 
613 However, this will not be taken into account if the dismissal was caused by the min~rit~ shareholder's 
own misconduct as shown in Woolwich v Milne [2003] EWHC 414 (Ch), where the mmonty shareholder 
had been remo~ed from the board as a result of his aggressive and bullying conduct, and the court 
approved that. '. 
6f4 B, Clark., Just and equitable winding up: wound up?, Scots Law Tzmes. 2001, 12, pg. 110. 
615 B, Clark., Unfairly Prejudicial Conduct: A Pathway through the Maze. Company Lawyer. 2001, (22)6, 
pg: 174. 
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5.2 Proposals to reform minority shareholder protection (Law 
Commission and Company Law Review Group) 
Introduction 
Following the realisation that there were certain drawbacks and failings in the 
functioning of minority shareholder protection under common law and in the statute , 
there have been many attempts to diagnose and identify the causes. It is important to 
emphasise that there was no tangible and detailed study that reflected how minority 
shareholder protection worked in practice until 1996, when the Law Commission 
produced an analysis of the problems and offered some possible solutions. This was 
followed by an extensive nationwide consultation which led to the so-called 
Shareholder Remedies report in 1997. A very important role was played in these 
analyses in 2000 and 2001 by the Company Law Review Group, which concentrated on 
addressing the problems from a practical point of view. 
Therefore, the problems of minority shareholder protection in UK law were not fully 
acknowledged until these and other studies were undertaken. Similarly, the problems of 
minority shareholder protection in Saudi Arabia and Dubai will not be acknowledged 
until substantial research is conducted into how this area of law functions in practice 
and what can be done to improve it. This section of the chapter will thus be very 
beneficial for both Saudi Arabia and Dubai, showing how researchers and practitioners 
of UK law diagnosed the problems and then offered recommendations for refonn. 
5.2.1 Proposals regarding common law 
5.2.1.1 Recommendations to refonn personal action 
The Law Commission intended in its study to cover all aspects of minority shareholder 
protection and therefore started with personal actions under common law. Its 
proposals616 did not give extensive consideration to personal actions outside of the 
unfair prejudice ground as they are not the main concern in minority litigation. 
616 Law Commission Report 1997, paras 7.2-7.10 & 7.12. 
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However, the Law Commission considered, but rejected, the inclusion of a non-
exhaustive list of personal rights to be enforceable under any new Act. The reason for 
this rejection617 was the inability to deliver a comprehensive list of enforceable personal 
rights. Further, it was argued that there was no evidence that the absence of a list of 
enforceable personal rights would cause difficulties in practice.618 
Later, the Company Law Review (CLR)619 revisited the issue of producing a list of 
personal rights by opening up the debate on whether a non-exhaustive list of personal 
rights might be included in any new legislation.62o The Review referred to the personal 
rights which were identified by case law in order to compile such a list. However, this 
step was rejected by the legal professions, who argued that there were no practical 
problems in respect of personal rights and that these rights were already available to 
individual shareholders depending on particular constitutional arrangements.621 The 
CLR noted in its Final Report622 in respect of this matter that the majority of its 
members favoured the listing of personal rights in any forthcoming statute and thus it 
was included in its recommendations. However, Hannigan argued that if these 
recommendations were put into practice, shareholders would be likely to exclude the 
enforcement of personal rights from the constitution (article of association) and, as a 
result, other shareholders in the future might find it even more difficult to enforce their 
rights.623 The CLR did not deny this possible disadvantage, but nonetheless concluded 
that the advantages of its proposals, in terms of the clarity they offered, outweighed 
·t 624 1 . 
It is very hard to understand why the CLR showed such concern over personal rights, 
given that they appeared to be functioning without difficulty and no problems were 
evident. The mere fact that case law reveals that very few cases have been brought on 
personal grounds throughout the history of company law does not necessarily mean that 
there is a problem in the protection of personal rights that requires reform. A further 
617 See Law Commission Report, para 7.10. 
618 B, Hannigan., Company Law. 1st ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. pg: 456. See Law 
Commission Report, paras 7.2 - 7.10 -7.12. 
619 Company Law Review. Developing the Framework, 2000. 
620 Company Law Review, Developing the Framework, 2000, paras 4.72-4.99. 
621 See Company Law Review, Completing the Strocture, 2000, para 5.72. 
622 Company Law Review. Final Report. vol. 1,2001, para 7.34. 
623 B, Hannigan., Company Law. 1 st ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. pg: 456. 
624 Company Law Review. Final Report. vol. 1,2001, para 7.36. 
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argument that must not be neglected is that idea of changing the law where there is 
stability, settlement and certainty may itself create many problems, rather than offering 
improvement. It is also regrettable that the Law Commission and the CLR gave little 
priority to defining the grounds and principles of personal rights so that they would be 
easy for minority shareholders to identify and, accordingly, to exercise. 625 
5.2.1.2 Recommendations to reform derivative actions 
5.2.1.2.1 Law Commission 
The Law Commission concluded in its report, Shareholder Remedies,626 that the 
exceptions to the rule in Foss v Harbottle627 were uncertain and that the procedures to 
follow were very complicated and could amount to a mini-tria1.628 In reaching this 
conclusion, the Law Commission examined reported cases over a period of 150 years. 
The Commission believed that most of the problems in derivative actions emanated 
from the requirement that wrongs had to amount to fraud on the minority and that a 
majority shareholder was able to ratify the action. Both factors placed heavy restrictions 
on derivative actions, meaning that they did not function effectively. Thus, the Report 
recommended replacing the narrow concept of fraud629 with a more open principle 
which would make a wider range of conduct subject to litigation. Therefore, the Law 
Commission proposed that common law should be replaced with a statutory derivative 
procedure equipped with more modem, flexible and accessible criteria for determining 
whether a shareholder could pursue an action.63o Besides fraud, this proposed statutory 
derivative procedure would include negligence, default, breach of duty and breach of 
truSt.631 
The Law Commissioner, Diana Faber, said that the aim of the proposed changes to the 
concept of fraud was to provide speedy, fair and cost-effective mechanisms for 
625 It is still difficult for certain legal practitioners to distinguish the grounds related to derivative actions 
from those related to personal rights. See: Latchford Premier Cinema Ltd v Ennion [1931] 2 Ch 409 and 
Oliver v Dalgleish [1963] 1 WLR 1274. 
626 Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies. (1997, Cm 3769). 
627 [1843] 2 Hara 461. 
628 Law Commission Report, para 6.4. 
629 Law Commission Report, paras 6.51-6.55. 
630 Law Commission. Shareholder Remedies. 1997. para 6.15. 
631 Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies. 1997. paras 6.23 - 6.49. 
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resolving various types of dispute between minority shareholders and those running the 
632 
company. In other words, the Law Commission's main concern was to achieve a 
balance between the ability of the majority shareholder to run the company effectively 
on a day-to-day basis and the need to protect minority shareholders.633 More 
importantly, the Commission made clear that the courts should prioritise the company's 
interests, even if this went against the wishes of the directors/majority shareholder, who 
may not want to pursue the action. To this end, the Commission proposed that 
. . 634 fr h . . permIsSIOn om t e court should be reqUIred In order to continue a derivative action. 
In deciding whether to grant permission, the court should take into account all the 
relevant circumstances, including the good faith of the minority shareholder635 and the 
company's interests.636 The Commission stated that the wording should make plain that 
the discretion was wide and that the factors set out were only examples of the 
circumstances to which the courts should show regard.637 In other words, the Law 
Commission recommended that the court should be given full discretion to consider 
other factors which were not listed. 
This strategy of granting permission came from the Law Commission's recognition that 
there is a conflict of interest when the majority shareholder makes a decision over 
whether or not to litigate. However, it is also the right of the majority shareholder to 
have freedom from unnecessary shareholder interference. Therefore, the question arises: 
who should be the judge of this?638 It appears that the Law Commission's proposal has 
answered this important question by withdrawing the power over litigation from the 
majority and granting it to the court, which has full discretion to examine each case 
before permitting the derivative action to proceed.639 Thus, the court will permit the 
action to go ahead according to certain criteria and, most importantly, the company's 
interests. 
632 Summary of the Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 142. ... 
633 P, Roberts. & J, Poole., Shareholder remedies - corporate wrongs and the denvatIve actIon, Journal of 
Business Law. 1999, March, pg: 101. . . . 
634 Law Commission Report, paras 6.66-6.69; see also Law CommISSIon ConsultatIOn Paper, para 16.18. 
635 Law Commission Report, paras 6.75-6.76. . . 
636 The Law Commission (1997, para: 6.73) proposes a list of factors whIch the court should take mto 
account when ruling. It is important for the court to have flexibility in examining these factors, then reject 
the claim if it is not satisfied that it is in the company's interest. 
637 Law Commission Consultation Paper, para 16.44. .. . 
638 P, Roberts. & J, Poole., Shareholder remedies - corporate wrongs and the denvatIve actIOn, Journal of 
Business Law. 1999, March, pg: 101. 
639 T, Boyle., The new derivative action, Company Lawyer. 1997, 18(8), pg: 254. 
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Nevertheless, the proposal has been criticised as allowing the court too much 
involvement in companies' internal management.640 It seems unfair to some that the 
court is required to become more involved in the company's commercial decision-
making, while it is not appropriate for the management to assess whether the litigation 
. c. . t th ' . 641 IS lor or agatns e company s mterests. This proposed role for the court thus creates 
a dilemma for judges when considering whether the action should be allowed because 
the minority shareholder may have a potential claim, but where the litigation is not in 
the company's interest. 642 However, the court may in such cases prioritise the 
company's interest as being more important than the minority shareholder's protection. 
Therefore, it is contended that the court is the best entity to judge between shareholders 
in order to achieve what is best in the company's interest. 
The Law Commission also proposed that the court should reqUIre a minority 
shareholder who intends to bring a derivative action to notify it of such an intention, 
specifying the cause of action and stating that, if the company does not take proceedings 
in respect of the cause of an action within 28 days,643 a derivative action will be 
commenced.644 This proposal was very constructive and practical because it has given 
the majority shareholder the opportunity to avoid litigation by correcting the misconduct 
complained of. 645 
Pettet646 warned of some problems which might occur if the Law Commission's 
proposals for producing statutory derivative action replaced common law. He believed 
that it would be difficult for the court to remain detached from developing or applying 
principles which had already been developed in common law. The situations with which 
the court would be faced, he argued, were not likely to be any different under the new 
640 P, Roberts. & J, Poole., Shareholder remedies - corporate wrongs and the derivative action, Journal of 
Business Law. 1999, March, pg: 101 to 103. ., 
641 R, Rirt., The Company's Decision to Litigate Against its Directors: Legal Strategies to Deal With the 
Board of Directors' Conflict of Interest Journal o/Business Law, 2005, March, pg: 167. 
642 R, Rirt., The Company's Decision ~o Litigate Against its Directors: Legal Strategies to Deal with the 
Board of Directors' Conflict oflnterest, Journal o/Business Law, 2005, March, pg: 161 & 162. 
643 Law Commission Consultation Paper, paras 16.15-16.17. ..' . . 
644 Unexpectedly, this requirement has not been stated in the statutory denvattve aC~IOn In the Compames 
Act 2006 although it is very important for preventing any misuse or abuse of the ~ctt~n. . 
645 P, Roberts. & J, Poole., Shareholder remedies - corporate wrongs and the denvatlve actIOn, Journal of 
Business Law. 1999, March, pg: 104. 
646 B, Pettet., Company Law. 2nd ed. Pearson Education Limited, London, 2005. pg: 229. 
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statute from those which had fonned the substance of shareholder litigation for the 
century and a half since Foss v. Harbottle647 was decided. However, it does not seem 
right to argue that the situation would be unlikely to change from the traditional position 
because, once the new statute has created new grounds, procedures, mechanisms and 
requirements to establish a derivative action, cases and situations would certainly be 
different from those under the common law. 648 
5.2.1.2.2 Company Law Review 
The Company Law Review broadly supported the approaches proposed by the Law 
Commission,649 but it set in motion further work and consultation in several areas. The 
first consultation proposed by the CLR was to consider further the issue of effective 
ratification, which was not covered by the Law Commission. This followed the 
realisation by the CLR that a derivative claim could never be brought in respect of an 
act which could be ratified or was even ratifiable by the majority shareholder's votes.650 
The CLR acknowledged that even if refonn was made to facilitate the use of wider 
grounds accommodating more wrongs, majority shareholders could still prevent a 
minority shareholder from pursuing litigation if the power remained in their hands to 
ratify any wrong or misconduct. Therefore, if actual refonn were to take place, the 
application of ratification and ratifiability under common law should be considered 
first. 651 
Therefore, the CLR proposed652 that the question of the validity of ratification or 
ratifiability by the majority shareholders precluding the pursuit of a wrong should 
depend on whether the necessary majority had been reached without the need to rely 
647 [1843] 2 Hara 461. 
648 However lawmakers usually try to cover all the important issues in the statute in order to achieve a 
balance reg~rding the extent to which the court is free to develop some areas of the law. This is 
exemplified by the statutory derivative action ssI70-177 of the Companies Act 2006, which states that the 
directors must pay regard (among other matters) to six factors, leaving the court to decide or develop 
what else should be considered. 
649 See Company Law Review, Developing the Framework (2000), paras 4.112-4.139, especially para 
4.115. 
650 H, Hirt., Ratification of breaches of directors' duties: the implications of the reform proposal regarding 
the availability of derivative actions, Company Lawyer. 2004, 25(7), pg: 200. 
651 The ratification position under common law was stated in Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd v ~~man 
Industries Ltd (No.2) [1981] Ch 257 at: 307; that there was no limit to the power of the maJonty to 
authorise or ratify an act or transaction. 
652 Company Law Review, Final Report (2001), para 7.46; Completing the Structure (2000), para 5.85; 
Developing the Framework (2000), para 4.126. 
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upon the votes of wrongdoers, of those who were substantially under their influence, or 
of those who had a personal interest in condoning the wrong. However, this particular 
proposal was criticised since it was thought that shifting away from a consideration of 
the nature of the wrongdoing itself to an analysis of those who voted to ratify the wrong 
and those who actually committed it, would not be helpful in clarifying the law on 
ratification.653 Moreover, giving more importance to the wrongdoers than to the wrong 
itself might not serve the interests of the company, as it would be very difficult to 
identify the wrongdoers or to differentiate them from those involved in influencing, or 
who had been influenced by, the majority. For example, the test of influence would be 
particularly difficult to apply in the context of family-structured companies.654 
In its second recommendation, the CLR agreed with the Law Commission that there 
should be a statutory derivative action 655 to include actions based on fraud, negligence, 
default, breach of duty and breach of trust. Indeed, the CLR went further, 
recommending the extension of the derivative action to all breaches of directors' duty of 
care and skill, thus going beyond the category of self-serving negligence that could be 
proceeded against under common law. The CLR concluded that these changes in the 
law relating to the duties of care and skill should have their counterpart in policing 
procedures. 656 
5.2.2 Proposals towards the statutory protection under s459 
It is true to say that when s459 arrived, there was excessive use of this action due to the 
generality of the wording of the 1985 Act, which invited minority shareholders to raise 
any issue even if it was not relevant in support of an action. Despite the overuse of the 
section by minority shareholders, however, they were actually not confident as to 
whether they had the right to litigate under the section or not, because the outcome was 
always uncertain. This absence of clarity in defining certain principles, doctrines, 
653 B, Hannigan., Company Law. 15t ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. pg 4?4. 
654 D, Prentice. & J, Payne., The corporate opportunity doctrine, Law Qu~rterly Review. 2004, 120 (Apr), 
pg: 201. The application of such a test (differentiating the wrongdoers o~ mfluencers from th~se who have 
been influenced) was seen in Salomon v Salomon (1897) A.c. 22, WhICh concerned a famIly-structured 
company, and it turned out to be unworkable. . 
655 Modem Company Law for a Competitive Economy Fmal Report (London: DTI, 2001) paras. 6.19 -
6.40. 4 27 
656 Company Law Review, Developing the Framework (2000), paras .1 . 
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grounds and issues was not foreseen in the early days of s459 H ft h 
. owever, a er more t an 
twenty years of litigation under the section, there was a clear and critical need for 
reform in order to improve and develop this area of law so that lawyers would be able to 
advise their clients as to whether or not a claim was likely to succeed. Therefore, 
proposals were put forward by the Law Commission and the CLR to reform s459. 
5.2.2.1 The Law Commission 
The Law Commission aimed to provide authoritative guidance on the meaning of unfair 
prejudice, because the concept was not easily understandable and was not associated 
with a certain outcome.657 The Commission came to realise, however, that the benefit of 
the general, flexible nature of the concept of unfair prejudice outweighed the 
uncertainty that might be inherent in the existing meaning. Nonetheless, Ferran argued 
that such uncertainty made it even more difficult for persons who were not specialists in 
company law to identify clearly the types of conduct which should be alleged if they 
were to demonstrate a good case for relief under s459.658 Furthermore, this applied even 
to specialists such as lawyers and judges, who might also have found it difficult to 
identify conduct which counted as unfair and prejudicial, because there were no clearly 
identifiable grounds for unfair prejudice. 
The majority of the work of the Law Commission659 emphasised the excessive length 
and costs of many proceedings and the amount of litigation brought under s459. The 
Commission proposed that these problems should be dealt with primarily by active case 
management in the context of the new Woolf rules of court procedure.66o Nonetheless, 
there was a potential risk in giving full case management powers to courts, as it might 
lead to uncertainty due to an increased reliance on the exercise of judicial discretion.661 
Another recommendation to reduce the length and cost of proceedings under s459 was 
to limit the period for the minority shareholder to litigate. The Law Commission 
657 Law Commission Report, Shareholder Remedies. 1997. . . 
658 E, Ferran., Shareholder Remedies: The Law Commission Report. The Company Fmanclal and 
Insolvency Law Review. 1998.2 (2), pg: 237-240. 
659 Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies. (1997, Cm 3769) Law Com No 246. . 
660 These are the Civil Procedure Rules 1998. According to these Rules (paras 1.1 and 1.4), actl~e 
management by the court will encourage the parties to co-operate with each other to ensure that the tnal 
proceeds quickly and efficiently. . . . , . 
661 D S Reconceptualising company law: reflectIOns on the law CommIssIon s ConsultatIOn 
, ugarman., 76 
Paper on shareholder remedies: Part 2. Company Lawyer, 1997, 18(9), pg: 2 . 
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believed that such a limitation would result in greater certa' t C b' 662 In m y lor usmess. 
response to this proposal, it was argued that the minority shareholder must be given a 
reasonable opportunity to discover and consider the relevant circumstances and that it 
, 
is often difficult to ascertal'n a art' I . . P lCU ar moment m hme when the cause of action 
d 663 occurre . 
In a further attempt to reduce the length and cost of proceedings, the Law Commission 
recommended that the court should be given the power to dismiss any claim, part of a 
claim or defence which, in its opinion, had no realistic prospect of success at full 
trial. 664 Such a rule would have had a noticeable impact on section 459 proceedings, by 
eliminating weak or unimportant allegations, thereby reducing the duration and cost of 
I · 665 H h' Calms. owever, t IS was not an easy task, as one of the problems of s459 was the 
generality of its wording,666 leaving judges, let alone shareholders, unsure of what was 
included under unfair prejudice and what was not. 667 The Law Commission did not 
address the court's jurisdiction under s459 to grant the minority shareholder an 
indemnity order. 668 The deficiency of such an order would allow the problem of 
excessive costs to remain unsolved. 
The Law Commission also sought to address the overlap between the remedies under 
s461 and the Insolvency Act 1986, s122 (l)(g). Undeniably, case law showed that it was 
common for applications for s459 relief to include winding up as an alternative remedy 
for the same claim. Therefore, the Commission proposed in this regard that the winding-
up order should be added to the list of remedies available to the minority shareholder 
under s461 of the Companies Act 1985.669 However, this proposal of the Law 
Commission to include the creation of a winding-up order in s461 was criticised 
662 For a member to be able to claim on the basis of a single act of the company, whether past or future, 
would be prejudicial. See Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies. 1996, Consultation Paper, paras: 
20.9-20.14. 
663 P, Roberts. & J, Poole., Shareholder remedies - corporate wrongs and the derivative action, Journal of 
Business Law. 1999, March, pg: 55. 
664 Law Commission Shareholder Remedies. (1997) para. 2.18. 
665 P, Roberts. & J, Poole., Shareholder remedies - corporate wrongs and the derivative action, Journal of 
Business Law. 1999, March, pg: 46. 
666 Consultation Paper, 1996, para. 14.5. Also see paras: 4.19 and 4.23 of the rep~sts.. . 
667 P, Roberts. & J, Poole., Shareholder remedies - corporate wrongs and the denvatIve actIOn, Journal of 
Business Law. 1999, March, pg: 53. . . . • . 
668 D, Sugarman., Reconceptualising company law: reflectIOns on the law Commission s Consultation 
Paper on shareholder remedies: Part 2. Company Lawyer, 199:, 18(9), pg: 277. 
669 Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies. 1996, ConsultatIOn Paper no.142. See paras: 20.24 & 20.28 
of the Consultation Paper. 
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because each of the actions serves different objectives.67o Furthennore, the separation of 
the two actions did not limit the court's power to grant either when needed. 
The Law Commission recommended that appropriate provisions should be included in a 
finn's articles of association671 in order to encourage shareholders to specify areas of 
potential dispute and to identify the "exit option" with a clear mechanism to use if such 
disputes should occur. This would facilitate the exit of a shareholder from a private 
company following a dispute, without the need to litigate under s459.672 
McGee673 agreed with the Law Commission's recommendation, argumg that the 
inclusion in articles of such exit mechanisms should be strongly encouraged, since this 
would help shareholders to focus their minds on what might go wrong at a time when 
they still had some chance of thinking more or less rationally about the subject. While 
this argument may be valid to the extent that shareholders would open their minds in 
advance to find a mechanism to exit from the company in the event of a dispute, there 
would remain the more difficult problem of the valuation of shares. Case law674 shows 
that many cases have been brought on the grounds of a dispute over the value of shares, 
since they continually fluctuate. Thus, it is believed that the exit mechanism should 
consider how the shares would be valued in case of such a buyout. 
5.2.2.2 The Company Law Review 
The Company Law Review considered almost all the recommendations put forward by 
the Law Commission675 and strongly supported the proposal for stronger case 
management to address the issues of length and cost. However, the CLR rejected the 
proposal for inclusion of an exit option in the articles of association on the basis that it 
would be impracticable to prescribe a fair exit regime in advance and for the full 
670 P, Roberts. & J, Poole., Shareholder remedies - corporate wrongs and the derivative action, Journal of 
Business Law. 1999, March, pg: 53 & 54. . . 
671 The model or template articles (standard form) which apply to all compames regIstered under the 1985 
Act. 
672 See Law Commission Report, paras 5.1-5.32. 
673 A M G E't Mechanisms in Private Companies, The Company Financial and Insolvenc-",,' Law 
, c ee., Xl 
review. 1999.3 (1), pg: 59. 01106 h 
674 In Elliot v Planet Organic Ltd [2000] 1 BCLC 366, and Irvine .v I:vine [2006] WL 9 , t ere was 
debate as to whether the court should consider the quasi-partnership m order to value the shares on a pro 
rata basis. 
675 Company Law Review, Developing the Framework (2000), para 4.102 - 4.106. 
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diversity of companies. 676 This rejection by the CLR does not seem to have had a strong 
justification, because allowing shareholders to have a clear exit option with an effective 
mechanism to value the shares in their articles of association would have been rather 
practical and effective. It is true that shareholders would not be able to foresee all the 
circumstances that might occur in the future, as their contracts would be incomplete, but 
such a system would at least provide remedies for some disputes. 
On the question of adding winding up to the possible remedies available under s461, the 
CLR concluded that no such reform was necessary, because enabling minority 
shareholders to claim such a remedy would risk the viability and stability of companies 
and consequently it was appropriate for winding up to be the subject of a separate action 
under the Insolvency Act 1986, s 122 (l )(g). 677 In fact, it is believed that even if 
winding-up had not been among the remedies available under s461, the court would still 
have had the power to decide whether to grant such relief as the court would have 
remained empowered to rule as it saw fit.678 This was demonstrated in Re R.A. Noble & 
Sons (Clothing),679 where the court held that an order would, if necessary, be made to 
wind up the company. In addition, in Re Full Cup Ltcf80 the court instructed the 
minority shareholder to bring a winding-up claim instead of a claim under s459. 
As well as addressing the Law Commission's proposals, the CLR considered the impact 
of 0 'Neill v Phillips681 on this area of law and consulted on whether to recommend the 
statutory reversal of the decision in this case, as it was perceived by some as having 
unduly narrowed the scope of s459. In addition, it consulted on whether it needed to be 
replaced with a broader remedy which would be available in cases of unfairness. 682 The 
CLR took the view that the decision in 0 'Neill v Phillips should not be reversed,683 
noting that any widening or extension of the limited principles in the judgement would 
lead to lengthy and expensive proceedings and unjust outcomes.684 Nonetheless, it is 
676 Company Law Review, Developing the Framework (2000), para 4.103. 
677 Company Law Review, Developing the Framework (2000), para 4.105. " .. " 
678 According to s461 (1) of the CA 1985, the court is empowered to make such order as It thmks fit for 
~iving relief in respect of the matters complained of. 
79 [1983] BCLC 273. 
680 [1995] BCC 682. 
681[1999] 1 WLR 1092. 
682 Company Law Review, Developing the Framework (2000), para 4.106-4.111. 
683 Company Law Review, Completing the Structure (2000), paras 5.70-5.78. 
684 Company Law Review, Completing the structure (2000), para 5.78. 
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believed that it would always be better to follow Arden 1's view in Re BSB Holdings 
LtJ85 that the wording of s459 was wide and general and that, therefore, the categories 
of unfair prejudice were not closed. The minority shareholder should be allowed to 
bring a legal action based on a wide range of conduct, and it should subsequently be up 
to the court to see whether the claim is valid and legitimate. 
A final question considered by the CLR was whether arbitration could take place 
between shareholders, instead of litigation. The CLR did not recommend that arbitration 
should be compulsory for shareholders' disputes, but it considered whether there might 
be scope to encourage its greater use as an alternative to litigation.686 
5.3 Minority shareholder protection under the Companies Act 
2006687 
This section concentrates on the working of the new minority shareholder protection 
under the Companies Act 2006 ('the Act'). It will critically examine the extent of 
simplicity and flexibility which have been brought by the Act and what improvement it 
offers. In particular, this section of this Chapter will address the questions: what effect 
has the Act had on the grounds of the statutory derivative action? Does the Act mean 
that there will be greater litigation of directors' duties?688 Has the Act created certainty 
and stability by introducing the statutory derivative action? And, if so, to what extent? 
Does the Act deliver a better derivative action to the minority shareholder? And, finally, 
does the Act change the unfair prejudice ground? 
5.3.1 Derivative action under the Companies Act 2006 
a. Statutory derivative action 
685 (No.2) [1996] 1 BCLC 155. 
686 See Company Law Review, Developing the Framework (2000), paras 7.44-7.69; and Company Law 
Review, Completing the Structure (2000), para 2.28. . .. . . 
687 This section has been published in (M, Almadam., Denvattve actIOns: does the Compames Act 2006 
offer a way forward? Company Lawyer. 2009, 30(5), 131-140.) ... 
688 J, Sykes., The continuing paradox: a critique of minority shareholder and denvahve claIms under the 
Companies Act 2006, Civil Justice Quarterly. 2010, 29(2), pg: 205. 
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Following the investigations of the Law Commission and the Company Law Review,689 
it was realised that the rules in Foss v Harbottle were complicated and not sufficiently 
wide, and accordingly, the scope of the exceptions to the rules was uncertain and 
shareholders had difficult procedures to work through. As noted earlier, common law 
required the minority to establish "wrongdoer control,,690 and "fraud on the minority" as 
grounds to bring a derivative action, and neither of these helped the minority 
shareholder to bring an action for the company's interest. In fact, they actually placed 
extreme limitations and difficulties on the right to bring a derivative action. Therefore, 
replacing common law with a "new derivative procedure with more modem, flexible 
and accessible criteria for determining whether a shareholder can pursue an action" was 
recommended. 691 Consequently, the Companies Act 2006 introduced a statutory right 
for minority shareholders to bring derivative claims on behalf of companies. Currently, 
a statutory derivative action under s263 may be brought in respect of a cause of action 
arising from an actual or proposed act or omission involving negligence, default, breach 
of duty or breach of trust by directors of the company.692 In other words, the statute 
allows the minority shareholder to bring a case in respect of a wide range of misconduct 
and wrongdoing. 
The government's objective when producing the statutory derivative action in the 2006 
Act in this way was to ensure that shareholders could bring valid claims whilst no 
I · I' 693 disturbance was caused to businesses by unnecessary or specu abve c aIms. 
Therefore the Act can be said to have achieved a balance as it serves all interests within , 
the company at the same time. In any case, irrespective of what the true intention of the 
government was in producing the statutory derivative action, codification by itself has 
been a great achievement which has provided efficient guidance and direction to 
d . d 694 directors, shareholders, lawyers, an even JU ges. 
689 Law Commission Shareholder Remedies. (1997, Cm 3769). 
690 Burland v Earle 6902] AC 83; Edwards v Halliwell [1950] 2 Al~ ER.1064;.Pavlides v Jensen [1956] 1 
Ch 565. In these cases it was the right of the majority to bar the mmonty actIOn whenever they lawfully 
ratify alleged misconduct. 
691 Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies. (1997) (para 6.15). 
692 Companies Act 2006, s263(1) and (2). .. . 
693 J, Sykes., The continuing paradox: a critique of minority shareholder and denvatlve claIms under the 
Companies Act 2006, Civil Justice Quarterly. 2010,29(2), pg: 205. ... 
694 J, Sykes., The continuing paradox: a critique of minority shareholder and denvatlve claIms under the 
Companies Act 2006, Civil Justice Quarterly. 2010, 29(2), pg: 214. 
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The number of matters providing a potential ground to bring a derivative action is now 
considerably greater under the statute since the grounds for conduct that permits the 
bringing of a derivative action have been widened and the court has been empowered, 
with free discretion,695 to put itself into the position of a reasonable director of the 
696 1 h 
company. A tough the court now has statutory provisional stages and a filtering 
process to refine any misuse or abuse of the action, it faces a considerable dilemma 
when exercising its discretion in dealing with an action which should be allowed but , 
for which litigation is not in the company's interest. 697 However, the statute maintains 
the principle that only the company can litigate, which was a cornerstone of common 
law. Therefore, ratification (but not ratifiability) is still an essential determinant in 
whether to allow an action to proceed. 
b. Ratification under the statute 
Traditionally, under common law, it was for the shareholders as a whole698 to decide 
whether to enforce derivative actions, since the majority shareholder could ensure 
ratification in order to restrict the scope of actions under common law. The CLR 699 
realised this, and proposed that a company's decision to pursue a wrong should depend 
on whether the majority needed to ratify had been reached without the need to rely on 
the votes of the alleged wrongdoers, or those who were substantially under their 
influence.7oo 
The statute followed this proposal and made a major change to the principles of 
ratification under the statutory derivative action. Currently, any decision by a company 
to ratify a director's conduct must be taken by the members, without reliance on votes 
h d ·· . 701 in favour from the directors or any person connected to t e wrong omg m questIon. 
Although it remains a complete bar to a derivative claim that the alleged wrong has 
695 Companies Act 2006, s263(2) and (3) empower courts, for the sake of granting permission, to be more 
involved in order to determine the circumstances alleged. 
696 A, Alcock. J, Birds. & S, Gale., Companies Act 2006. 15t ed. Jordans, Bristol, 2007.yg: 166. . 
697 H, Rirt., The Company's Decision to Litigate Against its Directors: Legal Strategies to Deal With the 
Board of Directors' Conflict ofInterest, Journal of Business Law, 2005, March, pg:, 159-208. 
698 In the case Allen v Gold Reefs of West Africa [1900J 1 Ch 656 it was established that directors have to 
act 'bonafide' in the interests of the company as a whole. . 
699 Company Law Review, DTI Consultation Document, Developmg t~e Framework, March 2000. 
700 Company Law Review, Final Report (2001), para 7.46; Completmg the Structure (2000), para 5.85; 
Developing the Framework (2000), para 4.126. 
701 Companies Act 2006, s239. 
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been effectively ratified by the company being able to bt· t·fi· . h th 
' 0 am ra I catIOn WIt out e 
wrongdoers' votes is a significant change and one which w·ll 11 rtu ·t· 
, I a ow more oppo m les 
to bring derivative claims, whilst reducing the possibility of ratification. 702 
Another change is that the mere fact that an alleged wrong is ratifiable but has not 
actually been ratified, may no longer be a complete bar to the statutory derivative claim, 
. I h 703 as was prevIOus y t e case under common law. However, under the statute, the court 
is required to consider the fact that the alleged wrong could be, and in certain 
circumstances, would be, likely to be ratified by the company.704 Keay and Loughrey 
believe that, as long as the question of whether a wrong has been or could be ratified , , 
remains the determining factor for the court in deciding whether to grant permission to 
allow the derivative action to proceed, the position of ratification in the statute is no 
different to that of common law.705 The authors derive this conclusion from Franbar 
Holdings v Patel,706 where it was confirmed that the statute has not altered the common 
law position of ratification when there are wrongs that can be ratified by the majority. 
Hannigan also sees that the position of ratification under the statute makes no 
substantive change to the general principle of majority rule which used to give control 
to majority shareholders over ratification under common law, as the majority may 
remain empowered to ratify a wrong even under the statute.707 Nonetheless, these 
authors have overlooked the fact that what makes ratification under the statute less of a 
bar to minority shareholders is that it is now more likely to be achieved without the 
wrongdoers' votes. 
On the other hand, this new position of ratification has also received heavy criticism for 
creating the possibility that any shareholder connected to the wrongdoer may not be 
allowed to vote. In fact, if every shareholder connected to the wrongdoers was not 
allowed to vote, the limit on ratification may be seen as a wide-reaching provision with 
the potential to disenfranchise shareholders from their right to vote even if they have no 
702 J, Sykes., The continuing paradox: a critique of minority shareholder and derivative claims under the 
Companies Act 2006, Civil Justice Quarterly. 2010, 29(2), pg: 221 & 222. 
703 Companies Act 2006, s260(1) and (2). .. . 
704 D, Lightman., The Companies Act 2006: A Nutshell Guide To T.he Changes To The DenvatIve Claim, 
Civil Justice Quarterly, 2007, 26 Jan, pg: 37-39. See also: Compames Act 2006, s263(2) (b), (c). 
705 A K & J L hrey Derivative proceedings in a brave new world for company management and 
,eay. ,oug ., 
shareholders, Journal o/Business Law. 2010, 3. pg:162. 
706 [2008] EWHC 1534 (Ch). 
707 B, Hannigan., Company Law. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. pg: 448. 
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1 . . h 708 persona mterest m t e matter. This argument has men't as't d l' h . 1 
, 1 un er mes t e potentIa 
withdrawal of the right to vote from certain shareholders connected to the wrongdoers. 
In private companies, shareholders and directors always have connections with each 
other, and denying the shareholder's right to ratify any wrong simply because he is 
somehow connected to the wrongdoer seems inappropriate. 
c. How to establish a derivative action under the statute 
Establishing a derivative action under common law was surrounded by difficulty. 
Firstly, it was required, for the most part, to prove that the directors had committed a 
"fraud on the minority", which meant something as serious as appropriating the assets 
of the company. 709 Secondly, it had to be established that the wrongdoers were in 
control of the company. Thirdly, the action had to be brought bona fide for the benefit 
of the company and with its name.710 Furthennore, it had to be established that the 
company had suffered a loss and that it was unfair for wrongful conduct to be 
ratified.711 Finally, it was necessary to demonstrate that the alleged wrongdoing had 
benefited the wrongdoers.712 Thus, many difficult and complex requirements under 
common law restricted potential claims from benefiting from the derivative action and 
from achieving the purpose for which the action was originally designed. 
In contrast, almost all of these difficult requirements have been refonned in the new 
statutory derivative action in order to make it easier for the minority shareholder to 
establish an action. Under the statute, it is no longer necessary to show that the alleged 
wrongdoers are themselves in control of the company.713 This has been confinned in 
Wishart v Castlecroft Securities Ltd714 when Lord Reid, from the Inner House of the 
Court of Session in Scotland, disagreed with Lord Glennie in the first instance, when 
the latter required the minority shareholder to establish wrongdoer control in order to 
proceed with the derivative action. It is believed that Lord Reid was correct in doing so, 
708 D, Nambisan., Commercial and Chancery; Insider Dealing, The Lawyer, 2006, 11 September, pg: 33. 
709 C, Timmis., Company Law: In good company? Law Society Gazette. 2006,103(13), pg: 16. 
710 See the case Barrett v Duckett [1995] 1 B.C.L.C 243. . 
711 A, Reisberg., Judicial Control of Derivative Actions, International Company and CommerCial Law 
Review. 2005, 16(8), pg: 335-339. 
712 J, Dine., Company Law. 5th ed. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2005, pg: 253. 
m Companies Act 2006, s260(3). 
714 Scottish case: [2009] CSIH 65 (lR (Ex Div)). 
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because removing such a requirement is what the Parll·ame t . t ded 715 M n m en. oreover, 
Davies explains that the real purpose of removing such a requirement is so that the court 
can grant pennission, even if the alleged wrongdoers are not in control of the 
shareholders' meeting.716 Fundamentally, according to the Act/ I7 it is no longer 
necessary to establish that the wrongdoers themselves benefited from the alleged 
. d t 718 Wh t . . " 
mlscon uc . a IS more mterestmg m the new requirements is that no defence of 
acting in good faith by the directors or wrongdoers will be accepted. This means that the 
claim can be successful even if the majority shareholder acted in good faith, as the court 
will give priority to the company's interest.719 
Another advantageous factor which may also smooth the progress of the derivative 
action is that the statute empowers the court, with free discretion,720 to put itself into the 
position of a member of the board of the company.721 In doing so, the court will judge 
whether a reasonable hypothetical board of the company would pursue such an action. 
For example, in Airey v Cordell,722 prior to the Act, the test which was applied was to 
judge whether a reasonable independent board could decide whether it was appropriate 
to pursue a derivative action. Although the court in this case had to assert its own view 
of how the board ought to proceed, it was satisfied that such a hypothetical board could 
take the decision to pursue the derivative claim, and thereby the permission to bring a 
derivative action was granted. Another example, decided after the Act was enacted, was 
seen in Stainer v Lee723 where the minority shareholder brought a derivative action 
against the majority shareholder, who had made a substantial interest-free loan to a 
company he owned. The court granted the minority shareholder permission to continue 
the action after applying the test of the reasonable hypothetical board and finding that it 
would have pursued such an action. However, as Sykes states, there is no indication as 
to how, in practice, the court can distinguish the actual views of the theoretical 
715 D, Cabrelli., Statutory derivative proceedings: the view from the Inner House, Edinburgh Law Review. 
2010, 14(1), pg: 117. 
716 P, Davies., Principles of Modern Company Law. 8th ed. Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2008, pg: 619. 
717 Explanatory Notes of Companies Act 2006, 8 Nov 2006 para: 491. pg: 74. ... 
718 D, Lightman., The Companies Act 2006: A Nutshell Guide to the Changes to the Denvatlve Claim, 
Civil Justice Quarterly, 2007, 26 Jan, pg: 37-39. , . 
719 B, Cain., Members' rights and derivative actions, Company Secretary s Review, 2006, 30(2), pg: 
9&10. . .. b 
720 Companies Act 2006, s263(2) and (3) empower courts, for the sake of grantmg permiSSion, to e more 
involved in order to determine the circumstances alleged. 
721 A, Alcock. J, Birds. & S, Gale., Companies Act 2006. 151 ed. Jordans, Bristol, 2007. pg: 166. 
122 (2007) B.C.C 785. 
123 [2010] EWHC 1539 (Ch). 
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independent board. The lack of criteria in earlier cases and th t tut . If th 
, e s a e, ltse ,means at 
it is not an easy task for the court to predict whether any reasonable hypothetical 
independent board would decide to pursue such an action. 724 
d. Stages and filtering process in the statutory derivative action 
It was realised that the main difficulty of bringing a derivative claim under common law 
was due to the wrongdoer's control of the board. When the Law Commission 
recognised this conflict of interest in the board's making of the decision to litigate, they 
recommended that power should lie with the court instead. This power should be 
exercised by the court in granting permission to continue a derivative action without 
allowing the board to have any more control over the litigation decision.725 This reform 
tries to strike a balance between protecting majority shareholders from nonsense claims, 
while protecting the minority shareholder's right to pursue wrongdoing.726 
The government, in the Act, followed this recommendation and empowered the court to 
grant permission to proceed with the action. So the Act727 has withdrawn the power 
from the board and transferred it to the court, in the form of general discretion to decide 
whether to allow an application to proceed.728 Therefore, any minority shareholder can 
bring a derivative action without reverting to the board, and it is then up to the court to 
grant permission if the claim is strong enough. 729 
However, the Act has not left the court without criteria, guidance and direction to follow 
when exercising its power in this respect. Rather, the Act has provided several stages 
and filtering processes in order to try to ensure that no misuse or abuse of the action is 
allowed. The aim of the Act, in creating these stages, was to provide safeguards to 
protect the companies from nonsense and disruptive claims which do not serve the 
724 J, Sykes., The continuing paradox: a critique of minority shareholder and derivative claims under the 
Companies Act 2006 Civil Justice Quarterly. 2010, 29(2}, pg: 222 & 223. 
725 The Law Commi~sion 1997, para: 6.73 recommended that the court should tak~ i~to account all the 
relevant circumstances without limit when analyzing the facts in order to grant permISSIOn. 
726 B, Hannigan., Company Law. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. pg: 447. 
727 Companies Act 2006, s261(1}. .. . 
728 J, Sykes., The continuing paradox: a critique of minority shareholder and denvatIve claIms under the 
Companies Act 2006, Civil Justice Quarterly. 2010, 29(2}, pg: 215. . 
729 The criteria in considering whether to grant permission is that the court must .take mto account whether 
the applicant is acting in good faith as well as satisfying sl72 of the Compames Act 2006 test (duty to 
promote the success of the company). 
188 
, . t t 730 Th . 
company s III eres s. ese stages O1ve the court s 'fi d' . e~ peCI c power to IsmlSS 
unmeritorious cases at an early stage without the need to involve the company.731 Most 
researchers and practitioners, if not all, believe that there should only be two stages in 
this procedure. However, in practice, there seem to be three. 
In the first stage, the court must be satisfied that it is a prima facie case. For this, the 
court will consider the applicant's evidence alone without involving the directors, the 
majority shareholder or the company. The court must dismiss the application and make 
a costs order against the minority shareholder if the case does not disclose a prima facie 
case.
732 In fact, it is believed that this stage is truly an excellent reform of the position in 
common law, as it protects the company from being embroiled in disruptive cases. For 
example, in Mission Pic v Sinclai/33 the court refused to grant permission at the prima 
facie stage because it considered the alleged damage somewhat speculative, and that it 
did not present a prima facie case. Although the prima facie test was used under 
common law, Keay and Loughrey feel that the meaning of the term is indefinable. They 
also believe that no court has ever discussed in detail the actual meaning of the concept, 
and exactly how to establish it in a case.734 This concern seems to be well-founded, as in 
WisharP35 and other recent cases no effort was made towards defining the term and 
again the area was left without the judicial guidance that is sorely needed. Keay and 
Loughrey also state that this first stage has not been given sufficient thought by either 
the Parliament or the court, and that it should be limited only to ensuring that a claim is 
not nonsense and that the wrongdoing is related to grounds set out in the legislation, and 
nothing else. 736 Furthermore, Hannigan argues that the courts should be willing at this 
stage to allow the minority shareholder to proceed at least to the next stage, bearing in 
mind that the court will still be able to refuse permission further down the line.737 
730 A, Keay. & J, Loughrey., Derivative proceedings in brave new world for company management and 
shareholder, Journal Business Law. 2010,3. pg: 153. 
731 B, Hannigan., Company Law. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. pg: 451. 
732 Companies Act 2006, s261 (2)(b). 
733 [2008] EWHC 1399 (Ch). 
734 A, Keay. & J, Loughrey., Derivative proceedings in brave new world for ~ompany ~anagement and 
shareholder, Journal Business Law. 2010, 3. pg: 154. The authors here thmk .that, m order for ~e 
minority shareholder to establish prima facie case, he/she should be able to estabhsh a greater than 50 Yo 
chance of success. 
735 Scottish case: [2009] CSIH 65. 
736 A, Keay. & J, Loughrey., Derivative proceedings in brave new world for company management and 
shareholder Journal Business Law. 2010, 3. pg: 157. 
737 B, Hannigan., Company Law. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. pg: 45l. 
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However, it remains to be seen how the courts would apply this stage in practice, as no 
case so far has made this clear. 
In the second stage (the stage which many researchers do not acknowledge) the court 
. 'd b 'd d 738 may reqUIre eVl ence to e provl e by the company. This stage has been created to 
give the minority shareholder the opportunity to access information to prove the 
wrongdoing. It is believed that this stage is likely to be efficient as long as the court 
restricts the company to answering specific questions and providing specific evidence. 
In contrast, this stage may prove neither useful nor efficient if there is an opportunity 
for the company to respond to the claim. One concern that needs to be noted here is that, 
since the majority shareholders who are in control will represent the company in any 
response, they will provide the court with what is right from their perspective. 
Therefore, in practice, the majority shareholders will, most probably, provide the court 
with evidence that is not going to hold them accountable for any misconduct. In this 
second stage, it is assumed that the court may not allow the action to proceed if the 
evidence provided by the company does not help to prove the misconduct claimed of, as 
the court is empowered to dismiss the claim at any stage. It is also believed that the 
court would hold the case until the company provides the requested evidence and the 
court may also demand further evidence from the company if what was originally 
provided did not comply exactly with the request. 
In the third stage,739 the court opens the application for a hearing involving both parties. 
It has been argued that, if the court concludes that either the claim is unlikely to succeed 
at a full hearing, or that the recoverable compensation from the wrongdoers is 
outweighed by the costs of the litigation, the court will refuse permission.74o Therefore, 
the court is empowered to dismiss the claim at this stage, but it is believed that the court 
is less likely to make any such order here, because the aim of the costs order is to stop 
applications which do not disclose a prima facie case from progressing at the first stage. 
However, in the third stage the reasons for dismissing the application may be different. 
For example, the court may dismiss the claim because it would not benefit the 
738 Companies Act 2006, s261(4)(a). . . ." . 
739 Companies Act 2006, s261 (4). On hearing the apphcatlOn the court may:(l) gIve pe~lsslon to 
continue the claim as it thinks fit; (2) refuse permission and refuse the claIm; or (3) adjourn the 
proceedings on the application and give such directions as it think~ fit. . 
740 A B I J B' d & Others. BOllie & Birds' Company Law. 6 ed. Jordans, Bnstol, 2007. pg: 683. 
, oye. , Ir s. , J 
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company's interest even if it succeeded For instance in F b U Id· Ltd v 
. ,ran ar nO zngs 
P 1741 h . d . . ate t e JU ge lllveshgated several factors when deciding to grant permission, 
including the potential for success, the value of compensation recovered, the cost of the 
proceedings, and the damage which would be caused to the company in the case of 
Co ·1 742 D . h h· lal ure. aVles notes t at t IS stage, particularly, offers an advantage to the court, as it 
answers the question of whether the claim is in the interests of the company. 743 
However, this is not always true, as the court may refuse permission which, if allowed, 
would benefit the company, but this benefit would be smaller than the costs of 
litigation. 
A criticism has been put forward relating to the court's examination of the alleged 
conduct in the third stage (by which point the court would be deeply involved with 
consideration of the company's affairs, and therefore the company's commercial 
decisions). It is believed that the court may not have the ability to correctly predict the 
decision of a reasonable board of a company because it is still an external body.744 This 
argument may be true, as there is variation from one company to another in terms of its 
activity, objectives, targets, etc, and it may be difficult for the court to put itself in the 
position of every company, as there is no single standard to apply. 745 
Furthermore, in this third stage the court will take into account whether an s994 (unfair 
prejudice) petition can be pursued instead of a derivative claim.746 Cabrelli believes that 
the English courts are not prepared to grant permission to continue a derivative action if 
a remedy under s994 is available.747 For instance, one of the reasons for refusing to 
grant permission in Franbar Holdings Ltd v PateP48 was the ability of the minority 
shareholder to pursue the same claim under s994. 
741 [2008] EWHC 1534 (Ch). The pennission in the case was r~fused holding that the applicant had not 
shown that the hypothetical board would have pursued such a claIm. ... 
742 J, Sykes., The continuing paradox: a critique of minority shareholder and denvabve claIms under the 
Companies Act 2006 Civil Justice Quarterly. 2010, 29(2), pg: 223. 
743 P, Davies., Princ~les of Modem Company Law. 8th ed. Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2008, pg: 614 & 
615. . D I . h h 
744 H, Hirt., The Company's Decision to Litigate Against its Directors: Legal StrategIes to ea WIt t e 
Board of Directors' Conflict of Interest, Journal of Business Law, 2005, March, pg: 159-208. 
745 Also see sub-section: 5.4.3.1.c How to establish a derivative action under the statute. 
746 Companies Act 2006,263 (3)(e).. '." " 
747 D, Cabrelli., Statutory derivative proceedings: the VIew from the Inner House, Edmburgh Law Re\ leH " 
2010, 14(1), pg:121. 
748 [2008] EWHC 1534 (Ch). 
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Although it is very important for the court to have the power to grant " 't d permISSIOn, 1 oes 
not make sense to have three stages in practice, simply to allow the minority 
shareholder to speak out. These stages should be reduced to a single stage that entitles 
the court to decide whether to grant the minority shareholder permission, rather than 
wasting time and money going through these separate stages. If the case is proved to be 
valid in the court's eyes at the prima facie stage, then permission should be granted. 
However, it is believed that the third stage in the Act, opening the application for a 
hearing, may be a total waste of time. This is because the case will never provide, at this 
early stage, a full picture which enables the court to see clearly the potential for success, 
as many issues will arise throughout the duration of the proceedings. 
e. Concerns about the statutory derivative action 
Since the Act came into force, there have been many concerns and worries regarding the 
practical working of the statutory derivative action. The first concern regarded the 
possibility that the new statutory derivative action would facilitate the way for too many 
cases to be brought.749 The new development has been negatiVely described as a 
"massive lowering of the hurdle which will make it very easy for shareholders to 
commence claims. They [shareholders] will simply have to just make an allegation of 
negligence".75o In the same way, Dodd has expressed his suspicion that a company's 
directors may be exposed to an unacceptable degree of scrutiny and an increased threat 
of claims being brought by militant minority shareholders.751 Furthermore, Wild and 
Weinstein have also raised this concern in saying that the new statutory derivative 
action will open the floodgates for litigations.752 Others take it to an even more extreme 
level and believe that the new derivative action is totally anti-business, and that it has a 
great potential to create a society of litigation culture just like in the US.753 
749 Brocklesby assumes in his article (N, Brocklesby., Derivative claims ~nder ~e ~o~panies ,Act, 2~06, 
In - House Lawyer, 2007, February, pg: 94-97) that this clause will retam the maJonty rules pnnclple 
exactly as enshrined in the case Foss v Harbottle [1843J 2 Hare 461. 
750 C, Timmis., Company Law: In good company? Law Society Gazette. 200~, 103~13), pg: 16. , 
751 A, Dodd., Directors' duties and derivative actions, Company Secretary s Revlew, 2007, 30 (19). pg. 
M5C, Wild. & S, Weinstein., Simth & Keenan's Company ~aw.l4th ed. Longman, .Hru:low, 2?09. pg: 264. 
753 J S k Th .' dox' a critique of minonty shareholder and denvatlVe claims under the 
, yes., e contmumg para . 
Companies Act 2006, Civil Justice Quarterly. 2010, 29(2), pg: 222. 
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Nonetheless, it is believed that all these threats and dangers are more theoretical than 
real. 754 Sykes states that, despite these fears, there is no evidence to support such a bleak 
picture emerging. In fact, as he also adds that initial evidence shows that the courts are 
not completely shifting from their traditionally adopted approach. 755 Likewise, 
Hannigan also notes that it is a mistake to conclude that the introduction of the statutory 
derivative action could significantly increase the risk to directors, as it is, in effect, 
unlikely that there will be any considerable rise in the number of proceedings. 756 Thus, 
it is contended that any belief which states that the new derivative action is a reason for 
alarm, is overstated, because the Act has included in its design certain stages and a 
filtering process to ensure that no worthless or self-interested claims take place. Davies 
emphasised this particular point by noting that Parliament, when producing the Act, 
recognised that companies may be distracted from more important commercial matters 
by having to clarify in court why such a claim should not be allowed to proceed any 
further, and therefore the Act contains stages whereby claims can be filtered without 
even having to involve the company. 757 
The second concern is over how a court gauges the manner in which a director acting 
pursuant to s 172 would proceed.758 Section 172 is rather a complex provision. The 
problem with it is that there are no clear criteria or definite standards for the court to 
follow when dealing with the section in derivative action.759 In fact, the Act does not 
seem to provide any clear framework to ensure that directors are held accountable for 
their decision-making processes under derivative action. Nonetheless, it is believed that 
the Act has deliberately left many areas open in order for the court to have discretion 
and be allowed to develop principles so it can bring justice when it is needed.76o 
f. Matters still remaining unreformed under the Act 
754 D, Lightman., Boards Beware! Lawyers Loom, The Times. 2006, 12 September, pg: 6. 
755 J, Sykes., The continuing paradox: a critique of minority shareholder and derivative claims under the 
Companies Act 2006, Civil Justice Quarterly. 2010, 29(2), pg: 222. 
756 B, Hannigan., Company Law. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. pg: 451. 
757 P, Davies., Principles o/Modern Company Law. 8th ed. Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2008, pg: 620. 
758 Section 172 require directors to have regard for all six factors in every decision according to s172. 
759 A, Keay., Section 172 (2) of the Companies Act 2006: An Interpretation and Assessment, Company 
Lawyer, 2007, 28(4). pg: 109. 
760 A, Alcock. J, Birds. & S, Gale., Companies Act 2006. 1 st ed. Jordans, Bristol, 2007. pg: 166. 
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The first reform that should be made to the current Act is in respect of the three stages 
which are designed to drive the minority shareholder through a lengthy and impractical 
process in order to be granted permission. These stages slow down the efficacy and 
effectiveness of the claim, as it takes a long time to allow the minority shareholder to 
bring a derivative action. In fact, the Law Commission only proposed there to be one 
stage that the minority shareholder should go through to be granted permission.761 Thus, 
the permission stages should be combined, enabling the minority shareholder to obtain 
permission instantly or at least much more quickly. 
The second reform regards the indemnity order. It is understood that there has been no 
change in the court's power to indemnify the minority shareholder against any liability 
in respect of costs incurred in the claim.762 The Act does not seem to solve this problem, 
which existed for a long time under common law, and which proved not to be in the 
company's interests. Therefore, the Act has left the derivative action lacking a critical 
procedure upon which many cases may depend.763 Wrongdoers may take advantage of 
this by committing wrongs, knowing that there is only a small risk of an action being 
brought against them because of the financial burden.764 It is admitted that it may not be 
fair to give an indemnity order to the minority shareholder as soon as he/she brings a 
derivative claim, as this may give an opportunity to a troublesome minority shareholder 
to abuse or misuse the action and waste the company's money on baseless claims.765 
However, it is assumed that the permission stage provides the best opportunity to grant 
the minority shareholder an order for indemnity, as long as he/she is granted permission 
to proceed with the action. Consequently, the Act should add the right to obtain an 
indemnity order once the minority shareholder is granted permission, regardless of the 
result of the case, as stated in Wallersteiner v Moir. 766 
761 The Law Commission: Shareholder Remedies: 1997, para 6.4. 
762 D, Lightman,. The Companies Act 2006: A Nutshell Guide To The Changes To The Derivative Claim, 
Civil Justice Quarterly, 2007, 26 Jan. pg: 38. 
763 A, Reisberg., Derivative Actions and Funding Problem: The Way Forward, Journal of Business Law, 
2006, Aug, pg: 445-467. 
764 J, Sykes., The continuing paradox: a critique of minority shareholder and derivative claims under the 
Companies Act 2006, Civil Justice Quarterly. 2010,29(2), pg: 226. 
765 D, Cabrelli., Statutory derivative proceedings: the view from the Inner House, Edinburgh Law Review. 
2010, 14(1), pg:120. 
766 [1975] QB 373. 
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The third reform of the Act should be to require the minority shareholder to provide 
written notice to the company, identifying the wrongdoing and the remedial action to be 
undertaken.767 Although the Civil Procedure Rules expect the minority shareholder to 
hand a notice to the company before commencing an action, there is no requirement in 
the statute for himlher to do so. If this requirement were adopted, it would prevent any 
misuse or abuse by the minority shareholder and would give the directors a chance to 
remedy the wrongdoing without going through lengthy and expensive litigation. Sykes 
assumed that the government's aim in choosing not to adopt the 28-days prior notice in 
the Act was to prevent the majority shareholder's "wrongdoer control" over litigation, 
since this may delay claims being brought, as was the case under common law. 768 
However, Jonathan Djanogly MP argued in Parliament that empowering the minority 
shareholder to commence litigation against the majority shareholders without consulting 
or informing the board would increase the chances of tactical litigation.769 Therefore, it 
is believed that the Act should require the minority to give written notice to the majority 
in advance, stating that he/she will proceed with a claim if no remedial action regarding 
the wrongdoing is undertaken. 
Another amendment that should be made to the Act is in respect of the requirement for 
clean hands to bring a claim. It is clear from cases under common law 770 that the clean 
hands condition did play a major role in certain cases being refused. The Act has not 
resolved this unsuitable requirement, and it can be argued that the same requirement 
remains. 771 In fact, it is hard to understand why the Act has done this, since the 
important issue for the court is doing justice for the company and not for the minority 
shareholder.772 Therefore, the way that the minority shareholder has acted should be 
irrelevant in this type of litigation. It is contended that, once the Act adopts this 
requirement, the majority could always abuse it by claiming that the minority 
shareholder did not have clean hands, and that the action was the result of a hidden 
767 This proposal, put forward by the Law Commission (Shareholder Remedies. 1997), was ~at t~e 
derivative claimant should give notice to the company, and only 28 days after that the mmonty 
shareholder should be entitled to claim. 
768 J, Sykes., The continuing paradox: a critique of minority shareholder and derivative claims under the 
Companies Act 2006, Civil Justice Quarterly. 2010, 29(2), pg: 222. 
769 Hansard Deb HC 17 October (2005-06) [Speech]. 
770 Towers v African Tug Co [1904] 1 Ch. 558 CA, and Nurcombe v Nurcombe [1985] 1 W.L.R 370 CA 
(Civ Div). 
771 A, Keay., & J, Loughrey., Derivative proceedings in brave new world for company management and 
shareholder, Journal Business Law. 2010, 3. pg: 168. 
772 J, Payne., Clean hands in derivative actions, Cambridge Law Journal. 2002, 61 (1) pg: 76. 
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purpose. Therefore, the correct principle should be, as Roberts and Poole suggested, that 
when a claim is likely to benefit the company's interest, the court should allow it even if 
the minority shareholder does not have clean hands. 773 Similarly, in Wishart v 
Castlecroft Securities Ltd774 Lord Glennie stated that it was not clear why a company 
could not benefit from a claim simply because the minority shareholder had an ulterior 
reason to bring it. 
Finally, it is also clear that no concern has been given in the Act to the personal rights 
which functioned under common law as well as the derivative action. In fact, the Law 
Commission 775 and the CLR 776 debated whether to state a non-exhaustive list of 
personal rights in any new legislation but, in the end, the Act does not state a non-
exhaustive list of personal rights. It is believed that the Act has done the right thing in 
not changing the status of personal rights, as any change in the law when there is 
stability and settlement may create problems rather than offer a positive reform. 
Nonetheless, the Act should have made some effort to define the personal rights, 
grounds and principles that the minority shareholder can identify and exercise.777 It is 
claimed that leaving the personal actions without clarification and guidance to follow 
may create confusion and puzzlement in some cases. Talbot has noted that the minority 
shareholder is likely to be confused now when complaining against an ultra vires action, 
as it is not clear whether to bring a personal action under common law or a claim 
against the directors for a breach of s171 (via a derivative action) for failing to observe 
the company's constitution.778 It is true that the grounds of personal rights, in practice, 
may be better served by other remedies, such as s994, and therefore may gradually 
773 P, Roberts & J, Poole., Shareholder remedies corporate wrongs and the derivative action, Journal of 
Business Law. 1999, Mar. pg: 107. 
774 Scottish case: [2009] CSIH 65 (lH (Ex Div)). 
7?5 Law Commission Reports, Shareholder Remedies. (1997) 
776 Company Law Review. Developing the Frame Work (2000). Also, Company Law Review. Final 
Report. VoU (2001). 
777 There is still confusion in the law over exercising the personal rights. It is not clear where the line is 
drawn between enforcing personal rights and derivative rights. This confusion appeared from time to time 
under common law in cases such as Latchford Premier Cinema Ltd v Ennion [l931] 2 Ch 409 and Oliver 
v Dalgleish [l963] 1 WLR 1274. It was argued in each case whether derivative rights or personal rights 
should have been exercised. Recently, more confusion occurred in cases like Johnson v Gore Wood & Co 
(2001] 1 All ER 481. ., . 
778 L, Talbot., A contextual analysis of the demise of the doctrine of ultra VIres In EnglIsh company law 
and the rhetoric and reality of enlightened shareholders, Company Lawyer. 2009, 30(11), pg: 325. 
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disappear. 779 However, it is still important to clarify the personal rights, as it is indeed 
difficult now to establish whether a personal right exists.78o 
5.3.2 Unfair prejudice under the Companies Act 2006 
Unfortunately, the Companies Act 2006 has not included any changes to s459 of the 
Companies Act 1985. This means that the Act has not addressed the deficiency and 
uncertainty which the Law Commission and CLR identified. Many recommendations 
and proposals were put forward to improve the law in this area, but they all seem to 
have been ignored. To prove that s994 still carries a certain lack of clarity, in the recent 
case of Wilson v Jaymarke Estates Ltd,781 the majority shareholder allegedly committed 
unfair prejudice by withdrawing a sum of money from the company's bank account 
without the minority shareholder's consent. However, the shareholder's lawyers were 
not sure which grounds to bring an action upon, and were not able to advise the 
minority shareholder whether the case had potential for success under s994. Lord Hope, 
in the House of Lords, was not happy with the legal consultation given to the minority 
shareholder in this case. Nonetheless, the confusion and doubt of the lawyer in this case 
was expected because there is no clear guidance or criteria for lawyers to follow in 
order to establish a clear case under s994. 
Moreover, Goddard believes that, although both unfairness and prejudice are important 
factors for establishing a case under s994, neither is properly defined.782 Therefore, all 
the concerns and alarms raised under s459 will be raised again under s994. In addition, 
it is claimed that there are many new questions about the unfair prejudice remedy that 
need to be answered. For example, what makes excessive remuneration unfair within 
the framework of the section? These concerns and others have been raised in Irvine v 
Irvine783 and Fowler v Gruber/84 but they have not yet been addressed. As a result, it is 
argued that s994 is expected to produce certain difficulties and complexities in some 
cases that may not be easy to tackle. 
779 B, Hannigan., Company Law. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. pg: 465. 
780 S, Judge., Company Law. 1 st ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. pg: 148. 
781 Scottish case: [2007] UKHL 29; 2007 S.C (H.L) 135 (HL). 
782 R, Goddard., The unfair prejudice remedy, Edinburgh Law Review. 2008, 12(1), pg: 94. 
783 [2007] 1 BCLC 349. 
784 [2009] CSOH 156. 
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On the other hand, despite all of the obscurity and lack of clarity in s994, it is widely 
admitted that it is still the most preferred action for minority shareholders. Sykes 
emphasises that it was not right to anticipate that the introduction of the statutory 
derivative action would prevail over s994, as cases show that unfair prejudice remedies 
are still regularly sought.785 This is exemplified by certain recent cases, such as Callard 
v Pringle786 and 0 'Donnell v Shanahan,787 where the minority shareholders preferred to 
use s994 to remedy wrongs which also had the potential to be brought under the 
derivative action process. Therefore, the usage of s994 is still favoured, not only to 
serve the criteria under s994, but it would still, as Cabrelli indicated, achieve all that 
could be achieved by the statutory derivative action, and even more.788 This particular 
point was seen in Gamlestaden Fastigheter AB v Baltic Partners Ltd,789 where the 
minority shareholder brought s994 proceedings regarding a wrong done to the company, 
which was the basis for a classic derivative action, and the court held that, although the 
majority shareholder applied to strike out the claim on the basis that s994 should benefit 
only the minority shareholder in his capacity as a member, the majority shareholder was 
ordered to pay damages to the company. Thus, it can be claimed that s994 will still 
protect personal and corporate rights and interests effectively. This popularity of s994 is 
due to its effectiveness in remedying wrongs and having easier requirements to meet, 
even though the section has its flaws. 79o 
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has explained and examined the developments and processes which have 
led to the present protection for minority shareholders in the UK. It would be very 
useful for Saudi Arabia and Dubai to understand how the development of UK law has 
addressed its problems, and whether it has done so successfully. Therefore, this chapter 
has outlined the protection offered to minority shareholders under common law and the 
old company law prior to 2006, examined what the Law Commission and the CLR 
785 J, Sykes., The continuing paradox: a critique of minority shareholder and derivative claims under the 
Companies Act 2006, Civil Justice Quarterly. 2010, 29(2), pg: 224. 
786 [2007] All E.R. (D) 91. 
787 [2009] EWCA Civ 751. 
788 D, Cabrelli., Statutory derivative proceedings: the view from the Inner House, Edinburgh Law Review. 
2010, 14(1), pg:119. 
789 [2007] UKPC 26. 
790 P, Davies., Principles of Modern Company Law. 8th ed. Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2008, pg: 707. 
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recommended and proposed in order to address the failure of minority shareholder 
protection under common law and the old statute, and showed the results of these 
recommendations as reflected in the Companies Act 2006. 
Under common law, litigation was exercised by minority shareholders only through the 
exceptions to Foss v. Harbottle. These exceptions were categorised into two types: 
personal actions and derivative actions. However, minority shareholders were faced 
with difficulty when bringing a personal or derivative action under common law. When 
it came to derivative action, the minority shareholder had to establish "fraud" and 
"wrongdoer (majority) control" which did not help the minority shareholder to promote 
the company's interest. This was because not all wrongdoings necessarily amounted to 
fraud. Consequently, these harsh requirements placed extreme limitations on such 
personal and derivative actions under common law. 
On the other hand, s459 of the Companies Act 1985, "unfair prejudice", functioned with 
much greater flexibility. The wording of s459 was broad and its categories were open, 
to the extent that minority shareholders were driven to use the device even if it was not 
necessary. Gradually, it was realised that the availability of the new remedy was capable 
of being oppressive towards the majority shareholder. At that time, certain judges tried 
to develop methods of restricting the number of cases being brought. The case of 
o 'Neill v Phillips played a major role in restricting the ease and simplicity of pursing an 
unfairly prejudicial case. 
The Chapter discussed the attempts by the Law Commission and the Company Law 
Review Group to diagnose the causes of certain failings in the functioning of minority 
shareholder protection in common law and in the statute. From their findings, they 
concluded that the rules under common law were complicated and not sufficiently wide 
and, therefore, they recommended replacing common law with a new derivative 
procedure with more modem, flexible and accessible criteria. They also delivered 
certain recommendations and proposals regarding s459, "unfair prejudice". 
It has been shown that the Companies Act 2006 introduced a statutory derivative action 
that is flexible, and that can be brought not only in respect of fraud, but also of other 
misconduct. The Act has also empowered the court to grant permission to proceed an 
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action after subjecting the claim to certain filtering processes to ensure that no misuse or 
abuse of the action is allowed. Although it can be claimed that the statutory derivative 
action has introduced flexibility and guidance, the chapter has highlighted certain 
matters which still require reform. 
It has been also demonstrated in this section that the Companies Act 2006 has not 
introduced any change to the position of unfair prejudice, but rather has transferred s459 
of the Companies Act 1985 as it is to s994 of the new Act. This means that the Act has 
not addressed the deficiency and uncertainty which the Law Commission and Company 
Law Review emphasised under s459 and, thus, many recommendations and proposals 
seem to have been ignored. 
200 
Chapter 6 
Solving the problems of Saudi Arabia and Dubai 
Introduction: 
After having diagnosed where the problems lie and identifying the weak and inefficient 
aspects of minority shareholder protection in SA and Dubai in chapter 3 and 4, it is now 
important to offer appropriate and workable refonns. At this stage, the research should 
be able to prescribe changes in minority shareholder protection in SA and Dubai that 
address identified problems and flaws, and it will do so by taking some inspiration from 
the UK experience. As has been discussed in previous chapters, the UK minority 
shareholder protection system has gone through many revolutionary stages which have 
improved its functions and practicalities to the extent that it can now be confidently 
taken as a guide for any jurisdiction that seeks to refonn the law in this respect. What 
makes UK company law advantageous is that it has been the subject of a great deal of 
investigation as attempts have been made to discover what is, in practice, most 
appropriate, before refonn has been implemented. Consequently, UK minority 
shareholder protection does not offer theoretical recommendations or hypothetical 
proposals that are far-removed from reality. For UK protection to arrive at this level of 
sophistication in protecting minority shareholders, numerous devices and mechanisms 
have been tested thoroughly to see which can offer real protection and which cannot. 
Therefore, it is thought that, if any developing jurisdiction seeks to refonn its law in this 
respect, it will be much better for it to learn from the valuable experience of UK law, 
rather than starting again "from scratch". UK protection may offer a strong foundation 
for any jurisdiction which seeks to engage in refonning its minority shareholder 
protection. 
As outlined above, Saudi and Dubai legislators may, when refonning their minority 
shareholder protection, be able to learn from the UK experience and study its practice in 
order to see what can be borrowed or adopted. However, this is not to say that the two 
jurisdictions should follow the UK example blindly and take whatever UK law offers, 
because, as has been shown in chapter 5, UK law still carries a certain degree of 
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deficiency, and SA and Dubai are jurisdictions with very different legal systems. 
Instead, this chapter will indicate which statutory provisions can be adopted and to what 
extent they need adaptation for effective and efficient application in SA and Dubai. To 
put it another way, this chapter will demonstrate the possibility and probability of SA 
and Dubai borrowing and adopting certain devices and mechanisms from those 
workable, practical and actionable remedies under UK law, in any future reform of their 
company law.791 
This chapter is divided into a number of sections, each one addressing an existing 
problem within minority shareholder protection in SA and Dubai. Once the problem is 
identified and diagnosed, the same section will outline how UK law can address it and 
to what extent it can do so. Thus, an overview of the problems in SA is given in the first 
section, while the second section focuses on the problem of having no statutory 
provisions, its effect and how to solve it. The next section attempts to draw a balance 
between the wish of judges to have unrestricted discretion and the necessity to have a 
statutory footing to regulate minority shareholder protection. The fourth section deals 
with the problem of costs when litigating and the fifth section discusses how Saudi and 
Dubai law should adopt grounds which permit the shareholder to bring proceedings for 
harm done to their personal interests and what needs to be adapted for these to become 
more workable. The next section reveals the rights and interests of the minority 
shareholder which SA and Dubai should include in their statutes. The seventh section 
discusses certain alternative remedies that may support the statute in providing efficient 
protection, and the eighth recommends Dubai company law, in particular, to follow the 
recommendations and proposals which have been delivered by this research. The final 
section is the conclusion. 
6.1 Outlining the Saudi problem: 
It is important to begin this chapter by recapping the current position of Saudi law in 
regard to protecting minority shareholders. Saudi company law was enacted in 1965 and 
therefore came into force prior to the recent explosion of commercial activity in the 
country. The provisions which specifically deal with minority shareholders in private 
791 What makes this research so unique and valuable are the reliable results of the empirical study, which 
was conducted in SA to investigate the doctrine of minority shareholder protection in practice. 
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companies are very few, incomplete and afford little or no protection.792 For example, 
there is a statutory provision which gives the minority shareholder the right to complain 
to majority shareholders over any conduct, and it is then for the majority shareholders to 
decide whether the action complained about should be ratified or not,793 meaning that 
the law here entitles the majority shareholders to act as judges in their own case.794 It 
also restricts complaints to being made prior to the completion of the conduct; otherwise 
the minority shareholder's right to complain is denied. This provision, then, is 
deliberately designed to keep power and control over the company's affairs in the hands 
of the majority shareholders. 
Another example which proves the deficiency of the law in this respect is when Saudi 
law allows minority shareholders to bring a legal action against the directors of the 
company (who in most private companies are the majority shareholders) if they are 
acting or are about to act ultra vires or illegally (especially outside its corporate 
objectives).795 However, the law does not clarify who can act on behalf of the company 
in such cases, and also does not specify the options which may be available for the 
minority shareholder if the company does not intend to pursue any compensation. A 
further example which highlights the absence of practical protection is seen when the 
law gives minority shareholders the right to advise and recommend matters to directors 
(majority shareholders), 796 but without stating how to do so, and without clarifying 
which action can be brought if the majority shareholder does not take the advice on 
board and damage is done as a result. The same provision gives all shareholders 
(including the minority) the right to access, on request or by themselves, any type of 
information, statistics, data and reports that are relevant to the company's affairs. 797 
However, the statute does not provide a mechanism to indicate which procedures to 
follow in making such a request. Furthermore, the statute does not specify which 
792 See Chapter 3, Section 3.2. In this section the current position of the law when it comes to minority 
shareholder protection has been discussed in detail. 
793 s28 of the Saudi Company Law 1965. It is important to note that the statute here does not define the 
types of conduct which the majority has authority upon and to what extent. It i~ also not clear for the 
minority shareholder as to when he/she can involve the court in disputes or complamts. 
794 See Chapter 2, Section 2.1.4. 
795 See Chapter 3, Section 3.2. . 
796 s24 of the Saudi Company Law 1965. This right entitles minority shareholders, who are non-drrectors, 
to have their say on matters related to the company even if they are not directors. 
797 s24 of the Saudi Company Law 1965. 
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grounds the shareholder should rely on or even which remedies are available when 
prosecuting such a claim. 
Although Sharia law contains some principles that may protect minority shareholders 
from potential abuse or misuse, it merely provides general and indirect principles, 
leaving the detailed mechanisms, devices, legal grounds and remedies for the statute to 
formulate according to the requirements of contemporary commercial and company 
I 798 Th d fi " ... h aw. us any e clency m protectmg mmonty s areholders in private companies is 
not attributable to Shari a (as its role is to provide general principles, not specific detail, 
when it comes to company law).799 It is, rather, the statute that is to blame for not giving 
much more detail and for not providing remedial mechanisms. 
Having examined what is relevant to the protection of minority shareholders in the 
Saudi statute, it can be claimed that there are many circumstances which the Saudi 
statute does not address clearly or at all, such as abuse of power, negligence, breach of 
duty, fraud, expropriation, or oppression, when committed by directors or majority 
shareholders. In fact, it is believed that the current statute, rather than offering legal 
assistance, guidance and protection to minority shareholders, has served to increase the 
degree of difficulty and confusion, not only among potential foreign shareholders, but 
also among Saudis.8oo In reality, most of the statutory provisions have weak 
characteristics and so cannot protect minority shareholders appropriately. Thus, the 
Saudi statute creates overlaps that lead to inconsistency and uncertainty when it comes 
to minority shareholder protection since there is no statutory guidance as to the grounds 
on which the minority shareholder may bring an action. Furthermore, no remedies are 
identified for the minority shareholder to use when misconduct occurs in the company, 
and harms the minority, and accordingly the Saudi statute does not guarantee the 
minimum required protection for minority shareholders. 
As a result of the lack of effective protection offered by the Saudi statute, it is 
undeniable that Saudi minority shareholder protection is wholly lacking from top to 
798 See Chapter 3, Section 3.3.5, where the role of Sharia in protecting minority shareholder has been 
discussed in full. 
799 Although Sharia seems only to provide general principles when it comes to company law and its 
functions, Sharia provides full detail and complete guidelines when it comes, for example, to family law 
or inheritance. 
800 See Chapter 3, Section 3.2. 
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bottom, starting with the failure to recognize the rights and interests of minority 
shareholders and ending with the lack of remedies for them to use when necessary. In 
effect, it is found that out-dated Saudi company laws obstruct minority shareholder 
protection and contain gaps which may result in uncertainty, ambiguity and even 
injustice.8ol This means that Saudi law is not suitable for dealing with contemporary 
corporate issues, especially in relation to protection of minority shareholders in private 
compames. 
This chapter aims to examine ways of creating a system that deals justly and fairly with 
the protection of the minority shareholder in SA (and also Dubai), and it is believed that 
this can be achieved by following in the footsteps of the Anglo-Saxon model as long as 
it does not contradict Sharia principles or critical legal, cultural or political constraints. It 
is also believed that minority shareholder protection in SA and Dubai cannot be subject 
only to general principles or commercial conventions any longer; it has now become 
necessary to solve the problems and provide a thorough and effective protection. 802 
Every proposed solution to the problem of protection in SA emanates from UK law, 
which is a leading model amongst Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions, but certain adaptations are 
suggested so that their particular problems may be dealt with appropriately. 
6.2 The problem of having no statutory provisions 
The first problem is that, while it has been proven803 that, indeed, minority shareholders 
in SA and Dubai do face certain types of misconduct from majority shareholders in 
private companies when the latter commit fraud, abuse, infringement of rights, 
negligence, breaches of duties and trust, unfair prejudice and oppression, there is no 
codified statutory system to protect minority shareholders against each and every one of 
these types of misconduct. The types of misconduct are similar to those which exist 
under UK law, but what differs is that Saudi and Dubai laws lack statutory grounds that 
can enable the minority shareholder to pursue every instance of wrongdoing. Another 
negative impact which comes from the lack of having a codified system to regulate 
minority shareholder protection is the confusion that minority shareholders face in 
801 See Chapter 3, Section 3.3 .6, where the role of the company statute in regulating protection alongside 
Sharia is explained. 
802 See Chapter 3, Section 3.3.6. 
803 See Chapter 3, section 3.3.1.1, and also 3.6.2. 
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understanding the difference between corporate and personal actions. This confusion 
occurs in SA and Dubai because there is no clarity as to what each action (corporate and 
personal) serves. As previously mentioned, minority shareholder protection in SA and 
Dubai cannot merely be subject to general principles or commercial conventions any 
longer, as it has now become clear that the absence of a detailed statutory code leads to 
uncertainty and ambiguity. It was ascertained from the empirical study that certain 
commercial practitioners (among them lawyers) did not know the potential grounds 
which may be used when seeking to remedy a wrong committed against the 
804 Th' . b h' h . I company. IS IS ecause t eng t IS not c early stated in the statute in a way that is 
accessible to the minority shareholder. There is therefore a necessity to codify minority 
shareholder protection in the company law statute.805 Thus, it is strongly recommended 
that SA and Dubai company law introduce a comprehensive statutory code that can 
provide for minority shareholder protection and manage its grounds and actions. 
UK law has produced such a code by designing five different actions, mostly statutory, 
that guide the minority shareholder to establish specific grounds and meet certain 
requirements when wishing to remedy a particular case of misconduct. In fact, having 
statutory footings also provides efficient guidance and direction to directors, 
shareholders, lawyers, and even judges.806 In both SA and Dubai, codification would 
allow courts to be deeply involved, with much greater confidence, in all commercial 
disputes between shareholders, and not only where there is clear fraud as in current 
practice. Codification would also help to promote understanding of the idea of litigating 
on behalf of the company and for its interests, something which UK law has offered 
through derivative actions, but SA and Dubai lack. 807 Thus, the best way to solve this 
lack of codification of minority shareholder protection in both SA and Dubai is to learn 
from the UK statute and see which of its features can be adopted. The table below 
contains a summary of the UK actions to show how each one functions, what it services 
and requires, and what remedy it offers. In fact, this information could provide Saudi 
and Dubai law-makers with a much better understanding of how to codify their laws. 
804Chapter 4, Sections 4.4.4. 
805 F, Almajid., A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the Corporate Governance of Saudi Publicly 
Held Companies: A Comparative and Analytical Study from a Legal Perspective. Ph.D Thesis. 2008. 
University of Manchester: UK. at 166. 
806 J, Sykes., The continuing paradox: a critique of minority shareholder and derivative claims under the 
Companies Act 2006, Civil Justice Quarterly. 2010,29 (2), pg: 214. 
807 See Chapter 4, Section 4.3.1.1, and also 4.4.4. 
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UK minority shareholder protection 
I I I I 1 
Action: Personal Statutory Unfair Winding-up 
actions derivative prejudice 
Investigation of the 
order s122 
under action s260 s994 Insolvency Act 
company and its 
Common Law 1986 
affairs by the 
Secretary of State 
s431 of CA 1985 
Serves: The minority The company's The interest of The minority The company and its 
personally interests the minority shareholder shareholders. Usually made 
shareholder in relation to public, not 
private, companies. 
Grounds: Ultra vires, Fraud, The company's The action is If directors or majority 
failing to negligence, affairs are being pursued when shareholders have been 
meet a default, breach or have been there is a guilty of fraud, 
requirement of duty, or conducted in a breakdown the in misfeasance or other 
of special or breach of trust. manner which is relationship or misconduct towards the 
extraordinary unfairly confidence and company or its members. 
resolution, or prejudicial to trust between Or if the company's 
infringement. the member's shareholders. members are not given 
interest. all the information about 
its affairs which they 
might reasonably expect. 
Requirements: The minority Prima facie He/she needs to The minority 
The application shall be 
shareholder case. establish that shareholder needs supported by such 
only needs to Clean hands. the conduct of to establish that it evidence as the Secretary 
establish that Obtain the majority is just and of State requires. The 
he has been permission to shareholder is equitable to wind applicant must have 
personally proceed with the unfairly up the company. good reason for 
harmed to claim. prejudicial to requiring the 
pursue this his/her interests. investigation. 
action. 
Remedy or Personal Damages go to Regulate the Winding up the 
Give information as to 
damages: damages to be the company conduct. company those interested in 
awarded to Require the shares, etc. 
minority company to Impose restrictions on 
shareholder refrain from action. shares and debentures 
Authorize civil 
proceedings 
(derivative 
action). 
Order of purchase 
by other members 
or by the 
company itself 
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It is important to note that none of the UK remedies, in the table above, are explicitly 
stated in either the Saudi or Dubai company statutes. However, a number of participants 
in the empirical study confirmed that similar remedies are available under the Saudi 
judicial system, but are known by other names (and one may assume, similarly, that this 
is most probably the case for Dubai).808 For example, the empirical study shows that the 
idea of taking personal action because of unfair prejudice does currently exist, but is not 
codified. Interestingly, interviewees in the empirical study, despite being selected on the 
basis that they were likely to be in very close contact with the law and its 
implementation in this area, were not able to agree on the availability of such personal 
actions, nor on which remedies exist in relation to them. This strongly suggests that 
there is something missing from the SA and Dubai statutes, whose function should be to 
provide guidance as to what remedies are available, and which of them are most 
appropriate in any particular case. Thus, it is thought that the UK approach may provide 
the organisation needed if it were adopted. 
A significant advantage which stands to be gained in SA and Dubai if a codified system 
is adopted is that minority shareholders will be prevented from becoming confused as to 
the correct titles of remedies. This is important since the empirical study proved that 
participants (including judges) were attributing many different descriptions to a 
particular remedy.809 From a practical point of view, this inconsistency of nomenclature 
must have a negative effect and cause confusion for everyone dealing with minority 
shareholder protection.810 This is not to say that the Saudi and Dubai laws should adopt 
exactly the same names as the UK actions, but rather to say that the two jurisdictions 
clearly need to make a formal distinction between actions, to enable minority 
shareholders to differentiate between them and succeed in choosing to exercise the most 
appropriate one for each case. 
All these existing problems which have been identified in minority shareholder 
protection in both SA and Dubai most probably stem from a lack of clarity, guidance 
808 The results of the empirical study regarding this issue were analysed in Chapter 4 Section 4.3.3.3. 
809 Also see Chapter 4 Section 4.3.3.3. 
810 See Chapter 4 Section 4.3.3.3. To de~~nstrate that there is so m~ch. confusio~ when it comes to .na~es 
of the actions, participants in the empmcal study agreed that a slmll~r functIOn to the UK denvatIve 
action existed under Saudi law, but they differed in the names they gave It. 
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and criteria in the statute. Thus, even if the Saudi system does have certain existing 
d· " I' 811 reme les, as some mtervlewees c mm, they are worthless if not systematically 
organised on a statutory footing in a way which simplifies their application and ensures 
that all minority shareholders are able to exercise the actions properly. Therefore, it is 
suggested that the two jurisdictions under discussion need, at the outset, to borrow the 
actions in the table above so they can be codified in any future reform. 
Nonetheless, this borrowing of UK actions cannot take place without considering what 
would work if adopted completely and what would first require certain adaptations for it 
to become workable. As mentioned previously, SA and Dubai may only adopt a reform 
that is compliant with their needs, traditions, customs, norms, ethics, principles, values, 
standards and, above all, with Shari a, so any adoptable model should be altered in 
accordance with these standards first. Thus, the following sections will outline the 
adaptations which need to be applied to any adoption of the UK actions in order to 
produce a code that is suitable for SA and Dubai. 
6.3 The problem of restricting judges' discretion: 
The empirical study seems to suggest that judges, amongst others, see no reason for the 
need to codify minority shareholder protection. This may be because judges believe that 
it is always better for grounds to remain unlimited, rather than restricting the minority 
shareholder to attributing certain causes to certain grounds. Surprisingly, judges hold 
the belief that the current situation in SA allows the minority shareholder to pursue any 
matter that he/she is not satisfied with, and it will then be up to the court to investigate 
it.812 However, judges are not aware that such a situation can cause problems and 
confusion. This is because if all cases are only subject to the judges' discretion, there 
will never be an understanding of why one minority shareholder's claim is successful, 
and why another is not. It is also important to note that even if a judge allows a minority 
shareholder to bring a matter to the court's attention according to his discretion, it is still 
not clear by what criteria or on what grounds the minority shareholder may do so. 
811 See the table in Chapter 4, Section 4.3.3.3. 
812 See Chapter 3, Section 3.4.4. 
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In sum, judges in SA tend to be moved to support the argument against making specific 
grounds and remedies under the statute, especially regarding actions on behalf of the 
company because they feel that if all remedies were specified and stated under the 
statute, they would be restricted to these grounds and remedies and could not go beyond 
them when required to deliver justice. They also believe that the current position gives 
more room for discretion because remedies and their functions are not taken from the 
statute, but from general Islamic jurisprudence, justice, fairness and commercial 
conventions, which enable them to apply more remedies and bring justice to more cases 
on broader terms. 813 However, this point, in particular, has been discussed in the English 
case of O'Neill v Phillipi 14 where Lord Hoffmann emphasises that a balance has to be 
struck between the breadth of the discretion given to the court and the principle of legal 
certainty. He also states that it is highly desirable that lawyers are able to advise their 
clients as to whether or not a petition is likely to succeed. Accordingly, if no statute is in 
place to provide guidance, a greater lack of consistency in the courts' decisions can be 
expected compared with where there are well-drafted statutory provisions. 
It is thought that the best way to balance these two different interests (namely, 
specifying grounds and remedies in the statute, and giving discretion to judges) is by 
adopting the grounds designed by the UK statutory derivative action when dealing with 
cases related to the company's interests, but not restricting judges to them exclusively. 
The grounds which Saudi and Dubai law should consider adopting are: fraud, 
negligence and breach of duty and trust. However, the adaptation is that the courts 
should not only apply these grounds, but some room would be granted in the statute for 
the courts to develop and create other grounds that are not specified in the statute but, 
nevertheless, would be required by justice. This combination of specifying some 
grounds and allowing some discretion is very likely to satisfy judges in SA and Dubai 
since the new statute would not stop them drawing on the long heritage of traditional 
principles to develop new ones when needed. It may seem odd to consider that any 
proposed law should have to satisfy the judges, particularly in SA. However, it is not 
being claimed that judges' satisfaction is a goal which the law in SA should primarily 
be concerned with, but rather it is recognised that judges in SA are acting as guardians 
813 This impression was taken from judges ~ho were intervie~ed in the empirical study. Analysis of their 
responses and their opinions was delivered m Chapter 4, SectIon 4.4.4. 
814 [1999] 1 WLR 1092. 
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of Sharia and the proposal ensures that any new law does not restrict justice and 
fairness, and, of course, any company law must be compatible with Sharia. In practice, 
however, judges may find themselves not using their discretion to develop new grounds, 
because almost all the grounds will already be specified if SA and Dubai adopt the 
statutory derivative action found under UK law. 
6.4 The problem of costs: 
It has become evident (after examining the statutes and analysing the empirical study) 
that current SA and Dubai laws (even the proposed Bills)815 have not clearly addressed 
the issue of costs, and therefore many questions are left unanswered when it comes to 
funding the claim of a minority shareholder, especially in relation to derivative actions. 
For instance, who pays the costs of litigation? How should indemnity costs be paid? At 
what stage of the litigation should indemnity be granted? Is the court empowered to 
order the company to fund claims? To what extent should the company become 
financially involved in disputes between shareholders? 
It is true to say that the courts in both SA and Dubai tend to apply a principle similar to 
that found in the English case of Smith v Croft816 when dealing with indemnity, or 
indeed are stricter, as they almost never grant indemnity orders at an early stage and 
very rarely grant a costs order to the shareholder at the end of proceedings, even if the 
minority shareholder succeeds. It is not an exaggeration to say that many minority 
shareholders do not want to risk their own time and funds in proceeding with actions, 
when the result in terms of pecuniary recovery is always uncertain in SA and Dubai. 
Therefore, it is thought that both Saudi and Dubai laws need to adopt this concept of 
indemnity in more detail, but not with the strict application provided for Smith v Croft· 
As mentioned in previous chapters, UK company law has addressed the costs issue in 
more detail than SA and Dubai laws, so it is logical that SA and Dubai should seek to 
learn from the UK experience. However, this is not to say that UK law has addressed all 
the issues regarding indemnity perfectly, but rather to say that, in order for SA and 
Dubai to improve their indemnity provisions, they may receive guidance from UK law. 
815 See Chapter 3, Section 3.4, and 3.5.4. ., 
816 (No.2) [1988] Ch. 114. See comments and analysis ofthis case III Chapter 5, SectIOn 5.1.1.2.3. 
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In fact, it is evident that UK law does not seem to offer a clear solution to the indemnity 
problem,817 as the recent Companies Act 2006 omits a critical procedure upon which 
many cases may depend.818 As a consequence, the majority shareholders, under UK law, 
know that there is only a small risk of an action being brought against them due to the 
heavy financial burden it entails, and at the same time the court is reluctant to order the 
company to indemnify the minority shareholder.819 Equally, this scenario exists in SA 
and Dubai. 
Thus, it is suggested that any reformed statute in SA and Dubai should entitle the 
minority shareholder in a derivative action to be indemnified by the company once it is 
determined that he/she is acting in the company's interests, and any benefits from the 
litigation would go to the company itself. Of course, this is not to say that the minority 
shareholder should be entitled to indemnity as soon as they purport to represent the 
company, but the courts in both jurisdictions should have discretion as to how and when 
to apply the indemnity rule and in deciding who is entitled to obtain it. Thus, the statute 
should include the right to indemnity, but make the issue of how to enforce it subject to 
the judges' discretion. Subsequently, the statutory rule should be that the minority 
shareholder has a right to be indemnified by the company when representing it in a 
derivative action, unless it is clear that the action brought is unnecessary, which, of 
course, is ultimately an issue for the court to decide.82o If this rule is adopted in any new 
statute in SA and Dubai, it will be similar to the rule in the English case of 
Wallersteiner v Moir821 which held that the minority shareholder should be indemnified 
regardless of the outcome, because he/she is acting in the company's interest, and any 
benefit from the action will go to the company itself. 
6.5 The need for establishing personal grounds as a basis for minority 
shareholder action: 
817 See some analysis of the current position of indemnity under the Companies Act 2006 in Chapter 5, 
Section 5.3.1.(f). . 
818 A, Reisberg., Derivative Actions and Funding Problem: The Way Forward, Journal of Busmess Law, 
2006, (August), pg: 452. ., . 
819 J, Sykes., The continuing paradox: a critique of minority shareholder and denvative claIms under the 
Companies Act 2006, Civil Justice Quarterly. 2010,29 (2), pg: 226. 
820 See Chapter 5, Section 5.1.1.2.3. 
821 [1975] QB 373. 
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The empirical study demonstrated that there is a need in SA for the specification of 
grounds which can enable the minority shareholder to bring an action when hislher 
personal interests in the company are dealt with in an unfairly prejudicial way.822 If SA 
and Dubai genuinely intend to reform their minority shareholder protection effectively, 
they should not only give consideration to grounds and actions related to the company's 
interests, but also to grounds and actions that relate to the minority shareholder 
personally, in order to allow the minority shareholder to protect hislher own rights and 
interests in the company, for the reasons given in Chapter 2. UK law, which acts as a 
role model in this research, has designed a statutory action under s994 that deals with 
this particular concern and could be adopted by both Saudi and Dubai law. However, 
there are certain adaptations which would need to be made to this section, not only to fit 
within the two jurisdictions' commercial environments, but also because UK law in this 
respect is surrounded by ambiguities and difficulties. It is evident that this section 
provides little coherent guidance for UK courts to follow (as discussed in Chapter 5).823 
Therefore, in order to make it workable and actionable in SA and Dubai, and also to 
allow these two jurisdictions to derive maximum benefit, there are some amendments 
and modifications which should be made to it first. 
First of all, it is believed that once the unfair prejudice petition is adopted, other 
personal actions, of the type which exist under UK common law, do not need to be 
included in separate provisions. Although personal action under UK common law is 
generally wider than unfair prejudice (as it may protect a wider array of shareholder 
rights provided for in the statute, such as the right to enforcement of the terms of the 
articles of association or the right to pursue dividends that have been declared), the 
proposed version of unfair prejudice for SA and Dubai, is modified to also cover these 
interests and rights. It is better for SA and Dubai only to have one action which serves 
such interests and rights because, if two similar actions were to operate at the same 
time, people would be likely to find themselves confused, especially in SA and Dubai 
where minority shareholder protection is being introduced for the first time. In other 
words, it is thought that it is better to select only one action to operate, but one which 
will operate widely. Thus, whichever interests and rights relate to the minority 
822 See Chapter 4, Sections 4.3.3.3. 
823 See Chapter 5, Section 5.3.2. 
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shareholder personally, the new proposed version of unfair prejudice should be broad 
enough to cover them.824 
Secondly, Saudi and Dubai laws should adopt UK unfair prejudice but provide greater 
flexibility. This can be done by entitling the minority shareholder to bring a legal action 
against a wide range of conduct, without having strict requirements to meet. 825 It is 
believed that Saudi and Dubai laws should not apply the same harsh restrictions as in 
UK law, which requires that the conduct complained of must be both unfair and 
prejudicial. 826 In reality, the conduct may be unfair without being prejudicial or 
prejudicial without being unfair, but under UK company law it is not sufficient for the 
conduct to satisfy only one of these - it must be both unfair and prejudicial. However, it 
is thought that the Saudi and Dubai statutes should enable the minority shareholder to 
litigate against a wide range of conduct, leaving the court to have discretion in deciding 
whether or not the claim is legitimate and valid. In other words, the Saudi and Dubai 
courts should allow a petition that is only unfair to the interests of the minority 
shareholder but not prejudicial, and vice versa. For such a new version of unfair 
prejudice to work in SA and Dubai, the courts will need to apply the unfairness test and 
if the conduct amounts to unfairness towards the minority shareholder, then the 
shareholder should be allowed to initiate proceedings. However, one of the dangers with 
this could be that nonsense claims could proliferate and so the courts would need to use 
a great deal of discretion to prevent such claims. 
Thirdly, the SA and Dubai laws should adopt speedy and economically attractive exit 
routes which would allow the minority shareholder to leave the company with shares of 
an undiscounted value.827 It is agreed that the exit option is indeed the main concern of 
s994 of the UK law but, unfortunately, while providing for flexibility, UK law does not 
provide a clear procedural mechanism, particularly for exiting.828 Surprisingly, even the 
824 In fact it is believed that even the personal actions under UK. common law may be gradually 
abandoned' as personal grounds, in practice, may be better served by other remedies, such as the s994 
unfair prejudice petition as mentioned in B, Hannigan., Company Law. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009. pg: 465. Also see Chapter 4, Section 4.3.1.(f). ., 
825 It is believed that this is the best way for unfair prejudice to operate in both SA and Dubal, as long as It 
is up to the court to judge whether the claim is valid and legitimate. . .. . 
826 Judges in UK. cases stressed that the conduct being complained of must be. both prejudICIal and unfaIr 
in order to comply with the requirements of th: provision. See Chapter. 4, S~ctlOn 4.1.2.4. 
827 A, Dignam. & J, Lowry., Company Law. 5 ed. O~ord: Oxford Umverslty Press, 2~09. pg: 236. 
828 P, Davies., Principles of Modern Company Law. 8 ed. Sweet & Maxwell. 2008, pg. 707. 
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compulsory purchase under s996 is not a right, but only a discretionary remedy that 
minority shareholders cannot insist upon.829 However, the SA and Dubai statutes should 
facilitate the exit of a minority shareholder from a private company following a dispute, 
without the need to litigate. This adaptation in particular would seem to be workable if 
adopted in SA and Dubai because, if their statutes had a clear exit mechanism for use 
when needed, the shareholder would not be affected by having to go to the court to seek 
such an exit even if there was an existing dispute. This can be done, for example, if the 
statute provides a clear route to exit the company by stating that the minority 
shareholder should give notice to the majority shareholder by declaring hislher intention 
to the board to exit the company (three months) in advance. Then, if this period ends 
without himlher obtaining an offer from the majority shareholder to purchase the shares, 
the minority shareholder should be allowed to search for an outside buyer for another 
limited period. If no outside buyer wishes to buy the minority shares, the statute should 
allow the minority shareholder to seek a winding-up order. However, disputes may arise 
between shareholders as to the value of shares so the courts could step in, valuing the 
shares according to their market value, or may direct the shareholders to specialised 
professionals who could also value the shares fairly. Therefore, the minority shareholder 
should always have the right to be bought out with an undiscounted value of shares if 
he/she was somehow forced to leave the company.830 The burden of proof is on the 
minority shareholder to show that he/she is indeed being forced to leave the company 
rather than simply leaving ofhislher own free will. 
The fourth adaptation concerns the fact that, despite having shown that the winding-up 
remedy does exist in SA, the majority of interviewees in the empirical study were 
mistaken in believing that it was not available in the Saudi system.831 In fact, the 
interviewees were not only mistaken in not recognising its availability but, interestingly, 
ld 832 Th·· ·fi . they also did not want it to be available to minority shareho ers. elr Jush cahon 
829 For example, in Phoenix Office Supplies Ltd, Re [2003] 1 B.C.L.C. 76, CA,. the Court of Appeal 
rejected the minority shareholder's claims to have his shares purchased at an undlscounted value., ev~n 
though he was removed from management by the majority shareholder, who breached the mmonty 
shareholder's legitimate expectation. ..
830 See Chapter 4, Section 4.3.1.6, where a discussion has been undertaken regardmg. the need ~or Saudi 
law and any jurisdiction alike to offer an exit strategy to the minority shareholder with an undlscounted 
value. . th· d· 
831 The empirical study showed that two-thirds (68%) of all interviewees did not beheve that e wm mg 
uB order existed as a remedy in the Saudi commercial environment. 
8 2 See Chapter 4, Section 4.3.3.3. 
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was similar to that expressed by Dignam and Lowry833 regarding the inclusion of the 
winding-up remedy in the UK's s996. Dignam and Lowry argue that the facts which 
satisfy the grounds and tests under s994 are different from the grounds and tests under 
the winding-up remedy. They also think that, if adopted, it would allow minority 
shareholders to put the maximum amount of pressure possible on the majority 
shareholders to enforce their wishes, thus enabling minority shareholders to destabilize 
b · 834 S' '1 1 h' usmesses. Iml ar y, over two t lrds of the interviewees in SA thought that there 
would be no benefit in codifying the winding-up order in the Saudi system, as it would 
grant minority shareholders a very powerful weapon which has great potential for abuse. 
Nonetheless, the position taken here is that the remedy of winding-up should be 
available in SA, as long as the court has total control over it. This can be done if there is 
a requirement for the court's leave to be obtained before a winding-up order can be 
sought. 835 It is assumed that once the seeking of a winding-up remedy is subject to the 
court's leave, nonsense claims are likely to be eliminated, as the court will refuse 
permission if it is found that the minority shareholder sought the remedy only to apply 
unjustified pressure on the majority shareholder or was acting unreasonably in seeking 
such a claim.836 It can be argued that minority shareholders could still use the winding-
up remedy as a pressure tactic to force the majority shareholder to obey their demands. 
However, the court's discretion should always make the winding-up order a last resort, 
since the court has to insist on all other remedies first (for example the buyout order), 
and will only allow it if all other remedies are deemed not applicable. Therefore, if this 
adaptation is followed in SA and Dubai law, the concerns that adding the winding-up 
remedy to those available under unfair prejudice may shake the stability of companies, 
seem to be overstated. 
A fifth proposal is that, even though Saudi and Dubai laws should borrow the concept 
of legitimate expectations from the UK system in relation to unfair prejudice claims, 
833 A, Dignam. & J, Lowry., Company Law. 5th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. pg: 231 & 
232. & 
834 A, Dignam. & J, Lowry., Company Law. 5th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. pg: 231 
232. . bl . d' th 
835 R, Cheung., The statutory minority remedies of unfair prejudic~ and just and eqUIta e ~m mg up: e 
UK Law Commission's recommendations as models for reform m Hong Kong, InternatIOnal Company 
and Commercial Law Review. 2008, 19(5), pg: 160 & 161. . ' . 
836 R, Cheung., The statutory minority remedies of unfair prejudic~ and just and eqUItable ~mdmg up: the 
UK Law Commission's recommendations as models for reform m Hong Kong, InternatIOnal Company 
and Commercial Law Review. 2008, 19(5), pg: 160 & 161. 
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certain modifications should be made to it. At present in SA and Dubai, only formal and 
written agreements between shareholders are recognised by the courts, which are very 
reluctant to recognise incomplete or informal agreements, even when there is evidence 
of legitimate expectation at the time of investing in the company. Although the UK 
concept of legitimate expectation is an important feature which protects the interests of 
the minority shareholder, it is surrounded by ambiguity in practice. Therefore, for SA 
and Dubai to adopt it, there should be an elimination of reliance on terms that are not 
clearly defined, such as "good faith".837 It was Lord Hoffmann (when examining the 
conduct in the English case of 0 'Neill v Phillipi 38) who used the term 'good faith' 
several times to replace terms like 'just', 'equitable' and 'unfairness'. 839 He introduced 
'good faith' by stating that "unfairness may consist in a breach of the rules or in using 
the rules in a manner which equity would regard as contrary to good faith". 840 However, 
this application of the term 'good faith' has encountered a great deal of criticism based 
on the argument that it is not practical. For this reason, the new version of legitimate 
expectation which should be adopted by SA and Dubai ought to exclude the term 'good 
faith' or any other imprecise terms.841 This adaptation of the legitimate expectation 
would not make Saudi and Dubai courts recognise any other right or obligation for 
shareholders other than what both (minority and majority) really intended to assume.842 
Therefore, the Saudi and Dubai statutes, when adopting legitimate expectation, should 
give a broader meaning to it in order to reflect all parties' objective intentions at the 
time of setting up the company and while running it, even if the agreements are 
. I . c. I 843 mcomp ete or In.LOrma . 
837 B, Means., Contractual Approach to shareholder Oppression Law, The Fordham Law ~eview. 20~0, 
79(3), pg: 41. The author has suggested that the equitabl~ contract t~eory should fun~tton al~n~~Ide 
reasonable expectation in order to eliminate, as much as pOSSIble, the relIance on the term good faIth ,as 
it is not clearly defined. 
838 [1999] 1 WLR 1092. 
839 See Chapter 5, Section 5.1.2.9.3. 
840 O'Neill v Phillips [1999] 1 WLR 1092, pg: 1099 & 1100. " 
841 See Chapter 5, Section 5.1.2.9.3., where the arguments against Lord Hoffmann s suggestIOn of 
applying "good faith" have been discussed. . ' . . 
842 Robert in (A, Robert., Shareholder Rights and Remedies in Close CorporatIOns: OppressIOn, FIdUCIary 
Duties, and Reasonable Expectation, 2003. In: B, Means., Contractual Approa~~ to sharehol~er 
Oppression Law, The Fordham Law Review. 2010, 79(3), pg: 42.) ~as ~aid that UK le~ItImate ex~ectatlon 
functions in a way that may lead COurts to only consider the mmonty shareholder s expectatIons and 
neglect the expectations of the majority shareholders. . 
843 B, Means., Contractual Approach to shareholder Oppression Law, The Fordham Law Review. 2010, 
79(3), pg:42. 
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The sixth adaptation relates to the use of unfair preiudice to remed t ~ Y a corpora e wrong. 
It has been observed in English cases such as Callard v Pringle844 and 0 'Donnell v 
Shanahan
845 
that the minority shareholders preferred to use s994 to remedy corporate 
wrongs which also had the potential to be brought by way of derivative action. 
Therefore, it seems that the use of s994 is still favourable in the UK environment, not 
only to serve the criteria under s994, but also to achieve all that can be achieved by the 
statutory derivative action, and more. 846 This particular point is illustrated in 
Gamlestaden F astigheter AB v Baltic Partners Ltd,847 where the minority shareholder 
brought a s994 petition regarding a wrong committed against the company (which was a 
classic derivative action), but the court allowed the claim and, although the majority 
shareholder applied to strike out the claim on the basis that s994 should benefit only the 
minority shareholder in his capacity as a member, the majority shareholder was ordered 
to pay damages to the company. Thus, under the UK system, it can be claimed that s994 
unfair prejudice will still protect personal and corporate rights and interests. 848 
Nonetheless, there is no clear guidance for UK courts that can be followed when 
applying s994 for corporate relief. 849 So if SA and Dubai were to precisely mirror the 
UK application of s994 in remedying corporate wrong (i.e. derivative action), there 
would be a high possibility of creating confusion rather than offering a worthwhile 
reform. It is always much better for each action to specialise in serving only one aspect 
as far as interests or rights are concerned. Importantly, this is not contrary to what was 
suggested earlier in relation to the first recommendation of this section, namely to bring 
all personal actions under the unfair prejudice ground, by having the unfair prejudice 
ground drafted widely. It must be noted that the system of minority shareholder 
protection will be introduced for the first time to SA and Dubai in this level of detail, so 
the system must be easy to comprehend, flexible, defined, detailed and, above all, 
844 [2007] All E.R. (D) 91. 
845 [2009] EWCA Civ 751. 
846 D, Cabrelli., Statutory derivative proceedings: the view from the Inner House, Edinburgh Law Review. 
2010, 14(1), pg:119. 
847 [2007] UKPC 26. (Commonwealth Country) 
848 P, Davies., Principles of Modern Company Law. 8th ed. Sweet & Maxwell. 2008, pg: 707. .. 
849 Lord Scott stated in Chime Corporation, Re in [2004] HKCF AR 546 (PC (UK)) that corporate rehef, If 
sought through S994, should only be allowed if it is clear that the directors are l~abl~, and ~f the order to 
be made is equal to an order which the company could have obtained t?r0ugh denvahv~ ac.tlOn. H.owever, 
it has been assumed by Hannigan (B, Hannigan., Drawing boundanes betw~en denvahve claIms and 
unfairly prejudice petitions, Journal of Business Law. 2009, 6, p~: 623.) tha~ thIS ~pproach put forward by 
Lord Scott is not workable because it is not an easy task to predIct the pOSSIble cIrcumstances of the case 
ifit has been brought instead under the derivative action's grounds. 
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practical. This contrasts with UK law which has had minon'ty h h Id " s are 0 er protectIOn III 
place and in operation for over 160 years Thus it is proposed as t' d l' h 
" , men lOne ear ler, t at 
the Saudi and Dubai statutes should include both unfair prejudice and derivative action, 
each of which would be designed to serve different interests and achieve different 
objectives. Accordingly, the requirements and criteria for each of these devices would 
be totally separate. It would not be efficient or practical to allow unfair prejudice to 
serve the aim of derivative actions or vice versa, as this may cause a puzzling overlap. 
Thus, it is suggested that the Saudi and Dubai statutes should never allow this overlap to 
occur as long as there is another existing device which delivers the same remedy. 
6.6 The need for statutory rights and interests: 
One of the major problems with Saudi and Dubai company law is that the law does not 
recognise and acknowledge statutory rights and interests for minority shareholders who 
require protection. It is strongly recommended that SA and Dubai specify a non-
exhaustive list of rights and interests for minority shareholders, and then design statutory 
actions that allow those shareholders to protect these rights and interests. It is noted that 
UK law does not state specific rights or interests for the minority shareholder in the 
statute but, at the same time, it is thought that it would be more appropriate and 
convenient for the Saudi and Dubai commercial market and business environment to 
have a certain number of listed rights and interests for minority shareholders which the 
law would be capable of protecting.85o The innovation of listing shareholder rights and 
interests in SA and Dubai statutes, as mentioned earlier, stems from the introduction of 
the new system of minority shareholder protection. This system carries new concepts, 
doctrines, grounds etc which will require greater detail and specification to enable 
people to understand and access them more easily. If the statute catalogues the rights 
and interests to which minority shareholders are entitled, it will provide them with a 
better sense of what can be protected so that they know precisely what to expect. 
To draw up such a list, this section will refer back to the participants in the empirical 
study to see what they had to say in answer to the question, What rights and interests do 
850 s172 of the UK Companies Act 2006. Also see Chapter 4, Section 4.3.l.(e).1t i~ thought that.UK law 
can still offer certain criteria and standards as a model for directors in SA and Dubal to comply wIth when 
running a company, such as the fact that the UK Company Law.2006 (sl :2) requires. t~e director to 
promote the success of the company through having regard for certam factors m every deCISIon. 
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you think should be reserved in the statute for minority shareholders and protected by 
h I ?851 P " t e aw. artlclpants proposed many rights and interests, but only those considered 
most appropriate and efficient are mentioned here. In fact, these recommendations 
concerning rights and interests are amongst the most valuable outcomes of this research. 
The rights and interests which should be included in any future reform in SA and Dubai 
are: 
1. The right to specify certain matters in the statute that cannot be passed unless by 
way of unanimous resolutions, so that the majority shareholder cannot have the 
ultimate say on all matters. 852 
2. A clear right to represent the company (when litigating on behalf of the 
company), subject to court permission, without the need to obtain permission 
from the majority shareholder. 
3. The right to have a transparent exit system where the shareholder would be given 
a fair price for hislher shares. The statute here should provide a mechanism to 
produce a fair valuation of shares by consulting the court or a specialist 
professional. 
4. The right to attend all meetings and participate in all decision-making if the 
minority shareholder understood that this would be the case when setting up the 
company. 
5. A clear right of access to information, documents and financial reports. For this, 
the statute should provide a mechanism that forces the majority shareholder to 
provide any information regarding the company to the minority shareholder on 
request. The statute here should also provide a remedy, such as seeking a court 
order, for the minority shareholder if the majority shareholder does not 
cooperate. 
It is believed that if these minimum rights and interests are reserved and protected in 
Saudi and Dubai company statutes, there will be a significant improvement in the 
protection of minority shareholders offered by each of these jurisdictions. It should be 
851 See Chapter 4, Section 4.3.3.1, where full analysis of the participants' proposals of interests and rights 
have been stated. 
852 It is important to note here that one of the few advantages of the Saudi Company. Law 1965. in 
protecting minority shareholders is the requirement of the law to have unanimous resolutIons. regard1~g 
certain specific matters. However, participants recommended specifying even more matters whIch reqUIre 
this. 
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emphasised once again that this list of rights and interests is a non-exhaustive list since 
some room should be left for the court to develop and recognise other rights and 
interests which are not specified in the statute for the minority shareholder, but which 
may also need protection. For example, the shareholders may agree to include extra 
rights or interests in the shareholder agreement, which the court would also have to 
recognise. The court may also develop new ones in case law (if case law becomes a 
source of guidance in both jurisdictions) which would thereby become protected just 
like the statutory ones. However, it is thought that these rights and interests listed above 
are the most important for the minority shareholder that any effective law should 
protect. Once SA and Dubai company laws give recognition to such rights, they will 
also have to provide actions to allow the minority shareholder to defend them. 
6.7 Alternative remedies: 
Alternative remedies are other options which protect the minority shareholder alongside 
the statute. This is not to say that there are remedies which can replace the benefit of the 
statute, but rather that they should work together with the statute to deliver the most 
effective protection possible to the minority shareholder. It is strongly felt that it is the 
statute which should be the provider of primary protection, with any other source 
playing only a secondary role. Therefore, the alternative options, namely arbitration, and 
the provision of benefits in both the company's internal code and in a shareholder 
agreement, may only support the statute to achieve its target of providing effective 
protection. Their role would revolve around building an environment that protects the 
minority shareholder from every direction as each one of these alternatives has a small 
role to play, but one which may contribute, overall, to the protection of minority 
shareholders. These alternative remedies are detailed below. 
Firstly, it is interesting to note that going to arbitration was recommended by the 
Company Law Review (CLR) to improve the protection of minority shareholders under 
UK law, but was never adopted. 853 The CLR did not recommend that arbitration should 
be compulsory for shareholders' disputes, but it did consider whether there might be 
scope to encourage its greater use as an alternative to litigation. However, within the 
853 See Company Law Review, Developing the Framework (2000), paras 7.44-7.69; and Company Law 
Review, Completing the Structure (2000), para 2.28. 
221 
commercial environment of SA and Dubai, it would seem that arbitration in minority 
shareholder cases would work efficiently if adopted. This is clear since the empirical 
study, which was conducted in SA and discussed in Chapter 4, showed that there is 
great public demand for arbitration as an alternative way of solving disputes between 
shareholders.854 Interviewees tended to prefer arbitration over court hearings due to the 
fact that it offers speed, lower costs and professional judgment. Thus, any future reform 
of company law in the two jurisdictions should promote, activate and give space for 
arbitration to play an effective role. For example, arbitration could be activated if the 
statute had a provision that directs disputes to arbitration in the first instance. 
Secondly, the shareholder agreement can be seen as another option that could also 
provide effective protection to the minority shareholder alongside the statute. However, 
the empirical study demonstrated that only a very small number of participants believed 
that the shareholder agreement would be sufficiently reliable as the only source of 
protection for minority shareholders.855 Although it is true to say that a shareholder 
agreement can protect minority shareholders, they are only protected by it up to a certain 
extent. Shareholder agreements are never well-detailed and cannot cover all possible 
eventualities because, like all contracts, they are always incomplete.856 It has to be 
understood that the statute is the essential ground for determining the obligations, rights, 
interests and powers of each party. The shareholder agreement cannot function instead 
of the statute or replace it; otherwise these rights and interests would be subject to 
inclusion in, or exclusion from, the shareholder agreement. In other words, the inclusion 
or exclusion of rights and interests would be subject to what the majority shareholder 
dictates. The fact that needs to be established here is that the shareholder agreement 
should only act as an extension of the statute which functions along the lines of its 
prOVISIOns. 
Again, the shareholder agreement in SA and Dubai cannot replace, or have a greater role 
than, the statute, but instead the two should work together to protect the interests and 
rights of minority shareholders. This is not to say that the shareholder agreement has no 
854 See Chapter 4, Section 4.3.3.2, as interviewees suggested the activation of arbitration in order to 
establish a healthy commercial environment. 
855 See Chapter 4, Section 4.3.2.3. 
856 See Chapter 2, Section 2.2.1, where an argument has been made to prov~ that the shareholder 
agreement cannot be the sole provider of such protection, because all contracts are Incomplete. 
222 
important role to play in protecting the minority shareholder Th' I b C 
. IS ro e can e seen, lor 
example, if the shareholder agreement includes a clause Whl' h k " cor c rna es prOVISIOn l~ 
arbitration in any dispute occurring between the shareholders, to prevent it going to 
litigation. In these cases the court should enforce the shareholder agreement, compelling 
the shareholders to go to arbitration and not to the court first. However, the arbitrators 
cannot pass fair judgment unless the statute provides clear rights and interests for the 
minority shareholder together with effective protection. The problem is that, because the 
statutes in SA and Dubai do not protect minority shareholders efficiently, arbitration 
may mean a speedy resolution at a lower cost, but does not provide fair judgment as it is 
a reflection of the weak protection in the statute. Another example of the role which the 
shareholder agreement may play is to state specific rights and interests for the minority 
shareholder that the statute has not stated. As mentioned previously, the statute cannot 
provide an exhaustive list of all interests and rights, so there is always space for the 
shareholder agreement to include more. Therefore, any future reform in SA and Dubai 
company law should also give the shareholder agreement a role to play in protecting 
minority shareholders. 
Thirdly, the company's internal code should work alongside the statute. In fact, the 
empirical study demonstrated that the company's internal code on its own is inadequate 
in protecting the minority shareholder if the protection does not emanate essentially 
from the statute. If there is no statutory protection, then the company's internal code will 
be heavily influenced by, and weighted in favour of, the majority shareholder, who can 
include or exclude clauses according to what benefits himlher the most. Nonetheless, 
participants in the empirical study suggested a way to use the internal code for 
protection; that is, by producing an ideal model of an internal code, for all companies to 
follow, which guarantees minimum protection for minority shareholders.857The internal 
code may include detail on the rights and interests of the minority shareholder, how 
decisions should be taken in practice, what procedure the minority shareholder must 
follow when complaining internally against misconduct, and how the minority 
shareholder can bring the case to the court if a wrong has been committed against either 
the company or against himlher personally. The role of the company's internal code role 
857 See Chapter 3, Section 3.4.3.3.2. This suggestion was made b.y certain ~articipants who believed that 
an efficient internal code can provide effective alternative remedIes alongsIde the statute and can help to 
create a healthy commercial environment. 
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will be slightly different to the statute in this respect as l't w'll 'd d'l d 1 proV1 e more eta1 an 
specification of how procedures are followed (especially internally). 
In sum, it is important to understand that, to improve minority shareholder protection as 
a whole in SA and Dubai, many aspects of company law should work effectively 
together. It is true to say that changing only the statute may protect minority 
shareholders to a certain extent. However, the mechanisms discussed above can still 
contribute to improvement of this protection. In other words, the company law statute is 
one aspect of protection and, while it may be the most important one, there are still other 
factors that can also make a positive contribution to the reform, such as the shareholder 
agreement, arbitration and the company's internal code. 
6.8 Recommendations regarding the reform of Dubai Company Law: 
All of the above recommendations and proposals are suitable for reforming company 
law in both SA and Dubai since their company laws are similar and this would suggest 
that their deficiencies and inadequacies are also similar. Although, in general, Dubai 
company law is a few steps ahead of Saudi Arabian law,858 the status of minority 
shareholder protection in Dubai is more or less the same as that in SA as there is no 
specific section or separate package of provisions in its companies' statute that provides 
protection for the minority shareholder in private companies.859 It is believed that even 
the recently proposed Bill for Dubai company law will only address superficial or 
external issues and neglect fundamental matters when it comes to minority shareholder 
protection in private companies. The proposed Bill does not give substantial 
consideration to many of the deficiencies and weaknesses which are seen to exist in the 
present commercial environment in Dubai. For example, the following questions remain 
unanswered:860 What are the interests and rights of the minority shareholder that should 
be protected in private companies? On what grounds may the minority shareholder 
litigate? Who bears the cost of litigation (indemnity)? What type of remedies can be 
sought? How can we distinguish between shareholders' personal interests and corporate 
interests? 
858 See Chapter 3, Section 3.5.1. 
859 See Chapter 3, Section 3.5.2. 
860 See Chapter 3, Section 3.5.4. 
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On the other hand, some claim861 that, if a certain limited number of proposals were 
adopted in Dubai, the minority shareholder would have the minimum level of protection. 
These proposals are firstly, to enforce a specific remedy for conduct amounting to 
excessive prejudice; secondly, to allow minority shareholders a clear right to access 
corporate information on demand; and, thirdly, to provide a device that enables the 
minority shareholder to challenge illegal or ultra vires acts. Nonetheless, I still believe 
that even if these proposals or similar ones are adopted by Dubai company law, they will 
not be enough to provide efficient protection. It should be understood that Dubai 
company law, like Saudi law, requires comprehensive reform to all of its provisions 
related to minority shareholder protection. This is to avoid short-term and deficient 
solutions which can only fill gaps temporarily and do not tackle the actual root of the 
problem once and for all. If the problems of minority shareholder protection in Dubai 
are not addressed fully and systematically, there will be always the possibility of these 
problems recurring. Thus, the best option to enable Dubai company law to provide 
efficient protection for minority shareholders is to follow and adopt what has also been 
recommended for Saudi law. 
6.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has identified the problems which affect Saudi and Dubai law as far as 
minority shareholders are concerned and has discussed how these jurisdictions can learn 
from the UK experience in protecting minority shareholders. To do this, the chapter has 
shown how the lack of codification can be addressed by examining the UK statute and 
selecting which of its features should be adopted. 
This chapter also sought to provide a balance by suggesting a means to satisfy judges by 
not restricting them only to the statute, but also allowing them to develop other grounds 
if justice so requires. In addition, the need for SA and Dubai to adopt personal grounds 
that provide for personal actions has been discussed, but it was also highlighted that 
many adaptations are required to make these reforms workable in the two jurisdictions. 
861 G, Watts., The Shareholder's Legal Toolkit: Minority Shareholder Rights under UAE Law, Al Tamimi 
& Company (19 April 2010), pg: 8. Available at: . 
<http://ww..;.thefreelibrary.comlThe+Shareholdet.102 7 s+ Legal+ Too lkit+ M ino.rity+Shareho Ider+ Rlghts+u 
nder+UAE ... -a0224273778> accessed 10 May 2010. Also see Chapter 3, SectIon 3.6.4. 
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To address this issue, the chapter has recommended a (non-exhaustive) list of rights and 
interests which should be included in any future statute. 
The chapter also considered certain alternative remedies that may support the statute in 
providing efficient protection. However, it has been stressed that these alternative 
options will only assist the statute, and cannot replace it. The chapter concluded by 
offering recommendations to Dubai company law in particular since, because the status 
of minority shareholder protection in Dubai is more or less equal to its status in SA, 
Dubai law needs to follow and adopt the advice which has been offered throughout this 
research to SA 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the empirical study suggested that there is general 
awareness among the public in SA of the shortcomings in company law, especially 
surrounding the fact that the majority shareholders are awarded so much power, while 
no effective protection is available to minority shareholders. This suggests that there will 
be a positive reception to any new statutory reform, especially from those who suffer the 
most from the law's inadequacies. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
a. Summary 
There has long been a need for the Gulf States to develop and improve their company 
law, not only to meet domestic demands to do business, but also to keep up with 
international trends to attract foreign investments. This is particularly relevant in 
relation to the protection of minority shareholders in private companies in Saudi Arabia 
and Dubai, a subject that has not been studied in detail prior to this research. 
The study has only taken two Gulf States jurisdictions as examples. The jurisdictions, 
namely SA and Dubai, were chosen because they have expressed an intention to reform 
their laws in order to diversify their oil-reliant economies by opening up their 
commercial sectors. They understand that this target cannot be met unless they create 
regulations, and reform certain existing ones, to facilitate the influx of foreign 
investments. 
In fact, both regions are rated as being the best places in the Arab world for conducting 
business, and Saudi Arabia, in particular, ranks amongst the top twenty countries in the 
world in this respect. 862 It might be assumed that Saudi Arabia and Dubai are considered 
two of the best areas in the world for doing business because they have comprehensive, 
practical and convenient company law systems which protect all parties' rights and 
interests. This belief, however, does not reflect what is actually taking place in practice 
when it comes to minority shareholder protection and the problem which exists, 
specifically, is that the law grants the majority shareholder unrestricted power within the 
company, while failing to recognise rights and interests for the minority shareholder 
which should be protected. 
This research has sought to answer numerous critical questions. Do existing minority 
shareholders in Saudi Arabia and Dubai suffer any type of abuse of power or oppression 
from controlling majority shareholders? Does the statutory law, or do the courts, furnish 
862 See chapter 1, section 1.1. 
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any legal mechanisms to remedy any wrongdoing or unfairness which occurs? Is UK 
company law, with its extensive commercial experience and knowledge, able to provide 
a way forward for the reform of both SA and Dubai' s laws? The main aim of the 
research was therefore to propose and recommend a practical system of minority 
shareholder protection that would provide an efficient, healthy and practical commercial 
environment, able to offer effective protection for the minority shareholder in both 
locations. 
The introductory chapter of this thesis dealt with the agendas, objectives and 
methodologies of the research. The second discussed minority shareholder protection in 
general and addressed the question of why there is a necessity to protect the minority 
shareholder. Chapter three examined the situation in Saudi Arabia and Dubai in terms of 
what the law says about minority shareholder protection, then chapter four offered 
detailed analysis of an empirical study that was carried out in SA to reflect how 
minority shareholder protection truly works in the marketplace. Chapter five of the 
thesis discussed the UK context and how its laws and processes playa role in protecting 
minority shareholders. The reason for exploring UK law in this research was because it 
is thought that jurisdictions like SA and Dubai can learn from its long experience of 
addressing minority shareholder protection, which has made it a leading model in this 
respect. Chapter six examined the possibility of SA and Dubai borrowing and adopting 
certain devices from those workable and practical remedies which exist under UK law, 
to employ in any future reform. Finally, this chapter seeks to draw conclusions and 
makes comments relevant to any future study that is needed. 
It was necessary to begin this research with an examination of the theoretical and 
philosophical justifications behind the need to protect the minority shareholder. It is 
important for anyone who intends to gather information about minority shareholder 
protection to obtain a clear picture of how the minority shareholder is generally treated 
by the majority shareholder and how the minority shareholder may suffer if no effective 
safeguards are in place. This is because, once the voting procedure is applied, corporate 
democracy will award the majority shareholder ultimate power over the affairs of the 
company. However, what is worrying is that majority shareholders may simply view the 
company as a mere extension of their own interests. This can even go further, to the 
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point where the majority shareholder either expropriates company property, which will 
harm the minority shareholders' interests and rights, or seeks to oppress the minority. 
There are a number of ways in which majority shareholders can take advantage of their 
position in order to serve their own individual interests but, unfortunately, not all of 
these ways are acknowledged by all jurisdictions. One example is oppression of the 
minority. This type of misconduct, in particular, has been recognised and defined by 
certain jurisdictions and denied by others. The result which may occur if no redress is 
provided when such misconduct occurs within the company, is that the majority 
shareholder may escape liability, and thus prospective shareholders may be very 
reluctant to invest because no safeguard exists to protect their investments in the 
company. 
Some jurisdictions (like SA and Dubai) still insist on having no comprehensive system 
of minority shareholder protection, in the belief that this will protect companies against 
a single vexatious shareholder who might waste the company's money if allowed to 
litigate on its behalf. Another reason is a desire to ensure courts do not get overwhelmed 
by a high volume of actions. Furthermore, it is said that, as long as the majority 
shareholders invest more, and thereby have more power, then their rights and interests 
should be always prioritised and favoured over those of the minority shareholders. 
However, this research has argued that the benefits which are gained from having an 
effective system of minority shareholder protection far outweigh any of the 
disadvantages which have been cited. For example, the presence of an effective system 
of protection can help to provide the degree of confidence which is necessary for the 
proper functioning of a market economy.863 In fact, it has been proven that the more 
effectively the minority shareholder is protected, the more investments are made, and 
the more the economy grows. Moreover, it is also suggested that the principles of justice 
and fairness demand the minority shareholder to have protection since minority 
shareholders are vulnerable. 
863 See Chapter 2, Section 2.2.1. 
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The law and the quality of its enforcement are potentially important determinants of 
which rights and interests each shareholder will have and how well these rights and 
interests are protected. However, to guarantee these rights and interests for minority 
shareholders and ensure that they are protected, there must be an external body which 
has the capacity to fulfil such a role on request - namely, the court. Nonetheless, some 
have doubted the court's capability to resolve these types of cases. This is to say that the 
courts may not be the best judge, from a commercial point of view, when it comes to 
matters related to the company's affairs. However, this research has presented evidence 
that courts have indeed shown understanding of minority cases. Meanwhile, it has been 
argued that the court cannot offer assistance to the minority shareholder if the statute 
does not allow it to do so. For this reason, the law should first recognise the rights and 
interests of the minority shareholder, and then provide a mechanism for the court to 
ensure the protection of these rights and interests. 
It is believed that the best way to offer effective protection for minority shareholders is 
through corporate governance mechanisms, which do not just provide protection for the 
minority shareholder, but also offer a comprehensive system of benefits for everyone 
who deals with the company. This system will not only serve the minority shareholder 
but also the court, as it will be clear for the court which remedies can be applied in each 
case. If the statute does not make explicit provision to this effect, the court may not find 
itself freely empowered to bring justice. Therefore, there should always be several 
grounds, besides fraud, on which the minority shareholder might rely. Otherwise, many 
cases of misconduct and wrongs may escape liability and it is possible that it will be the 
company itself that is harmed. 
The main reform which this research has sought to offer relates to the position of 
minority shareholder protection in Saudi Arabia and Dubai. It has thus been essential to 
highlight the shortcomings of the current legal position, as far as minority shareholders 
are concerned, in these two countries in order to understand exactly what needs to 
undergo reform. First of all, it has been found that the law in SA is accused of creating 
overlaps which have caused inconsistency and uncertainty when it comes to minority 
shareholder protection. Some argue that this deficiency in Saudi company law may 
emanate from the contradictory interaction between modem legal institutions and 
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traditional Islamic applications.864 However, this research has found that this is not the 
case because Sharia does not contain detailed enforcement mechanisms which would be 
able to detennine "when" and "how" to implement specific actions or remedies when a 
dispute occurs within a company. Therefore, this deficiency in protecting minority 
shareholders in private companies cannot be attributable to Sharia, as its role is to 
provide general principles, not specific detail, when it comes to company law.865 Rather, 
it is the statute that is to blame for not giving much more detail and not providing 
remedial mechanisms. 
When it comes to Dubai, this research has acknowledged that, in general, its company 
law is more detailed, modem, and practical than Saudi company law. However, Dubai 
law is not completely free of deficiencies when it comes to minority shareholder 
protection. Both jurisdictions have recently produced Bills which attempt to reform and 
improve the function of the existing company law. Unfortunately, however, the Bills in 
both countries fail to address many of the deficiencies and weaknesses which have been 
identified throughout this research, and many questions remain unanswered. For 
example, what are the grounds on which the minority shareholder may litigate? What 
remedies can be sought? Which of the interests and rights of the minority shareholder 
should be protected? As long as these matters and others are not dealt with efficiently, it 
is still very hard to advise minority shareholders as to what their rights are, how they 
can exercise them, and whether they should be able to pursue a successful case. 
The most umque aspect of this research is the empirical study which set out to 
investigate the area of minority shareholder protection in greater depth in order to 
diagnose where exactly the problems lie in SA so that appropriate and workable reforms 
could be offered. After approval was granted from the University of Leeds, the 
empirical study, for which the method of face-to-face interviews was adopted, took 
place in October-December 2009. Candidates, for example, judges, lawyers, 
businesspeople (sole traders), and minority and majority shareholders, were carefully 
864 F, Almajid., A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the Corporate Goven:ance of Saudi .Publicly 
Held Companies: A Comparative and Analytical Study from a Legal Perspective. Ph.D TheSIS. 2008. 
University of Manchester: UK. pg: 140. . . ' . 
865 Although Sharia seems to only provide general pnncIples ~hen It comes to company la~ and Its 
functions, it provides full details and complete guidelines when It comes, for example, to famIly law or 
inheritance. 
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chosen and included.
866 
After analysing the data and l·nC'.ormatl'on 
jJ collected by this 
empirical study, I was able to identify the factors which have caused the Saudi minority 
protection system to be deficient. The study found that firstly th C'.·1 f th 
' ,e lal ure 0 e statute 
to provide clear guidance with respect to minority cases confuses people, including 
those who work with the law on a daily basis. Secondly, it was said that neither the 
shareholder agreement nor the company's internal code can overtake or replace the need 
for statutory provision which protects the minority shareholder. Thirdly, it was shown 
that the concept of litigating on behalf of the company to protect its rights and interests 
is not understood by a large number of people. Fourthly, it was concluded that judges 
may not be in favour of codifying all remedies and reliefs for minority shareholders in 
the statute. This may be because judges tend to have unfettered discretion and do not 
wish to be restricted by the statute. 
This research chose to study the UK model as far as minority protection is concerned 
because it has been through successful development and improvement in protecting 
minority shareholders. The model is one which both Saudi Arabia and Dubai can be 
expected to obtain guidance from, given its experience in dealing with minority 
shareholder protection in an effective way. It is important to say that some of the 
deficiencies and uncertainties which used to exist under the old UK law were somewhat 
similar to those which apply now under SA and Dubai company law. Therefore, it 
would be very useful for these two jurisdictions to understand how the development of 
UK law has addressed these particular problems. It is true to say that minority 
shareholder protection has been in existence under UK law for over 160 years as part of 
common law. However, under common law the minority shareholder was faced with 
problems which prevented himlher from claiming for a wrong committed against the 
company. This difficulty was acknowledged by the Law Commission and the Company 
Law Review when the problems were analysed, and some possible solutions were 
offered. Consequently, the UK Companies Act 2006 was introduced to replace the old 
law with new, modem, flexible criteria with which a minority shareholder could pursue 
an action. However, there are matters which remain unreformed in the Act. For 
866 The empirical study did not survey the position of Saudi public compan,ies becaus,e (as mention,ed in 
this thesis many times) the shareholder in a public company has more remedIes an~ re~Iefs made avaII~ble 
to him than the minority shareholder in a private company, Furthermore, the ~mo~ty shareholder ~n a 
public company always has the exit option, which is not applicable to the, mmonty shareholder In a 
private company, As a consequence, interviewees were made aware that thIS research concerned only 
private companies, 
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instance, it is thought that the Act should have added the right to bt" "d " o am an m emmty 
order once the minority shareholder is granted pennissl"on to c t" d"" onlnue a envahve 
action, regardless of the final result of the case" Also, the Act should have abolished the 
requirement for clean hands before being able to bring a derivative action, since the 
issue for the court is doing justice for the company and not judging the minority 
shareholder. In addition, the Act has not changed anything regarding the position of 
unfair prejudice, but rather it has transferred s459 of the Companies Act 1985 exactly as 
it was to s994 of the new 2006 Act. This means that the Act has not addressed the 
deficiencies which were identified in relation to the fonner section. 
b. The reform and outcome which this research has offered to SA and 
Dubai: 
After having diagnosed where the problems lie regarding minority shareholder 
protection in SA and Dubai, and also after studying the merits of UK law as a model to 
learn from, this research has sought to prescribe proposals for reform of the law relating 
to minority shareholder protection in both jurisdictions. As identified early on, the main 
problems in both countries emanate from the lack of statutory grounds which can enable 
the minority shareholder to pursue every instance of wrongdoing. Indeed, minority 
shareholders in SA and Dubai do face certain types of misconduct from majority 
shareholders, but there is no codified statutory system to protect minority shareholders 
against each and every one of these types of misconduct. It is thought that the best way 
to solve this deficiency is to codify minority rights and remedies. This codification of 
minority shareholder protection in both SA and Dubai should follow the UK statute, but 
not in every respect. The code should allow judges to be unrestricted, as judges in the 
two jurisdictions do not normally tend to be limited to the statute. This may allow the 
courts to develop and create other grounds that are not specified in the statute but, 
nevertheless, would be required by justice. 
SA and Dubai statutes should also give consideration to personal grounds and actions, 
in order to allow the minority shareholder to protect their own rights and interests in the 
company. However, in order to make this workable in SA and Dubai, and also to obtain 
maximum benefit, there are some modifications that should first be made to UK law in 
this respect. 
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Firstly, the unfair prejudice ground provides the same remedies and achieves similar 
results to those available under the personal action of common law, and the proposed 
version of unfair prejudice to be adopted for SA and Dubai should cover these interests 
and rights too. Secondly, it is believed that Saudi and Dubai laws should not apply the 
same harsh restrictions as UK law, which requires that the conduct complained of must 
be both unfair and prejudicial. In reality, the law should enable the conduct that can be 
complained about to be unfair without being prejudicial or prejudicial without being 
unfair, and the court should be left to exercise its discretion in deciding whether or not 
the claim is legitimate and valid. Thirdly, the Saudi and Dubai system should create 
speedy and economically attractive exit routes which would allow the minority 
shareholder to leave the company with a price for hislher shares that is undiscounted. 
Fourthly, it is suggested that the winding-up remedy can safely operate under an unfair 
prejudice ground if there is a requirement that the court's leave needs to be obtained. 
Fifthly, any version of legitimate expectation that is applied should exclude the term 
'good faith' or any other imprecise terms.867 The sixth adaptation relates to the possible 
use of unfair prejudice in UK law to remedy a corporate wrong. It is believed that SA 
and Dubai cannot follow this UK practice because there will be a high possibility of 
creating confusion and complexity. 
It is believed that one of the major problems with Saudi and Dubai company law is that 
the law does not recognise and acknowledge statutory rights and interests for minority 
shareholders who require protection. This research has recommended a non-exhaustive 
list of rights and interests for minority shareholders that should be included in any future 
reform: 
1. Specifying certain matters in the statute that cannot be passed unless through 
unanimous resolutions. 
2. The right to litigate on behalf of the company when needed. 
3. The right to have a transparent exit system with the payment of a fair price. 
4. The right to attend all meetings and participate in all decision-making. 
5. A clear right of access to information, documents and financial reports. 
867 See Chapter 5, Section 5.1.2.8.c. 
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It is also believed that concentrating only on statut . . ory prOVISIons for mmonty 
shareholder protection may not produce efficiency as th . ere are some alternatlve 
remedies which may also have a positive part to play in protecting minority 
shareholders. These alternative options -namely, arbitration, the company's internal 
code and the shareholder agreement - may assist in achieving the most effective 
protection so SA and Dubai should consider them in any future reform to ensure that 
minority shareholders are as well-protected as possible. 
c. Recommendations and comments 
It would seem that this research is the first to deal with minority shareholder protection 
in SA and Dubai. Surprisingly, no Law Commission or other public body in either SA 
or Dubai has devoted itself to reviewing how well minority shareholder protection in 
private companies works in practice. However, having completed this investigation, it is 
obvious that company law in both jurisdictions is deficient when it comes to minority 
shareholder protection, from its failure to recognize the rights and interests of minority 
shareholders to the lack of remedies for them to use when necessary. The study has 
attempted to contribute to the field and build a foundation which can offer clear 
guidelines to those researchers who might investigate the subject further. In other 
words, allowing for the fact that this subject matter has so far very rarely been 
discussed, it is hoped that this work can serve as a reference point for any future studies. 
It is strongly believed that any jurisdiction which intends to reform its minority 
shareholder protection system should follow in the footsteps of the Anglo-Saxon model. 
This is because the adoption of such a model would be an important means of ensuring 
high standards of corporate governance, effective protection and enhanced investor 
confidence and it may be appropriate even when a jurisdiction does not share the 
culture, tradition or system in which it operates. This thesis has emphasised that Anglo-
Saxon countries confer on minority shareholders in private companies stronger 
protection than many other countries. However, it is important to note that it should 
always be possible for any jurisdiction to amend and adapt the Anglo-Saxon model in 
order to make it suitable for its own commercial environment. It is also believed that the 
minority shareholder protection in SA and Dubai cannot only be subject to general 
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principles or commercial conventions any longer and it has now become a necessity to 
codify remedies and relief for minority shareholders in the statute. 
If the UK model which has been discussed and adapted in this research is adopted by 
SA and Dubai, then minority shareholder protection will be introduced in detail for the 
first time. This means that the system introduced must be easy to comprehend, flexible, 
clear and well defined, thus helping to avoid any misconception or misinterpretation. 
Therefore, it is suggested that the law in SA and Dubai should be unambiguous and not 
overly strict when it comes to the requirements to be fulfilled in order to bring 
proceedings. However, control over who should monitor these types of cases, to ensure 
that the company's interest is always prioritized, should be in the judges' hands. It is 
believed that this, and not a law providing harsh criteria or difficult requirements to be 
met, is what would produce efficiency and justice in SA and Dubai. 
Finally, it should be noted that, after conducting the empirical study in SA and having 
had the opportunity to interview candidates, I gained the impression that there would be 
a strong, positive reception from the public for any future attempt by the law-makers in 
SA to reform the current position of minority shareholder protection in private 
companies, as almost all of them realise that this is an area which needs urgent reform. 
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Appendix 
Empirical Study Questions 
General detail 
• Participant's name: 
• Date of interview: 1 12009 
• ~~~gory: ( ) businessperson Jkc I ~.J () minority shareholder ~ ~~ 
. I ~ 
( ) majority shareholder 4..;j3SYI ~ 4~ ( ) foreign investor ~ 
( ) regulator tfo 
( ) lawyer -r'k....a 
( ) academic staff ~.,)\Si 
...•....••..••. <.S...fol 
• The interview questions: 
The problem: 
( ) judge ~\.i 
( ) officer t..r'~ ul;Y' 
( ) other 
1. Do minority shareholders actually face abuse, fraud, infringement, negligence or 
breach from the majority in SA and UAE? If so, what sorts of wrongdoings are 
you aware of? 
Do you at the outset see that there is a need, under certain circumstances, for the 
minority to act on behalf of the company and protect it from the majority's 
abuse or wrongdoing? Why? 
~ A..!..,i:J Jl.u\J Ji ~ Jl t.;~ Jt tl~ Jl.J.ak.J1 ~ ~~ -4-1.J:! ~YI ~ 4y!JI ~ JA 
~I wy~1 JlAc.1 ~Lo !~.,) J 4..;.,)~1 ~ ~WI w\Sy!JI ~ 4..;foYI ~ 4y!J1 ~ 
~ ~ ~'JI 4u . .!il , uJ~1 ~ ~ , [YhJ ~UA 04 -Sy JA !.J~';ll I~ ~ 4l~ 
!ljWJ !~I~J JI4J ~~l ~~ 0'" ~y!JI ~w 4..;j3SYI ~ -S.jC.,) ~.JJ <l.Sy!J1 
2. According to S28 of the Saudi Company Law, "The minority has the right to 
complain to the majority over any wrongdoing and it is then for the majority to 
decide whether to ratify or not". 
What is your view of this section? Does it cause any problems in real business 
life? 
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3, Wh,at hypothe~is or theo~" do you think, the company law has adopted as the 
~~,~~sto~ ~an~ll~g t~~ ~aJ~ont.?' the ultimate power over the company? And why? 
~I ~ ~ xl F.;ill o~WI '-i.)~1 ulS~1 U~\.! 4-:!k UJ -:11 .<;11 I ~ .1~:11 ' 
Y I~W -J YA.5. yhll .)c. ~\Sl I ~ . i..F'" o..J->&' .J 01..;...>'"""" ~ '.A 
4. D,o you thi~ that the lack o~minority protection causes any problem? Why? 
YI.)W-J ~LA Y~ ~li:i ~ ~~I ~lS~ ~'-"'.:....,! ~ljiJI-J u~~1 ~ u4 ~ JA 
5. Does this lack of minority protection have any impact upon the general economy 
and the local and foreign investments? Y~ ~I-J ~I .J~'1I-J rWI .)~'11 ~ ~~I ~lS~ ~~ u~\.! .} ~I y); Uf. 
6, Do you think that it is possible for a minority shareholder to seek an 
undiscounted payout, once the minority shareholder is not happy with the way 
the company is being run? 
LA.)jc J.)\.c. ~ ~ J.".-:JI ~I ~ JA ' ulSy:;JI ~b t51)1~) ~ ~ La ~\ ~ 
YA.5.y!JI 0-0 ~.J~I ~ ~.J ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~I ~~ ~..>:! 
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7. ~at.guide or criteria do you follow when dealing with minority cases since 
I :e ~~ a .. n absence o~ common !aw and accordingly no case law? ' 
.J .. ~ lY.\~~.J;! ~ ~~ lJc. y~\ 0a t..,.ll\ \~ ~ ~~\ ,ljc. ~\ ~I.;.ll I ta..J\ ~ Y~~ 0a o~~)'\.J 4-:!l\ ~~)'\ ~1£Al ~ o.)jiA ~~ . .J...>::1 ~ 
Current remedies available: 
1. What practical remedies are available for the minority to seek if there is a 
wrongdoing or abuse done to the company? 
u~\ -yjJS'l\ 4l~ ~ ~~ ~I.J y~\ 0a tl~'l\ o~ ~ o.)ji.JI ~~Ull J..,hll ~~ 
YA.Sytl\ r\~l ~ 
2. In reality, what role does the court play in cases where minority shareholders 
allege oppression? Does the court strictly stick to the Act or does it interfere 
when it is necessary to bring justice? To what extent do courts get involved? 
Elaborate? ~'l\ ~ ~t:il\ 0~Ul\ ~ ~h.JI JA Yt9\)\~) ~ y~\ o~.) ~h.JI .J.JJ y\~ 
!~\ ~ !~.iil\ \~ 0~ t..G~ 'il ~\.J !~\.la.ll ~ o.J.Jy.AlI ,ljc. ~iiJ rl o~l~ 
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3. To what degree does the shareholder agreement protect the minority 
shareholder? What happens if the agreement contradicts the statutory power 
granted for the majority and grants instead the minority more rights? If the 
shareholder agreement was the only source to provide protection for the 
minority, do you think that this is adequate? What about including rights and 
interests, in a statutory form? 
~ ~ I~} ~~\j ~)I ufi.:. --¥ !~'il 4ly!J ~~ ~tsy!JI ~ ~ u1lfi.- 4.).) ~I ~I 
~ ~yAill rJ .).JAi ~ ~ y!JI ~ ~ ~.) ~ ~) r~1 t'" u:a.)lA:i:i ~)IJ \j;':" "' ts y!JI 
';II , ~.Jb. ~'il ~tsy:;J ~ ut ~ ~I 0*)1 ~I JA ~tsy!JI ~ uts I~J !(~ 'il 0.0 
~ ·1 JLa:h ';I ~m .. --.:- II o~ ..l:a.bJ t..Js. 4...lk .)t...uc. ';II .. . 'i JA' ~ ts· ~II ~ . L .li:i..j 
.. U ,J'-'~ .... . ~u ..JA~ ~...>'"'"" u. 
!.yl!~ Wb ~~ 4J}i r~1 ~ L5.foJ1 o~ Wjts uJ La!, I.A~I fi~ 1Jc 
4. According to S28, "If the conduct or act has been completed, then the minority 
has no right to complain to the majority to assess or review the con?uct". 
What do you think that the minority should do after the completIon of some 
wrongdoing? • . ~ ~ '-it ~ ~fjlc 'II ~ , ~ '-i'iJI ~ts~ ufi.:. " utsy!JI u~\j 0.0 28 o.)WI CY"' ~ 
I~ ~.) ~tsy:;JI ~ 'i j..,?-:! , ~y:;J~ ~ ~ t- ~.;.lIJ yl~1ll t...1o .wI ~J .~w 
"J-JI .]I.)}J ~Ijlc 'II ." ." ~. . ~_.\ -:~. >.11 ~ :,ts I~I t.-~ ~WI.la.J Ja! ,el ~ I~ya.;! ul ~'il ~tsy!J ~ ~ 
'(''is'"'J "U..J-""'"'"' .) ...... ., ":I' 
Your recommendations and proposals: 
1. What rights and interests, do you think, should be reserved in the statute for 
minority and protected by the law? . ".1 ~ -;\1 ~ ·\.ill _ll -.\1., ~..,w\ ~L. tJ~ JiS:il u~\.ill ~ 4.J; ~ J ~ ~ ufo u .... -r .. .>J C"'----
!G~I utSy!JI ~ ~tSy!JI l.;-a u4l!'i1 ~~JI.A 
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2. DhO Yt ou thldink that extra remedies should be available under the statute? If so 
w a wou you suggest? . , 
Y~~T\ r-\5.~ ~ w\5.y::JI 0..,it! ~ o..,»9jj ~ 0 i ~ ..;jjl~.);J ~-' j..o r\..l:ull -,I C)bJ\ y\lA 
3. ~at. could create a healthy protective environment that accommodates the 
mmonty shareholders' needs? 
Yw\5. y::JI ~ ~\71 ~~ w4~1 yc ~ 4.:u4-:i 'Y~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
4. Would any of the following UK remedies work, if adopted, in SA and Dubai: 
:
41 2;P ~ I~l ~:J.JI A..;:J~I ~ ~ 01 ~ .yl\.:ill ";.J\.c~1 -' wlr-Iy,..)l1 j..o..;1 ~ 
a. Personal action: related to infringement of personal rights . 
• 412' oi ,tl\ J.."bJI ~ \.j~~ A.il..:i.o :.y,(2; 1~1 ci .. J'.&.J 
h. Derivative action: a device for a minority to exercise if the company's interest 
is harmed. 
\.jJC:JlI 01\ ~ .~ 4.Sy::JI J..,h ~ ..;~ ~ ~ ~I ..;-,\.c~ ~ :~I 1S~.ll1 
4.Sy::JI ~ 'Yfo\71 ~ 4.lc )4W ";.JC:JlI t!.J.J 4.Sy!il1 ~l rl~l ~ ~:J.J\ ~y!il\ ~ 
.4.1 rl~J r-~ Iyt! 0.ljjl 
c. Unfair prejudice petition: specifically designed to deal with any act by the 
company that harms the shareholder's interests . 
. 4.Sy::JI ~ ~y::JI ~ ~ ..;.lUlI y~ W..:i.o :.;y4l1 ci$-J 
d. Winding up order, it is for minority shareholders to seek, when it is just and 
equitable to do so. .. 
J:J\.c vuLJ :J flo.J ..l.i.c 4.S y::JI ~ r- \5. y!'JI ~ ..; 1 ~ ->:! ~I ";.JC ~I ..r'.J : ~I IS.J&- J 
.~jj t.J~.J 
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